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- ART. I.—1. *Seventeenth Report of the Postmaster-General on the Post Office.* Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London. 1871.
2. *Previous Reports of the Postmaster-General.*
3. *An Act [33 & 34 Vict., chap. 79] for the Further Regulation of Duties of Postage, and for Other Purposes Relating to the Post Office.* London. 1870.
4. *An Act [34 & 35 Vict., chap. 30] for the Further Regulation of the Duties on Postage.* London. 1871.
5. *British Postal Guide, Containing the Chief Public Regulations of the Post Office, with Other Information.* Published Quarterly by Command of the Postmaster-General. No. 63. London, 1st January, 1872.
6. *Report on the Post Office.* 1854. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London. 1854.
7. *Telegraphs. Report by Mr. Scudamore on the Re-Organisation of the Telegraph System of the United Kingdom.* Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty. London. 1871.
8. *Telegraphs: Return to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated July 12th, 1871, for Copy "of any Reports which have been received by the Chancellor of the Exchequer respecting the Financial Results of the Transfer of the Telegraphs to the Government."* Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed July 24th, 1871.

THE Post Office Department of the United Kingdom has grown to be a public servant on so large a scale, and exercising so many and various functions, that the history of its

expansions, improvements, innovations, and backslidings (if these last can be shown to exist), is a very fruitful source of information on the national welfare and prosperity. Almost every one in this kingdom is more or less nearly affected by the perfection or the reverse with which the functions of this Protean public servant are performed; and probably there are but few who are not acquainted with the catalogue of businesses transacted by the Post Office, beyond the mere transmission of letters. But it is likely that comparatively few are acquainted with the history of this "general servant's" gradual growth and development, and it may be interesting, before discussing the present aspect of the relations between the public and the Post Office, to glance in some summary fashion at the leading events in the history of the national carrier, &c., so far as those events are accessible.

Thanks to the excellent reports of the Postmaster-General, published annually since the year 1855, those who will may be in possession, not only of each succeeding year's events and improvements, but also of a great deal of matter more strictly historical, which, before the publication of these reports, was comparatively inaccessible. Without specifying sources of information, we will at once proceed to our historical survey.

Even this practical institution—perhaps, the *most* practical and variously employed of public institutions—may be said to have its romantic and suggestive side; for, like the primitive Aryan race from which the civilised nations of the world take a common derivation, its origin is wrapped in much obscurity. In the earliest times that we can trace, letters on public service, equally with private missives, depended for conveyance solely on special messengers. More recently, the task of conveyance was performed by the common carriers, who, about the time of the Wars of the Roses, began their regular transits from place to place. Slow as they must have been, travelling their entire journey without change of horses, they were for a long time the best conveyance the public had; and it was not till a couple of hundred years after the Wars of the Roses that organised Government Posts (relays of mounted messengers) were established. As early as the reign of Edward II., private speculators kept horses for hire, in order that messengers might "travel post;" and it is said that in 1481, during the war with Scotland, Edward IV. "established a system of relays of horses (probably from York to Edinburgh), the post stations being twenty miles apart, so that despatches were

conveyed two hundred miles in three days." In 1548 we find the Act 2 & 3 Edward VI. c. 3 fixing at a penny a mile the charge for post horses impressed for the Government service; and there is evidence that, even before that time, the horses kept by private speculators for "travelling post" were used in private affairs as well as on public business.

The ordinary correspondence of the public in the reign of Elizabeth was probably conducted by such means as individuals could procure, as there is no evidence of any permanent organised system of conveyance for general use, although there were certainly posts* in existence, organised for the transmission of public despatches. The first Letter Post established by the Government, for other than Government purposes, was organised in the reign of James I. It seems that foreign merchants in London had established a Post Office for themselves as early as 1514, for the conveyance of letters from London to the out-ports; but in 1568, a quarrel among these merchants, as to the appointment of a Postmaster, was referred to the Government, and a petition was got up by English merchants, representing that the alien Post acted unfairly towards them; and it is probable that this affair was the cause of the Government setting on foot the Post for the benefit of English merchants, which is referred to in a proclamation of Charles I. This Post, however, was for foreign letters only. Special messengers still carried the Government correspondence, and, presumably, that of private individuals; and it was not until the next reign that this small beginning was expanded into a regular establishment for the conveyance of inland letters.

In 1635, Charles I. issued a proclamation, commanding "his Postmaster of England for foreign parts to settle a running post or two, to run night and day between Edinburgh and London, to go thither and come back again in six days, and to take with them all such letters as shall be directed to any post town in or near that road." Under this proclamation, bye-posts were to be connected with several places on the main line, "to bring in and carry out the letters from and to Lincoln, Hull," and other towns. Similar posts to Chester and Holyhead, Exeter and Plymouth, were to be established, and it was promised that the plan should be developed in the direction of Oxford and Bristol, Col-

* Camden mentions one Thomas Randolph as the Chief Postmaster of England in 1581. The first horse-posts in Ireland were established in Elizabeth's reign, for the transmission of military news during O'Neil's wars.

chester and Norwich, as soon as possible. The rates of postage fixed in this proclamation were pretty heavy, considering the value of money in those times as compared with its present value. The scale was—

"	For a letter to be carried any distance under 80 miles	2d.
"	" between 80 and 140 "	4d.
"	" any longer distance in England	6d.
"	" to any place in Scotland	8d."

In 1637, a second proclamation virtually established the most important feature of the new organisation,—namely, the Government monopoly; for it laid down that, to any places whither the Government posts went, letters should not be carried by any other messengers or foot-posts, except "common known carriers, or messengers particularly sent on purpose, or persons carrying a letter for a friend." However much the Government may have desired to accommodate the public in creating this new institution, a powerful inducement doubtless suggested itself in the shape of a very profitable monopoly; and it may be considered that the institution was fairly established when it was placed under the superintendence of the principal Secretary of State, after the disgrace of its first chief, Mr. Postmaster Witherings, who was superseded in 1640 on account of alleged abuses. Within two years of this event, the new Government monopoly, naturally regarded as an encroachment on the rights of the people, became the subject of inquiry for a Committee of the House of Commons, and the matter was afterwards discussed in Parliament; but, no less naturally, the usefulness of the institution was found sufficient to justify its maintenance.

In 1644 the chairman of the above-named Committee, Edmund Prideaux (subsequently Attorney-General to the Commonwealth), received the appointment of Chief Postmaster. By him was established a weekly conveyance of letters to all parts of the United Kingdom, which, according to Blackstone, "saved the public a charge of £7,000 a-year in maintaining postmasters." Five years later, a feeble attempt to infringe the monopoly was made by the Common Council of London, by which body a rival post was set on foot. This the House of Commons soon put down; and the Government has retained the monopoly ever since. The amount of the year's revenues derived from the posts at this period (1649) was £5,000 only; but the troublous times which ensued seem to have favoured Post Office development, for in so short

a time as fifteen years the revenue had increased to £21,000!

Important alterations were made during the Commonwealth, and confirmed in the reign of Charles II. In the ordinance of the Commonwealth, under which these changes were made, a reason for establishing posts was adduced,—namely, that they would be “the best means to discover and prevent many dangerous and wicked designs against the Commonwealth;” but this motive does not seem to have prevented the Government under the restored Stuart dynasty from confirming the improvements, for the substance of the ordinance is re-enacted in the Statute 12 Car. II. c. 35, which Act has been called the Post Office Charter, as being the first strictly legal authority for the establishment of the Post Office.

The establishment of internal posts in Scotland cannot be referred to an earlier period than the latter half of the seventeenth century, during which period several internal posts were set going on the most important lines of road. It is true that the proclamation of 1635 provided for the conveyance of letters from London to Edinburgh; but it did not provide for posts from place to place in Scotland, and it was not until 1695 that an Act of the Scotch Parliament provided for a general Scotch Letter Post.

In the meantime, the undertaking of Robert Murray, who set up a penny post for the delivery of letters and small parcels in and near London, had undergone its trial, and had attracted the attention of the Government. This post, established in 1683, was assigned by Murray to William Dockwra, who conducted it so successfully that the profitable nature of the concern seems to have induced the Government to take forcible possession of it, on the ground of its being an infringement of the rights of the Crown. Dockwra, however, received a pension of £200 a-year, on account of his loss, and was also made Controller of the London District Post, which existed, up to so late a time as 1854, as a separate department of the Post Office. Since 1663 the profits of the Post Office had largely increased; for in 1685, after the incorporation of Dockwra's penny post, the revenue was estimated at £65,000 a-year. Between this time and 1710 we hear of nothing more important than an attempt to establish a halfpenny post to compete with the Government post, made by one Povey in 1708, and put down by the arm of the law.

The Statute 9 Anne, c. 10, passed in 1710, was of very

considerable importance. By it the Act 12 Car. II. and the Scottish Parliament's Act of 1695 were repealed, and the law of the Post Office was placed on a new footing, which held its own till 1837. This Act provided for the establishment of a General Post Office for England, Scotland, Ireland, and the British Colonies, under one head, to be styled "Her Majesty's Postmaster-General," who was to keep a "Chief Letter Office" in the metropolis of each of the three kingdoms, as well as one in New York and one in the West Indies.

About this time the Cross Posts appear to have become a subject of careful observation to one Ralph Allen, to whom their organisation seemed very imperfect and susceptible of improvement. It was natural that the benefits of an institution so young had not yet spread themselves to a great extent in many districts; and Allen, noticing that some districts were almost without postal accommodation, while letters were carried in a very roundabout manner between other places, conceived that the Cross Post system might be enlarged and remodelled, so as to increase the revenues of the Post Office, and add much to the advantages of the public. In 1720, the Government farmed the Cross Posts to him at a rental of £6,000 a-year; and the effect of his improvements was, that he realised an annual profit of £12,000 and upwards. As his arrangement with the Government was for life, he enjoyed the profits of his own keenness undisturbed. He lived to enjoy them for forty-four years; and we must not omit to mention that this man, public benefactor as he was in his postal career, carried out the same character in private life, devoting his handsome income chiefly to charitable works and to the entertainment of men of genius and learning. When he died (1764), this profitable branch of the service was conducted by a salaried officer, who received £300 a-year, handing over to the Government the whole of the profits, amounting in his time to £20,000 per annum.

Although the dimensions of the legitimate Post Office business which was done by the Department at this time were almost insignificant as compared with the dimensions another hundred years increased it to, and that quite apart from the various extraneous branches of business now carried on by the Post Office,—although the Secretary's staff in 1763 was less than a twentieth part of the Secretary's staff in 1863, and although the Packet Service then represented an expense of but £10,000 a-year instead of the large sum it

now represents,—there was yet work enough performed to render the Post Office a very considerable institution. Indeed it was producing a revenue of nearly £150,000. The Packet Service, now so immensely enlarged, was then performed by some fifteen boats.

It seems probable that the privilege of sending and receiving letters gratuitously enjoyed by members of both Houses of Parliament up to the period in question and later, had been in existence ever since the Post Office was established, or at all events from the time when the Long Parliament adopted it. The privileged persons merely had to write their names on the covers of the letters, in order to secure their free transmission; and the privilege was much abused in many ways, so much so that in 1784 it was found necessary to make considerable restrictions. An insufficient attempt at restriction had been made in 1763, and a further action in this direction was taken in 1795; but it was not till the Penny Post of 1840 came in force that the privilege was abolished.

But the year 1784 was important in Post Office annals on other grounds beside that of the step towards this reform. It was in that year that an Act of the Irish Parliament was passed, which had the effect of separating the Irish Post Office from that of the sister kingdoms, an arrangement which remained in force for nearly sixty years. In the same year the plan of Mr. John Palmer for accelerating the conveyance of the mails was introduced; and as this plan had effects of the utmost importance in regard to public convenience, as well as being productive of largely increased revenue, we must not omit to give an adequate account of it.

Up to the year 1783 mails had been carried by mounted post-boys, at an average rate of three or four miles an hour (including stoppages). Mr. Palmer, who was the manager of the theatre at Bath, had observed that some of his fellow-citizens were in the habit of sending by the coach, at a much larger expense than that incurred in sending by the post, any letter of particular importance, which they might specially desire to get delivered safely and punctually; and he conceived the idea of sending the mail-bags, on all possible occasions, by the passenger coaches, in the care of guards at once trustworthy and well-armed. In proposing his plan to Mr. Pitt, he commented as follows on the existing state of things:—

“The Post, at present, instead of being the swiftest, is almost the slowest, conveyance in the country; and though, from the great

improvement in our roads, other carriers have proportionably mended their speed, the post is as slow as ever. It is likewise very unsafe, as the frequent robberies of it testify; and to avoid a loss of this nature, people generally cut bank bills or bills at sight in two, and send the bills by different posts. The mails are generally trusted to some idle boy, without character, mounted on a worn-out hack, and who, so far from being able to defend himself or escape from a robber, is much more likely to be in league with him."

Besides the suggestion for remedying this state of things, Mr. Palmer made other suggestions affecting the despatch and arrival of mails. Up to that time the mails had been sent off from London at all hours of the night, and had arrived there in a haphazard sort of manner; but Mr. Palmer saw that they could be so arranged as to be despatched at hours convenient to the public, and to arrive from various parts simultaneously and be delivered at the same time.

Notwithstanding the natural opposition of the Post Office people to the whole scheme, it seemed good in the sight of Mr. Pitt, and was adopted under an Act of Parliament. As soon as the new system came into operation, the average speed of the mails rose to six miles an hour, a further acceleration taking place later on; while there was at once a large accession to the number of letters sent, although they were sent at a somewhat higher rate of postage than formerly. As a speculation, the affair was so successful that in 1792 the Government could not resist the temptation of breaking faith with the originator of the scheme, in order to divert from his pocket his own share of the profits. He had entered on the conduct of the new order of things as "Controller of the General Post Office," with a salary of £1,500 a-year, and under an agreement that he should also receive a share of 2½ per cent. of any amount in excess of £240,000 net annual revenue; but when his gains became too great to be tolerated, he was set aside, with an allowance of £3,000 a-year, though his duties had been unexceptionably performed. How badly he had been treated, we may best judge from the fact that, after much petitioning, Parliament saw fit to make him a grant of £50,000.

In 1792 the first rough sketch of the present extensive money-order system came into being: it was at first carried on by Post Office clerks on their own account, and became a regular branch of the Post Office establishment only in 1838; but it was not till 1840 that it became of much importance. Before that, the commission was so large, and the cost of transmission so considerable, that people made but little use

of the system; but the penny postage cured the one evil, while the other fell away before the general inclination to make the department as serviceable to the public as possible.

In 1799 was originated the present ship-letter system, under which letters are sent to every part of the world whither private ships go, so as to supplement, in a very useful manner, the operations of the regular packet service. The origin of the ship-letter arrangements was an Act of Parliament empowering the Postmaster-General to send letters by any private ship whatever, at half the rates of postage payable on ordinary packet letters.

In 1814 the department had so immensely increased its needs with its increasing business, that the old Post Office in Lombard Street was found to be outgrown. To remedy this evil, the substantial and handsome building on the east side of St. Martin's-le-Grand was erected; but it was not opened for use till fifteen years later.

In 1818, and during subsequent years, an improvement from without enabled the Post Office greatly to accelerate the provincial mails. MacAdam, called by Scott the "*Colossus of Roads*," introduced his system of road-making; and it was not long before the improved roads led to an increase of some four miles an hour in the speed of the mails. Indeed, after a short time, the mail from London to Devonport (a distance of 216 miles) was carried in as short a time as twenty-one hours and a few minutes. In 1830 a far more important alteration was inaugurated: the railway from Liverpool to Manchester was opened, and was made use of for the conveyance of the mails.

Since the introduction of railways, everything in the shape of business has made enormous advances,—going, it would seem, at railway speed; and the Post Office, with which alone we are at present concerned, has certainly performed its part in the general rush of civilisation, and that with alacrity. Indeed, during what may be fitly called the *Railway Era*, postal improvements have been rapid and extensive. In 1835 the Indian mails were first conveyed direct through the Mediterranean and over the Isthmus of Suez; and this line of communication soon extended itself to China and to Australia. In 1836 a very large increase took place in the number of newspapers sent through the post. This arose from the reduction of the stamp duty on newspapers. In 1837 Sir Rowland (then Mr.) Hill brought forward his plan for a penny postage, which, after much discussion, was adopted in 1839, and carried out the following year. This

change made, in a sense, a postal revolution, increasing the number of chargeable letters from 76,000,000 in 1839 to nearly 169,000,000 in 1840! The history of penny postage is in itself subject enough for a considerable essay. Indeed it seems a pity that Sir Rowland Hill, who is so very well qualified to deal with the subject, has not given us a history of the penny post. Such a book the public would be glad enough to see.

With the introduction of penny postage, the history of the Post Office may be said to have commenced afresh. We may call the penny postage division of the history *modern*, and the antecedent division *ancient*. Of the modern history of this institution the first era may be considered as ending in 1854, when Lord Elcho, Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir Charles Trevelyan, and Mr. Hoffay, being commissioned to inquire into the establishment of the Post Office, presented a masterly report, making very large and important suggestions, which were substantially adopted. In the meantime, the legitimate business of the Department, as well as its one extraneous business of transmitting money orders, had been steadily increasing; and the Post Office had also undertaken to carry books, in addition to letters and newspapers.

We have already shown the immediate increase in Post Office business which was brought about by the penny postage system; and a few figures will suffice to show the steady increase effected in the first fourteen years of the system. The number of chargeable letters carried in the United Kingdom in 1854 was 443,000,000, or 274,000,000 in excess of the number carried during the first year of penny postage. The number of money orders issued in the United Kingdom in 1839 was 188,921 (representing a sum of £313,124 13s. 4d.). In 1840, the penny post system had already driven the number up to 587,797 (representing a sum of £960,975 10s. 3d.); and in 1854 the number had risen to 5,466,244 (representing a sum of £10,462,411 16s. 4d.). These few figures seem to us clearly enough to prove that the first modern era of the Post Office was a triumphantly successful one, whatever may have been the shortcomings of the establishment as such; and that the establishment was very far from being what was wanted, the Commissioners showed abundantly in their report of 1854.

Since the foundation of the establishment which was the outcome of that Commission, there have been, along with steadily maintained increase of the already existing business, a number of new undertakings, some successful, some not

very successful, which indicate that the putting of the establishment on the improved footing aimed at by the Commissioners served to bring into the service of the Department a good amount of high class talent and energy, or to stimulate what was already there but without sufficient inducement to activity. The principal of these undertakings are the Post Office Savings Bank system, established in 1861, the Government Insurance and Annuity system, established in 1865, and the acquisition of the telegraphs, transferred to the Post Office in 1870. Besides these larger things, the Post Office has taken upon itself the conveyance of samples and patterns, under an arrangement which it allowed to degenerate into a regular parcel post for all sorts of small goods, and has ultimately recalled this parcel post so far as inland transmission is concerned, leaving it in operation as regards transmission to colonies and foreign countries. Its machinery has also been made available for the sale of inland revenue licenses (a very extensive business); and under the Post Office Act, 1870, it began a new era,—the era of halfpenny postage.

The issue of halfpenny post-cards of a certain size, upon which communications of the nature of a letter may be freely circulated, the admission of circulars wholly or in great part printed, and of various other business documents, to the privileges of the Book Post, under the reduced scale of a halfpenny the two ounces, the conveyance of newspapers for a halfpenny each, irrespectively of weight, are matters which form virtually a halfpenny post within certain limitations, and which have certainly served to suggest to the public mind the possibility of a halfpenny instead of a penny post; and since the Act of 1870 was put in force, a further step in this direction has been made in the revised scale of letter postage, which was brought into use simultaneously with the final withdrawal of that great public boon the Inland Sample Post (or, as it really was, the Inland *Parcel* Post), concerning which we have seen so much disaffection expressed in the newspapers throughout the kingdom. This new scale is very peculiar. A letter weighing one ounce or under is to be prepaid a penny; a letter weighing between one and two ounces, three halfpence. The scale then proceeds by steps of a halfpenny for every additional two ounces up to twelve; and for any parcel over that weight, a postage of a penny for every ounce of the whole weight is charged. The objects of this arrangement are obvious. To preserve the initial penny in the scale of letter postage, *which pays so well*; to give persons

the opportunity of sending their little mementos and small consignments of various goods at a moderate rate (though not so cheaply as by the so-called Sample Post), and to put a prohibitory tariff on parcels that would seriously incommode the Office as at present constituted.

Now, any one who reads carefully the foregoing paragraph will at once see that the arrangements referred to are of an essentially tentative character—the same character as is observable, not only in much of the history of the Post Office of late years, but in a great deal of latter-day legislation. We are not concerned at present to develop the position that the Post Office is in a tentative period (as shown even by the frequent changes reported in the constitution of its establishment), much less do we care to go into the various well-known phases of tentative legislation; but, seeing that the existing composite penny and halfpenny postage is clearly not final, or even likely to remain as it is for many years, we cannot but discuss the present aspects of this the most important question connected with the Post Office, not even excepting the administration of the telegraphs, a matter of such magnitude that it cannot be fully dealt with in an article on the Post Office proper.

Before closing, we may have something to say about the various extraneous business, successful or otherwise, conducted by the Department; but primarily, we are concerned with the halfpenny post that is looming in the distance, and looming through a mist of curious anomalies.

We do not use the term "anomaly" to designate a thing necessarily objectionable *per se*, and, therefore, to be got rid of as soon as possible. On the contrary, the most notable feature of the penny postage itself, next to its cheapness, is the vast and convenient anomaly that it costs the Cornish miner no more and no less to communicate with his distant relatives in the Orkneys (if he have any) than it costs Miss Smith of Whitechapel to communicate with Miss Jones of Billingsgate, provided that both parties employ the Post Office as their medium of communication. There can be no doubt that this uniformity is the most desirable thing in the world in such a matter as a postal tariff, both for the sake of the corresponding public at large, and for the sake of those who are concerned in the distribution of correspondence; for any complex scale of postages according to distance must leave writers in more or less doubt what a letter to so and so would cost them, and thus, operating on average slothfulness, act as a deterrent to letter-writing; while such a scale

coupled with one of weight must be so hampering to those who manipulate letters and assess postage, as to render the present speedy manipulations altogether impracticable. *That* glorious anomaly, therefore, we shall never be so retrogressive as to do away with; and as the same anomaly has already been applied with success to telegraphic communication, we may well be very chary of looking with too critical an eye upon other anomalies.*

Having in view the various tariffs under which the revenues of the Post Office are collected for various services, and seeing that that Department, after meeting its own working expenses in full, pays into the Exchequer an annually increasing balance, we observe naturally enough that there are certain striking inequalities in the amount of service done to individuals for the same charges, and that, in many instances, a man gets a big service done for *less* than it costs another man to get a small service done, so that virtually one man pays for another man's advantage. Now it will not do to regard the Post Office as a mere business concern, whose customers are the public at large, and which has its "leading articles," and does not care about making a profit on every transaction so long as the whole business pays. The real fact is that, so long as there is a profit on the aggregate transactions of the Post Office at all, that Department is, to the extent of such profit, an organ of *taxation*; and as all taxation must arrange itself according to the preponderant feeling of the country, we have only to inquire, not whether the taxes of the Post Office are levied in a spirit of equality (for equal taxation is a chimera), but whether they are levied in accordance with the spirit of national sentiment and judgment.

The fiction of business and custom as applied to the Post Office and the public is so shallow and ridiculous that we should not have thought well to bring it forward for contradiction, but for the fact that we have seen and heard a great deal of argument of one sort and another based upon that view of things. The real fact is, that the People carries its own letters for its own benefit, and derives the sole advantage, not only from this operation, but from whatever profits accrue. The "plant" (to keep up the commercial figure of speech) belongs to the People, the representatives of

* By the bye, looking at the probability of the acquisition of the Railways by the State, what are we to say to the possibility of a uniform railway fare all over the kingdom? Why should it not be practicable on the same grounds that uniform rates for postal and telegraphic communication have proved practicable?

the People are the ultimate controllers and legislators on all important Post Office measures and the ultimate administrators of Post Office funds. If the Post Office wants money for any given purpose, it comes out of the taxpayers' pockets; if the Post Office makes money, as it does, to a pretty large extent, it goes back into the taxpayers' pockets;—or, which is the same thing, goes to reduce the needs for taxation. And thus, when any clamour is made for postal advantages to special classes of people, such clamour, one may be pretty sure, is traceable to restricted money-making views, or to want of regard for national feeling and advantage. In this manner, the Pattern Post seems to have owed its origin to a kind of trade jealousy. Tradesmen in general were jealous of the advantages afforded by the Post Office to persons connected with what may be called the literary trades. The tenth report of the Postmaster-General, in dealing with the origin of the Pattern Post, and its progress up to the year 1864, contains the following instructive paragraph:—

“It will be seen that the extensions of the Pattern Post have been effected gradually, and with caution. It has, indeed, been necessary so to proceed. The organisation of the Post Office is so vast, and the means which it possesses for rapid and constant communication, even with the most distant and the least populous parts of the kingdom, are so complete, that the public have a constantly growing motive for requesting that the distribution of other articles than letters may be added to the primary duties of the Department. And the Department also may be said to lie under a constantly increasing temptation to extend its operations, and to undertake, at the request of the public, new duties, for the performance of which it is fully qualified, but which no private organisation could so satisfactorily accomplish. There are, however, many serious obstacles to such extensions. There can be no doubt that the Book Post has entailed a very large increase of expense on the Post Office, and that it has made the primary duty of the Department—the duty of distributing letters—more difficult of performance than it might otherwise have been. By the establishment of the Book Post the gross weight of the mails, and the weight to be carried by each letter-carrier, have been increased, and by it the operations of sorting have been much complicated. It did not appear to me, however, that the objections which might have been raised in the first instance against the establishment of the Book Post would, when that Post had been fully established, tell with equal weight against the establishment of a Pattern Post. It appeared to me, that I might so regulate the Pattern Post as to guard against undue addition to the gross weight of the mails, or to the burdens of individual

letter-carriers, that the special arrangements which had been made for the sortation and examination of book packets, would, to a great extent, suffice for the sortation and examination of pattern packets, and that as the establishment of a Pattern Post would benefit not one trade only, but every trade throughout the country, the Post Office might with propriety enter on the experiment. I am happy to say, that hitherto the experiment has been entirely successful."

The chief instruction to be derived from this paragraph comes out by setting it alongside of two short paragraphs concerning a reduction of postage on patterns and samples in the last report of the Postmaster-General (that on the year 1870). At page 4, we read:—

"In making this reduction, which was in addition to one earlier in the same year, when the postage had been reduced from 2*d.* to 1*d.* for every four ounces, and the maximum weight from twenty-four to twelve ounces, the Department took the precaution of expressly insisting that the privileges of the sample post should, for the future, be strictly limited to *bona fide* patterns and samples. The transmission of other articles at the sample rate was never sanctioned.

"The public felt aggrieved at the restriction; and as the difficulty of defining samples in all cases could not be overcome, it was decided to reduce the inland letter postage to such an extent as would enable the public to send through the post in closed covers, not only patterns and samples, but also any light articles, for a moderate charge; thus abolishing altogether the distinction between letters and samples, and providing a cheap and convenient post for small parcels."

From these extracts we learn that the experiment of which the results looked so cheerful in 1864 changed its aspect altogether six years later; and, unlike its predecessor the Book Post experiment, began to look gloomy on the occasion of a reduction of postage. That "the public felt aggrieved" is a sort of admission of the fact that we are all well aware of; that, although the Post Office terminology never indicated a Parcel Post, the public had really taken one on their own account; and certainly, for some years, the Department did not inquire rigidly as to the *bona fides* of so-called "samples," sent as presents or as consignments, but let the people use freely the Parcel Post of the people's own making. We learn, also, that the Sample Post, created with the view that other trades should share the benefits given to the book trade by the Book Post, was not approved by the nation on such a footing, and had to be abolished when it came to a question whether commercial transactions were to be treated with greater favour than private transactions. The public

felt what the Post Office seems not to have recognised, that the Book Post does not exist in the commercial but in the educational interest, and affects the community much more largely than any Sample Post can do. The Sample Post became a distinct failure very shortly after it was attempted to put it on an equal footing with the Book Post. There was no sufficient ground for *taxing the letter writers* in general, to give benefits exclusively to tradesmen or merchants. The forwarding of commercial interests was too vague a sentiment for the occasion, and people would not see the difference between wholesale and retail trade,—between a merchant sending as a sample, preparatory to purchase of stock, goods that an individual could not buy and send, with any view whatever, at the same rate. In this people had right on their side. The distinctive Sample Post is a good riddance; but we must still add a few words concerning the taxation aspect of the remaining Posts. We observe that newspapers and books have for many years been carried at a far cheaper rate than letters have; and this observation brings us face to face with the fact that letter-writers have been taxed for the benefit of the readers and vendors of books and newspapers. This, we think, is as it should be, because the diffusion of printed literature is infinitely more important in its effects on the community at large than is the diffusion of written letters. Every man has, or should have, an interest in the distribution of knowledge and the development of sympathies effected by the cheap transmission of books and newspapers; and so strong an interest as to make him cheerfully submit to a tax that is so far from inconvenient as the infinitesimal tax on letter-writing. If it be asked why the Post Office revenue derived from its legitimate business should be devoted in part to performing this desirable service to the cause of education, the answer is, because, by the machinery of the Post Office, the tax on letter-writing can be more directly and advantageously applied for the public benefit, than if such tax were paid in full into the Exchequer, and went the way of all taxes.

That something like this has been the feeling of the country for a long time, the barely questioned co-existence of separate book, newspaper, and letter posts, for so many years, is proof enough; and we have not the slightest doubt that, as long as there was no possibility of sending a post letter for less than a penny, a penny would have been cheerfully paid in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand, if not more. The changes of October 1870, how-

ever, have introduced, along with still cheaper book and newspaper postage, an element which induces one to ask what would become of those facilities for the diffusion of knowledge and sympathy in the event of the profits on letter-writing being so far reduced as to preclude the possibility of carrying books and newspapers cheaply with them.

By using Government post-cards, people have, since October 1870, been able to send letters quite long enough for an infinity of purposes, all over the United Kingdom, for a halfpenny each, and have had all their stationery, thus consumed, provided by the Government without any additional charge. Beyond this, the admission of partly written circulars to the book-post halfpenny scale has opened the door to an immense amount of correspondence, business and private, being carried on at a halfpenny a letter instead of a penny. We are acquainted with business firms who have not only been at great pains to devise a variety of forms whereby to bring their communications within the definitions of what may go by "Book Post," but are also, they say, in the habit of receiving a great number of actual written letters, made up in halfpenny wrappers, and passed through the post undetected, presumably because the number of real circulars, &c., sent through the post, is so vast, as to make it quite impossible to detect *all* frauds. Thus there is getting to be a defined and developed hankering after halfpenny letter post.

The Postmaster-General's report for 1870 (the latest that has appeared) embraces only three months of the halfpenny post era; and we cannot fairly, from the figures given in that report, calculate the effect which the October (1870) changes may have had upon the revenue derived from letters. We observe that the net revenue, as stated in the table at page 33, was higher than in any previous year; but we can have no idea, even if we set the increase in comparison with the increase of former years, how much of it arose from the regular addition to the number of letters, and how much was attributable to post-cards, &c. From the table at page 14, however, it appears that the number of letters delivered in the United Kingdom in 1870 was 862,722,000, as compared with 831,914,000 delivered in 1869, while the number delivered in 1868 (see previous report, page 9) was 808,118,000; so that, while the increase in 1869 was about 2·94 per cent., that in 1870 was about 3·7 per cent. Thus it is evident that, as far as we can judge from the first three months of

the halfpenny *régime*, the transmission of penny letters suffered no diminution through the change.

The question, however, is not one which returns for even the whole period of the halfpenny *régime* would enable us to solve. It really is a question how long the average Briton, with his passion for economy and for having the most he can get for his money, will rest contented without a *real* halfpenny post, now that he has been indoctrinated into the belief that letters *can* be carried for a halfpenny. The likeliest ultimatum for the average British mind to arrive at in the matter seems to us to be this, that there is a twofold tariff for *letters*; those that are closed up entirely being chargeable according to the scale set forth at page 275, and those that are left open to inspection being chargeable at the lower rate applicable to books and printed matter. That a vast number of people have been and still are under the impression that they may send a letter for a halfpenny, provided they leave it open, each man's daily contact with the world at large may suffice to convince him; and many of our readers have doubtless seen, both recently and at the first start of halfpenny postage, certain printed letters from the Secretary of the Post Office to the effect that such and such documents, concerning which people have addressed him, are letters not entitled to go by Book Post, and have been rightly charged; and the fact that such a reply is kept ready printed by the Department, indicates that there must be a great number of letters sent prepaid only a halfpenny, and charged in consequence. The misconception under which persons act in these cases is not an unnatural one. They see that a letter may go for a halfpenny if written on a post-card, and that certain partially-printed letters and formal documents are allowed to go by the Book Post, and they suppose that if they provide their own stationery for a short open letter they will not be charged for not using the cards that a paternal Government provides for them *gratis*. That misconception will be a very difficult one to remove.

Again, the Act of 1870 does not define what a circular is; so that the Post Office has been burdened with the difficult task of discriminating, among the multiplicity of things popularly termed circulars, between those that are really such and those that are not. There seems to be no official definition of the word "*circular*" published earlier than that given in the *British Postal Guide* (No. 63) for January last; and there we are told that "a Book Packet" (that is, a

packet sent under certain conditions at the rate of a halfpenny for every two ounces) "may contain not only books, paper, or other substance in ordinary use for writing or printing, whether plain, or written, or printed upon (to the exclusion of any written letter or communication of the nature of a letter), but also *Circulars*, i.e., letters which appear from internal evidence to be intended for transmission in identical terms to several persons, and the whole or the greater part of which is printed, engraved, or lithographed."

Thus it may be seen that the Post Office, in examining any given document, wholly or partly written, for which halfpenny privileges are claimed, has to decide first whether it is a letter, or contains any communication of the nature of a letter. If not, it should seem, it may have the coveted halfpenny franchise without further question; but if it be found guilty of being a letter, it must then be tried according to the criterion of identical terms, applicable only to documents that *are* letters, but "the whole or the greater part of which is printed, engraved, or lithographed."

We have been at some pains to ascertain what documents are held to come within these conditions, and what are not; and we find that invoices, statements of accounts, lists of goods ordered, formal receipts for money, lists of empties returned, and an infinity of such things, may go by the halfpenny post, so long as they bear no extraneous communication of the nature of a letter; but if they bear any such communication, they must be prepaid a penny. In our judgment, however, all the documents enumerated above *must* convey communications "of the nature of a letter," though not necessarily in the form usually associated with the word "*letter*."

In the category of circulars in great part printed (as admitted to the halfpenny franchise) are "advice-notes" sent by wholesale tradesmen to their customers in various towns, stating when their travellers will call for orders, and having the days of call filled in in manuscript,—letters summoning board-meetings of all kinds, having the *agenda* of the meetings specified in manuscript,—summonses to attend landlords at such and such places to pay rents, times and places being specified in writing. These are samples of an immense variety of documents that are really circulars; but they are also samples of an almost equally large variety of documents that are very curiously affected by a strictly logical and honest application of the definition already quoted from the *Postal Guide* (see above); and the question of half-

penny or penny postage seems to depend frequently on very slight shades of difference.

Among the curious anomalies in this connection, we may note, for example, that an insurance policy may go by Book Post, while an insurance proposal form filled and signed in manuscript, and a notice for renewal of premium, printed all except the date for payment and the number of the policy, are penny letters. Again, of the forms used by registrars under the Compulsory Vaccination Act,—forms of which we all know the look so well,—the certificates of successful vaccination may go by Book Post, but notices to vaccinate, sent through the Post by registrars to parents of children, and having merely a date and a child's name written into a whole page of print, are letters, on account of the impossibility to assume that every one receiving the notice is to have the same child vaccinated. As a third and final instance, we may mention that the secretary of a charitable institution, wishing to send out as cheaply as possible his reminder-circulars to the supporters of the institution, sent a specimen to the Post Office, with the amount of subscription, £1 1s., stated in writing, and asked whether it might go by Book Post. He was told that it might; but, on afterwards sending out some more, filled up with amounts varying from 5s. to £1 1s., he was told that he had better for the future send them as letters, because, although it was natural to assume that a great many persons subscribed a guinea, it was not so natural to assume this with regard to 5s. or 10s. 6d.; and this, no doubt, is perfectly true, although, in point of fact, our secretarial friend was sending out a great number of the circulars filled in with each sum.

Now we have sought out and set in order these minute particulars,—whereof we have before us a vast store that it would be impossible to utilise except as a basis for some general deduction,—we have sought them out, not with the view of ridiculing the decisions of the Post Office, which we regard as being perfectly just under the criterion whereby it passes judgment on candidates for circularship and claimants to the halfpenny franchise. We do not even wish to dispute the propriety of the criterion itself for the time being; for we are aware how needful it must be to have some such criterion, and how it is impossible to have a partial benefit such as the present halfpenny post administered so as to affect every class of the community equally. We have given these examples for the purpose of showing how complex and intricate any such thing as a Circular Post must be; and

because we think that, like its tentative predecessor the Sample Post, it must either degenerate into something more general, or be merged in a different arrangement altogether, or do both things in succession.

Before going further we must point out that the halfpenny franchise is not an unmixed benefit for all documents to attain to, though it is to some. In the first place, the regulations affecting the stamping of book packets and circulars do not afford such good means for tracing delays (and thus *checking* them) as do the regulations as to stamping letters; and in the second place, postmasters are authorised to keep back books, circulars, and post-cards for one post, or one delivery, as the case may be, if, by attempting to dispose of them together with the letters, the letters themselves would suffer delay.

In these distinctions we have sufficient indications of the line in which those who are most competent to deal with such matters might proceed, if disposed to create a veritable double Post on the simple principle of first and second class, or, having regard to the system of registering letters already in force, on the principle of a first, second, and third class.

We can readily believe that, at the present moment, it would be difficult for the Post Office to find either accommodation or force for the requirements of such a third-class post as we should wish to propose for the consideration of the Government; but in due time accommodation and force may alike be brought up to any requirements; and we conceive the magnificent machinery of the Post Office is capable of development to meet the needs of a more efficient Parcel Post than the so-called Sample Post which it has been found necessary to abolish by Act of Parliament. Moreover, should the State acquire the Railways, as no doubt it ultimately will, the way to a Parcel Post on a large scale would be very considerably smoothed.

Our proposal would be simply this,—that, instead of circulars and the various other things extraneous to literature being sent by Book Post, the public should be allowed to send at a cheap rate (say a halfpenny the two ounces) in closed packets, like letters, all things whatsoever now carried under various rules and restrictions, and not excluding letters themselves; but with the clear understanding that these packets are liable to the disadvantages referred to above. Such an understanding would, we believe, be sufficient to maintain in its flourishing condition the present penny post,

for no doubt the majority of the letter-writing community would be fully sensible of the advantage of having their letters delivered at the earliest possible moment, and would only send by our proposed halfpenny post, beside miscellaneous articles, such letters as they might not regard with any degree of solicitude. There is, moreover, to be relied on, the sense of *respectability* in sending one's letters by the "bettermost" Post.

There is no reason why those very convenient things, the post-cards, should not still be a part of the postal scheme, coming in under the lowest charge of the third class post: only, we would rather see the Government making some slight charge beyond the postage charge for the cards themselves, and allowing people to have them manufactured according to their fancy (within limits as to size and weight), and thus doing away with the slight ground of complaint the stationers have had under the Act of 1870.* Neither do we see any reason why the penny-letter scale should not be restored to regularity by making it a uniform scale of a penny an ounce (or, if necessary, a penny for every half-ounce, as heretofore). Lastly, we would not disturb the liberal arrangements affecting newspapers, and we would have a still cheaper book-post for books and printed matter, so as to retain the educational advantages of the postal system in full.

Our idea of the Inland postal tariff which the people are now wanting, and might have without difficulty or disadvantage, after, perhaps, some little delay, takes, when tabulated, the shape shown hereunder; and we must premise that we understand by the word *letter* any parcel whatsoever within the prescribed limits of size and weight, made up in a closed cover, and that we also mean it to include (as far as the third class is concerned) post-cards as at present used.

PROPOSED POSTAL TARIFF.

LETTERS.

First Class.—For every letter to be sent off unconditionally by the first mail after being posted, delivered by first delivery after reaching the place of destination, and to be checked from hand to hand (or registered), 1d. per oz., and 4d. for registration.

Second Class.—For every letter to be sent off and delivered with like unconditional punctuality, but without registration, 1d. per oz.

* This has been done since the above was written.

Third Class.—For every letter posted on the understanding that it is to be sent off and delivered as soon as it is possible to send and deliver it without risk of detention to the letters of the first and second class, $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per 2 oz.

NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS, &c.

For every newspaper, $\frac{1}{4}$ d. for each transmission (as at present).

For every packet of books or printed matter other than newspapers, sent in a cover open at the ends (as at present required), $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per 4 oz.

Limits of size and weight to be according to the resources of the Department at the time of commencement, and gradually enlarged as the resources enlarge.

The advantages of such a scheme as this would be (1) the removal of all invidious distinctions as to what may and what may not be sent for a halfpenny; (2) extrication from the dilemma of allowing everything wrongly sent for a halfpenny to pass, or keeping a check on abuse at the cost of immense labour in examining halfpenny packets; (3) the creation of a really cheap and serviceable Parcel Post.

To issue stamps for the purposes of the halfpenny post, very dissimilar to those in use for the penny post, would be a simple and easy manner of distinguishing the two sorts of letters. Indeed, the only real difficulty lies in the grave question whether the creation of such a halfpenny post would render the penny post unprofitable. The disadvantage of possible detention already exists in regard to the post-cards and book-packets; but it would be necessary for the Post Office to make it far more generally understood by the public than it is at present; and the desirability or the reverse of the proposed innovation rests, in our judgment, solely on the question whether, under a full popular comprehension of the disadvantages in question, an undue number of the letters now sent by penny post would then be sent by halfpenny post. If they would, it yet remains a question whether, by adding to the liability to detention, the present well-understood condition of leaving open at the ends, the fear of curiosity would not be powerful enough to secure a sufficient remainder of profitable penny post. If this last condition were maintained, it need not be really for purposes of examination, but for the sake of a better defined distinction between penny and halfpenny post than mere difference of stamps and liability to detention would afford.

It might be argued that such a halfpenny post as we propose should be introduced to supersede the penny post altogether, if on close calculation it were found that the letters

would not then be carried at an actual loss ; and many persons are of opinion that the Post Office should not be a revenue-yielding department. For our part, we should be slow to advocate any measure which would deprive the Post Office of the power to make the liberal concessions it has for years made, in an increasing ratio, to the cause of education and enlightenment: we would have no postal scheme that would necessitate grants for expenditure exceeding in amount the revenues of the Post Office, because we should fear some natural opposition to making special grants for other than lucrative purposes ; whereas, as long as the Department is self-supporting, and more, its liberalities of operation will not be objected to. Moreover, in a department conducted by a huge family of Englishmen, all of whom have more or less of the British admiration for and pride in a "paying concern"—a department, too, wherein so much alacrity is required—it would be a pity to introduce the depressing sense of conducting business *at a loss* : such a sense would be a fiction, of course, but one that would be certain to prevail if the Post Office drew more out of the Treasury than it paid in.

Concerning the miscellaneous business of the Post Office we have not a great deal to say. It is made up, as we have already noticed, and as our readers are doubtless well aware, of the transmission of money orders, the maintenance of a grand national savings bank, the granting of life insurances and annuities with Government security, the issue of Inland Revenue licenses, and last, though not least, the transmission of telegraphic messages.

The table at page 14 of the last report, headed "General Progress of Business," shows a fair increase in the money order business ; and we are told at page 15 that the total number of money order offices at the close of 1870 was 4,090, or 29 more than the total number at the close of 1869. The scheme referred to in this report, and since carried into effect, of having a regular penny scale of money order commission, beginning with 1d. for sums under 10s. instead of with 3d. for sums not exceeding £2, and ending, as formerly, with 1s. for a sum of £10, is one that cannot but have added to the revenues of the Post Office, while affording a great convenience to the public, and superseding a great part of the necessity people have been under of sending small remittances in the form of postage stamps—to the strong temptation of letter carriers and sorters, whose experienced fingers can feel stamps in the manipulation of a letter—and

also to the frequent distress of individuals whose property falls a prey to this highly developed sensitiveness of dishonest postal fingers. One thing in connection with the Money Order Office we cannot but regret, as a retrograde step, wholly in keeping with other steps that we shall have to remark on presently: we mean the farming of the counter work to a gentleman who hires his own *employés* at his own terms—so that the work, being permanent Civil Service work, is done by men who are not Civil servants, but merely the hirelings of one particular Civil servant. A contemporary newspaper, the *Standard*, took occasion to comment severely on this state of things recently, in connection with a fraud committed by one of the men, or youths, in question; and while the *Standard* was, we believe, mistaken as to the fraud having been a direct result of the farming system, we cannot but agree in condemning any system that puts the permanent work of the State into hands not in the State's employ.

We are pleased to see that the Post Office Savings Bank continues to be a splendid success. Not only does the total number of depositors still go on increasing, but an analysis of the figures of 1870, as compared with those of 1869, shows an increase in the amount deposited more than proportionate to the increase in the number of depositors: so that, while the 1,085,785 depositors of 1869 had, at the end of that year, an average balance of £12 9s. 1½d. each due to them, the 1,183,153 depositors of 1870 had, at the end of that year, an average balance of £12 15s. 3d. each due to them.

It is a great thing that the national savings bank should have the confidence of the people so thoroughly, and be able to satisfy them so well as to terms: and we wish we could congratulate the Post Office on an equal success in the matter of insurances and annuities: the comparatively insignificant business done by the Post Office in this respect is no doubt attributable to the high price charged for the advantage of Government security. The State could doubtless secure a virtual monopoly of this class of business by offering the same terms as are offered by private speculators; and it seems a pity that so desirable an institution as this would be should not be carried out on the large scale of the Savings Bank system, and, if necessary, at a fair cost in compensations to those whose business would be acquired by the State. This would, of course, be a gigantic undertaking instead of a little one; but the acquisition of the telegraphs has, at all events, shown that the Post Office is equal to adopting new businesses on an enormous scale.

The matter of Inland Revenue Licenses calls for no remark beyond a *quere*, why the revenue they represent, collected by Post Office machinery, should not be finally carried to account as Post Office revenue, instead of being "received and brought to account in the books of the Department *preparatory to its transfer to the credit of the Board of Inland Revenue.*" Surely this transfer is a needless operation.

The subject of the Telegraphs is one which should not be treated except in a separate article; for it is a subject of vast importance, and of very great interest: we must not, however, omit to give, as briefly as possible, the result of the two Parliamentary papers on this subject named in the list that heads this article. On the first page of Mr. Scudamore's Report, of January 1871, we read as follows:—

"I shall be able to show that the Department is on the very eve of fulfilling all its promises to Parliament and the public, and that if its progress up to the present time has not appeared to keep pace with the expectations of the public, it has been at least as rapid as the circumstances in which we have been placed would permit. I shall be able, however, to show that, even in the first year of our operations, we shall very nearly obtain, if we do not actually obtain, the estimated gross annual revenue; that this gross annual revenue must inevitably grow larger from year to year; that though, in the first year of our operations, our estimates for cost of construction, reconstruction, and maintenance will, for reasons to be described, be exceeded, the normal proportion of expenditure to revenue will not hereafter differ from that given in previous estimates, and that the financial results of the completed scheme will not be less favourable than those which I have all along predicted for it."

In the financial statement made by Mr. Scudamore, under date the 3rd of June, 1871, we are told that "in the fourteen months ending on the 31st of March last, our telegraph revenue actually amounted to £798,580," although in a paper of Mr. Scudamore's, printed and distributed by Lord Hartington among the members of the Government, in 1869, it had been estimated that the telegraph revenue for the first year after the transfer would be £673,838 (or £786,144 in fourteen months).

"I cannot," continues Mr. Scudamore, "speak with the same precision as to our working expenses. . . . However, after going as closely into the matter as I can, I think I can state with safety that our true working expenses for the fourteen months to the 31st of March last did not exceed £470,000. If, on further examination, this sum should have to be altered, I think it will be reduced rather than

increased. If my view be correct, we earned a net revenue in the first fourteen months of our work, amounting to £328,000. Assuming the capital expenditure up to the present time to be £7,500,000, we are certainly earning a gross annual revenue upon it of 10 per cent., *i.e.*, £750,000; and it is equally certain that our working expenses are not more than 58 per cent. of our revenue. The net revenue, therefore, is much more than sufficient to cover the charge for capital. I cannot help adding that this result has been arrived at after an enormous increase in the facilities afforded to the public, and after a reduction of tariff, which, on the present number of messages, is equivalent to a reduction in the total paid by the senders and receivers of messages of £300,000 per annum."

It will be seen that one year's gross revenue, at the rate of £798,580 in fourteen months, will not yield nearly 10 per cent. on a capital of £7,500,000; and, as it is positively stated that 10 per cent. was already being earned on the capital by the beginning of June 1871, we may congratulate ourselves on a decided increase in the rate of telegraphic earnings having taken place between the 31st of March and the 3rd of June, 1871. Indeed, Mr. Scudamore does not fail to indicate some of the sources of this increase.

"We did not," he remarks, "begin to get any revenue from the Isle of Man Extension until August last. We did not begin to get anything from the Channel Islands Extension until December last. We did not begin to get anything from the new Irish lines until February last. We have not as yet got anything from six wires of the Beachy Head line, which have been useless until now, because the land lines erected by the French Government, in connection with the new cable of the Submarine Company, were damaged during the war. I may add here that the war generally checked telegraphic communication with the Continent, and tended to keep down our revenue."

The changes of October 1870 appear to have involved, as they necessarily must have done, a very large increase in the numbers of Post Office servants, especially of the London establishment; and those changes have thus enabled that department to test, on a very considerable scale,—though only in its superficial bearings—a question of some national importance—that of the efficiency of boys for the performance of much work of a kind heretofore done by men: the *expediency* of the State granting employment to boys is a question too large for such a test, and, in our judgment, a very dark question of State morality or the reverse.

In the Sixteenth Report of the Postmaster-General to the Lords of the Treasury, we read as follows:—

"In 1869 changes were introduced into the department which must eventually have a very important bearing upon the question of cost. Dating from a time when stealing a letter was a capital offence, a rule existed prohibiting anyone under the age of sixteen from taking part in any Post Office duties whatever. Without underrating the importance of debarring persons who had not arrived at years of discretion from having access to letters, I was at a loss to understand why, by the exclusion of all but men, a forced rate of remuneration should be kept up for easy and irresponsible duties; and, accordingly, with your Lordships' full approbation, I introduced several classes of boys at wages varying according to their age."

In the Seventeenth Report we learn that, of an increase of 750 in the numbers of the London establishment alone, "a great part consists of boys."

"These boys," says the Postmaster-General, "as your Lordships are aware, are mostly employed in the sorting of newspapers; and whatever apprehensions may have been entertained as to their fitness for the work, have been agreeably disappointed. The business has in no way suffered, the per centage of errors has not increased, and the mails have been despatched with the accustomed punctuality."

As far as it goes, this is a practical reply to the question of the *utility* of boys for much of the less important work in Government offices: the only thing that casts a slight air of factitiousness on the colouring of the picture is the paragraph which immediately follows that just quoted. We had fancied that there were black sheep in the Post Office, as well as in other large bodies of men, and that we had seen, from time to time, reports of letter-carriers, sorters, and clerks tried and convicted on various charges of dishonesty, drunkenness, and so on; but the following passage on the "conduct of the officers" is quite charming in its enthusiastic glow and the millennial picture of ideal morals it presents:—

"Of the conduct of the officers during the past year it is my duty, no less than it is a pleasure to me, to speak in the highest possible terms; and, in saying this, I wish it to be understood that I refer, not to individuals, or the members of any particular class or classes, but to all. All alike, those employed in the provincial as well as the metropolitan offices, seem to have been animated by a single object—that of helping to prove, each within his own sphere of duty, and to the extent of his ability, that, in undertaking the measures of the year, various and extensive as they were, the Post Office had not overrated its powers. It is this spirit of zealous co-operation which constitutes the chief strength of the Department, and gives it confidence in the face of difficulties."

The last sentence no doubt represents a fact; for without a preponderance of the "spirit of zealous co-operation," such an institution as the Post Office could not flourish as it does; but so sweeping an encomium on a body of men whom we all know to be "mixed," leads one to question whether the advantages of employing boys have not been looked at through the same rose-coloured spectacles as must have lent "enchantment to the view" summed up in our last extract.

Our first objection to this wholesale employment of boys in the Post Office, or other Revenue Departments of the Civil Service, is not a business one, though we strongly doubt whether, from a merely business point of view, the measure will prove a good one in the long run. Our main objection is on social grounds. That young boys, who ought not on any sound social principle to be bread-winners at all, should be with public consent turned into clerks, letter-carriers, and sorters, is simply lamentable. That many of the boys thus employed by the State would find other employment in default of this, may be admitted without detriment to our position; for, however that may be, there are unquestionably many parents and guardians who would seize an opportunity to get a boy into Government employ at a far earlier age than they would send him elsewhere to shift for himself. Thus the measure in question cannot but augment the evil we think so serious; and beside this, the mere fact that the State sanctions such employment of boys lends a ruinous support to the evil. Foreign scoffers may well mock at a country that compels education on the one hand, and on the other, from motives of short-sighted economy, entices parents and guardians rudely to cast off their children's bibs and tuckers in favour of high stools and quill-driving in the close confines of city offices!

On social grounds, therefore, we are extremely sorry to see this large element of puerility already introduced into the enormous establishment of the Post Office; but from a "Service" point of view we are not prepared to regard the movement with an atom more favour. Taken together with the movement under the present Government in the direction of employing largely what are called "registered writers," to do work heretofore done by established clerks, this employment of boys presents an enormous front of innovation on the principles of a Civil establishment, which has been based on foundations indicated and laid by minds of first-rate capacity to deal with such matters; and we are

sorry to find the system of hand-to-mouth engagement of State servants very rapidly on the increase.

When the Commissioners of 1853, to whom we have already made reference, sent in their report on the Establishment of the Post Office, they drew attention to the interest the Department possessed, "because, owing to its extent and the variety of work which it embraces, it furnishes in itself a series of examples of most of the difficulties which are experienced throughout the Civil Service, and an inquiry into it involves the necessity of considering nearly all those measures which have been separately suggested in the cases of other offices." In a similar sense, we are led to view this question of employing boys and writers, who are not established servants of the State, to do work heretofore entrusted to those who were established servants, not simply in its bearings on the Post Office, but in its general relation to the Civil Service. The Post Office affords in this connection an excellent example, because in its case there can surely be no question of cutting down redundant establishments, but merely one of substituting one class of labour for another. To cut down a really redundant establishment is an obviously right and needful step, provided it be not done with haste unfair to its actual members; but in altering the character of an indispensable establishment a very different and much more hazardous step is taken.

One of the most obvious objections to cutting off the lower sections of large staffs of clerks,—the sections employed in the performance of the more elementary drudgery,—and superseding those sections by means of officers who form no part of the establishment proper, and have no claim to rise or prospect of rising to the higher duties, is this. The officers doing the higher duties must naturally come into the service at a stage of the duties for which they have not had those means of qualification afforded in a year or two of the drudgery. To have gone through the lowest clerical work of an office is a most important step towards that full acquaintance with duties and just conception of the constitution of an office that every clerk should have, in order to become of the highest utility; and we are convinced that to have an establishment of men beginning too high up would be an evil only second to that already adverted to—of commencing in tender years; and the worst of it is that those who commence in tender years have no security whatever of continuing their service into maturity, and thus turning to such account as they may the evil of a too early "start in life."

This brings us face to face with the question,—What is an established Civil servant as distinguished from an unestablished one? An established servant is one whom the State takes into its employ for the whole term of his computed working life, on the sole condition of good and faithful behaviour, and on the understanding that when he is no longer fit for service he shall retire with an allowance from the State. An unestablished Civil servant is one whom the State employs professedly for the time being, without any understanding as to permanency of service, who may and in many cases does, wear himself out in the Service,—that is to say, work the whole natural working life of him in the pay of the State,—and then, having no claim whatever to a pension, *may* go away and starve, or go to the workhouse. The feeling of the public has long been, and, we believe, still is, so decidedly in favour of life engagements with its servants, and the opinions of high and competent judges have given such ample support to this feeling, that we have been led to examine the chief arguments adduced in favour of a permanent, as distinguished from a hand-to-mouth Civil Service, when the matter was so fully discussed not very many years ago.

The chief aspect of the movement we are deploring is its dead set against the general application of the superannuation system. The question of systematically granting pensions to all persons permanently employed in the Civil Service was elaborately inquired into by a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1856; and the inquiry was re-opened and continued at the end of the same year by a Royal Commission. In the first session of Parliament in 1859 the matter was debated at considerable length. A Bill, based upon the recommendations of the Select Committee and the Commissioners, and applying the principle of Civil Service pensions in the universal manner proposed, was passed, and this Act is still the law of the country. Competent opinions expressed throughout the agitation of the question bore so strongly in favour of the universal pension system, and, by consequence, so forcibly against the employment of Civil servants without the prospect of superannuation allowances, that when the measure had passed the Houses and received the Royal assent, it took, or seemed to take, the status of an act of final legislation, the arguments in favour of it being based chiefly upon veritable economic expediency rather than upon those principles of common humanity which were in some cases brought to the support of the cause.

The feeling in favour of the system in question has been growing in the land for the best part of a hundred years; and the true principle of superannuations was clearly laid down by a Committee appointed in 1786, who were of opinion that "an establishment ought in wisdom to be formed," which should entitle *every public officer* to "provision upon retirement, not dependent upon caprice or accident, or arising from the perpetuation of abuses, but known and certain, free from the competition of individuals, or the animadversion of the public." Now it is perfectly clear that, in the event of a man who is not technically a permanent Civil servant, but who has given up his health and strength to the service of the State, applying for a pension, he could not have it without liability to the "animadversion of the public," inasmuch as his claim is only moral, not legal; and it is a mere technical evasion to employ large bodies of men on public work of a permanent character, and, in virtue of the terms of agreement with them, deprive them of the title and advantages of permanent servants. No doubt mutual convenience will, in the large majority of such cases, lead to permanent work being done by permanent servants; and in this connection we are tempted to quote no less an authority than Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was the first witness examined before the Select Committee of 1856, and showed throughout that intimate knowledge of the history and bearings of the whole question implied in his position of Assistant-Secretary to the Treasury. He stated, *as the result of his experience*, that practically it was found necessary to give a superannuation when the servant had become old, and the efficiency of the Department required that he should retire. He affirmed, emphatically enough, that it was "absolutely necessary" to give those pensions, and that the public also could not allow good and faithful servants, worn out in the public service, to starve. We may add to this remark that, if in order to avoid the extreme alternative depicted by Sir Charles Trevelyan, the State decided to turn off the so-called temporary servants before they got worn out, but when they were still vigorous and only suffering from the minor disadvantage of crystallisation in a certain mode of life, the cruelty would *seem* less heinous, but would probably be in the aggregate more burdensome to society.

Before this same Committee, Mr. W. H. Stephenson, who had also, by virtue of his position in the Treasury, had peculiar opportunities for forming a judgment on this subject, affirmed that he had "always thought it the duty not less than the

interest of the State to provide for its worn-out servants," and that in his opinion "the remuneration of every civil servant ought to consist of a salary and a pension." Another important witness, Sir James Graham, who had introduced for Lord Grey's Government the Bill passed in 1834, held that "persons unfit for the performance of their duties should be enabled to retire upon adequate pensions, so as to make way for persons younger than themselves, who would receive an advance of salary and perform the active duties;" he went so far as to say he "thought so strongly that that was the case, that he should very much regret if the Treasury were extremely rigorous in exacting the very utmost length of service that the bodily frame could endure." Another experienced witness, Mr. Tilley, the present Secretary of the Post Office, at that time Assistant Secretary, adduced as a bad effect of the want of retiring allowances, "that old and useless men continued receiving salaries, rendering very insufficient service." He stated that very often "the younger men, who really performed the service, had an unfair share of the duties thrown upon them, although they received inferior salaries, and that perhaps there were more clerks in an office than were absolutely necessary, so that superannuation pensions were frequently given under the form of continuing the salaries—men being thus pensioned upon full salary."

In the Report of the Royal Commission, there was a very able preliminary discussion as to the expediency of providing Civil servants with retiring allowances at all. The Commissioners showed beyond any possible question that, "having regard to *public interests alone*," there is "ample reason for the maintenance of such allowances." Recognising the utter impracticability of removing estimable public servants without provision, the Commissioners drew attention to the ill effects of the absence of a proper superannuation system, and adduced abundant instances from evidence in their hands. They maintained the high position that "the evil consequences of retaining a single Civil servant in an important post for which he had become incompetent could not be estimated in money, and might be much more than an equivalent for the expense of the superannuation of a whole department; and, for these reasons, they were unhesitatingly of opinion that the public interest would be best consulted by maintaining a system of superannuation allowances."

The chief objects sought in altering the state of affairs then existent were defined by the Royal Commissioners as being (1) to provide in every case a power of granting an adequate

superannuation allowance; (2) to place all classes of Civil servants, as far as possible, on a uniform and equal footing, so as to remove the existing causes of dissatisfaction, and thereby to obtain the best security for the *permanence of the new system and the future efficiency of the service.*

In the case of the Post Office it had been shown to the Commissioners that serious injury to the service had resulted from anomalies and inequalities in the system, and they recommended that, in that as in every other department, in fixing the terms of engagement on every new appointment, the remuneration should be considered as consisting partly of the salary and partly of the prospect of a pension. They referred specially to a letter addressed to them by the Duke of Argyll, then Postmaster-General (printed in the Appendix to their Report, at page 21, which see),—a letter wherein the need to make the pension system uniform and regular in its operation was vigorously set forth and conclusively shown to be a real and urgent need; and in letters from other departments of the Civil Service, also printed in the Appendix to the Report, evidence of an analogous nature was given.

When the Bill came before Parliament, Sir Stafford Northcote, by whom it was conducted, pointed out at the second reading that the Bill "was principally intended to put all classes of the Civil Service on one uniform footing, as well as to put an end to . . . anomalies . . . in the system of superannuations." The object of the system itself, he added, was "to get good men for the Civil Service, to keep them as long as their services were valuable to the country, and to provide for their retirement when their services were not sufficiently valuable." Such a system, he said, should be "clear, intelligible, and uniform, because, under a system by which people, when appointed, were uncertain as to whether they would receive superannuation, the State could not, on the one hand, when it engaged them, get the benefit of the system by engaging them at moderate salaries, nor, on the other hand, dispense with their services just when they begin to be of less value than when they were engaged." He affirmed the measure to be one "for the improvement of the Civil Service generally, and he believed it to be one of true economy." Mr. Disraeli, in the course of the debate, expressed his opinion that the Bill was "founded on principles of policy and justice," and drew attention to the fact of its having "been recommended, and fairly recommended, by the the public;" and a good deal more of valid and evident justification was brought forward before the Bill became an Act.

Now it is perfectly true that the boys and men taken into the pay of the State in these latter days of liberal administration, and kept outside the provisions of the wise Act we have just referred to, are not misled into the supposition that they are to be of necessity the permanent servants of the State. The Civil Service Commissioners issue periodically circulars, which any one may have observed posted in shop windows and other public places, inviting boys to employment, and specifying the terms: they likewise distribute freely printed copies of the regulations respecting the "temporary" writers in public departments; and it is made abundantly clear that no one of these persons is engaged with the understanding of even conditional permanent service, or of superannuation when past work.

In the printed regulations affecting writers, men-writers and boy-writers are alike informed that "no service, however much it may happen to be prolonged, will confer any claim to superannuation or compensation allowance," and boy-writers are told that they "will not be retained, as such, after they shall have reached the age of 19." In a circular of the Commissioners dated the 18th of January, 1872, inviting boys for examination for the posts of boy-sorter and boy-telegraph messenger, it is stated that "selections will be made from the boy-sorters to fill vacancies in other situations at wages of 16s., rising to 18s., 24s., and ultimately to 45s. a week. But should the boy-sorters not have ceased to be on the boy-class when they attain the age of 19, their services will be dispensed with;" and a similar statement is made in regard to the boy-telegraph messengers. Thus, boys of from 14 to 16 are led to commence work *with the hope* of being permanently appointed to situations "under Government" by the time they are 19; but, in the event of these hopes being unfulfilled, the young men are to be turned off to commence afresh; and it is the simplest thing in the world for any Government, inspired with the ardour for reducing expenses to a minimum, no matter at what hazards, to put such pressure on the practical heads of departments as may induce them to be very tardy in filling vacancies on the establishment, and performing, by means of shoals of supernumeraries and auxiliaries, work for which fresh men are really wanted, keep the number of appointments from the boy-classes as low as possible, so as to be unduly increasing the per-centage of young men turned adrift at the age of 19.

How baneful such a system will be, and what class of boys will be likely to enter the service with such prospects, when

once the working becomes thoroughly known, we may well tremble to surmise; and if the horrible farming system, under which men have so strong a temptation to starve an income out of their subordinate hirelings, obtain also an increased footing, the public must not look to have the work of its really working departments done without a very grave falling off in quality and consequent decrease of public convenience. We repeat that the Superannuation Act is the subject of a mere technical evasion in the movement we have been discussing. We believe the Act to be a wise and prudent one, and we object proportionably to this evasion. The nation has a strong enough feeling against redundant establishments supported for the sake of increasing patronage,—and with the recent righteous loppings off of patronage redundant establishments have naturally been cut down;—but the nation has shown no feeling whatever against the law that regulates the terms on which its permanent work is done: the law that enables it to get good men cheap, keep them long by giving them an assured income and the knowledge that they are more or less provided for in the case of breakdown, and finally maintain them in their old age without an inordinate expenditure. Neither do we think the nation would sanction, if it understood, the evasion of that law. If we are mistaken, and the Act is no longer an exposition of the popular mind on this subject, let it be repealed after due discussion in Parliament, and let the people find out, by practical experience in broad daylight, what will be the effect of such a repeal on the Civil Service generally, or on that branch of it that we have been specially examining—the Post Office.

- ART. II.—1. *System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines.* By Dr. FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG. Translated from the German, with Notes and Appendices, by THOMAS M. LINDSAY, M.A., &c. Longmans and Co. 1871.
2. *Pure Logic; or, the Logic of Quality apart from Quantity.* By W. S. JEVONS, M.A. Stanford. 1864.
3. *The Substitution of Similars, the True Principle of Reasoning.* By W. S. JEVONS, M.A. Macmillan. 1869.
4. *Elements of Deductive Logic.* By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A. Fourth Edition. Clarendon Press. 1871.
5. *Elements of Inductive Logic.* By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A. Clarendon Press. 1870.
6. *Logic.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., &c. Part I.: Deduction. Longmans. 1870.
7. *Logic.* By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., &c. Part II.: Induction. Longmans. 1870.
8. *Laws of Discursive Thought; being a Text-Book of Formal Logic.* By JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. Macmillan. 1870.
9. *Elementary Lessons in Logic, Deductive and Inductive.* By W. S. JEVONS, M.A. Second Edition. Macmillan. 1871.
10. *The Elements of Logic.* By THOMAS SHEDDEN, M.A. Longmans. 1864.
11. *The Student's Manual of Mill's System of Logic.* By the Rev. A. H. KILLICK, M.A. Longmans. 1870.
12. *A Manual of Logic; or, a Statement and Explanation of the Laws of Formal Thought.* By H. J. TURRELL, M.A. Rivingtons. 1870.
13. *Notes on Logic; for the Use of Students preparing for Examinations.* By H. COLEMAN, B.A. Longmans. 1870.
14. *An Outline of Logic; for the use of Teachers and Students.* By the Rev. F. GARDEN, M.A. Rivingtons. 1871.
15. *Logicæ seu Philosophiæ Rationalis Compendium.* Curâ Rev. GULIELMI JENNINGS, Philosophiæ Prof. apud Maynooth. Dublin: M'Glashan and Gill. 1862.

EVERYONE able to follow the course of philosophic inquiry in this country during the last half century, or acquainted with the studies of our higher education, will be aware that a notable change has taken place in reference to Logic within that period. He will know that the Logic of to-day is not the

Logic of fifty years ago. Logical studies now occupy a very different position in most academical institutions from that which they held in the college life of our fathers. What is the precise nature of the change? How has the revolution been brought about? In their relation to the nature of modern culture and our intellectual progress these questions are entitled to attention, but in their bearing on the present condition of Logic and logical studies among us they are more important and pressing. It is not too much to affirm that it will hardly be possible to understand logical science, as it is presented in the literature of our day, without a knowledge of the development of logical doctrines since the appearance of Whately's *Elements*.

The publication of Whately's *Logic* in 1825 constitutes an era in the history of Logic in this country. Before the appearance of this work the study was almost extinct in our Universities, and what passed for logical instruction was restricted to a rote knowledge of the merest scholastic rules. Sir W. Hamilton, Mr. J. S. Mill, Professor Fraser, Professor Boole, Professor Bowen, Dr. M'Cosh, Mr. Devey, and almost every other logical writer attribute the revival of interest in these pursuits to Whately's book. In the Appendix to his translation of Ueberweg's *Logic*, Mr. Lindsay thus refers to the fact:—

"The revival of logical study in England dates from the publication of Archbishop Whately's *Elements of Logic*. Before the appearance of this work the study of the science had fallen into universal neglect. It was scarcely taught in the Universities, and there was hardly a textbook of any value whatever to be put in the hands of the student."—Ueberweg's *System of Logic*, p. 557.*

From this event, then, we may date an awakened interest in Logic, and the impulse thus given to the study has led to important developments of the science and to the production of a vigorous literature on the subject. At a time when so much is said about intellectual culture, and when so much is attempted for the improvement of our secondary and higher education, it appears desirable to bring under consideration the new phases which Logic has assumed in its recent literature, and to inquire how far it may be adapted to be further employed as a means of mental training. Such is the object of the present paper.

* How different is the state of matters now, when we find Professor Jevons exclaiming, "No inconsiderable part of a lifetime is needed to master thoroughly the genius and tendency of the recent English writings on Logic."—*The Substitution of Similars*, p. 6.

We have said the logical theories of our time can only be fully mastered in and through some knowledge of the history of the science during the last fifty years. Before, however, we can enter upon this narrative it will be needful to consider, in some detail, the state of things which existed before Whately wrote; for we should know out of what came the deplorable state of logical studies in Britain half a century ago. How did it come to pass that so important a part of philosophic inquiry as logic should have fallen into "universal neglect?" The fact is by no means inexplicable. Indeed, strange as it may at first seem, a little inquiry into the previous history of philosophic thought in England will clear up the point. The condition of things just referred to was the natural, the inevitable issue of the direction which speculative thinking had taken in this country during the two centuries which had preceded the publication of Whately's book. As it arose out of circumstances which were peculiar, in all their strength, to England, it is the more needful to examine the facts, in order that we may the better understand the subsequent change in logical pursuit among us. The movement which ultimately degraded Logic in England may be traced back through the writings of Dr. Thomas Brown, Dugald Stewart, Dr. Reid, and Locke, to its origin in the speculations and influence of Bacon. Let us now look at the beginning and progress of this course of thought.

Aristotle is regarded as the founder of Syllogistic Logic. He explains the nature of the syllogism, and of the syllogistic reasoning, in the different works that form the *Organon*, and particularly in the *Prior and Posterior Analytics*.* Some slight modifications were effected in his doctrines and unimportant additions made to the system by his successors and the Schoolmen, but substantially the system has been accepted from his time to our own day. It is spoken of as the Aristotelian Logic, and sometimes as the Logic of the Schools. In the Middle Ages it acquired immense influence. By the Schoolmen, Aristotle's Philosophy, and especially his Logic, were regarded as something superhuman. His authority directed all their speculations, and may be said to have shaped their intellectual life. Now, when rightly understood, this Aristotelian Logic is very similar, in its general character, to

* Happily the student or intelligent English reader has now easy access to a fair rendering of these writings in the translation of Mr. O. F. Owen, M.A., published in Bohn's Classical Library under the title, "*The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle; with Notes, Examples, Analysis, and Introduction.*" 1853.

what has been known since the time of Kant as Abstract, Pure, or Formal Logic. As these expressions will frequently occur in our discussions, it will be desirable that the reader should understand their import, and we will, therefore, here observe that this Logic only concerns itself with the thinking processes—with the legitimacy of the inference made by the mind from given premisses; it does not take cognisance of the matter, the objects, or the facts about which we reason. It guarantees the accuracy of the operation constituting the syllogistic process, and the truth of the conclusion as drawn from the premisses: but it does not deal with the truth of the premisses, or with outward material facts, or insure truth about things. As applied and perverted by the Schoolmen, this Logic was concerned with subjective states, with abstractions, and with imaginary entities; it abounded in subtle distinctions; it developed a spirit of dialectical refinement; it fostered frivolous disputation, and carried into controversy every kind of verbal quibbling.

It was against this system of Scholastic Logic that Bacon so earnestly protested, and against the authority of Aristotle that he so persistently rebelled. Before Bacon's time several thinkers, as Valla, Vives, and Ramus, had sought to overthrow the authority of Aristotle, and to supersede his Logic, but with comparatively little success. Bacon was opposed to the whole spirit and tendency of Scholastic Logic, as he understood it. His mind was, indeed, one of vast compass, but it was at the same time thoroughly practical. While the immediate object of his labours was to unfold a method of inquiry applicable to science, his ulterior purpose was the discovery of material truth—knowledge of law among the phenomena of the outward world. Let it be distinctly understood that the special object of all his philosophical writings was really logical—that is, the establishment of a method that would assist men in attaining a knowledge of nature. In fact, his *Novum Organum* was designed to be a system of Inductive Logic, as we now apply that term. The cherished object of Bacon's life was to overthrow the old system, and to set up in its stead his own practical Logic. In every one of his philosophical works Bacon denounces the Syllogistic Logic as useless for the attainment of a knowledge of nature.

In those documents, so important in the explanation of his design, *Sic Cogitavit*, the general preface to the *Instauratio Magna*, the *Distributio Operis*, and the preface to the *Novum Organum*, in the *Advancement of Learning*, in the *De Aug-*

mentis, and in the *Novum Organum*, he speaks in decided terms of the futility of the old system, and of the superiority of the Inductive Logic which he was about to unfold. It will be desirable to place before the reader two or three of these pregnant passages. In the general preface to the *Instauratio* he says :—

“As for those who have given the first place to Logic, supposing that the surest help to the sciences were to be found in that, they have indeed most truly and excellently perceived that the human intellect, left to its own course, is not to be trusted; but then the remedy is altogether too weak for the disease; nor is it without evil in itself. For the Logic which is received, though it be very properly applied to civil business, and to those arts which rest in discourse and opinion, it is not nearly subtle enough to deal with nature; and in offering at what it cannot master, has done more to establish and perpetuate error than to open the way to truth.”—*Works*, Vol. IV. pp. 17, 18.

In *The Plan of the Work*, or *Distributio Operis*, speaking of the design of the *Novum Organum*, his new Logic, or “doctrine concerning the better and more perfect use of human reason,” he says :—

“The art which I introduce with this view (which I call *interpretation of nature*) is a kind of Logic, though the difference between it and the ordinary Logic is great,—indeed immense. For the ordinary Logic professes to contrive and prepare helps and guards for the understanding as mine does; and in this one point they agree. But mine differs from it in three points especially;—viz., in the end aimed at, in the order of demonstration, and in the starting-point of the inquiry. For the end which this science of mine proposes, is the invention, not of arguments, but of arts; not of things in accordance with principles, but of principles themselves; not of probable reason, but of designations and directions for works. And as the intention is different, so accordingly is the effect; the effect of one being to overcome an opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action. In accordance with this end is also the nature and order of the demonstrations. For in the ordinary Logic, almost all the work is spent about the Syllogism. Of Induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken any serious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hasten on to the formulæ of disputation. I, on the contrary, reject demonstration by Syllogism, as acting too confusedly, and letting nature slip out of its hands. . . . The Syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of words, and words are the tokens and

* It would have been more satisfactory to the writer to have quoted Bacon's words in the original Latin; but, feeling persuaded the extracts will be more acceptable to the reader in English, he avails himself of the translations given in the edition of his works by Spedding, Ellis, and Heath.

signs of notions. Now, if the very notions of the mind (which are as the soul of words, and the basis of the whole structure) be improperly and over-hastily abstracted from facts, vague, not sufficiently definite, faulty, in short, in many ways, the whole edifice tumbles. I therefore reject the Syllogism. . . . Now what the sciences stand in need of, is a form of induction which shall analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and rejection, lead to an inevitable conclusion."—*Bacon's Works*, Vol. IV. pp. 23—25.

He then remarks "that he goes deeper and firmer into the foundation of the sciences than the common Logic, which takes on trust those things which his system examines into;" that is, the immediate information of the senses, and the "accurate collection of facts and instances." In the body of the *Novum Organum*, the *De Augmentis*, and the *Advancement of Learning*, many passages will be found to the same effect. Indeed, as the reader of Bacon will know, in almost the identical words.

To the same effect are the numerous passages in which Bacon speaks against Aristotle, and depreciates his writings and doctrines. He repeatedly charges him with injuring philosophy through mixing his Logic with it; represents him as arrogant, and likens him to Antichrist.* It must be understood that we give these extracts and opinions simply to show what Bacon thought. We do not concur in the views here expressed, but on the contrary regard his opinions on Syllogistic Logic as partly erroneous, and think that he was very unjust to Aristotle's character and labours. What he wrote, however, in this direction had a mighty influence in shaping the thinking of subsequent times; and although some of his statements on these points may have been incorrect, yet he did good service in destroying authority, and uprooting faith in systems. Mr. Ellis says:—"Probably no one did more towards putting an end to the existing state of things than Bacon did."† This we fully believe; and while we acknowledge that Bacon's writings on these topics produced a good effect, we still contend that they were pernicious in leading his countrymen to views respecting the nature and province of Logic as incorrect as those he sought to uproot. In the Middle Ages the Aristotelian Logic had been greatly overrated. In the time subsequent to Bacon its nature was grossly misunderstood, especially in England.

* *Novum Organum*, Bk. I. Aph. 63; *Advancement of Learning*, Bk. I. chap. ii.

† *Bacon's Works*, Vol. I. p. 65.

Lord Bacon wrote in the early part of the seventeenth century. There were many circumstances in the condition of the country and the times that led to a favourable reception of his views as to the value of Logic. The progress of the Reformation and the revival of learning brought in a more independent mode of thinking, and a freer discussion of all kinds of subjects; and this tended directly to emancipate the mind from the authority of individual teachers, and from slavery to old systems. In the same direction worked that spirit of enterprise, and that material progress, which so marked the age of Bacon. But that which contributed more potently than anything else to the diffusion of Bacon's notions was the character of the English mind. Without in the slightest degree questioning the originality, the depth, or even the speculative power of the Anglo-Saxon mind, we apprehend all will admit that its practical tendency is a large feature in its constitution. The English mind clings to what is substantial and real; it craves for immediate results, and it constantly seeks for practical ends. Hence it was that Bacon's denunciation of Logic found a cordial reception among the leaders of thought in his own country. It soon became the universal practice to speak of Logic as "scholastic jargon." Undeniably, some text-books on the subject were written in England within a hundred years after Bacon's death, and the elements of the science were taught in our Universities; but the writers who determined the nation's thinking on such matters almost uniformly adopted Bacon's views about Logic, or even more loudly decried its utility and study. It was emphatically so in the case of Locke, the next great English thinker.

It can scarcely be necessary to say that the whole drift of Locke's Essay goes to depreciate Syllogistic Logic. In Book IV. chap. xvii., he formally discusses at some length the value of this Logic, and contends that it is not only useless but pernicious in the acquisition of knowledge. Nothing could more forcibly show his gross mistakes as to the nature and province of Logic than the following observations:—

"There are many men that reason exceedingly clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. . . . Now, if, of all mankind, those who can make Syllogisms are exceedingly few in comparison of those who cannot, and if, of those few who have been taught Logic there is but a very small number who do any more than believe that Syllogisms, in their allowed moods and figures, do con-

clude right, without knowing certainly that they do, if Syllogism must be taken for the only proper instrument and means of knowledge, it will follow that before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know anything by reason; and that since the invention of Syllogism there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational. . . . Of what use, then, are Syllogisms? I answer, their chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed, without shame, to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree; or out of Schools, to those who thence have learned, without shame, to deny the connection of ideas which even to themselves are visible."—*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV. c. xvii.

Such is the way in which this great philosopher wrote about Logic! Comment is needless. It is equally unnecessary to dwell on the influence which Locke exerted on his successors and on the nation, in reference to their thinkings on subjects of this nature. His *Essay* was soon much more widely read than Bacon's writings had been, and it has ever since been a standard work in philosophy. His speculations have moulded the philosophy and the philosophic language of every generation of Englishmen since its publication in 1690. The next two English leaders of thought, Berkeley and Hume, gave no prominence to Logic in their speculations; but their writings contain abundant evidence that these philosophers shared the views of Bacon and Locke about Logic. The spirit of their writings went to deepen the impression produced by those of their predecessors. There is one passage in Berkeley's *Alciphron* which strikingly proves this, and shows that less attention was given at that time than formerly to the study of Logic in the Universities. *Alciphron* complains that young gentlemen spend several years at college in acquiring that "mysterious jargon of scholasticism." Crito replies that such is not now the case, and adds:—

"There was, indeed, a time when Logic was considered as its own object; and that art of reasoning, instead of being transferred to things, turned altogether upon words and abstractions, which produced a sort of leprosy in all parts of knowledge, corrupting and converting them into hollow, verbal disputations in a most impure dialect. But those times are past."—Professor Fraser's *Edition of Berkeley's Works*, Vol. II. p. 202.

We next come to what is usually called the Scottish school of philosophy, comprising Reid, Campbell, Stewart, Brown,

and their disciples. All these philosophers decri Sylogistic Logic. In several of his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, particularly in those on Conception, Abstraction, Judgment, and Reasoning, Dr. Reid deals with many questions belonging to Logic, but in none of these places does he discuss the nature and value of the science. Professor Veitch justly observes,—“Although Reid wrote an able summary of the Aristotelian Logic, the science itself had no proper place in his philosophy.”* In his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, the last chapter is entitled “Reflections on the Utility of Logic, and the Means of its Improvement.” In this chapter Dr. Reid affects to be more discriminating and impartial than his predecessors had been in their treatment of the subject. He condemns extremes, and talks of “the current prejudices against Logic,” and of the “too unfavourable opinion now prevalent being caused by the former excessive admiration of Aristotle.” He patronisingly remarks,—“Although the art of categorical Syllogism is better fitted for scholastic litigation than for real improvement in knowledge, it is a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius;” and on this account should be admired as “we admire the Pyramids of Egypt, though they are useless burdens upon the earth!”† His suggestions for the improvement of the science go in the direction of the Inductive Logic of Bacon. Dugald Stewart devotes the whole of the second volume of his *Philosophy of the Human Mind* to Reason, and Methods of Inquiry. The third chapter is headed, “Of the Aristotelian Logic.” In the sixty pages of this chapter he criticises very severely the Sylogistic Logic, and Aristotle's exposition of it. He thinks Dr. Reid spoke too highly of Aristotle's system, and he distinctly endorses what Bacon and Locke had said of it. Mr. Stewart condemns this Logic as useless, either as a means of extending knowledge or in polemical warfare, and is of opinion that its study “is infinitely more likely to do harm than good.”‡ But as Whately observed, many of the remarks of Stewart go to show the worthlessness of all reasoning, and do not lie especially against syllogistic reasoning. In the sixth chapter of his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Dr. G. Campbell attempts, certainly in a calmer way than Mr. Stewart, to show the futility of Sylogistic Logic; but his whole criticism is founded on a

* *Memoir of Sir W. Hamilton*, p. 158.

† *Hamilton's Reid*, p. 711.

‡ *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Vol. II. p. 293. 4to. Edition, 1814.

misconception of the functions of the Syllogism. In the forty-ninth and fiftieth of his lectures on the *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Dr. Thomas Brown gives what he calls an "Analysis of the Scholastic Logic." Dr. Brown agrees generally with his predecessors, Stewart and Campbell, as to the uselessness of this science, and he also urges objections of his own. The views held on this subject by these distinguished leaders of Scottish Philosophy have been reiterated by their numerous followers, and by a host of English writers in other departments of thought.

We are not about to reply to these opponents of Logic, but we cannot leave the topic without observing that these objections proceed on a radical misconception of the nature and capabilities of Syllogistic reasoning. These critics confound Pure or Abstract Logic with Applied Logic,—the principles and doctrines of a science with the application of the practical rules of inquiry after material truth,—and hence they expect Logic to do what it cannot; what it never attempted; what no analogous science pretends to do, or is expected to effect. This is evident when these writers urge against it that persons actually reason well who have no knowledge of Logic, that we do not reason in and by Syllogisms, and that the Syllogism does not aid us in discovering material truth. Logic may furnish an exposition of the laws of thinking, and it may present the Syllogism as the form into which the process of reasoning may be analysed, and its validity tested; but assuredly this is very different from saying that a man cannot reason well without a knowledge of the Syllogism, or that he must always reason in Syllogisms. The human mind thinks and reasons naturally and spontaneously; it thinks and reasons according to certain laws; and the object of Logic as a science is to supply an exposition of these laws through an analysis of the process. As Archbishop Thomson remarks,—“The clearest reasoner cannot with propriety be called a logician, so long as he disputes spontaneously and without rule; whilst the man with the humblest reasoning powers may lay claim to the title, in so far as he reasons according to laws ascertained by reflection upon the process of thinking.”* That man is a logician who can explain *how* he thinks and reasons.

The writers we have been referring to not only grossly err as to the nature and province of Syllogistic Logic, but they fail to tell us what Logic is, or should be, according to their

* *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 3.

conception of it. They frequently use the word "Logic" apparently to denote a science, an art, or a branch of knowledge, but they never say exactly what they mean by the term. It is true Dr. Campbell talks of a "natural Logic," Dr. Thomas Brown of "a rational Logic," and Mr. Stewart of "a just and comprehensive system of Logic," and apparently they use these expressions to denote something different from and superior to Syllogistic Logic, but they nowhere definitely explain what they mean by the language. They never tell us where this Logic may be found. From the context of some passages we may conjecture that they mean certain practical principles or rules that may be very useful in training the mind, or in securing the right use of the intellectual faculties. It seems pretty certain that they mean no distinct, well-defined science or art by the word "Logic," but rather some collection of directions that might be useful in the acquisition and communication of knowledge.* Be this as it may, it is well known that during the last century, and the early part of this, the term "Logic" came to be applied in a wide, vague, and loose sense.† This fact might be established by the practice of reputable writers, but it is clearly shown in the contents of some of the more popular treatises on the subject, as in the *Logic of Watts*, and particularly in what he calls "a supplement" to it, *The Improvement of the Mind*, and in *Duncan's Logic*. The favourable reception accorded to such a book as *Collard's Essentials of Logic*, 1792—96, may, perhaps, be taken as evidence that there were thinkers with juster notions of the province of this science than those which obtained in the general current of speculation. Dr. Kirwan's *Logic*, 1807, points in the same direction.

As might naturally be expected, the effect of this mode of writing about Logic by the leaders of English thought, from

* *Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind*, Vol. II. chaps. iii. and iv.

† Like these Scotch philosophers, Bacon used the word "Logic" in an extensive and somewhat loose sense. He did, however, try to tell us what he included under the term. He says,—“The logical arts are four in number, divided according to the ends at which they aim. For men's labour in rational knowledges is either to invent that which is sought, or to judge that which is invented, or to retain that which is judged, or to deliver over that which is retained. So, therefore, the rational arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition.”—*De Augmentis*, Book V. chap. i. Surely the term "Logic" here covers a sufficient number of things. What is very remarkable is, the French logician, Duval-Jouve, takes this extract as the motto of his *Traité de Logique*, and adds, "*Cette pensée de Bacon contient le plan du présent ouvrage*"!

Bacon to Brown, produced a general and deep-rooted conviction in the English mind that Logic was a frivolous, a useless,—nay, a pernicious thing. As a consequence, its study was everywhere discredited, and the science itself almost universally discarded in a liberal education. In several universities where logical chairs existed, it had been banished from the curriculum, and some general course of “philosophical education” substituted for it. “In Scotland,” says Sir W. Hamilton, “the chairs of logic have for generations taught anything rather than the science which they nominally profess.”* In a few other universities it lingered on, but in a most deplorable state. It was, in fact, to use the words of Hamilton, “degraded to an irksome but wholly unprofitable penance.” Nothing could more strikingly illustrate the correctness of this representation than the so-called *Lectures on Logic* delivered by Mr. W. Barron, as Professor of Logic at St. Andrews,† or, the account given in his admirable book, by Mr. Jardine, of the way in which he gave up teaching Logic in the University of Glasgow, and substituted for it his *Philosophical Education*.‡

Such was the condition of logical science and logical studies in England when Dr. Whately published his *Elements* in 1825. As we have seen, the unanimous voice of logicians declares that this work brought about a notable revival in the cultivation of Logic. It is worthy of remark that Whately's *Elements* did not effect the change in virtue of its unfolding any discovery or new doctrine in the science. As an exposition of logical principles, and as an illustration of these, the book possessed marked excellences; and its merits in these respects had, undeniably, something to do with its influence. But these were not the circumstances which chiefly enabled the work to accomplish a revolution in English thought about the study of Logic. In the preface, in the introduction, in several of the books and chapters, Whately devotes special attention to the prevalent misconceptions as to the province of Logic. He clearly saw that the errors on this point were the source of nearly all the objections brought against it. He therefore addressed himself with great vigour to the task of exposing these mistakes, and it was largely to what he wrote in this direction that

* *Discussions*, p. 127. Written, 1833.

† *Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic*. 2 Vols. 1806.

‡ *Outlines of Philosophical Education, illustrated by the Method of Teaching the Logic Class in the University of Glasgow*. 1818. 2nd Edition, 1825, pp. 24—32.

we may attribute the success of the book. His specific merit is, that he impressed the public mind with juster views in reference to the object of the science. He first pointed out what Logic is *not*, and then recalled attention to what it is, or what he conceived it to be. He remarked:—"The brevity and simplicity of its fundamental truths have led many to suppose that something much more complex, abstruse, and mysterious, remained to be discovered." He instances the perversions in the sciences, as the degenerating of astronomy into astrology, and adds:—

"But none is more striking than the misapplication of Logic by those who have treated it as the art of rightly applying the rational faculties, or who have intruded it into the province of Natural Philosophy, and regarded the syllogism as an engine for the investigation of nature, while they overlooked the extensive field that was before them within the legitimate limits of the science. . . . By representing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching the use of the intellectual faculties in general, they raised expectations which could not be realised, and which naturally led to reaction."—*Logic*, pp. 11, 12—24, *seq. et passim*.

In opposition to this view, Whately held that Logic should be restricted to an explanation of the reasoning process, properly so called. He regards it both as a science and an art, and thus defines it:—"Logic may be considered as a science, and also as the art of reasoning. It investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes such rules as may be derived from those principles for guarding against erroneous deductions."* With Whately, reasoning meant syllogistic reasoning simply. Hence, in his treatise, Logic is synonymous with the doctrine of the Syllogism. He tells us:—"The syllogistic theory does not profess to furnish a *peculiar* method of reasoning, but an analysis of that mental process which must invariably take place in *all* correct reasoning. Logic does not bring forward the regular Syllogism as a *distinct* mode of argumentation designed to be substituted for any other mode; but as *the* form to which all correct reasoning may ultimately be reduced, and which consequently serves the purpose of a test to try the validity of any argument."† Further, Whately maintains that Logic should concern itself solely with the process

* *Logic*, p. 1.

† *Ibid.* pp. 11, 12, *et seq.*

of reasoning, or of inference, and should not take cognisance of the matter or facts reasoned about. He says :—"The rules of Logic have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the premisses,—except, of course, when they are the conclusions of former arguments,—but merely teach us to decide, not whether the premisses are *fairly laid down*, but whether the conclusion follows fairly from the premisses or not."* Whately held that it was no objection whatever to Logic to say that many persons reasoned skilfully who had never learned the system. This was a mistake as gross as if anyone should regard grammar as a *particular* language, and should contend against its utility that many speak correctly who never studied the principles of grammar.† Now we believe it was mainly through his efforts to correct such mistakes that Whately was the means of bringing about a revolution in the study of Logic. Of course it is admitted that, as a text-book which unfolded a definite conception of what Logic really is, the *Elements* rendered an invaluable service to the cause of logical reform.

From what has been said, it is evident that, according to Whately, the sphere of Logic is very limited: it is confined to the process of reasoning. This notion of its province approaches to that of the school of Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel, when they speak of Abstract, Pure, or Formal Logic. His views, however, were not by any means identical with theirs. The Formal Logic of the latter school deals with the formal laws of thought, or thought as thought, and thus includes the consideration of the laws affecting conceptions, or the formation of concepts, of judgments, or the nature of propositions, as well as of reasoning strictly so called. But Whately limited Logic to the process of reasoning, and excluded from it doctrines and laws about concepts and judgments. He certainly deals with these in his book, but they are regarded as "extra-logical." The truth is, Whately could not be consistent with his theory on this point, but felt bound to explain these and other matters, though he considered them as extra-logical. Although his treatise is in no way remarkable for erudition or for original doctrines, yet there is much that is novel and attractive in his mode of treating the subject. His expositions are divested of scholastic jargon: they are simple and clear. He discarded hackneyed instances, and his own illustrations were striking and fresh, drawn from common life and the ordinary

* *Logic*, p. 233.

† *Ibid.* p. 12.

course of thought. These features added much to the value of the work, and contributed to render it popular and useful. It must, however, be stated, that, while Whately declares that "the process of reasoning is alone the appropriate province of Logic,"* he likewise maintains that "Logic is entirely conversant about language,"† and consequently not about "thoughts" or "things." Regarded as a systematic exposition of the science, Whately's book is far from being perfect. It is marked by inconsistencies, by errors and by defects which have been pointed out by Hamilton and other critics.

Whately's treatise at once attracted the attention of persons interested in philosophical literature, and produced a favourable impression on this class of readers. Perhaps no better evidence of this could be given than is furnished in the opinion of Sir James Mackintosh, who, writing to a friend under date of May 1827, says:—"May I venture to ask you to read a treatise on Logic, by Dr. Whately, published about three months ago. I should say that the book was a restoration of an unjustly deposed art;"‡ and, in a note to his *Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy*, he calls it "one of the most important works of the present age." For a book on an abstract subject, it was extensively read by thoughtful persons of all classes. In a few years it ran through several editions, and took its place in our literature as the standard work on Logic. As the *Elements* thus attracted notice, and awakened interest in a despised branch of knowledge, it gave rise to fresh discussion on the subject. Whately's book called forth other works,—some in imitation of it, others in criticism of its doctrines, or against its principles. It must suffice to mention one or two of these. Dr. Hind's *Introduction*, 1827, was professedly based on Whately's book. In the same year appeared Mr. George Bentham's *Outlines of a New System of Logic*, in which the author approves some of Whately's views, but dissents from others. This book is interesting in the history of Logic as containing some views about the Predicate which have been regarded as an anticipation of Hamilton's discovery of the Quantification of the Predicate. In 1829, the late Sir G. C. Lewis, then a student of Christ Church, Oxford, issued a pamphlet controverting some doctrines maintained by Whately. Within a few years of the appearance of Whately's *Elements*, there were published several editions of *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*, with "Annotations," "Illus-

* *Logic*, p. 17.

† *Ibid.* p. 56.

‡ *Memoirs of Mackintosh*, Vol. II. p. 435.

trations," or "Observations." Other treatises on the basis of Aldrich, or *Translations of Aldrich, Questions on Aldrich*, and similar Introductions followed in rapid succession: "all so many manifestations," observes Hamilton, "of the awakened spirit of logical pursuit." Whately's book was not only read by the thoughtful, but it was soon extensively used in education. If not so generally employed at Oxford and Cambridge as it should have been, it was early adopted as a text-book in most of our freer colleges, where the study was not altogether extinct, and in not a few the reputation of this work led to the introduction of Logic as a subject of study. Then the work was repeatedly reprinted and widely circulated in America, and was almost universally adopted as a text-book in the colleges of that country. In the preface to the third edition, speaking of its success in America, Whately was able to say,—"I believe it is in use in every one of their colleges."

In April 1833, Sir W. Hamilton's celebrated article on Logic appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*. Looking at the influence of Hamilton's speculations on the recent course of logical doctrines and logical study in this country and America, the publication of this paper may be regarded as an important event in the progress of the science. It has been said that this article "contains the germs of all his subsequent discoveries." If such a remark is not strictly accurate, the paper certainly expounds very distinctly his doctrines respecting the nature and province of Logic, and supplies hints of several doctrines that he afterwards fully developed. Professor Veitch says:—"This article inaugurated a new era in the mode of dealing with its subject, by showing, for the first time in this country, the true place of Formal Logic in the range of the philosophical sciences."* As a critique on Whately, it is searching and sharp, but we cannot, with some writers, think that it is unjust. Sir William points out the blunders, inconsistencies, errors and defects of Whately's work. The article is, however, particularly interesting in the history of Logic in England, because it contains the first explanation in our language of the nature of Pure or Formal Logic. Whately did not understand this matter clearly, and failed to set before his readers the precise nature of the abstract science. Hamilton shows that he makes Logic a formal science in one chapter and a real science in another. Our critic, however, repeat-

* *Memoirs of Hamilton*, p. 158.

edly insists that Logic is only a formal science. What does he mean by the term? On this point Hamilton was a disciple of Kant; and as these expressions, Pure, Abstract, and Formal, Logic are much used in recent writings, it may be useful to place Kant's definitions before the reader. Kant says:—

"Logic may be considered as twofold,—namely, as Logic of the general, universal, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws, therefore, to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed. The Logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of objects. . . . Logic is again either Pure or Applied. . . . Pure Logic has to do with the pure *à priori* principles, and is a canon of understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental."—*Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 46, 47. (Meiklejohn's translation.)

Though Sir W. Hamilton's views were moulded on those of Kant, his definitions and divisions of Logic are more complete and scientific than those of his master. He regards Logic as "the science of the laws of thought, as thought." He remarks:—

"Logic is a formal science. It takes no consideration of real existence, or of its relations, but is occupied solely about that existence and those relations which arise through, and are regulated by, the conditions of thought itself. Of the truth or falsehood of propositions in themselves, it knows nothing, and takes no account. All in Logic may be held true that is not conceived as contradictory."—*Discussions*, pp. 145, 146.

This language explains the shorter definition, which he is constantly repeating, that "Logic is the science of the laws of thought, as thought." Further to assist the reader to understand these statements, we may say:—1. That by pure, abstract, or formal thinking, is meant the mere process of thinking without regard to the objects thought about. This is thought as thought. 2. This pure thinking does not take place at random, but is regulated by fixed laws which are called formal laws, because they relate to the form only and not to the matter of thought. 3. These laws are universal and necessary, or in no sense empirical or contingent,—that is, they take place invariably in all minds, whatever be the subject thought about. 4. Still, in deter-

mining and ascertaining these laws, Logic deals with the products of thought,—concepts, judgments, and reasonings.

As we have seen, it was in this article that Sir W. Hamilton first expounded those views of the nature of Logic which have in recent years exerted so marked an influence on the writings of this country and America. From their first publication these speculations engaged the attention of the few philosophic minds among us, but some years elapsed before they produced any sensible effect on our logical literature. In the meantime, the use of Whately's book was daily extending. Several elementary works were issued that were moulded on Whately's plan; and the Archbishop himself was induced to prepare *Easy Lessons on Reasoning*, as a sort of popular introduction to the science. Wherever any attempt was made to teach Logic, the *Elements* was taken as a text-book. In America, Hedge's manual was almost universally superseded in education by Whately's. It was in that country that several of the most successful efforts were made to improve Whately by simplifying the mode of treatment, and by adapting the exposition to teaching purposes. Among books of this kind we may mention *Logic; or, the Art of Reasoning Simplified*, by S. E. Parker, London and Philadelphia, 1838. We believe Mr. Parker's book had some circulation in England, and was much used in private tuition. He adopts Whately's general plan; but his mode of treating the details is characterised by great power of simplifying and illustrating the subject. The book is admirably fitted to aid in elementary instruction: in most respects it is superior to Whately as a text-book.

It should not be concluded that Whately's book was allowed to pass without criticism, or his doctrines without challenge. In various forms—in articles, pamphlets, and books—independent thought was manifested, and among other efforts of this kind we may mention Mr. Smart's *Outlines of Sematology*, 1831; *Sequel to Sematology*, 1837; Dr. Moberly's suggestive tractate, *Introduction to Logic*, 1838; and Prof. De Morgan's capital little work, *First Notions of Logic*, 1839. Mr. Smart is wholly opposed to the received doctrines of the Syllogism, and to the Aristotelian Logic. He defines Logic as "the right use of words, with a view to the investigation of truth,"* or, "the art of reasoning by means of words."† He does not, however, with Whately, hold that the process of reasoning is solely concerned with words,

* *Sematology*, p. 124.

† *Ibid.* p. 132.

but contends that, acting through words, "the mind always compares things."* He ridicules the notion that Logic only deals with words, or the process of reasoning. The mind intuitively compares things, and registers the result in words. "The Logic of Aristotle is the Logic of fools."† Notwithstanding remarks of this nature, Mr. Smart's writings show much acuteness, and abound in original and ingenious thought.

In 1836, Sir W. Hamilton was appointed to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. We agree with his biographer, that "Sir W. Hamilton's appointment was the inauguration of a new era in the philosophical thought and education of the country."‡ In this position Hamilton was called upon to reason out the principles he had briefly outlined in his famous article. A course of from thirty to forty lectures supplied him with the opportunity of unfolding his system. He at once prepared a course of lectures, which were delivered biennially to his students, and which were published by Dr. Mansel and Prof. Veitch in 1860. His reputation as a philosophical thinker, and his ability as a teacher, soon secured for him a large attendance of students, and he thus, through the young men that formed his classes, began from this date to propound his doctrines and to influence the thinkings of his countrymen on logical subjects. The *Lectures* do not contain all his improvements in logical science; indeed, he continued to make additions, and further to develop his principles until the last years of his life. His most matured views are to be found in the Appendix to the second edition of the *Discussions*, published in 1853, and in the Appendix to the *Lectures*. The editors inform us that these "Lectures were repeated with but slight alterations from 1836 to the author's death in 1856." We have then the *Lectures* substantially as they were delivered in the first years of his professorship, and it is consequently clear that Hamilton taught from 1836 many of his characteristic doctrines, such as the views on the nature, province, and divisions of Logic, on the application of the fundamental laws of thought, the nature of notions and concepts, judgments and reasonings; his doctrines about indefinite propositions, comprehension and extension, opposition and conversion; respecting the construction of the syllogism, modality, moods, figures, hypotheticals, methodology, modified Logic, &c. In the ordinary *Lectures*, as now published, we have no distinct

* *Sematology*, p. 128.† *Ibid.* p. 151.‡ *Memoir of Hamilton*, p. 158.

explication of his great discovery—the Quantification of the Predicate. He states, however, that he “had by 1833 become convinced of the necessity to extend and correct the logical doctrine upon this point;” * and he also declares that “the doctrine of a thorough-going Quantification of the Predicate with its results I have probably taught since the year 1840 at the latest.” †

The year 1842 is notable in the history of Logic as the date of the first edition of Archbishop Thomson's *Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought; or, A Treatise on Pure and Applied Logic*. Although Mr. Lindsay describes it as “a textbook for junior students,” it was a very valuable contribution to logical science. The work displays accurate acquaintance with the literature of the subject; it is written with singular clearness, and it unfolds important new logical doctrines. Its publication thus indicates a decided advance in the science, and its ability and success materially aided the progress of logical studies. The author designed it “to enlarge the science of pure Logic,” and it is, like the speculations of Hamilton, written from the Kantian stand-point. In reference to the first edition, it must be stated that, through independent research, Thomson had reached conclusions on some points similar to those of Hamilton, and he, consequently, introduced improvements in the same direction as those of the Edinburgh Professor. The publication of the *Outline* brought these eminent logicians into intercourse, and Hamilton communicated to Thomson “a full account of the principal novelties in his logical system.” In subsequent editions Thomson availed himself of these, and acknowledged this obligation, and the *Outline* is, in its main features, identical with many of Hamilton's views. Thomson regards Logic both as a speculative and a practical science, and divides it into Pure and Applied. He defines it thus:—“Pure Logic is a science of the necessary laws of thought;” or thus: “Pure Logic is a science of the formal laws of thinking, and not of the matter.” We regret our lack of space to particularise, at any length, the new doctrines unfolded in this excellent manual. It must suffice to observe that, as furnishing fresh and more scientific views, the portions that treat of the province of Logic, of language, the nature of conceptions and notions, of judgment, the distribution of terms in judgment, immediate inference, conversion, opposition, syllogistic notation, moods

* *Discussions*, p. 650. † *Ibid.* p. 650; *Lectures*, Vol. II. p. 249.

and figures, reduction of syllogisms, inference in extension, intension, and denotation, are valuable as presenting new views. As a treatise on Formal Logic, the *Outline* is a decided improvement on Whately's *Elements*; it is, at once, more simple and scientific, as well as more complete; and yet more distinct and definite as regards the object-matter of the science.

Here we must pause, in our sketch of the history of Formal Logic, in order that we may trace the origin and progress of another branch of logical science, or of another species of Logic—*Inductive Logic*. From what has already been advanced, the reader will know that, from the time of Bacon the practical English mind had longed for a Logic that should deal directly with *things*, rather than solely with *thoughts*, and that should aid in ascertaining truths about outward phenomena. The Logic of the Schools appeared to most Englishmen too abstract and too far removed from the facts of nature and the affairs of ordinary life. This was the drift of Bacon's indictment against the old Logic. Bacon said this system may be applied to matters of opinion, but "it does not deal with nature,"—"it leads to no results." He wanted a Logic that should "command nature,"—that should "sift and examine the information of the senses," and that should "enter the province of the several sciences," and should "call the putative principles of these sciences to account, until they are established." Bacon complained that the old Logic was trifling, barren, unprofitable, and that it produced no immediate results, and no knowledge in reference to sensible objects. And such, in effect, were the complaints of Locke and his successors against the Logic of the Schools. What they demanded of a "natural Logic," or a "rational Logic," were practical results of the kind just referred to. As we have seen, the errors of these thinkers arose from their mistakes as to the legitimate object of Syllogistic Logic; they condemned and rejected the old system, and vaguely demanded something better, but did not find it. After the splendid discoveries of Newton, the success attending his method, and the enunciation of his rules of philosophising, there arose a still stronger feeling in favour of induction as *the* method or *the* Logic which alone could lead to material truth. This is clearly seen in the works of Reid, but it is more formally expressed in the writings of Dugald Stewart. To some extent it pervaded the lectures and other pieces of Dr. Thomas Brown. The whole design of Reid's suggestions for the improvement of Logic was to substitute

the Inductive method for the Syllogism. Stewart devotes a considerable portion of the second volume of his *Philosophy of the Mind* to "the method of inquiry pointed out in the experimental or Inductive Logic." He insists on the importance of observation and experiment, of the comparison of instances of the uniformity of the operations of nature, of analysis and synthesis as parts of the inductive method, but does nothing to develop a connected body of Inductive Logic. This long chapter abounds in reflective observations upon Experimental inquiry; but it contains no exposition or systematic statement of the principles or rules of inductive reasoning. There is no attempt to unfold the new method in a scientific way, or to illustrate its practical application in scientific inquiry.

The wonderful development of every branch of physical science during the closing portion of the last century and the first quarter of the present, must have directed the attention of philosophic minds to the methods by which this extraordinary progress had been achieved. Yet nothing was attempted in the way of an exposition of these methods until the publication, in 1830, of Sir J. F. Herschel's *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*. The appearance of this volume marks an epoch in the history of Inductive Logic. It is not styled, "On the Inductive Method," or "On Inductive Logic;" still the whole contents of the volume relate to scientific method; and the second part, "Of the Principles on which Physical Science relies for its Successful Prosecution, and the Rules by which a Systematic Examination of Nature should be conducted," deals entirely with methods of inquiry. The seven chapters forming this part contain a lucid exposition, with striking illustration, of the methods of scientific investigation. This portion of the work belongs strictly to Inductive Logic, because it supplies principles and canons for guiding inquiry after truth among outward phenomena. The methods and rules of philosophising here explained are founded on the actual practice of successful cultivators of physical science. Herschel brought to this inquiry rare mental gifts and a rich store of varied scientific knowledge, and the result was one of the most delightfully instructive scientific works ever written.* It may be regarded as the first systematic attempt to set forth the doctrines of Inductive Logic, and it has materially

* On the appearance of this work Sir James Mackintosh spoke of it as "the finest work of philosophical genius in our age, or perhaps the finest since Bacon. I firmly believe no other man in Europe could have written Herschel's *Discourse*."—*Memoirs*, Vol. II. p. 481.

influenced the subsequent course of the science. Every writer in this department, since 1830, has been largely indebted to the labours of Sir John Herschel.

The next eminent writer in this branch of logical inquiry was Dr. Whewell. In 1837 Dr. Whewell published his *History of the Inductive Sciences*. This was followed, in 1840, by his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. In the third edition the *Philosophy* has been much enlarged, and has become three distinct works:—1. *The History of Scientific Ideas*; 2. *Novum Organon Renovatum*; 3. *The Philosophy of Discovery*. Although the first is mainly historical, it contains much research and discussion that explain the formation of science and of scientific knowledge. The third is also partly historical and partly controversial, yet it abounds in disquisition which elucidates the nature and growth of scientific truth. But the second part, the *Novum Organon Renovatum*, belongs more especially to Inductive Logic. It is here that Dr. Whewell unfolds the successive steps, the different processes, by which science is built up, and the various methods by which scientific knowledge is formed and acquired. The *Novum Organon Renovatum* embraces a more elaborate discussion of these matters than is to be found in Herschel's *Discourse*; it treats more articulately several topics mentioned in the *Discourse*, besides dealing with others not touched upon by Herschel. It is, then, a more complete treatise on Inductive Logic than existed before its publication. In all his writings on the history and philosophy of science, Dr. Whewell strenuously contends for the necessity of two factors in the formation of science—*facts* and *ideas*. He holds that the whole history of science shows that these two are equally essential to the discovery of scientific truth. Each involves or necessitates the other. From facts alone no science can be formed; all facts must be interpreted by ideas. Further, these fundamental ideas are not derived from experience or the senses, but most of them originate in the mind's native powers. In this aspect of his speculations, Whewell is somewhat of a disciple of Kant, though Dr. Mansel thinks he does not stick closely enough to Kant's principles. Dr. Whewell's writings on Induction are an important part of our Logic of Science, and, notwithstanding the criticisms of Mr. Mill, Mr. Lewes, and others, we deem his views most deserving the attention of every student of Inductive Logic.

We now come to Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investiga-*

tion, which was originally published in 1843. In reference to Inductive Logic, there can be no doubt that this is the most important work in the language. It is the *opus magnum* of the ablest expounder of the sensational philosophy, and of the most vigorous philosophical writer of the age. All that we can attempt respecting such a book is briefly to state a few points that may help the reader to understand its historical position, or to show the relation of Mr. Mill's views to previous speculations, or to those which come after his work.

1. Mr. Mill uses the term Logic so as to include under it the two kinds, or parts, of logical science:—Ratiocinative, Deductive or Syllogistic Logic, or the reasoning from generals to particulars; and Inductive methods of inquiry, or the reasoning from particulars to generals.
2. He was the first writer of authority to describe the second species of Logic in this way. Herschel and Whewell had spoken of the processes, the methods, the rules, the steps, of Induction, but they had not used the phrase "Inductive Logic" to denote the entire principles of scientific inquiry and evidence. Further, it should be noted that with Whewell inductive science is limited to physical science. Inductive Logic, as applied by Mill, is not so restricted.
3. Mill not only enlarges the denotation of the term through its extension, but he also enlarges its significance in the direction of its comprehension, depth, or connotation. In his system, the processes subsidiary to Induction proper—observation, abstraction, generalisation, classification, definition, naming, &c.—are embraced in Inductive Logic.
4. Mill maintains that Induction may be properly brought under Logic, or be justly regarded as a kind or part of Logic, because Induction is as strictly a process of inference or reasoning as Deduction.
5. Taking the word in this enlarged sense, Mill says—"the proper subject of Logic is proof."* And he defines it thus:—"Logic is the science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence; both the process itself of advancing from known truths to unknown, and all other intellectual operations, in so far as they are auxiliary to this."†
6. Although Mill uses the word Logic in a wide signification, he does not apply it in the vague, loose way that Stewart did, but with a distinct and definite meaning.
7. As treating of the two kinds of Logic, Mill's system consists of two parts—the first occupied with Ratiocinative, and the second with Inductive, Logic. He does not, however, allot anything like

* *Logic*, Vol. I. p. 177 (6th edition).

† *Ibid.* p. 11.

equal space to each part. Ratiocinative Logic only occupies about one-fourth of the work, while three-fourths are devoted to Inductive Logic. 8. We cannot say that the two parts are equally meritorious. While the Inductive Logic is a most precious contribution to logical science, the Ratiocinative is by no means so satisfactory. 9. Mill admits that Logic is both a science and an art.* 10. Our author does not agree with Whately, that language is the subject-matter of Logic, nor with Hamilton and his school, that it deals exclusively with the laws of thought; but he maintains that Logic must deal with *things, objects, phenomena*, and hence must relate directly to our belief or disbelief of propositions about things. 11. Accordingly, while Mill's Ratiocinative Logic is designed to cover the same ground as Syllogistic Logic, still he does not belong to the school of Formal Logic, as represented by Kant, or by Hamilton and his disciples. He dissents from their views as to the nature and object of the science. 12. In reference to the nature and functions of the Syllogism, Mill's views differ materially from the doctrine of the school of Formal Logic. He assigns to the Syllogism a much inferior function in the theory of reasoning. 13. Mill has rendered the greatest service in unfolding Induction. He has given to Inductive Logic a systematic and scientific character.† 14. The doctrines of Mill's philosophy underlie many of his logical principles, and, indeed, mould most of his fundamental views in that science. This is the case with other logical writers belonging to this school of philosophy, and notably so with Professor Bain.

Returning now to the history of the other branch of our subject, the next step in the progress of Formal Logic was Sir W. Hamilton's discovery of the *Quantification of the Predicate*. As we have seen, Sir William says that he publicly taught this doctrine in 1840; but he first formally explained it in the Prospectus of the *Essay towards a new Analytic of Logical Forms*, 1846. The Prospectus, which contained the heads of the *Essay*, was published in the same year with Reid's works. In response to the requirements of this prospectus, a capital paper was written by Mr. T. S. Baynes, then a member of Hamilton's class, and now Professor of Logic at St. Andrew's. The *Essay*, which may be regarded as the fullest exhibition of

* *Logic*, p. 2.

† We agree with Dr. McCosh, that it would be a great advantage to students if that part of Mr. Mill's work which relates to Induction could be printed separately. As Dr. McCosh remarks, "This would leave them at liberty to get their Formal Logic elsewhere."—*Examination of Mill*, p. 336.

the forms of the new theory, was not published until 1850. This doctrine of "the thorough-going Quantification of the Predicate," and its consequences, have led to great changes in the details of Formal Logic; indeed, if fully accepted, this principle may be said to effect an entire revolution in the doctrines about propositions and syllogisms. What is meant by the "Quantification of the Predicate?" It is not easy to explain a point of this nature in a few sentences, nor without the use of technical terms that may not be familiar to all readers. Perhaps no simpler account could be given of it than is furnished in the following sentences by Prof. Jevons. He says:—

"The nature of the great discovery alluded to, *the quantification of the predicate*, cannot be explained without introducing the technical terms of the science. A proposition, or judgment expressed in words consists of a *predicate*, or attribute, united by copula to a *subject*. In this proposition,—*All metals are elements*,—the predicate, *element*, is asserted of the subject, *metal*, and the force of the assertion consists, as usually considered, in making the class of metals a part of the class of elements. The verb or copula, *are*, denotes *inclusion* of the metals among the elements. But the subject only is quantified; for it is stated that *all* metals are elements, but it is not stated what proportion of the elements may be metals. Now the quantification of the predicate consists in giving *some* indication of the quantity or portion of the predicate really involved in the judgment. *All metals are some elements*, is the same proposition thus quantified, and, though the change seems trifling, the consequences are momentous. The proposition no longer asserts the inclusion of one class in the other, but the *identity* of group with group. The proposition becomes an *equation* of subject and predicate."—*The Substitution of Similar, the True Principle of Reasoning*, pp. 7, 8.

The reader will see that the import of this doctrine is, that what we call the two terms of a proposition, the subject and the predicate, should be equal in their extent, or in the quantity of thought which they express; in other words, the predicate should express as much as, and no more than, the subject; and hence they would be convertible. Thus in the common proposition, "All men are mortal," we say the subject "all men" is distributed, universal, or taken to denote all things to which it can be applied, while its predicate, "mortal," is not distributed, or not taken to denote all "mortals," because there are "mortals" besides men; but in this expression we really intend only to say that "all men are *some* mortals." This is what is in our thought; that is, in thought we actually quantify the predicate, but in the ordinary mode of wording

the proposition, we do not quantify it. Now the design of Hamilton's doctrine is to bring out this point, and to make it appear that every proposition is really an equation. The whole doctrine proceeds on what Sir W. Hamilton calls the logical postulate *that what is implicit in thought should be explicitly stated in the proposition*. He regards it as a self-evident truth, "that we can only rationally deal with what we already understand," and that this principle "determines the simple logical postulate—to state explicitly what is thought implicitly."*

In reference to the important and varied results of this doctrine, we can only say, it immediately affects the opposition and conversion of propositions, the rules for the construction of syllogisms, the reduction of syllogisms, the nature and number of the legitimate moods, the quality and number of figures, and many other logical points. We are unable to dwell on the numerous other innovations which Sir W. Hamilton brought into the different parts of Formal Logic, and especially into the doctrines affecting the details of the syllogism, notation, reasoning in extension and in comprehension, &c. His reforms have exerted a signal influence on the course of Logic, both in this country and America, during the last twenty years. The improvements introduced into this science by Professor De Morgan, Professor Boole, and Professor Jevons, have been effected mainly through a recognition and a carrying forward of this principle of the Quantification of the Predicate. By American logicians these discoveries have been more generally adopted than by English writers. The most recent American works are treatises on Formal Logic, and strictly belong to the Hamiltonian school. These writers adopt his definition of Logic, either in his very words or with the slightest variation. This is strikingly the case in Professor Atwater's *Manual of Logic* (Philadelphia, 1867), Mr. H. N. Day's *Elements of Logic, comprising the Doctrine of the Laws and Products of Thought* (New York, 1867), and Professor Bowen's *Treatise on Logic, or the Laws of Pure Thought* (Boston and Cambridge, 1870). We agree with Dr. McCosh and Professor Jevons in looking upon Professor Bowen's book as the most systematic exposition of the Hamiltonian Logic that has yet appeared. Both Mr. Day and Professor Bowen affirm that Sir W. Hamilton has done more for the science than has been done for it since the days of Aristotle.

* *Discussions*, p. 650 ; *Lectures*, Vol. II. p. 250.

Two widely differing schools of logical theory were now before English thinkers: first, there was the Formal Logic, that dealt with the laws that regulate all thinking, whatever may be the subject, and which was represented in the writings of Sir W. Hamilton, Archbishop Thomson, and their disciples; and secondly, there was the Logic of Phenomena, or the extended system which sought to determine the validity and conditions of all our knowledge and beliefs respecting things, and which was represented in the writings of Mr. J. S. Mill and his followers. Each of these schools has attracted to it able men. As might be expected from the realistic and practical tendencies of the English mind, Mr. Mill's views have found most favour with men of science and general readers, even if it be admitted that the theory of Hamilton has secured the approval of philosophic thinkers. From this period our logical literature rapidly increased. In 1846-7, Sir W. Hamilton was involved in a sharp personal controversy with Professor De Morgan, as to their respective claims to priority in the discovery of some extensions of syllogistic forms. While De Morgan had evidently reached conclusions in 1846 relating to the quantification of the middle term somewhat similar to those of Hamilton, his doctrine was clearly different from that of Hamilton. In 1847 De Morgan published his *Formal Logic; or, the Calculus of Inference Necessary and Probable*, a work of great ability and merit, as a contribution to the further development of logical science. De Morgan's book contains several chapters that are peculiarly interesting to the student, on account of their original and scientific views; but other portions, and those the most characteristic, are so involved in symbolic and mathematical forms that they are chiefly remarkable as ingenious and recondite speculations. Among other books—some of them elementary—we may mention Leechman's *Logic: an Introduction to Reasoning*, 1843-4-7. This is an elementary manual on Whately's principles. In 1845 appeared Dr. Gray's welcome *Logical Exercises*. Dr. Moberly's *Lectures on Logic*, 1848, is the production of a scholar and a clear thinker. Mr. Chretien's *Essay on Logical Method*, 1848, deserves notice, as well on account of its own merit, as because it indicates a revived cultivation of Logic at Oxford. The book offers an instructive history of Methodology, not simply in the narrow sense of that term as it is used in old text-books, but as showing the relation of Logic to science and scientific thinking. Mr. Chretien also discusses several important questions in the philosophy of Logic. In the fifth chapter the different kinds

of Modern Logic are noticed, and our author generalises them into three schools, as the writers make Language, Thought, or Phenomena, respectively the subject matter of the science. Munro's *Manual of Logic, Deductive and Inductive*, 1850, was a decided improvement on text-books for junior students. This manual has hardly received the attention to which we think its merits entitle it.

English logical literature, in the ten years from 1850, grew both in bulk and strength. It comprises many interesting works, of which we can only mention a few. In 1851 was published Mr. Karslake's *Aids to the Study of Logic*; a work of research and independent thought, and which is really adapted to fulfil the promise implied in the title. In the same year appeared the first edition of Professor Baynes' translation of the Port Royal Logic, and of Dr. Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica; an Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes*. The Port Royal *La Logique, ou l'Art de Penser*, was originally published in 1662, and for two centuries was justly esteemed one of the best manuals in Europe. The well-known treatise of Dr. Watts was indebted to this work for some of its most useful features. Through his excellent translation of the Port Royal, his introduction and notes, Professor Baynes has rendered good service to logical studies in this country; for, if the student desires to understand something of the *rationale* of the rules laid down in ordinary texts, he could not have recourse to a better work. Mansel's *Prolegomena* deals with the Philosophy of Formal Logic. On most of the fundamental points of the science, Mansel and Hamilton are at one; still, the *Prolegomena* is a singularly original, learned, and profound examination of the grounds of logical law. In this work we have the principles of the science reasoned out, and their foundations established in the nature of the human mind. In this place we may also mention Dr. Mansel's *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*, from the text of Aldrich. The editor has enriched his edition of this old text-book with introduction, notes, and supplementary dissertations that embody the most advanced views on almost every question, and has thus made the work very valuable for its logical disquisitions. Mansel was endowed with masterly analytical power, and he wrote with great clearness and vigour. Mr. S. Bailey's *Theory of Reasoning*, 1852, is largely a polemic against Syllogistic Logic,* though several chapters

* Able men continue to say strange things respecting the Syllogism. Perhaps the most remarkable is Mr. Herbert Spencer's declaration, "That the Syllogism is a psychological impossibility."—*Principles of Psychology*, p. 151.

are valuable as containing useful elucidations of the reasoning process. In 1853, the second edition of Sir W. Hamilton's *Discussions* was issued, with additional notes and a logical appendix of fifty pages, that comprise the author's most matured views and latest corrections. The following year gave us Mr. Devey's *Logic, or the Science of Inference; a Systematic View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Inference in the Various Departments of Human Knowledge*. In this work we see the direct influence of both Hamilton and Mill, although the author dissents from some of the doctrines of both these writers. It is one of the first attempts, after Mill's system, to include, in the same work, an adequate treatment of both Inductive and Deductive Logic. Mr. Devey has essayed this task with great learning and ability. He shows that Mill and his school have fallen into grave errors respecting some doctrines of Formal Logic, necessary truths, and the functions of the Syllogism; but he, at the same time, presents a pretty full account of Inductive Logic, in which, for the most part, he follows Mill. Mr. Devey is a better thinker than writer. Had his style been as simple and clear as his thinking is acute and original, we apprehend his book would have been much more widely read and used in education than, we fear, it has been.

The year 1854 is, however, notable in the history of Logic, because it brought forth Professor Boole's *Investigation of the Laws of Thought, on which are founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities*. This was the second of Professor Boole's works on the subject. He had, in 1847, published a smaller book, *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic*; but the later treatise contains his more developed doctrines. As may be judged from the mere title of these works, the design of Boole is to assimilate the reasoning process to mathematical forms. This is the distinctive feature of his very original and important speculations. It would not be possible to give an adequate or intelligible explanation of Boole's doctrine in a small compass. To be so mastered that their true character may be fairly estimated, either the various chapters of Boole's own work must be studied, or detailed expositions of his principles must be given with copious illustrations. If we felt satisfied that we could give the latter, we have not space for it. We can only just indicate the general direction of his theory. In a very interesting first chapter, entitled "Nature and Design of this Work," Dr. Boole explains the object of his labours. It opens thus: "The design of the following treatise is to investigate the

fundamental laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is performed; to give expression to them in the symbolical language of a calculus, and upon this foundation to establish the science of Logic." He seeks to "exhibit Logic as a system of processes carried on by the aid of symbols, having a definite interpretation, and subject to this interpretation alone;" and he exhibits "these laws as identical in form with the general symbols of algebra," and the end is to show, that "the ultimate laws of Logic are mathematical in their form." In carrying out this design, we may say, Professor Boole describes, in a very clear manner, in the second chapter, "The Signs and Laws;" in the third chapter he explains "How these Laws are Derived;" in the fourth he deals with "The Divisions of Propositions;" in the fifth he develops the "Principles of Symbolical Reasoning;" and in subsequent chapters he treats of interpretation, elimination, reduction, &c. This effort to reduce reasoning to mathematical forms proceeds upon, and in fact is, a new extension of Hamilton's Quantification of the Predicate.

Perhaps it will be best to notice here, in connection with Boole's views, the improvements introduced by Professor Jevons, as these are simply another development of Boole's doctrine. Professor Jevons has published an account of his proposed changes in three separate works, thus titled: *Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality apart from Quantity*, 1864; the *Substitution of Similars, the True Principle of Reasoning*, 1869; and in a paper communicated to the Royal Society, in October, 1869, on the *Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference*. Brief explanations of the doctrines are also given in other works. Professor Jevons' reforms purpose to follow out, in a sort of mechanical method, the doctrine propounded by Hamilton, De Morgan, Boole, and others, as to reasoning being an "equation." As we have already seen, Jevons regards the Quantification of the Predicate as a "great discovery." To him it appears a principle pregnant with mighty results for logical science. Referring to the labours of Thomson, De Morgan, Hamilton, and Boole, he remarks:—

"The result of their exertions has been to effect a breach in the supremacy of the Aristotelian Logic, and to furnish us with a system of logical deduction almost infinitely more general and powerful than anything to be found in the old writers. . . . To George Boole, even more than to any of the logicians I have named, this great advance in logical doctrine is due. . . . The intricate trains of symbolic transformations, by which many of the

examples in the Laws of Thought are solved, can be followed only by highly mathematical minds."—(Paper On the Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference, communicated to the Royal Society, p. 499.)

Now, the design of Jevons is to divest Logic of the mathematical forms in which Boole involved it, and still to secure the same results; that is, to treat propositions as "equations," and reasoning as a process of "elimination" of quantities, as in Algebra. He observes:—"Dr. Boole's remarkable investigations prove that, when once we view the proposition as an equation, all the deductions of the ancient doctrines of Logic, and many more, may be arrived at by the processes of Algebra."* Here, as in the case of Boole, we cannot explain Jevons' system, but may mention that, through the use of symbols—akin to, though different from, those of Algebra—he reduces reasoning to a sort of mechanical process, or rather, perhaps, we should say, he exhibits the process in a mechanical form. The professor accomplishes this by means of a logical Abacus which he has invented, and which he has described in his *Substitution of Similars*, and in a paper read before the Royal Society. His theory is certainly more simple than Boole's, and, at the same time, equally scientific in its character. Without attempting any criticism on these theories, we may observe that the speculations of both these thinkers deserve the closest attention in the study of the present state and prospects of logical science.

Among the works that appeared in the years following the publication of Boole's *Laws of Thought*, we must not omit Professor Spalding's Article on Logic in the 8th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1857, and, under the same date, his treatise, *Introduction to Logical Science*, in a separate volume. Of the many able books with which our logical literature has been enriched of late years, this is one of the best. Spalding takes note of recent improvements, and seeks to incorporate many of these in his discussions. He also adds much to the value of the work by his own research and lucid exposition. In 1860, Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic* were published under the editorship of Dr. Mansel and Professor Veitch. Much has been said about the "crude," "defective," and "imperfect" state in which his system is exhibited in these *Lectures*; but, notwithstanding the appearance of anything of this kind,

* *Substitution of Similars, the True Principle of Reasoning*, p. 8.

these *Lectures* form a grand storehouse of the truths of Formal Logic, luminously stated and ably defended. In Mr. Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1865, seven chapters are devoted to his logical doctrines. These chapters, like the other parts of the volume, contain severe strictures on Hamilton. On some points Mr. Mill is unfair to the great Scotch Professor, on others he succeeds in pointing out flaws in Hamilton's views and reasonings; but, upon the whole, we venture to think he leaves all the fundamental features of Hamilton's Logic untouched. Here we must refer to another book published in the same year as Mr. Mill's *Examination*, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's *Time and Space*. This is not a work expressly on Logic, and it has not hitherto been much noticed in writings on the subject, but it treats, in a very philosophic way, some of the most fundamental questions of logical inquiry. We are not considering Mr. Hodgson's system of philosophy, and therefore say nothing of his doctrine as to the reduction of general notions—indeed, of all knowledge—to the forms of Time and Space; but would merely draw attention to his discussions of a strictly logical character, and these may, in some degree at least, be estimated without adopting his philosophical theory. Besides numerous other sections, the whole of the second part of the volume, which he styles *Metalogical*, may be fairly regarded as bearing immediately on logical discussion. He throws new light on many points of the reasoning process: we would especially remark that his explanation of Induction and Deduction, and of the relation of the one to the other, is the most satisfactory elucidation of the point in the language. In 1866 appeared Dr. McCosh's *Examination of Mill's Philosophy*, in which five chapters are devoted to comment on the controversy between Hamilton and Mill on logical points. Though not characterised by anything very original, these chapters are worth the attention of the Logical student. We must mention here another work that, without treating ostensibly of Logic, contains some of the most searching and suggestive criticisms that are to be found in our philosophical literature. We refer to Dr. Ingleby's *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1869. The second part of this interesting volume is on "The Psychology of the Understanding," and consists of two divisions:—1. "The Theory of Positive Knowledge," and 2. "The Theory of Conditional Knowledge." In both these divisions, and in the notes upon them, we have most masterly strictures on the logical speculations of Kant, Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

Accepting the wide denotation in which Mill has used the term *Logic*—that is, as including inquiries concerning the principles of evidence and methods of investigation,—there are other writings that may be fairly said to come under Logical literature. For instance, we have had a series of books on *Moral Evidence*, on *Moral or Probable Reasoning*, and on the applications of such reasoning in religious and other inquiries. To this class belongs a book well known and highly esteemed half a century ago, and which ran through several editions—*Gambier On Moral Evidence*. This volume contains useful disquisitions on the different kinds of probable reasoning, and many wholesome directions for the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of the faculties. A work under a similar title is *A Treatise on Moral Evidence*, by the Rev. E. A. Smedley, M.A., 1850. But this book covers a somewhat different field from the former. Mr. Smedley's volume is more decidedly religious and theological than Gambier's. Perhaps, however, the ablest volume of this kind is Mr. Bosanquet's *New System of Logic, adapted to Moral Philosophy*; the second edition, 1870, is enlarged and "carried on to religious use and application." This is a work of considerable learning and ability, and comprises acute strictures on the Aristotelian and Syllogistic Logic. With Mr. Bosanquet Logic includes all kinds of reasoning. He says all the faculties of the mind are used in Logic; rhetoric is Logic, and oratory is Logic. He treats of the "Logic of the Bible," and "Religious Logic." Of a somewhat analogous, though certainly of a higher scientific, character, are the following:—

1. The sixth book of Mill's system, entitled *The Logic of the Moral Science*.
2. Sir G. C. Lewis's *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics, &c.*, 1852. This is an attempt to do for the political sciences what Mill has accomplished for general science in his *System of Logic*. It is learned, but it lacks the scientific power that pervades Mill's book.*
3. The second volume of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's *Theory of Practice*, 1870, in which he treats of the Logic of Ethics, the Logic of Politics, the Logic of the Practical Sciences, as theology, art, diplomacy, education, philology, history, &c. This book is written in a thoroughly philosophical spirit.
4. Here we might mention works on the Logic of particular sciences, as Oesterlen's *Medical Logic*, 1855.

* A French work which Sir G. C. Lewis often quotes and refers to—M. C. Comte's *Traité de Législation, ou Exposition des Lois Générales*, 4 vols., Paris, 1826—is really a treatise on methods of inquiry and reasoning in the political sciences. It is a work of great ability.

This, like other treatises of the same character, is simply the application of Inductive Logic to a particular science. Oosterlen professedly bases his work on the writings of Bacon and Mill. 5. We cannot with propriety exclude from Logical literature that important series of legal books entitled, *Treatises on the Law of Evidence*. These works directly unfold and apply a well-digested system of principles of Evidence to a special sort of inquiry after truth. They are essentially logical in their nature. In opening his great work *On the Law of Evidence*,* Professor Greenleaf distinctly refers to the principles of Logic as the foundation of his work. The English literature on the law of evidence has been greatly extended within the last fifty years, and now constitutes a body of logical discussion of a highly scientific character.

There is another sphere of thought which belongs to the domain of Logic—the theory of Probability and Chance. Speaking on this point, Thomson says, “This subject is the border-land between Logic and Mathematics, and the claim of the latter to it is stronger than the former.”† Still, De Morgan, Boole, and others have considered inquiries about Chance and Probability a part of logical inquiry, and their speculations on this subject are deeply interesting and instructive. For the general reader, however, the best treatise in our language on this subject is *The Logic of Chance: an Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, with especial Reference to its Application to Moral and Social Science*, by John Venn, M.A., 1866. This is a production that deals with Probability and Chance without Mathematics, and is nevertheless a thoroughly scientific book. It may, with the best advantage, be read in advanced logical classes.

Chronologically we have now reached the works that have appeared within the last few years. Most of those in our list are text-books, respecting which we shall say a word in the sequel. Ueberweg's *System of Logic* is a work of higher pretensions. This treatise comes to us from Germany. Now, in that country, Logic has not been neglected during the last century and a-half as it has been in England. Sir W. Hamilton remarks, “in Germany Logic has always been estimated at its proper value.”‡ Since the time of Wolff, and particularly since the days of Kant, Logic has been assiduously cultivated by our speculative neighbours. Many of the ablest thinkers

* *A Treatise on the Law of Evidence*, p. 3.

† *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 257.

‡ Reid's *Works*, p. 711.

among them have devoted their best energies to dialectical inquiries. The consequence is, the Germans have a rich Logical literature. As was inevitable under such circumstances, several distinct schools have arisen among them. There are, in the first place, what may be called the two extremes; the one represented by Kant, the leader of the Pure Logic, which concerns itself with the laws and forms of thought, and not its matter; and the other represented by Hegel, who propounds a doctrine, which, in effect, goes to identify existence with thought, in a way somewhat analogous to the doctrine of Plato about ideas. Between these are several sects:—some that more or less closely follow Kant, and hold views similar to those of Hamilton and Mansel in this country; and others who, in different forms, hold that Logic is concerned with things, or knowledge of realities, as Mill and his school teach with us. Ueberweg tells us that a number of eminent logicians “hold a middle course between the Subjectively-formal and the Metaphysical Logics.”* It is important to remark, that Ueberweg himself seeks to occupy a position in this middle course. He is equally opposed to what he calls “Subjectively-formal Logic,” as taught by Kant and Hamilton, and to the Metaphysical Logic of Hegel and his school. “Logic,” he says, “must deal with knowledge, with facts, the truths of things, and not simply with laws of thought.” There are two kinds of truth—“formal truth, and material truth; Logic has to do with both.”† Ueberweg defines the science briefly thus: “Logic is the science of the regulative laws of human knowledge;” or more fully thus: “With respect, therefore, to the aim and end of knowledge, Logic is the scientific solution of the question relating to the criteria of truth; or the doctrine of the regulative laws, on whose observance rests the realisation of the idea of truth in the theoretical activity of man.”‡ From these statements and extracts, the reader will see what are Ueberweg’s views of the nature and province of Logic, and what his position in relation to other logical sects. He divides Logic into—1. Pure; 2. Applied. Pure Logic teaches both the laws of immediate knowledge or perception, and those of mediate knowledge or thought. Here we see at once his fundamental separation from the school of Formal Logic. Applied Logic treats of the method of inquiry in the different sciences.§

In his preface, Mr. Lindsay states, that Ueberweg’s Logic

* *System of Logic*, pp. xi. xii.

† *Ibid.* pp. 5–7.

‡ *Ibid.* pp. 3–6.

§ *Ibid.* pp. 16–18.

"enjoys a popularity among German students that is shared by no other manual;" and this fact, and the "knowledge that there is no really good logical text-book for advanced students in our language, has led me to undertake this translation." Now, without being quite so confident as Mr. Lindsay is on the last point, we congratulate him on having accomplished this important undertaking, and we heartily thank him for his translation, and for the many useful additions to the text, in the shape of insertions, notes, and appendices. The treatise will form a valuable addition to our Logical literature, both on account of its intrinsic merits as a body of logical discussion, and because it brings us into acquaintance with the workings of the German mind on this part of philosophy. We are satisfied that the work will be acceptable to the advanced classes in Logic, as it is admirably adapted to aid them in what Sir W. Hamilton calls "the higher logical philosophy," as well as in what may be called the historico-critical inquiries in Logic. Ueberweg's book supplies a large amount of historical and critical information, that will have a peculiar interest for the higher students. This sort of information will stimulate and assist the reader in a comparison of the various schools and systems. Discussions of this nature have not been so much cultivated in England as we think they should be. Then, by dealing with "the regulative laws of knowledge," the author takes the student into a wide and important inquiry as to the origin and nature of human knowledge. On these and other grounds, without subscribing to all Ueberweg's views, we strongly recommend his book to the attention of all interested in the subject, and we trust that Mr. Lindsay's effort to place it before English readers will be appreciated as it deserves. We will only add a hope that, in future editions, Mr. Lindsay will be able to simplify many of the sentences, and thus render their meaning clearer and their construction more English.

While, as we have seen, English literature on this subject has been expanding—growing in range and power—and while the science has been greatly improved, it is satisfactory to know that logical studies have progressed in an equally successful manner. It was noted in the early part of this paper that the study of Logic was in a very degraded condition in our schools fifty years ago. Writing some years after the issue of Whately's *Elements*, Sir W. Hamilton said, "the last decade has done more in Oxford for the cause of this science, than the whole hundred and thirty years preceding." With

the awakened interest in the subject, chairs of Logic have been instituted, or new life has been infused into the old ones, through the appointment of Professors that fully entered into the spirit of the new movement. In the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, at Liverpool, and other places, logical chairs have been founded, and Professors appointed, who have taught Logic in a thoroughly scientific way, and with eminent success. In Scotland, the number of logical professorships has been increased, and a reformation effected in the old ones through modern appointments. In other places of higher education, in the newer universities and colleges, in provincial colleges—as Owen's College, Manchester—in Theological seminaries, and in colleges belonging to the different denominations, Logic has been raised to a regular study, and has been, for some years past, efficiently taught. Its private study has also been much extended, through a knowledge of the subject being required in public examinations, as in those for the Indian Civil Service, and by the Society of Arts,* as well as by the philosophical tendencies of the age. In the two great Universities the change may have been slower, but it has been no less complete. So late as 1847, Professor De Morgan wrote, "We live in an age in which Formal Logic has long been nearly banished from education; entirely, we may say, from the education of the habits. The students of all our Universities (Cambridge excepted) may have heard lectures, and learned the forms of the Syllogism to this day; but the practice has been small, and out of the Universities (and too often in them) the very name of Logic is a by-word."† We venture to affirm that all this is now altered. In the great seats of learning, in provincial and other colleges, the old meagre text-books have given place to the scientific works of the present time. No better evidence could be given of this, than is furnished by the superior text-books which have been recently issued from Oxford alone, from the character of the books read at Oxford, and from the following list of works prescribed for reading at Cambridge, and approved by grace of the Senate of the University in 1867:—Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*; Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*; Whately's *Elements*; Thomson's *Outline of the Laws of Thought*; Ba-

* It is a matter of regret that the Society of Arts should retain in their list of books to be used by candidates for their Logical examination, Whately's *Elements*, when there are so many books so much better suited for elementary instruction. Whately's book is in every respect unsuitable for junior students, or for a first course.

† *Formal Logic*, p. 240.

con's *Novum Organon*; Mill's *System of Logic*; Whewell's *Novum Organon Renovatum*.*

After all that has been said about the progress of Logical literature, the development of the science, the doctrines of the different schools, and the extension of its study, it may here be asked, what precisely is the thing whose study it is sought further to extend? What is to be understood by Logic? In answer to this question it will be needful briefly to indicate to what our historical sketch has led up. We apprehend it has been made clear that the term Logic has been very differently applied by philosophers during the last two centuries, and by writers belonging to the different schools of Logic in our time. It is manifest that it has been used to denote widely different things. Still we submit the progress of recent years will enable us to reconcile the different theories as to what should be termed Logic, and lead us to apply the word to a more definite and systematic body of truth, than could have been done at a former period. We have seen that before Whately wrote the term was used in a loose, vacillating sense. He protested against this practice, and contended for a very restricted application of the word: he sought to limit it to the mere process of reasoning, and held that any wider application was not an extension of the science, but only amounted to a verbal extension. In after years, Hamilton and Mansel extended the term from Whately's process of reasoning to the larger field covered by Formal Logic, and they, like Whately, contended that it should be limited to this. When speaking of the divisions of Logic into Pure, Modified, or Concrete, Hamilton says: "Modified Logic and Psychology are not distinct. It is on this ground that I hold that, in reality, Modified Logic is neither an essential part, nor an independent species of Logic, but that it is a mere mixture of Logic and Psychology. There is thus, in truth, only one Logic." This was Hamilton's theory. He said Formal Logic was the only Logic; but he felt he could not carry out this notion, and he acknowledged that "Modified Logic" should be included, though he did this under "protest."† In a similar way, Dr. Mansel maintained that the science should be confined to Formal Logic.‡ This doctrine makes Formal Logic the "whole" of logical science. Now, although this branch has been much improved of late years, and is now a truly valuable science, yet, as our readers will know, the ablest thinkers of

* Dr. Ingleby's *Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge*, 1870, p. 46.

† *Lectures on Logic*, Vol. I. p. 63.

‡ *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 6.

he age demur to the dogma that Formal Logic is the *whole* of Logic.* It will suffice again to mention Mill's extension of the science, and his application of the term, not only to deductive reasoning about things, but to Induction, in his wide use of the term. His views have been extensively accepted by scientific men, and many treatises have appeared, since his system was published, in which the broad conception of the nature and province of Logic is adopted. As instances of this, we might mention several of the books whose titles are given at the head of this article.

Apart from the views of what may be called minor sects, the question presents itself:—Cannot these two conflicting schools of Logic be reconciled or united, so far as that all may agree, not simply to extend the use of the term, but to bring under that designation a body of scientific truth that is bound together by common principles,—by a higher generalisation? This we think may be accomplished; nay, several of the ablest of recent writers proceed on the assumption that such a union is an accomplished fact. Hamilton and Mansel contend that there are necessary laws which regulate thought in deductive inference. Granted; but is this the case in the sphere of Formal Logic only? Are not the processes of inductive reasoning as certainly determined by law, as those of deductive reasoning? Mill and others maintain that they are; if so, why not say that Logic is the genus, and that Formal Logic constitutes one species, and Inductive Logic another species? Why not regard these as co-ordinate kinds or divisions of Logic? Such a mode of speaking of Logic and of its divisions seems quite compatible with the claims which Hamilton puts forth, in some passages, for Formal Logic, and it is certainly agreeable to the views of the other school. Professor Spalding defines Logic—"The theory of inference." Now, as Induction is as much a process of inference as Deduction, what valid objection can be urged against the union of these two as parts of one general science, or against their being regarded as co-ordinate species of this generic theory of inference? We know of none. It seems to us that Hamilton himself has admitted the propriety of this course in the following passage:—

"But allowing the term Logic to be extended so as to denote the genus of which these opposite doctrines of method are the species, it

* Many writers that do not belong to Mill's school of thought have expressed strong opinions as to the propriety of including Induction in Logical Science, and against its exclusion. See Dr. McCosh's *Examination of Mill's Philosophy*, p. 317, and Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's *Time and Space*, p. 471.

will, however, be necessary to add a difference by which these special Logics may be distinguished from each other, and from the generic science of which they are constituents. The doctrine, therefore, which expounds the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, in so far as these lie in the forms of thought, or in the conditions of the mind itself, which is the subject in which knowledge inheres,—this science may be called Formal, or Subjective, or Abstract, or Pure Logic. The science, again, which expounds the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, in so far as these lie in the contents, materials, or objects, about which knowledge is conversant,—this science may be called Material, or Objective, or Concrete, or Applied Logic.”*

Here, we submit, Hamilton yields the point in dispute. His second kind of Logic covers nearly the same ground as Mill's Inductive Logic. On the other side, although Mill depreciates Formal Logic, he admits that it may be accepted and useful as *one kind or part of Logical science*. He says:—

“That this part of Logic should be distinguished and named, and made an object of consideration separately from the rest, is perfectly natural. What I protest against, is the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and many other thinkers, that this part is the *whole*, that there is no other Logic, or Pure Logic at all; that whatever is more than this belongs, not to a general science or art of thinking, but (in the words of Mr. Mansel) to this or that material science.”†

After these admissions, may not the two theories be united to form one generic science of the universal laws of thinking,—a science that shall include Abstract and Concrete Logic, Pure and Applied Logic, Formal and Material Logic, Subjective and Objective Logic, Primary and Secondary Logic, General and Special Logic, Universal and Particular Logic, Deductive and Inductive Logic?‡

Such, we take it, is the conception of Logic accepted by the best thinkers, and such the representations of its nature

* *Lectures on Logic*, Vol. II., p. 231.

† *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 400.

‡ The definitions and divisions of Logic that are found in recent logicians, vary vastly in their wording. It would be instructive to bring the principal of these together and compare them, with the design of noting their agreements and real differences. There is much more substantial agreement in these modern definitions than many might suppose. It would not be difficult to reconcile or harmonise them. In his introduction to Aldrich, Dr. Mansel enumerates a number of apparently conflicting definitions. His list, however, is very defective, and the definitions are too briefly given. We do not concur in the remark of Professor Jevons, when he declares, “Modern Logic has been mystified by the diversity of views, and by the complication and profuseness of the formulæ invented by different authors.” We think this mist might easily be dissipated.

to be found in their writings. To us this conception seems to be just and sound, and scientifically established. Now, the study of Logic, so understood, must be an efficient instrument of mental training, and, as a consequence, it is admirably fitted for use in the great work of education. On the utility of Logic for this and other purposes much has been written. Our original design was to consider this point at some length, with the object of vindicating for Logic a larger employment in places of secondary instruction, and in all institutions that aim to widen and deepen the general culture of the people. There are peculiarities in the intellectual tendencies of Englishmen, and in the circumstances by which they are surrounded, which render it desirable that more attention should be given in their training to abstract thinking than hitherto has been given. Further, the form which Logical science has now taken singularly fits it to meet these peculiarities in the intellectual character and social condition of our countrymen. For a development of this argument we have not space; but we may present, instead, a statement of the heads under which the utility of this study has been argued.

1. In past times powers have been claimed for Logic which it does not possess. In this way much injury was done to the science and its study. It is therefore undesirable to claim for Logic any utility which cannot be realised. Whately, Thomson, Hamilton, and Mansel have dwelt upon this topic, and have shewn that the setting up of false utilities arose chiefly from misconceptions as to the nature and province of Logic.

2. The uses of Logic have been described and argued under two general heads:—1, its Subjective utility; and 2, its Objective utility. To the former have been referred its usefulness as an instrument of knowledge and a means of mental discipline; to the latter, the positive knowledge which it supplies as the science of the laws of thought and evidence, or, in the words of Hamilton, as "that complement of doctrines of which the science of Logic is made up."

3. Without adhering strictly to this division, we may say that Logic, in its objective character, is entitled to study because it presents, like every other science, a body of truth—of systematic truth. It professes to supply a system of reasoned truth in reference to the operations of the mind in thinking. Now, it has long been held that, irrespective of the practical utility of a body of truths, they, simply as truths, are worthy the examination of thoughtful men. Mr.

Garden urges this point with force in reference to Logic. He observes:—"All knowledge is desirable, as such, and irrespective of its results; and on this ground Logic is its own justification."* Thomson argues to the same effect.† Dr. Mansel says:—"The only question worthy a liberal mind, as regards the result of any investigation, is not, Is it useful? but, Is it true?"‡ If, therefore, it be admitted that Logic supplies a body of truth, these truths ought to be examined, and we are warranted to conclude, from the bare fact that its doctrines are truths, that a knowledge of them will be useful.

4. The very subject, however, to which these truths relate, confers on their examination a special dignity and importance. These truths relate to the human mind, "the greatest thing on earth," to its modes and laws of action. This fact alone should invest the study and knowledge of Logic with deep interest.

5. Then Logic is not simply a speculative, but it is also a practical, science. Its principles and laws are susceptible of application. The knowledge of these laws may be applied to guide our own thinking, and to correct the unsound or erroneous thinking of others. "Correct thinking is the fulfilment of laws, but it is possible to transgress these laws, and to think unsoundly."§ Now, the mere knowledge of the laws of thought will no more make a man a correct thinker, than a knowledge of optics will make a man see better; but, through its application, this knowledge may be of practical use to any one, both in aiding him to form just habits of thought and in helping him to detect false thinking in others. If so, what knowledge could be more practically useful? ||

6. In reference to Inductive Logic, the knowledge it imparts is more extensive in range, and more varied in character, than that furnished by Formal Logic, and the relation of this knowledge to the practical affairs of life more immediate and

* Garden's *Outline of Logic*, pp. 3-4.

† *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 69.

‡ Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 187.

§ *Ibid.* pp. 4-5.

|| Dr. McCosh observes: "By a logical training the mind is led to look keenly into the meaning of terms, and the relation of terms one to another, to place the case fairly before it, to sift the proof which may be proffered, and to determine how far it is fitted to support the conclusion. How useful, too, to know what are the common forms of invalid reasoning, to be aware of the places where error lurks, that so we may be on our guard against its insidious attacks, or ready, if need be, to seek it out, and expose it to view, and hunt it to death. By such a discipline, the mind may acquire a habit which will lead it spontaneously to reason accurately, and engender a spirit of penetration, scrutiny, and caution, which will save it from being carried along by impulse, by plausible statement, and clap-trap oratory."—*Laws of Discursive Thought*, p. 170.

tangible. As we have seen, Inductive Logic is concerned with the principles of evidence and methods of investigation, in all their varied applications. Hence, this knowledge is useful in almost every sort of intellectual effort or pursuit of life. It would seem to be unnecessary to insist on the utility of knowledge of this nature.

7. Yet, it may be argued that, in these times, when scientific knowledge is deemed to be essential, not simply to the advancement of culture, but as a means of material progress, and as an aid to industrial and commercial prosperity, the knowledge furnished by Inductive Logic is directly useful to all classes of the community.

8. Further, we may be allowed to say that the knowledge of the formation of science, of the nature of scientific truth, its conditions and real import, facilitates the acquisition of other knowledge, especially the acquisition of a knowledge of the sciences. Nothing will more directly assist and guide the student in such pursuits than the Logic of Induction; and nothing will more effectually lead to an accurate and thorough mastery of any part of science, or explain the foundation and dependence of its truths, than the information supplied by this branch of Logic. Without this, ordinary scientific instruction is almost certain to be merely empirical. Hence we say that in Grammar and Proprietary Schools, in Middle-class Colleges, and schools of every kind; in short, in primary schools and institutions where it is attempted to teach science, the elements of the Logic of Science should also be taught. It is the most effective means of rendering instruction in science truly scientific and not merely empirical.

9. Another kind of positive knowledge which the study of Logic supplies is that respecting the relation between language and thought. Language is the instrument of thinking, as well as the vehicle for the communication of thought. Logic explains this, and the knowledge is all-important to clear thinking and the accurate expression of thought. On this ground, if not on any other, this subject should be systematically studied by all who are destined to engage in the important work of teaching.

10. But, after all, the study of logic is most valuable as a means of mental development and discipline. Of the two objects of education—the impartation of knowledge and the unfolding and disciplining of the faculties—the latter is by far the more important, and the study of Logic is admirably fitted to promote that end. This utility has been insisted upon by almost every writer upon the subject; still, it does

not seem to be well understood or properly appreciated. Professor Bowen observes:—

“The chief function of Logic is disciplinary, for the effort to acquire it may be said to equal or surpass in value the subsequent use to be made of the acquisition. It is not of so much importance to know as it is to have strengthened and developed all the faculties in learning to know. No other study taxes so severely the power of abstract thought, and hence no one furnishes better preparatory training for the pursuit of all the sciences which do not consist mainly in accumulating facts and registering the materials thus obtained.”—*Treatise on Logic*, p. 43.

The efficacy of any study as a means of discipline depends largely upon the way in which it is taught. Now, if Logic be thoroughly mastered, if the exposition of doctrine is accompanied by copious and suitable exercises at every step, the study is peculiarly well adapted to call into vigorous exercise some of the most important faculties of the mind, and to discipline these to just habits of action.

11. The practical tendencies of the English mind, combined with the devotion of the nation to material interests, render it specially desirable that our youth should be far more disciplined to abstract thinking than they now are. We concur with the remarks of Dr. Morell on this point, in the preface to his useful *Handbook of Logic*. He says:—

“There can be no doubt, I think, that the whole system of English education has hitherto been greatly wanting in the sound development of the powers of *abstract thinking*. The proper road, nevertheless, to the cultivation of these powers appears to me to be very simple. . . . After the principles of Grammar have been well understood, the laws of thought, which are spontaneously involved in language, should be studied *more scientifically*; and to do this we want a simple introduction to Logic.”—Preface, p. 3.

At the head of this article we have placed the titles of a number of recently-published works on Logic. The list might have been extended; but those given may be taken as fairly representing the present state of Logical science in its different aspects in this country, as well as the efforts made to supply books for its elementary and advanced study. Two or three of these books have already been mentioned; the rest are properly text-books. From the titles of these works it will be seen that several of them are designed to cover the enlarged field of Logical inquiry, as they treat both of Deductive and Inductive Logic. It is so in the case of the productions

of Mr. Fowler, Professor Bain, and Professor Jevons. Mr. Fowler and Professor Bain give a separate volume to each of the two kinds of Logic, and in both cases Induction occupies a much larger space than Deduction. The other works are mostly devoted to Deductive or Formal Logic, though some of them contain brief explanations of Induction. There are two or three respects in which we may speak of these books collectively. In the first place, it may be said that they indicate sterling ability, a mastery of the subject, and improvement in the adaptation of text-books for teaching purposes. Then, they are not mere compilations, or other works rewritten, but compositions which display original power, in one direction or another, and which unfold the fundamental principles of Logic in a scientific spirit. With considerable variety of plan, the details are generally arranged in a lucid way, and the rules illustrated by well-chosen examples. In nearly all, even the more elementary, the improvements of recent years are explained, and in several cases these changes approved. In one other respect, some of these books show a decided advance upon the text-books of a generation ago—they include exercises. Several are without anything of this kind, and we regard this as a great defect; and the others vary in the extent to which the exercises are carried. Exercises, copious and appropriate exercises, are essential to a practical mastering of Logic by the young student. We hold that examples and exercises are as needful in the teaching of Logic as in the teaching of arithmetic or grammar. The principles and rules must be exemplified by instances, and a knowledge of the application of these principles and rules can only be wrought into the mind of the young students in this, as in other branches, through their being called upon practically to work out exercises for themselves.

In reference to the individual character of these works, we may say that Mr. Fowler's two volumes are written in a clear, forcible style, which indicates the vigorous thinker; they present the two sciences, or two kinds of Logic, in a form admirably adapted to assist the intelligent student. We have sometimes felt that he might expand the Deductive part with advantage to junior readers. Professor Bain's volumes are more pretentious, and offer a more elaborate exposition of the science in its two divisions; but they are inferior to Mr. Fowler's in almost every attribute that fits a book for the practical work of instruction. The work "aims at embracing a full course of Logic," and certainly the matter is abundant, but it is not well digested. Dr. Bain seems of

late to have turned book-maker. His style lacks the precision, the simplicity, and the point so needful in elementary works. In this book he seeks to cover too much ground, and deals with too many subjects. For an advanced or "full course" on Induction, the student should go at once to Mill's work; it is incomparably better than Dr. Bain's. Dr. McCosh's *Laws of Discursive Thought* is confined to Formal Logic, and, in reference to the "notion" and some other parts, it is very good. The author, however, attaches too much importance to his deviations from the great masters of this school. Mr. Shedden's *Elements* and Mr. Garden's *Outline* are both excellent manuals, though they differ considerably, as well in plan as in execution. Mr. Turrell's *Manual* is very short, but it is a very accurate statement of the laws of Formal Logic. It should be accompanied by fuller explanations and illustrations by the teacher. Mr. Coleman's *Notes* are well suited for the purpose he designs them. Mr. Killick's exposition of Mr. Mill's system is uncommonly well done; it is clear and faithful. Prof. Jevons' *Lessons* is a most capital introduction to the science. He possesses a rare power of explaining, illustrating, and simplifying the subject, and his exercises are copious and of the right sort. This little volume is, undeniably, the best text-book in the language for elementary classes, or for a first course. We should be glad if, in future editions, the author could enlarge the portion devoted to Induction. If this part of the work could be made a little fuller, the book would be almost perfect as a manual for elementary instruction in Logic. The *Maynooth Compendium* presents a careful digest of the principles of Deductive Logic as now received, as well as the discussion of some important philosophical questions that do not strictly belong to Logic.

ART. III.—*Comment l'Eglise Romaine n'est plus l'Eglise Catholique.* Par M. L'ABBE MICHAUD, Docteur en Théologie. Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher. 1872.

THE present Revolution—Reformation it cannot be called—in Roman Catholicism will have one immediate good effect at least, whatever its ulterior results may be. It will do very much towards neutralising or abolishing a certain *prestige* which has been conferred upon that system by its supposed unity of constitution and doctrine. The book mentioned above gives in a simple form the best accessible epitome of the evidence on this subject. In common with all other organs of English opinion, we have endeavoured to do justice to the German movement, and shall yet more fully examine its pretensions. But on many accounts we are more interested at present in the French form of it; and certainly the French exposition of the New—that is, of the Old—Catholicism are decidedly the most luminous and readable.

M. Michaud sets out by demonstrating that the Roman Church is not able to sustain the ancient fourfold test of the Notes of the Church. Those Notes have been from the beginning four: Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity; which, rightly interpreted, and taken as a quadruple test in their mutual relations, may be accepted universally, and applied to all communities that profess to belong to the Church of Christ. The Abbé shows that the addition of *Roman* has been made in the more recent catechisms of the Ultramontanes, simply from a lurking consciousness that their Church cannot now bear the application of the four, and to protect them from all consequences.

Taking Unity first, he maintains that unity must be the agreement of the Church with herself, not at any one particular time, but at all times. Now, the dogmatic definition of Papal infallibility and omnipotence has created a total rupture with the Catholic faith as taught before July 18, 1870. Applying his principle no further than to that one article of faith, he is able with great force to show that unity in the doctrines of religion is utterly given up; the older faith is thereby renounced. He then goes on to point out that the New Catholics—that is, the adherents of this

new faith—are not one among themselves, save in the unity of hypocrisy and fear. His description of the discord between the open profession and the secret and well-known sentiments of many of the submissive bishops, is a very sad one, but supported by good evidence. He says, with regard to this, and after quoting some strong sentences, written in 1769, on the Bull *Unigenitus*, by a priest of the last century : “ It is very much the same at the present time, in regard to the dogmatic decrees of the *Conciliabule* of the Vatican. If souls were transparent, what scandalous disagreements would be witnessed ! The priests who rally round the new Rome know this so well, that they dare not, even at the confessional, even before God, interrogate the faithful as to their belief ; and, even when they know that these penitents do not believe the new dogmas, they feign to be ignorant, in order that they may exteriorly and legally absolve them. To such stratagems are men reduced in the actual Roman Church ! ” It is further asserted, that an eminent English archbishop believes in the new dogmas, only as a help to the easier administration of his Church ; himself, however, tolerating a nephew who avows his non-belief in these dogmas. Other similar charges are made, which, as names are not given, we think add little weight to the argument. For the following, however, the names are given :—

“ We know two religious of great renown in Europe, who, embarrassed between the desire of saving their communities from the thunders of the Vatican and the claims of their consciences, submitted, but with the following expedient as a solace. The one said, ‘ It is one thing to obey, another to believe ; I obey, but I believe not ; ’—as if it was possible to obey in matters of faith without believing ! The other said, ‘ I believe the decrees of the Council, but I believe them in the sense in which God alone knows them to be true, for no man actually, not even the Pope, can know the true sense of these decrees ; God alone can and will make them clear in the course of events ; ’—as if the natural sense of these decrees was not plain enough, and as if it was not illusory to maintain, that one must be in agreement with the Pope in admitting the decrees, but might be in disagreement with him as to the explanation of their sense ! We have known another Religious, not less illustrious than the two former, Father Gratry, who submitted solely to obviate what he called a schism, but not because he was persuaded of the intrinsic verity of the new dogmas, and who feared not to explain them after his own fancy, in such a manner as to make them square with the general sciences of religion, and what he was pleased to call *Pharmonie féconde*.”

Now, M. Michaud has a right to plead against the unity of

a Church whose bishops excommunicate their priests for not accepting a dogma which they themselves interpret in a non-natural sense, and whose priests, in community and out, in whole bodies declare, while they submit, that they do not hold the session of 18th July, 1870, for œcumenical, and so many ministers of which keep silence, because an indiscreet word would deprive them of their duties and of their bread. The following words, however, suggest whether the Abbé is not using an argument that proves too much, and recoils upon himself:—

“It is thus that silently reasons an entire third of the French clergy; and, certainly, if there were in France, as elsewhere, numerous committees of Old Catholics, organised to gather the alms of the faithful, and sufficiently provided with resources to open the churches, maintain the worship, and assure the subsistence of the priests who would devote themselves to the preaching of true Catholicism, there might take place in a short time a resurrection that would astonish France, and which would be verily a resurrection of France herself, whether in a national or in a religious point of view. Be that as it may, the present situation of the Romanist Church betrays on all sides the most complete scepticism. To listen to the explanations of her most intelligent members, the act of faith is no longer one of the intelligence, but only an act of the will. It is enough to be reputed a believer, to have a certain *velleity* of believing; that is to say, to desire to submit the will to the teaching of the Pope. But it is not necessary to believe really; that is to say, to adhere, in spirit and in heart, to the doctrines supposed to be now revealed. The doubt of the mind, and even positive repugnance to the Papal symbol, are tolerated. All that is required is, to speak truly, the desire of submitting the will. Now, this theory of the nature of the act of faith is absolutely false, for it divides a man against himself; it permits the spirit to protest against the will; it lets the reason, the faculty destined to union with God as much as the heart, be separated from Jesus Christ and His Church; it tolerates a divorce between science and faith; it transforms Catholics into men to whom absurdity costs nothing, and dogmas into theses politically necessary but scientifically inadmissible.”

It is strange that the Abbé Michaud, and many other Old Catholics who use the same line of remark, do not perceive that the principle they adopt would drive them out of the Old Catholicism as well as out of the New. They have only to carry their principle back, and apply it gradually to all those developments which from age to age have been added to the body of doctrine. At each application the Church will be detected in the act of violating its unity; and at what point will M. Michaud be content to accept the Church

as one? In fact, we may be yet more stringent. Before this new dogma divided between the Old and the New, the Old had itself been divided, by the "Immaculate Conception," and ceased therefore to be the true Church. Therefore, that very Church, to which M. Michaud and others think they adhere, was not the Catholic Church at all; for it was not at unity with the Church before 1854, and not united in itself. Here is a great inconsistency. As to the other point, that of velleity to believe being substituted for faith, it also is a principle which may easily be applied with great force against those who use it, and many others besides them. Can these Old Catholics honestly say that they believe, *ex animo*, all the dogmas which Rome had enforced upon them before; and that they hold no articles of faith which they hold simply because they must believe, or at any rate accept, dogmas that the Church has made articles of faith? The New Catholics,—that is, in the modern phrase, "the whole body of the subjects of the Pope,"—are divided in faith: therefore they cease to be the one Church. And, if souls were transparent, we think it very probable that the Old Catholics would, on the very first inspection, and on the inspection of any diocese, any religious house, and almost any individual priest, be convicted of the same breach of unity. Indeed, we fear the imputation might be carried much further. Few Protestant communities would endure so rigid a test. But we have nothing to do with them now. Suffice that the Old Catholics, revolting against a Church that has lost its unity because it accepts dogmas which it does not heartily believe, are inconsistent in falling back upon the same Church, in a somewhat earlier form, which had been again and again guilty of the same violations of unity.

The next Note is Sanctity. This Catholic protester against Catholicism calls the Roman system the Brahmanism of the West, and an entire corruption, not only of the dogma of Catholicism, but of its morals also. It is said to turn obedience to God into obedience to man. The Courses of Morals in the Jesuit seminaries are shown to be now no more than a miserable Science of Casuistry. The Sacrament of Penance is disappearing before what is called *Direction*. The Abbé lets us into the secret that the Confessor is retreating, in the upper circles, before the Director. "Certain priests—and they are well known—boast among their friends of being, not the Confessors, but the Directors of such and such souls. Confession is the lot of inferior priests. What they call the high clergy, or the distinguished clergy, sometimes blush to be

numbered simply amongst the dispensers of absolution, as if absolution was not the exercise of the sacerdotal power received from Jesus Christ!" Doubtless, there is much ground for all this. But here again we cannot help asking, What authority there is in Scripture for the plenary absolution pronounced in the private confessional, which there is not for the direction, and conduct, and plenary guidance of souls, bereft of personal responsibility, to heaven? There is no Scriptural argument for either; but the Old Catholics vehemently condemn Romanism for the one, while they hold fast the other with great tenacity.

But our candid Romanist—for he is a Romanist, let him protest ever so much, his speech and tone and unevangelical faith betray him—takes occasion here to denounce certain views of the Sacrament of Penance which, to our minds, inhere in the very sacrament itself. The following grave charges, which we shall epitomise, lie against the so-called sacerdotal administration of this un-Christian sacrament everywhere, whether in Old or in New Catholicism. They will have all the more weight as coming from a Roman Catholic priest. In theory, Contrition occupies the first place in the Sacrament of Penitence; but, in practice, it is relegated to the second or third place, in order that self-accusation of faults may take precedence; and this accusation becomes rather a recital than an accusation. Instead of dwelling on the sin, the penitent is occupied with the scandalous narrative of the circumstances of the sin. If he thinks that his soul is relieved from condemnation, it is not really because he has repented of the fault, but because he *has told all*. And this is the result of the confessor's own act, who often indulges a feeling of curiosity, and, it may be, of worse than curiosity. "Whatever may be said of his sentiments, is it not true that the act in itself is too often only an act of inquisition, and of inquisition profoundly immoral? Thus the penitent, instead of confessing his sins, is tempted to dilate on those of others; and the confessor, instead of hearing the simple avowal of an individual fault, penetrates into the secrets of families, rules them as he lists in the name of God, too often separates by his imprudent counsels those who without him would have remained in the bonds of domestic love, and intermeddles with questions that often have to do more with physiology than morals, not to say religion." Again we would ask: Has this perversion of the priestly, or rather ministerial relation, been the result of modern Jesuitism—its new doctrines, new directories, and new aims? Certainly not; and we question

if M. Michaud or any of his brethren would not honestly confess that to a certain extent, it belongs to the system; and that the Sacrament of Penance cannot be administered without great danger of morals. Some occasional exceptions there may be; but, as sure as the ministry is that of man, such functions as these are perilous. So long as the *confessio oris* in the sacrament is poured into human ears, as of necessity, there will be, not only this frightful danger, but this absolute necessity, of evil. The Abbé complains that the *contritio cordis* is omitted or postponed in practice, although in theory it goes first. And is this to be wondered at? Who can forgive sins but God alone? Who can read the heart but God alone? It is utterly impossible to do justice to the heart's feeling of sorrow, save to God. And the evil that is here so frankly acknowledged—though with a one-sided bitterness, as if it belonged to the New Rome alone—is absolutely inseparable from the Sacrament itself. It was in the system before M. Michaud rebelled; go where he will, if he carries the sacrament with him, he will carry with him this element of danger—that of degrading the humble confession of the sin that the heart mourns over to God into what is too miserable to be further dwelt upon.

But the third impeachment of the morality of Rome in relation to the Sacrament of Penance is the change that has come over the third part of it, that of Satisfaction. "The Satisfaction that ought to be an expiation of the past and a preservative for the future, is ordinarily only an empty prayer, expiating nothing, having no relation to the faults committed, and requiring no effort that might tend to improve the character. If the penitent forgets it or neglects it, nothing is affected; it is enough that he tells his director so at the next confession, and then all is settled; or, if the penance is not a dull prayer, it is an alms imposed in a certain way, so that, if not agreeable to the penitent, it shall be profitable to the confessor." How is it that the eloquent censor of Romanism, who here describes one of the common perversions of the doctrine of Satisfaction, does not see that such a perversion is matter of necessity in wholesale confessions, when all kinds of sins are confessed, and all kinds of penances must then and there be extemporised. How is it that, in his ardour for releasing the Church from the fetters of modern Jesuitism, he does not see that these fetters are only the modern form of fetters that were forged long ages ago, though later than the Apostolic times? Where is the doctrine of human Satisfaction taught in the Scripture? Where is

the term expiation, or the idea it conveys, applied in the Bible to any acts of men? Where is the distinction between sins that may be thrown upon the sole expiatory merit of the Redeemer and those which demand man's own expiation united with His? Were it not for the sad consequences of all this, and the subversion of evangelical principles involved, we should be disposed to rejoice over what M. Michaud complains of—the imposition of prayers for penance that have no connection with the offence. There is some slight mitigation in the evil here. The very futility of the supposed expiation protects the truth of the real sacrifice. No sane mind could suppose that such petty inflictions avail to neutralise the evil and punishment of sin.

M. Michaud traces the corruption of morals—that is, the violation of the Note of Sanctity which belongs to the true Church—to the Jesuit ethical teaching. We go with him to almost any extent in condemnation of this Society, as troublers of Christendom. But, while admitting that the three principles which he quotes are the symbolical expression of most of the ethical degeneracy of Catholic Christendom, we cannot forget that these are themselves only the growth and result of the teaching of the Mediæval Church to which our Old Catholics cling. It may not be uninteresting to trace these leading principles that have done so much to undermine the foundations of morals. They are the principles of Probability, Intention, and Mental Reservation.

With regard to the first, viz., the doctrine that it is lawful to faithful Christians to follow a probable opinion, even though less probable than its opposite, that is, an opinion which is made probable by receiving the assent of a discreet man, it is evident that it silences conscience and places the criterion of morality in the judgment of the wise man who happens to guide it: in fact, its certain result has always been to reduce the souls of the faithful to mere machines which the Jesuit fathers might use at their will. The French clergy, assembled in 1656, termed these maxims *the plague of consciences*, and accused them of having so changed Christian morality and the maxims of the Gospel, that the profoundest ignorance would be preferable to such science. In their General Assembly of 1700 these Gallican Catholics expressed their condemnation thus: "It is not permitted to any one to adhere to an opinion which has not been judged by himself to be most conformable to truth. That in practice it is allowed to follow an opinion which we do not ourselves regard as the most probable, is a new principle, unheard of, and announced in these days by

unknown authors, who have sought to make it a rule of morals in opposition to the rule of the Fathers, *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, and therefore a principle that can never possess the security of a *Christian rule*." It would be uninteresting to dwell upon the thousand applications of a Jesuit rule which simply aims to make it easy to the troubled mind to suppress its sense of responsibility and resign itself to the guidance of others, whose assumed gravity and authority may, for their office' sake, outweigh the dictates of conscience.

The doctrine of Intention is the second of these Jesuit principles. In express contradiction to the maxim of St. Paul, not to "do evil that good may come," Jesuitism regards the means as indifferent provided the end is right. All depends on the ultimate Intention. A bad end corrupts good means; so also a good end justifies and sanctifies bad means. It is, therefore, enough to be sincere in the adherence to a good end; and, it must be remembered, that end may be only probably good, according to the principle just considered. However criminal and detestable the means may be, and may be known to be, it is of no consequence; if the end designed has the probability that the opinion of a discreet director gives it, all is holy and meritorious before God, inasmuch as His will is honoured, if not in the means, yet finally in the end designed.

This leads to the last principle, that of Mental Reservation, which is the secret of lying without committing sin, and of violating the oath without perjury. Thus, he who makes a promise with oath need not keep his promise, if, in making it, he took care to introduce a word or a thought silently which should completely change the meaning of his words. He who committed a fault yesterday, and swears that he did not commit it, does not swear falsely, if in saying, "I swear I did not commit it," he silently meant to add "to-day." The application of this utterly depraved principle, combined with the other two, has done much to corrupt the very fountain of morality; and there can be no doubt that Jesuit morality is the peculiar possession and boast of Ultramontaniam. But we demur to the limitation of the charge of unsanctity to the Jesuits, and their memorable principles of carnal accommodation. Catholicism, so called, throughout the world, Old or New, has a few principles interwoven with it that must tend to unholiness by a dire necessity. So long as there is a traffic in the accumulated merits held by the Church, and dispensations from the consequences of transgression—whether tem-

poral or eternal matters not to the majority—can be earned or bought, the everlasting safeguards of holiness are in danger. The Old Catholics cannot leave behind them with the Jesuits the perils of their sanctity. That Note of the true Church will cause them in other ways abundant trouble unless they seek a more fundamental cure.

The Note of Catholicity leads to a very interesting dissertation. It seems, in our Abbé's estimation, one of the grave errors of Rome that it makes Catholicity depend very much on its number of faithful and extent of territory, instead of basing it on the truth of its doctrine as held by all from the beginning. We do not think that the Ultramontanes commit that error. But the refutation of it here gives opportunity for stating some startling facts. Those Christians whom Rome anathematizes are spread everywhere. The dissidents are more in number than the adherents. Not to speak of the tens of thousands of Catholics who have remained faithful to the faith as it was before 1870, there are about one hundred millions of Greek Orthodox, twenty-five millions of Anglicans, sixty millions of European and American Protestants—making, in the Christian world, one hundred and eighty-five millions of Christians who in their turn regard the Roman Church as dissenting. Now, according to its own statistics, this Roman Church does not amount to more than a hundred and forty or fifty millions of professors. And, rigorously sifted, these numbers shrivel to something much less imposing. Deducting the immense multitude of those who are entirely ignorant, who, in fact, know no religion at all, and of those who remain merely in form, being at heart sceptical or indifferent, or non-Ultramontane, there remain those who pass as believing and knowing what they believe. And of these—few in comparison of the other two classes—how many are there who believe only in part, and know but superficially what they know! There are the multitudes of those, especially women, who are sentimental and mystical Romanists; and of those who in France derive all their knowledge of theology and religion from the Catholic papers. "For ourselves, we would not dare to affirm that there would remain, when all these are deducted, many hundreds of thousands. We know Romanists who go so far as to assert that a much less number would reckon all. Doubtless, the same analysis might be applied to other Christian communions; and there would be found among them the sceptical, the ignorant, the formalists, the sentimental, and the interested. But every intelligent mind will admit that the

religious sentiment and the faith of the Germanic races, and especially the Slavonic, have a more intelligent, more serious, more profound character than those of the Latin races, which are more and more turning towards the Atheism that denies God, or the superstition that falsifies Him, and which will soon, it is to be feared, be divided between the Red International that detests God and the Black International that ridicules Him."

It is curious to read the following words from a pastoral of Colbert, Archbishop of Rouen, to his clergy in 1697: "Be always penetrated with a profound respect for holy antiquity; study it with all your might, and draw all the rules of your conduct, in the functions of your ministry, from these sacred monuments. To avoid the pernicious relaxations introduced in these latter days, and defended by modern theologians, impress deeply upon your souls the rule of St. Vincent of Lerins, which respects morals as much as faith. To announce to Catholic Christians anything beyond what they have received has never been permitted at any time in the past, is not now permitted, and never will be permitted. On the contrary, to anathematise those who proclaim anything beyond what has been received, is a duty from which there can be no dispensation, in any particular, to the end of time." It is easy enough to see that this commentary on the Catholic principle of Vincent pronounces its condemnation on the Roman Church that now is; for it has proclaimed, as a truth revealed by Jesus Christ, an opinion which, before 1870, was regarded by many Roman bishops as a pernicious error. But it may be replied to our Abbé, that his Gallican authority forgot the prerogative of the Church to proclaim, under the authority of the Holy Ghost, new or only partially revealed truths; and, indeed, it would not be very difficult to impale him on a dilemma, from which, on his principles, he could not easily extricate himself. If the Church, speaking by its highest Conciliar or Papal authority, has never had the power of introducing anything new, whence came the multitude of articles which from age to age have been added? If they have, at least many of them, been added by despotic abuse, then the Church from which New Rome separates, and to which M. Michaud clings, had already ceased to be Catholic, and in his sense of the term there is no Catholic Church. "Who does not see," he asks, "that the Roman Church has become, through this revolution of 1870, the Church anti-Catholic, based, not on the principle that dogmatic truth is Catholic truth, universal truth, truth believed by all, but on

another principle essentially opposite, that dogmatic truth is the word of one man, the word of the Pope? In brief, the Catholic principle is that the Pope should conform himself to the faith of the universal Church; the essential principle of the actual Roman Church is, that the faith of the Church universal should conform itself to the word of the Pontiff. Thus the actual Romanism, far from being Catholic universalism, is no other than Papal particularism, and in consequence the radical contrary of Catholicism." We have once more to admit all this. It is powerful testimony from Gallicanism against Romanism; but it is a kind of reasoning that goes much further in its issues than this angry logician intended. It leads us to ask how far back we must go to find a truly Catholic Church in communion with Rome? whether there ever has been a visible Catholic Church in relation with that see as its head? and whether the beautiful word Catholic was not early lost to the visible Church, and reserved for the Church invisible, or for the glorious realisation of the kingdom of God in another world?

According to M. Michaud's definition, there is scarcely any difference between the Note Catholic and the Note Apostolical. We must give his account of the latter in his own words:—"To be Apostolical it would require that what it is now it descended from the Apostles; if not without accidental modification in the form, at least without alteration in the substance: that is to say, that its actual dogmas, and the principles of its actual ethics, and worship, and constitution, are the same as were believed, admitted, and practised by the Apostles." This seems rather a different Note from that which in the early Fathers lineal descent from the Apostles presented. But it is, in our judgment, a sound definition, though one that renders the term Catholic superfluous. Catholic is Apostolic, and Apostolic is Catholic. But, passing this by, M. Michaud applies his test chiefly to the one new dogma now in the contention. He appeals to a great historical and theological school, even in the West, which maintains that the primacy of the Pope rests only on ecclesiastical law, on the sanction which the first Ecumenical Councils gave it, following upon usage founded on the geographical and political situation of the city of Rome. According to this wide-spread opinion, there was no question of primacy among the Apostles: the words of our Lord to Peter, and the relations between Peter and the rest of the Apostles, bear no traces of any such distinction. Now, if this school of interpretation is correct, M. Michaud, who belongs to them, is correct in saying that

the present Roman Church has a constitution, discipline, and dogmas absolutely contrary to the constitution, discipline, and dogmas of Apostolical times. Therefore, it is a gigantic innovation on the Apostolical idea, and ought to be renounced and opposed in every possible way. Accordingly, M. Michaud renounces it heartily, and, as the representative of a large recalcitrant school, traces the growth of the system as the development of an utterly corrupt and unchristian spirit. Before giving his account of its history, however, we must pause once more to note the inconsistency which clings to the arguments and to the cause of these half-liberated men. They are Old Catholics; they cling to the constitution and belief of the Church as it was before the invasion of 1870. But is it not most plain and palpable that, on their own showing, the Papal system, as it existed before the last definition, was a very great deviation from Apostolical principle and practice? Has not the entire Catholic Church of the West, so called, been founded upon a Papal system of which the last Article of Faith is only the final and consistent expression? Practically, we admit, M. Michaud and the German Old Catholics go back for their Old Catholic Church to much earlier times. But, if they go back to those earlier times, they should turn their polemics against a multitude of errors in doctrine, worship, and practice, which have grown with the growth of the Papal principle, and without it would never have existed. Let us see, however, how the Abbé accounts for the Pontificate.

Though the Primacy is not Apostolical, its spirit may be traced up to Apostolical times. The Judaic element of the synagogue in the time of Christ, and the Pagan element of ancient Rome at the same epoch, conspired to give the first perversion to the Christian principle. St. Peter, leaving Judæa, and coming to Rome, according to the legend of the ancient Church, forms a complete symbol of the fusion of these two elements: the Judaism of an external, Pharisaic formality; the Romanism of a paganised worship and centralised power. Faint traces of this double influence are found in the earliest times. But the Gospel publicly read was a check at the first; and the authority of the Empire suffered no excesses of despotism. Moreover, the bishops and fathers of the East, and of North Africa, repressed these risings of ambition: Roman assumption was never more effectually and vehemently protested against than by those Cyprians and Augustines whom modern Rome exults in as her earliest and most celebrated representatives.

But, as ages passed, the ignorance of the barbarians who were converted to Christianity, and the growing indifference of the Christian communities under the influence of connection with the State, rendered easy the propagation of centralising and absolutist doctrines. In the ninth century the False Decretals of Isidore mysteriously appeared, as if thrown into the scene by an invisible but cunning hand, and the Ultramontane system was fashioned at once. The subsequent history of the Papal system is known to some extent. But its documents and archives are mainly hidden as yet.

"It is in these *False Decretals of Isidore* that the Ultramontane system had its origin: a system purely human, and human in the worst way, which has nothing of Christ nor of His Apostles, which did not penetrate into the schools of the twelfth century, and which was not developed to the point which it has now reached but by a continual series of falsifications, a full publication of the secrets of which will not be long delayed. . . . The origin of the Romanist system is there perfectly certain; and, thanks to the publication of documents hitherto hidden, the history of its progress is more and more fully revealed. In vain the Vatican interdicts its secret archives to the learned; the learned will sooner or later penetrate them. Meanwhile, every honest man says to himself, 'If these archives contain results favourable only to the Ultramontane Papacy, why are they concealed with such obstinacy, and why are its librarians expelled with such severity as soon as it is perceived that they prefer truth to the word of command, and are disposed to be severe?' An institution which reposes on truth and deems itself Divine, conceals nothing, because there is nothing to conceal. It brings everything to the light of day, because the light of day can only bring to its side the friends of truth. If, on the contrary, it is sealed against the friends of the truth, it is because its titles are false and it rests on a lie."—P. 53.

Such is the Apostolical Note of the modern Roman Church. And thus M. Michaud has established plainly enough that that Church has neither of the four original Notes that belong to the visible Church of Christ upon earth. We think that the charge may be brought against more than modern Ultramontaniam, even by the Abbé's own showing. But this will fully appear in what now follows.

A Church which has not the four marks of Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, must needs be, if in any sense a Christian community, heretical. According to the Abbé's definition of heresy, it is subtraction from or addition to truth revealed. He thinks the Protestants are heretics in the former sense, and Catholics, as they now are, in the latter. But, in his present frame of mind, he is free to assert that the

corruption by addition is the worst possible corruption, since it substitutes man for God. He declines, however, to embarrass himself by considering the question whether Protestants generally can, on his principles, have really subtracted from the Apostolic doctrine. He knows very well it would be very hard to prove this without renouncing the fundamental principles that give his book and his argument whatever value they have. Many of those bodies hold the entire Canonical Scriptures, and believe every doctrine that was held by the entire Church before the Roman ascendancy began. But we are not now obliged to defend ourselves. We have only to listen to the present indictment. It is that "whoever would continue a member of the actual Roman Church must admit sincerely, in the depths of his soul, where God cannot be deceived, as a dogma *really revealed by God and really believed in all Christian ages throughout the Church*, what a Roman bishop, before 1870, called "the suicide of the Church," what Mgr. Dupanloup himself characterised as "an unheard of absurdity," and what the most learned theologians still consider, with Maassen, as "the corruption, not only of history, but of revelation." There is only one thing that can be said in reply: no doctrine, it is asserted by Romanists, can be called heretical until it has been declared such by an œcumenical council.

The Abbé deals with this in two ways. First, the Council of Constance, in 1415, in those sessions which were regarded as Œcumenical even by Rome, defined that "everyone, even the Pope, is subject to an œcumenical council in matters of faith." But, supposing that had not been defined, it is the established principle that œcumenical councils only declare that which *is already of faith*: the declaration does not make it an object of faith but asserts that it is such. Thus, the Divinity of Christ was an object of faith before the Nicene Council, and he would have been considered a heretic who doubted it even before the conciliar determination on the subject. But M. Michaud finds his best ally in a principle that would soon save him from all his troubles, if he would first clearly define it to himself, and then yield himself fully to its guidance. "In the truly Catholic Church all are under obligation, though with different titles and in different degrees, to defend and affirm the faith received; because the knowledge of Divine things is a gift which God bestows on the simple faithful as much as on priests and bishops, though these have the sole authority of official teaching." This is no other than the affirmation of a principle which the Scripture continually

declares, but which the system of Rome,—we do not mean M. Michaud's actual Rome, but the Rome to which he still fondly clings,—will not accord to him or to any of its members, on any conditions whatever.

Coming to the question of the heretical doctrine concerning the Church propounded by modern Ultramontaniam, the Abbé as usual goes up to the Scriptures for his final appeal, as also for his starting point. He is fond of the idea of a "spiritual republic;" and, rightly understood, this is an incontestable representation. The Holy Ghost has shown what the officers must be, and directs in their choice; but the Church only exercises through them its own authority and performs its own functions. Down to the ninth century, M. Michaud thinks, but with many authorities against him, the Popes themselves exercised their authority in the Church only through councils and in conformity with the canons; and as the councils were then composed not of bishops only, but of priests and clerics, the Church was really governed by itself. This proves that there was no monarchy in its government. It was Nicolas I. (858-867) who began to put into practice the false Decretals, to transform the primacy into a monarchical despotism, thus changing the primitive constitution of the Church, and preparing the way for all subsequent alterations. In Matt. xviii., he rightly thinks, Our Lord did not separate the Apostles from the Church, but gave to the united Church all the powers of binding and loosing, of condemning and of absolving. It was in the sixth century that the Christian Republic was really overturned. The number of the faithful became too considerable to take part in the public affairs. The profound ignorance of the converted barbarians tended also to their exclusion, as well as the equally profound indifference of vast multitudes in the Church of those days. So late, however, as 683, the Fourth Council of Toledo, which regulated the form of the provincial synods, decreed that "after the bishops, the priests and the deacons, shall be introduced the laymen whom the council shall have judged worthy to assist." Soon this was given up, and the only representatives of the *turba fidelium* were the princes as a political representation: the Church was no longer a Republic, but an Aristocracy. Then came in the distinction between power of order and power of jurisdiction, as if the former referred only to the sacraments, while the latter touched the government of the Church. This was the very early Romish edition of the distinction between teaching and ruling elders. The inferior clergy were soon limited to holy things; things

ecclesiastical were confided to bishops, who, indeed, retained a relic of a former order of things in the titular canons who formed a sort of imaginary court around him. At the Council of Constance, the inferior clergy made an effort to recover their rights, but in vain. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the attempt was renewed, but with no success. The Church was a Monarchy tempered by Aristocracy. Then came the great difficulty of balancing the Episcopal and the Papal prerogatives in the government of the Church. With this is bound up the entire question of the recent Vatican Council.

At Constance and Paris the episcopal authority was above the pontifical; but the order was afterwards and elsewhere reversed. The question of the ultimate source of the Church's infallibility was hotly discussed. Did the bishops make the Pope's teaching infallible, or the Pope make that of the bishops? Did the bishops or the Pope give the force of law to the decrees? The question was one of minute and vexatious subtleties for a long time; but it could not remain there. The Pope was the first in possession, and that decided everything. Gallicanism, so much lauded by M. Michaud and other French clerical recalitrants, seems to us to have been very much wanting to itself. Bossuet was really at heart an Ultramontane. He admitted that the bishops were only sheep under the staff of the Pope. In spite of the episcopal character there was, between the bishops and the simple laity, "only a difference of quantity, that which distinguishes the sheep from the lambs." Bossuet taught this doctrine, though he could write, for his purpose, to Leibnitz, "The infallibility which God has promised to His Church resides primarily *in the whole body*." The Jansenists of Port Royal exaggerated the authority of the bishops, both as against the priests and against the Pope: their motive being dread of the Jesuit priesthood, the implacable foes of the episcopate.

"The movements of centralisation, which successively eliminated from the government of the Church the simple faithful and the priests, must needs run its course against the bishops, and remove them also in favour of the Papacy. The Ultramontanes, who were at first content to define the Church 'the Papacy united to the episcopate,' to check the Gallicans, who defined it 'the episcopate united to the Papacy,' soon eliminated the episcopate, and left only the Pope. As the bishops had made their priests mere servants of the episcopate, it was natural that the Pope should transform the bishops into simple servants of the Papacy. The bishops left the priests only the duty of obeying, and kept for themselves the right of commanding; the Pope,

in his turn, robbed them of all but the right of obeying, and kept in his own hands the right of governing the whole Church. The bishops would judge all things without the concurrence of the priesthood and the laity; it was logical that the Pope also should desire to judge all without the serious control of any, even the bishops. The bishops would suppress the tribunals and courts ecclesiastical, governing the priesthood no longer legally but arbitrarily; what was to hinder the Pontiff from having all causes, major and minor, brought to his own tribunals, and from replacing the laws made by his inferiors by his own pure and simple will?"—P. 85.

But M. Michaud and his coadjutors in this enterprise should remember, that the decision that vexes them so much was only the issue of principles inherent in the Church to which they belong for almost a millennium. It may have been a retaliation on the bishops, or the natural development of a spirit of ambition; but, in fact, the thing existed as a reality, at any rate in its worst effects, long before. In the twelfth century there was no Vatican decree, but there was all that the Vatican decree has legally secured. The Popes really made the laws, and promulgated them, at first in the name of the Apostolic See and then in their own name. "*Auctoritate sedis apostolicæ prohibemus*," we read in the first canon of the so-called Œcumenical Council of 1123, held by Callixtus II. In that of 1179, Alexander III. promulgated twenty-seven canons, declaring that it was with the approbation of the synod. But this approbation soon became a formula not needing to be inserted, and long ages ago the same independence was assumed which lately we saw exemplified in Pius IX., who, wishing to proclaim the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, consulted his bishops all over the world without deliberating with them, and used their assistance in the proclamation of a dogma which was made by the Pontiff alone and in his sole name.

"Some years ago Cardinal Litta was at the pains to tell us that, on his thesis, he understood the word *Church* in the sense *teaching Church*; that is, the bishops joined with the Pope: thus proving that this restricted definition was not the obvious and just meaning of the word. Such a scruple is now no longer necessary. The Church is now no longer a society of all the faithful, nor of the pastors, nor even of the bishops and the Pope, but it is the society of the Pope alone. The Pope is all, and occupies the place of all; the faithful, the priests, and the bishops are only the lambs and the sheep of his flock. It is enough to read De Maistre, Guéranger, Veuillot, and the Jesuits of the *Civiltà*, to be convinced that this is the fundamental basis of Ultramontaniam. 'When we speak of the Church,' said the Jesuit Gretzer,

'we mean the Pope.' 'It is from the Pope,' said the *Civiltà*, 'that the proper faith and the religious life of the Church and the bishops are derived. He is their head; . . . he is the dispenser of spiritual graces. . . . It is in the hands of the Pope alone, who is the sole dispenser and the sole guardian, that God has placed all the treasures of His revelation, of His righteousness, and of His grace. Thus He is in regard to us all that Christ would be, if He governed the Church visibly in person.' The Pope is the *summum oraculum*, the vicegerent of God on earth—*vices gerens in terra*. . . . This is literally and truly *Papism*, in the place of Catholicism, and, when we remember what M. Veuillot wrote in 1869, 'The Church will be God,' are we not right in saying, that the Ultramontanes of to-day make Catholicism into a veritable *Papolatry*? The Church is God; the Church is the Pope; therefore the Pope is God. This is all their doctrine, the sum of their *credo*."

The idea of the Faith, and what constitutes an article of faith, enters largely into the present discussion. The deposit of faith is committed to the Church as its guardian, but nowhere is new revelation promised to the Church. The force of this argument, however, is turned aside by the assumption, that with the original truth must be connected all that from age to age legitimate reasoning may deduce from it. It is obvious that this principle is the Protestant one of private judgment, with a thin disguise thrown over it. However, the objection may be met by the assertion, that the discussions which arrived at the truth in the early councils, were not discussions as to the essential matter of revealed truth, but merely the question of fact as to what heretics held. The Nicene discussion bore simply on the heresy that was condemned, not on the dogma that was defended. The argument then shifts, and in modern times it has been asserted, chiefly in England, that the Word of God is a germ that must be developed. Development is a word very familiar to us in England. It is not so familiar under its older and more orthodox form of explicit faith arising out of faith implicit. Revealed truths are the object of explicit faith; the truths which are inseparably connected with them, are at first believed only by an implicit faith. When, however, reasoning, conducted in episcopal conclave, and satisfactory to one master mind, has proved the connection between the developed truths and the truths of revelation, properly so called, those new developments may fairly be imposed upon the Church as matters of faith obligatory and explicit.

Now this development, or, as Vincent of Lerins called it, amplification of truth, is by no means a change. The man is the child, the same in nature and the same in person. Nor

is its addition: development is utterly inconsistent with that. Vincentius, whose name is so often quoted in this discussion, has elaborately refuted by anticipation the modern doctrines of development, on which, though by other names, the modern Church of Rome builds her credit. He took pains to show, that the increase of the truth that was promised was not to be an increase in the number of truths, but in their evidence and in their subjective influence in human minds. Faith becomes instead of implied explicit, instead of infantile virile, instead of imperfect perfect, not when more truths are seen, but when they are seen in a richer light. His words are, and they are well worthy of being meditated upon: "*Crescat igitur oportet, et multum vehementerque proficiat tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiæ, ætatum et sæculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia: sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia.*"

Whatever difficulties may surround the guardianship of the Christian faith, and the question of the connection between the written depository and the living intelligence of the guardian Church, certain it is that all security is gone, if a congregation of fallible men assume actively to interpret into revelations the latent doctrines that are supposed to exist in germ throughout the New Testament Scriptures. The passive attitude of defending the deposit—if such a term may be used—is not open to so much objection. In fact, there is no community of Christians which has not adopted this method of protecting the truth, according to its interpretation of that truth. Between this, however, and the positive function of defining new truths, and truths never before heard of as doctrines of revelation, there is a very wide difference. The well-known dictum of Vincent, formed by him to meet this very case, is an impregnable one *quoad hoc*. Embarrassing, perhaps, in some other respects—for instance, in the rigour with which "received by all" would pare down the capital articles of Christianity—it is peremptory and self-evidencing as to this, that the recent additions to the creed of Christendom have no authority whatever. The proposition of the dictum must be made negative to see its force. These doctrines, and many others which have preceded them from the same fertile source, were never believed by any considerable portion of the Christian world.

It may be interesting to pursue this subject a little further, and to see how the profoundest theologians of the Roman Church got over the difficulty that looked them so severely in

the face. In 1852 Pius IX. named a special commission to report on the possibility, theologically considered, of a solemn definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin. A few years later that necessity would have been superseded; as it was, the remarkable phenomenon was seen of a grave commission discussing most elaborately on what conditions a revelation made by the Lord Jesus and contained in the Holy Scripture might be revealed anew to the Christian world. The report presented, as unanimously adopted, the following principles:—1. That it is not necessary, in order to the definition of a doctrine, that opinions concerning it should never have varied within the Church, or that the guides of faith should always have been of one accord. Hence, St. Bernard and Thomas Aquinas might oppose, in their day, the Immaculate Conception, and Francis de Sales and Fénelon the Papal Infallibility; because these doctrines, not having been then asserted to belong to the deposit of Catholic truth, were not binding upon the acceptance of those saints. It is sometimes attempted to deny that there ever was such divergence in the case of eminent teachers; but, when absolute evidence forbids such an escape, the principle is boldly asserted that the most venerable doctors of the Church in any age might reject a doctrine which in another age might be declared to have always belonged to the truth of God. 2. In order to the definition of a doctrine, it suffices that some solemn and decisive testimonies be adduced which virtually include the doctrine to be defined: the actual accordance of the episcopate may be inferred from such decisive, however occasional, witnesses to a doctrine which infers the doctrine in question. For instance: It is of faith that the Church is infallible; now, the infallibility of the Pope is virtually contained in that of the Church, or is inseparably united with it; then the infallibility of the Pope has always been really believed at the same time with that of the Church, and may, therefore, be legitimately at any time defined. This word “virtually” plays a very considerable part in the discussion of the present question. M. Michaud evidently finds it rather hard to deal with. He denies the principle, and thereby gives his opponents an advantage. It were better to admit the principle, and to deny the actual application to the point in question. According to the plain, common-sense meaning of the term “virtual,” it can hardly be maintained that what is virtually contained in, or linked with, a doctrine, is not as true as the doctrine itself. The present necessity may not demand the

definition; but the necessity of a future time may demand it. Justification by faith is a doctrine which has others of great importance included in it virtually; but some of them were never placed in the formularies till the Augsburg Confession required them. This is the quaint method which M. Michaud is constrained to adopt:—

"A certain society has possessed, for many years, a block of marble. Now, in this block of marble there is virtually such and such a *chef-d'œuvre*, waiting for the chisel of Michael Angelo to give it reality. But what would Michael Angelo have done? Would he have created it? No. He would only have made it manifest, or evident to the eye. Then, it is perfectly logical to say that for so many years this society has been the proprietor of this *chef-d'œuvre*. . . . It is certain that the colours of this picture are of an incomparable richness, and he who denies it must be insane. Now, the wood on which these colours have been laid is inseparably united to it. Then, this wood is also of an incomparable richness, and whoever denies it is insane."

This kind of argument will not hold: neither is the statue virtually in the marble, nor is the colouring inseparably united to the wood. When the statue is revealed, part of the marble at least is gone: on no other condition than that of removing part of it is the statue to be made. And obviously the pigments might be taken from the wood without any injury to either: their union is purely accidental. But there are certain truths virtually contained in, or based upon, others, which time and the hour alone may require the creed to announce. But we may boldly challenge the facts here asserted.

It needs only the most rudimentary acquaintance with logical fallacies to see the frivolousness of the following arguments of the Ultramontanes. "The spiritual power is superior to the temporal; what is superior is master of what is inferior; therefore, the Pope is absolute master of temporal sovereigns. The Church is to survive to the end of time. If the Church survives the Pope must have temporal power; therefore, the temporal power is of Divine right. The Church must teach all nations; the sciences must be brought to the nations; therefore the Syllabus is justified." The minor is always false; as it invariably is in those Papal arguments. With a certain consciousness of this, the committee laid down, 3. That in order to the definition of a doctrine it suffices that the Catholic episcopate be actually in accordance upon it." This is plain and simple, and intelligible. But here again we have only, for ourselves, the argument of denial and appeal,

not indeed to Vincentius—though he would suffice—but to the Scriptures, which nowhere assign to the episcopate as such the responsibility or the power of defining new, or hitherto unrevealed, doctrine as of faith.

Bringing all this to bear upon the specific doctrine of the personal infallibility of the Pope, M. Michaud makes some remarks of which the following may be regarded as the pith. During the first eight centuries, when numberless errors required condemnation, and there was extreme difficulty of conciliating in the councils the bishops of the universal Church, no doctor can be found who had the slightest suspicion of this infallibility: the œcumenical councils are themselves permitted to examine teachings of the Popes, to pass judgment upon them, and even to condemn them as heretical. Now, can it be fairly contended that this absence of any suspicion or presentiment was equivalent to an implicit faith? Will it be said that the œcumenical councils which condemned the Pope as heretical believed all the time implicitly and virtually in his infallibility? Yet, this is what the Romanists are driven to affirm, in order to be consistent in their establishment of the new dogma. Disguise it how they may, they are shut up to the strange, irrational and revolting theory, that a fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith was for centuries, and in the earliest and best assemblies of the Christian Church, not only ignored, but also denied and condemned in act; that the most important provision made by the Redeemer for the supply of the defect of His bodily presence was utterly unknown to the chiefs of the Christian world.

But this is not all. When, at a later time, the agents and the theologians of the Roman Curia injected into the public mind the idea of the Pope's infallibility, the most trusted and orthodox doctors combated it as a Satanic delusion. In due time it was taught here and there as an opinion which might be accepted or rejected, like many other theological theses which, not being *de fide*, are left in suspense in the public mind. By degrees, some eminent ecclesiastics and professors of divinity consented to accept it as a theological verity, as contradistinguished from a dogmatic article of faith. As such it was taught in France, in certain seminaries, during the middle of the present century; but never, down to the very promulgation which has lately startled the world, had it been taught or accepted that the personal infallibility of the Pontiff was a doctrine of revealed truth.

M. Michaud lays the chief stress on the falsifications of historical evidence which have contributed to this result. We

think he has not overstated his case, and that it would be hardly possible to overstate it. But we are ourselves most impressed by the tremendous interference with our Saviour's own institutions that is involved in the new dogma. If our author could bring his mind to study the doctrine in the more direct and unrefracted light of the New Testament, he would have a still stronger case, and soon place himself in a position where his opposition would be, if not more effectual, at least more consistent. To us the promulgation of the new article is like an addition to the creed: it changes the very foundations of the relation of God to man: it violates the doctrine of Christ's person, and it almost invents a parallel of the Incarnation, an extension of it, at least, which the Scriptures never hint at. It leaves no room for the special functions of the Holy Spirit. It is the compensation for the lack of Christ's presence; and thus as it were a new sacrament, giving its own efficacy directly or indirectly to all the others, and absorbing into itself the various instruments of heavenly instruction and guidance. It leaves but little beyond, save that which it almost necessarily involves in the very statement of it, the supreme authority of the Pontiff to save and to bless.

The next topic that arises is the relation of the dogma to the idea of Œcumenical Councils. According to the modern doctrine, every local synod of every kind becomes œcumenical, and commands the homage of the whole world so soon as it has been simply approved by the Pope. After a long and striking array of authorities, private and conciliar, which prove that in every age the true representative character of the councils has been held, and the fact that their decisions required the acceptance of the universal Church to give them validity, M. Michaud makes a bold appeal to Scripture, and expounds, in a way rather novel as found in a Catholic work, whether of the Old or New Community, the great history of the first council, in Acts xv., with these results. If St. Peter, himself and himself alone, was infallible, why assemble any council? It was enough that he should speak, and all would be decided. A council was useless. It might, indeed, be said that, while it was needless on the ground of right, it was decorous on the ground of solemnity. But this will not hold, since, if it was only matter of solemnity, the debates held in it would be incomprehensible. Why, again, were the other Apostles there, if the Sovereign of the Church carried all its authority; or, if the Church was only the episcopal body, why were the priests

or elders included with the Apostles? Again, if the Church was only the pastoral body, why were the multitude of the faithful present in this council? If the elders and the laity have no part, either in the keeping of the deposit of the faith, or in the exercise of disciplinary power, why do they so formally assemble for the consideration of the matters in dispute? Why do they discuss these matters in the very presence of the Apostles themselves? Why do they venture to seal with their approval the words of St. James? and, above all, why does the letter of conciliation acknowledge that all the members of the council, Apostles, elders, and faithful, participated in the common Divine guidance?

It may be said, in opposition to all this, that those were times of transition, and that the Apostles had the right to veil their authority; and that the chief of the Apostles had the right to postpone his rights to a later acknowledgment. But such arguments have no force. The first Christian synod in the Acts hardly contains the very germ of recent Catholic councils. But M. Michaud goes further. If it was true, as the Romanists affirm, that the Apostles and Bishops were to form a kind of governing aristocracy, deciding all questions of doctrine and practice by their sole infallible authority, should we not have read of their assembling alone, to the exclusion of all others, and adopting resolutions which would have ended all controversy? Instead of this, we find a free deliberation, in which all take part, and in which the Apostles do not enforce any opinion of their own through the power of of any special prerogative. To our mind, this argument becomes much stronger when the general conduct of the Apostles in other respects is taken into the account. They are by no means indifferent, generally, to their personal prerogative. When the highest seal is to be set upon the commencement of a new work, they go down to confirm it. In their Epistles, written expressly as inspired men, called and qualified for this function, they take none into council, but speak with commanding and absolute authority. But this was an office in which it has never been pretended that they had successors. The most eminent Apostolical authority, St. Paul, is never supposed to have had a successor in his function. And it is not St. Peter's inspiration that his modern successor affects to claim. It is in the Apostolical synod, as described in Acts xv., that we might expect to find the original of Papal authority. There, if anywhere, would Simon Peter be the founder of the Papacy. But in the ecclesiastical assembly the type, and, in some sense, pattern,

of all ecclesiastical assemblies, the supreme authority that reigns in the written Epistles fails to appear. He says but little. He limits himself to the recital of the events which he has witnessed, and the deduction from them of the consequences that naturally followed. He by no means speaks as one who decides any question. He rather seems to give only personal evidence. True, that silence followed; but it was the silence of respect, and not of absolute submission; as is seen in the fact that others discoursed after he had ended. St. James replied, and gave his judgment on the same subject, a judgment, too, which was not at all points in conformity with that of St. Peter. St. Peter speaks first, it is said; but by those who forget that there had been already much discussion, and that, not only his personal character, but his special relation to the Gentile community demanded that he should vigorously introduce his own experience.

Some minor considerations may be introduced, which, however, have only a subordinate importance, though difficult of explanation to the modern Romanist, and Peter's person and words are not treated with the peculiar respect that modern theories would teach us to expect. The words of the great Apostle, also, are examined by another, and, what is more to the point, collated with those of the prophets, and derive their sanction from the Prophetic Word. Moreover, the Bishop of Jerusalem seems to have an official pre-eminence even over the Apostle, and Peter's name is wanting in the evangelical letter, which is written in the name of all. The Holy Ghost acknowledges no organ, no temple, but the body of the whole Church; and Paul does not refer to the decision as that of Simon Peter, but as that of the Apostles and elders. Indeed, the relations of St. Paul generally to St. Peter are incomprehensible on the modern theory that St. Peter was the first vicar of Christ upon earth.

There are difficulties connected with the narrative of the first synod, which assembled obviously without a Pope, was composed of the whole church universally represented, which decided without pronouncing articles of faith, and sent its letter of advice without an anathema. But, whatever these difficulties may be, they are quite independent of the importance of its constitution and record as an argument against the theory of the modern Œcumenical Council. An œcumenical council, representative of all the world, was not held in Jerusalem, and seems never to be contemplated in the New Testament.

The opponents of the Vatican Council, or *Conciliabule*, as

they call it in derision, are very many of them priests; and in their name the Abbé Michaud rebels against the dishonour done to their order. To do this gracefully he has first, in some sense, to vindicate the position of the priests in the Scripture. His Old Testament summary gives no trouble; but he is rather embarrassed in the New. He has two questions to settle: Were the priests different from the elders? Were they different from the bishops?

To the former he answers, No. But, when he supposes himself questioned as to whether the elder of the New Testament is not, like the elder in the Old, an officer without priesthood, his vigorous argumentation leaves him. He owns that the word "priest" occurs nowhere in the New Testament; and that it designates only the priesthood of Jesus Christ, and the universal priesthood of the believing company. But he affirms that the priesthood of the ministry is amply recognised; partly, in the power of baptizing and remitting sins; partly, by that of renewing the Eucharistical Supper; and partly, by the assemblage of functions entrusted to their hands in connection with Christian worship. Hence, the priesthood is the same as in the Old Testament, though the name is different. Here is the radical error; or, rather, this suggests the radical error. It is, comparatively, a vain thing to fight against the supremacy of the Pontiff in Rome, while the central and fundamental error is tenaciously held. If Christ, and all that belongs to Christ, continues on earth as the sacrifice, and is offered up by human priests, why may He not remain upon earth also in the person of one who shall be the chief of all the sacrificers? If our Abbé would honestly apply to this subject the canons of criticism which he applied so rigorously and so well to the interpretation of the synod chapter in the Acts, he would be constrained to give up the very word priest. As it is, he clings to all that is essential to Romanism. Because the elders baptize and conduct Divine worship, therefore they are sacrificing priests!

But were the priests different from the bishops? Not in the priesthood different; but the bishop has higher authority in the hierarchical order. Here, again, M. Michaud is rather unfair. He intimates that in the fourth century some doubted this, as if it had been universally received before. He makes much of the authority of Chrysostom, not much of that of Jerome. But it is not the theory of the Old Catholics to elevate the episcopate at the expense of the priesthood. Therefore, having said something to silence the Presbyterians of all shades, he turns to rebuke the Romanist exaggeration

of the episcopate. We have a pithy quotation from a disconsolate French theologian of the last century: "It seems to me, that we have lost the true idea of the priesthood. The only true one was that which was held in the earliest times. But to what is it now reduced? A priest of the present day is a man who says mass. One would say that he has no other right; and the very idea of a sacrifice has much suffered from the contempt that has fallen on the sacrificer. But what a happy change would be effected if we reformed our thought and speech into harmony with that of antiquity?" In restoring the idea to its pristine form, however, the enemies of the Vatican make it a strong point that the Seventy sent out by Christ were the type of the priests, while the Twelve were the type of the bishops. It was the venerable Bede who first made this parallel or analogy popular. But it is fatal to the pretensions of the champions of the priesthood, or the second order: if, indeed, the relation of the priests to the bishops is that of the Seventy to the Twelve, their cause is lost. It is vain to say that some of the most illustrious saints have been only priests: to wit, Jerome, whose authority St. Augustine made parallel with that of the bishops, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Origen, Vincentius Lirinensis, Maximus, Johannes Damascenus, Venerable Bede, Alcuin, Thomas Aquinas, Bernard, Vincent de Paul. It is vain to collect the testimonies in St. Paul's Epistles, and the corresponding testimonies of early antiquity. Those who so earnestly contend that the comparatively insignificant and temporary institution of the missionary Seventy was the type and standard of the eldership, or, as they call it, the priesthood, while they affirm that the episcopate enjoys the full honours of the successorship of the Apostles, must not wonder if the consequences of their voluntary humility recoil on their own heads.

M. Michaud dwells at length on the process by which the Romanists, as he calls them, have altered the notion of the priest. But, after what has just been said, it will appear evident that his strictures are too severe and, indeed, inconsistent. The distinction which he condemns as established in mediæval times was really, according to his theory, established in the New Testament. It was first the scholastic distinction between the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction: between what may be called, to adopt Romanist language, the implicit and the explicit authority of the priesthood. If the Seventy are to be regarded as the types of the second order in the hierarchy, then most certainly there must be for ever an actual distinction between them and

the successors of the Apostles in the character of their jurisdiction at least. This is an important point, and we will examine for a moment the pretensions here urged. It is said that in the mission of the Seventy the Saviour gave the same authority which He gave to the Apostles: that He gave equally to both mission and authority. The Seventy imposed authoritatively the teachings of the Gospel; they were absolute wherever they went; and their successors, the priests, have the same incontestable rights. When urged for proof of this, the only answer is, that "it is the doctrine of all antiquity." Certainly it is not the doctrine of the New Testament.

As applied to the episcopal function this question of order and jurisdiction becomes still more important. If the bishops hold from Our Lord Jesus the power of order in the Roman theory, it is from the Pope that they hold the power of jurisdiction. In the one sense they are the colleagues and the brethren of the Pope, in the other they are his sons only. Now, either jurisdiction is absolutely necessary in order that the power of order should be a true and legitimate power, or not. If it is absolutely necessary, it results that the power of order which the bishops received from Jesus Christ is entirely illusory: at bottom, all the efficacy of the episcopate is from the Pope, and not from Jesus Christ. Then the Pontiff is the real author of the episcopate and the real source of episcopal authority, in direct opposition to New Testament teaching. If, on the other hand, jurisdiction is not absolutely necessary to make order real and valid, of what use is it? It is a simple formality, designating to a diocese, and securing the orderly administration of ecclesiastical affairs. It becomes merely matter of religious notice; and the office deserves much less notice than is bestowed on it.

We shall not follow our author through his elaborate vindication of the episcopal authority as against the Pontiff, and his abatement of it as against the priesthood. The whole of this part of the subject is a tissue of inconsistencies, necessarily flowing from the radical error that the elder and the bishop were originally distinct. We pass to some genial words on the question of authority as it is affected by the last council. It will hardly be thought that the language of exasperation goes much beyond the truth in the following sentences:—

"According to the Romanists, authority is in its own nature absolute, whether he in whom it is lodged reasons or not, is deceived or not. As soon as he says 'I will,' all ought to obey without reasoning,

without reply, by all means without protest. Reasoning would be the act of a bad subject; replying would be the act of a revolutionary; protesting would be the act of a heretic. Romanist obedience is pre-eminently blind and passive obedience; and, consequently, Romanist authority is pre-eminently the will of a master. So much the worse for the master, if he is deceived; he alone is responsible. The subjects may differ from his error, but he alone will be guilty, and that is reason enough to throw everyone at his feet."

It is curious to hear one who is a believer in a hundred dogmas which are found in the Scripture only by the finger of authority, answering all this in purely Protestant fashion. But so it is.

"According to human nature and the Gospel, the subjects, while such, do not cease to be men. They abdicate neither their reason, nor their conscience, nor their liberty, nor their responsibility, and God Himself respects this reason, this conscience, this liberty, this responsibility; being Himself Reason, He cannot dispense with reason. In Romanism, on the contrary, the subjects are no longer more than passive machines. The Pope has only to move his wand, and an act of faith is produced immediately in their spirits, an act of submission in their will. If it is otherwise, all is disorder—all is lost. Of what use, say the Romanists, would be a Pope who should be only a servant of the Church? Would not Catholicism go to ruin, and that Church to which Jesus Christ promised His presence and assistance, would it not spoil the work of God, if the Pope did not govern it after His own will?"

Undoubtedly there is some truth in this last sentence of the Romanists proper. Catholicism, so called, would collapse in a very short time, if it were not held together by what remains of faith in a visible head and infallible centre of authority. It will be for ever impossible to construct a Catholicism, that is to say, a system that shall impose upon the universal world one system of faith and code of laws derived from antiquity, without a bond of union very much like that which the last dogmatic decree has given. The tendencies of the time forbid the thought of winning the nations on any other terms. It is a desperate expedient, but it is desperately necessary to adopt it. In sincere but vain efforts to throw off this spell, M. Michaud and his coadjutors are willing even to accept the name of Protestants.

"Did not St. Paul protest against St. Peter? Did not the Ninth Ecumenical Council, which anathematised the heretical Pope Honorius, protest against him? Did not St. Bernard, who denounced the abuses of the Roman Curia, protest against them? Did not all the councils which deposed the Popes protest against them? Here are Protestants

enough, and the Old Catholics, whom the Romanists treat as Protestants, because they protest against their new Roman heresies, are not in very bad company."

These are not the only Protestants whom M. Michaud might have mentioned as the good company amongst whom his cause has thrown him. He is thoroughly intimate with those Protestants of the Protestants who shook off the Papal authority in the sixteenth century. His spirit is precisely like theirs, and the pages in which he convicts modern Romanism of putting a false private interpretation on the Petrine texts of the Gospels, might have been extracted from the books of the German or French Reformers.

"Singular thing!" he says, "the Romanists, who accuse Protestants of appealing to free examination on matters of faith, do not perceive that they are doing the very same thing! that their interpretation of Scripture, especially of those texts in which St. Peter is concerned, is no other than a fanciful interpretation, absolutely contrary to that of all the Fathers of the first eight centuries, and that in imposing it on the faithful, on priests, on bishops, they despotise over faith, they tyrannise over consciences, they enslave the souls made free by Christ, and treat them as Pagan Cæsars treated the serfs of their empire."

This little book closes with what seems like a formal renunciation of Rome, written with fearful asperity, and at the same time with a certain consciousness of dejection and absence of hope. Excommunication is a terrible thing. No wonder it drives such priests as this one to an earnest study of that question which has again and again been alluded to in the preceding pages: the question as to the indelibility of orders, and the futility of the distinction between ministerial authority and ministerial jurisdiction. We must venture one more translation on this subject:—

"We may then conclude that the actual Roman doctrine, which restrains the authority of order by the authority of jurisdiction, which thus places the priest at the mercy of the bishops, and the bishops at the mercy of the Pope, is a doctrine contrary to theology and to history, the germ of which, however ancient in the tendencies of the Church of Rome, is nevertheless relatively modern, and in the seventeenth century was vigorously combated as an expedient of Ultramontane police, as a means of centralising the sacraments in the hands of the Pope, and of thus enslaving under his personal and arbitrary power the souls redeemed by Christ, and called by Him to the sacred liberty of the children of God.

"When certain timorous faithful think that Romanist bishops and the Pope can excommunicate the priests who have remained faithful to

old Catholicism; when they imagine that such an excommunication, purely Romanist, can invalidate the sacerdotal power which the priests received from Jesus Christ at their ordination *for eternity*, and take away their religious value from the acts of this indestructible power, they fall into a sad delusion.

"For these various reasons, and until Catholic bishops are instituted in France, we consider ourselves, we who as priests remain faithful to Old Catholicism, validly authorised to distribute to all souls the consolations and gifts of our priestly office."

There is something very pathetic in all this. As to the future, we must look rather to the German aspect of this question for light, and postpone for a season any further prognostication. One reflection remains in our mind after closing this honest book. Its lamentation is only the last strain of a complaint that has gone up from prostrate and dejected France for several generations. Not the least interesting portion of the volume is that which consists of fragments of ancient protests from theologians and bishops of Catholic France. At the present time those ancient laments have deepened into an irrepressible cry, which, echoed and confirmed in Germany, is, perhaps, one of the most affecting of the many wails that go up from this distracted world into the ears of the common Lord.

ART. IV.—*The Life and Times of John Wesley.* By the Rev. LUKE TYERMAN. Hodder and Stoughton. 3 Vols. Second Edition.*

OUR present article is the sequel of one on *Wesley's Character and Opinions in His Earlier Life*, which appeared six months ago in this Journal; and it will be necessary, in opening what we desire now to say respecting Wesley in his mature and in his later life, that we should recapitulate some of the information contained in our former article. We left Wesley still in Georgia, but on the point of returning to England. The date was 1737—8.

Wesley had gone to Oxford in 1720, being seventeen years of age. He took his bachelor's degree in 1724. He was ordained deacon in 1725, and elected Fellow of Lincoln College six months later, in March 1726. He had always been a moral youth, with religious habits and predilections: but in 1725 he was deeply awakened to a sense of his want of real holiness, and began thenceforth to seek after absolute consecration to God, as the great aim of his life. The main outline of his characteristic teaching in future life as to Christian perfection may be traced in the views which he at this time embraced, and which he seems to have learned chiefly from Thomas à Kempis and Jeremy Taylor. In the same year, also, he settled his views in opposition to the Calvinistic doctrines of predestination. About the same time, revolting at this point from Jeremy Taylor, he concluded that it must be the privilege and blessing of a Christian to know his acceptance with God.

In 1727, during Wesley's absence from Oxford at Wroote, where he was serving his father's rectory, his brother Charles became serious, and the original company of "Methodists," so designated in mockery or in pleasantry, was formed, Charles and a few like-minded friends being the members of the company. In 1730, shortly after his return to residence at Oxford,† John Wesley was placed at the head of this company, being styled the Father of the Holy Club.

* In our former article we inadvertently spoke of Delamotte, in Georgia, as Wesley's brother clergyman. He was Wesley's brother collegian, an Oxford man, and his attached friend and companion; but, we need hardly add, was never ordained.

† Nov. 22, 1729.

Wesley, as we have just stated, left Oxford in 1727, and went for a time to reside in Lincolnshire. Not long before his leaving he had visited the family of the Kirkhams, at Stanton, in Gloucestershire; and there appears to have been at that time some mutual attachment between himself and Miss Betty Kirkham. Of this, however, we lose the traces for several years afterwards. During those years, it is to be observed, Wesley was very far away from Gloucestershire; they were the years during which he had exchanged his university life for parochial residence and service in Lincolnshire. Possibly there may have been some reason connected with Stanton which helped in part to keep him so long away from Oxford, though the reason was certainly not that he had become indifferent to the merits of his friend Kirkham's sister. However, to Oxford he returned, as we have noted, at the end of 1729, and became the chief of the Methodist band. In the summer of that same year he renewed his personal intercourse with the charming daughter of the Stanton parsonage, although without any hope of marriage being possible, and through his connection with her family was introduced to Mrs. Pendarves, afterwards Mrs. Delany, with whom during several years following he kept up the remarkable and now well-known correspondence from which we gave some extracts in our former paper. His last and parting letter to her was dated in 1734. By that time he had learnt that his way and hers through life must be separate and divergent. Three years before, he was deeply engaged to her in admiration and affection, and would most gladly have married her, if he had been able. At that time she would have been a compensation to him for even the loss of his former hopes as to Miss Kirkham.

It was precisely during the interval which covers the correspondence with Mrs. Pendarves that Wesley's High-Church asceticism developed itself at Oxford. He set himself conscientiously to be an Anglican Churchman, according to the prescriptions of the Rubric; and to be a devout and holy Christian, according to early ecclesiastical examples and traditions. He became, accordingly, an ascetic ritualist of the strictest and most advanced class. At this time, to use his own words of himself, he "made antiquity a co-ordinate rule with Scripture." In 1735 he went to Georgia, and there, whilst inwardly the need and the attainability of a real consciousness and power of Divine love and holiness, as contradistinguished from any external services or observances, became with him a matter of deepening and almost passionate

conviction, outwardly his rule of life and service seemed to become more and more forbidding and unevangelical in its legal servility, its rubrical punctiliousness, and its ascetic severity. He was all that a High Anglo-Catholic of the present day is understood to be, except that he did not believe in the "conversion of the elements" in the Eucharist.

Nevertheless, with all his punctilious ritualism, there was curiously intermixed, during nearly the whole of these seven years (1730—1737-8), a strong tincture of mystical tendency and influence. This element represented the reaction, in such a true and earnest soul as Wesley's, of the inward against the merely outward. Through all his life, indeed, Wesley was resolute to maintain the union of outward godliness and religious observance with inward and spiritual contemplation and affection. But during the period of which we are now speaking, he had not found, in the "righteousness of faith," the true nexus and harmony between these antithetic necessities. Hence, at this period, the intermixture of ritualism and mysticism, the oscillations from one to the other, of which we spoke in our former article. Never ceasing to be outwardly the strict and ascetic High Churchman, Wesley, in his inward sympathies and longings, found himself strongly attracted by the union of contemplation and passion in the writings of the best class of devotional mystics, and was himself often a mystic at heart. Indeed, although servile ritualism and mysticism are antagonistic to each other, there is a deep congeniality, as all religious history has shown, between asceticism and mysticism, and, accordingly, on his ascetic side, Wesley found himself verging naturally towards the school from which, as a punctilious legalist, he was repelled. Besides which, Wesley could not, even for a time, find rest in legalism: earnest and real spirits never can. Whereas mysticism was a doctrine of rest,—made fair offers to him of "quietness and assurance for ever."

It was about 1728, or 1729, that Wesley was deeply impressed by reading Law's *Christian Perfection* and *Serious Call*. The fruit of these powerful books was seen in Wesley's deepened earnestness and "Methodist" singularity of religious strictness and devotion on his return to Oxford; that is, from the beginning of the year 1730. In 1732, he paid a personal visit to Law, at Putney; and from that period seemed to have begun to read the Mystics, chiefly, it would seem, at first, the Germans, who preceded and in part prepared the way for the Reformation, such as Tauler, and the author of the *Theologia Germanica*; but afterwards, also, such French writers as Madame De

Bourignon. Just as he was leaving England for Georgia, Law was going astray wide and deep by plunging into the unfathomable confusions of Behmenism. Into these Wesley never followed him; but, as we showed six months ago, appears to have distinctly and intelligently extricated himself from the meshes of mysticism towards the end of the year 1736, during his sojourn in Georgia. His criticism on the principles of mysticism, given in a letter to his brother Samuel, from Georgia, under date November 23rd, 1736, is worth quoting here, both for its own intrinsic value, and as a specimen of his philosophical and critical capacity at this period of his life:—

"I think," he says, "the rock on which I had the nearest made shipwreck of the faith was the writings of the Mystics; under which term I comprehend all and only those who slight any of the means of grace. I have drawn up a short scheme of their doctrines, and beg your thoughts upon it, as soon as you can conveniently. Give me them, as particularly, fully, and strongly as your time will permit. They may be of consequence, not only to all this province, but to nations of Christians yet unborn.

"All means are not necessary for all men: therefore each person must use such means, and such only, as he finds necessary for him. When the end is attained, the means cease."

"Men utterly divested of free-will, of self-love, and of self-activity, are entered into the passive state, and enjoy such a contemplation as is not only above faith, but above sight—such as is entirely free from images, thoughts, and discourse, and never interrupted by sins of infirmity, or voluntary distractions. They have absolutely renounced their reason and understanding; else they could not be guided by a Divine light. They seek no clear or particular knowledge of anything, but only an obscure, general knowledge, which is far better."

"Having thus attained the end, the means must cease. Hope is swallowed up in love; sight, or something more than sight, takes the place of faith. All particular virtues they possess in the essence, and therefore need not the distinct exercise of them. They work, likewise, all good works essentially, not accidentally; and use all outward means only as they are moved thereto."

"Public prayer, or any forms, they need not; for they pray without ceasing. Sensible devotion in any prayer they despise; it being a great hindrance to perfection. The Scripture they need not read; for it is only His letter, with whom they converse face to face. Neither do they need the Lord's Supper; for they never cease to remember Christ in the most acceptable manner."—*Tyerman's Wesley*, Vol. I., pp. 133—4.

The one really plausible position of all that are here laid down is that set forth in the first paragraph of the summary. How

much of truth there is in it, it is not our business to inquire at this moment. But we may observe that Wesley's special weakness at this time, as a ritualist, was in precise antithesis to this position. He taught the pernicious error which is in the opposite extreme to the no less pernicious mystical half-truth. His one prescription for the attainment of holiness and happiness was the use of "the means of grace;" of the instituted means. He taught that the more means there are, and are made use of, the more grace must needs come to the sincere user of them. His doctrine was a servile legalism, a plodding ritualism, less absurd, perhaps, and less open to mischievous abuse than the extremer developments of the mysticism summarised in the passage we have quoted, but not less opposed to Christian truth, and in special contradiction to the liberty wherewith Christ has made His people free. One secret of the strength and attraction of the mystical doctrines for him—that which drew him to them, even while he revolted against them—consisted, doubtless, in the fact that the element of truth which lay at the bottom of all their Antinomian paradoxes and inexplicable subtleties was, if it could only have been disinvolved from the fallacies in which it was embedded, precisely the principle that was needed to correct his own servile doctrine of "means," his ritualistic legalism. To this must be added that the mystical doctrines, under the hands of some of their teachers, become a very cunning web of verbal deductions; a fabric of fallacies very deftly put together, and exceedingly likely to impose upon a verbal logician. Now, Wesley was a most dexterous master of the logical art and method. But if his mastery of the logician's craft often stood him in good stead, when conducting an argument, it also was at times a snare to him. If he often easily and happily disentangled, he was sometimes entangled in verbal subtleties. The school in which he was trained was a school of verbal dialectics and of scholastic distinctions. Hence, if he was furnished with the skill and possessed the power finally to penetrate and refute the fallacies of the Mystics, he was for a time bewildered in their plausible mazes.

But, at any rate, the passage we have quoted shows that Wesley had, from the beginning, the taste and tendencies of the philosophic theologian; and, moreover, that he had a fine philosophic capacity. The philosophic tincture and bias of thought remained with Wesley through life, and was shown in many of his sermons, not only in such of his most finished discourses, published in his ripe maturity of thought, as that on *The Original of the Law*, but in many of those which,

in the later years of his long life, he wrote for the *Arminian Magazine*. His original tendency, in fact, was to be a philosophical rather than an evangelical, or even a Biblical, theologian. His Moravian guides, especially Böhler, drove him to the New Testament. Böhler had strong reason when he said to him, "*Mi frater, mi frater, ista philosophia tua excoquenda est.*" It has often been said that Wesley was not a metaphysician; and there is truth in the saying, although it is by no means so absolutely true as it is commonly assumed to be. But then there can hardly be said to have been any metaphysical science in his earlier days, least of all at Oxford. It might not be untruly said that even Cudworth was no metaphysician. But if Wesley was not a metaphysician, he was a philosophical student in the whole bias of his intellect, addicted, no doubt, like all the students of his age, and in the spirit of all scholastic traditions, to synthesis and deduction, rather than to analysis and induction, but nevertheless open to correction as respects this tendency. The characteristic parts of Wesley's theology were based on experience and consciousness. His Arminianism was founded on the moral intuitions of humanity, in opposition to the mere deductive logic of Calvinism. His doctrines of assurance and of Christian perfection, although moulded into a system by the help of his logical faculties—occasionally employed, as we venture to think, with more of verbal truth-seeming than of realistic and truth-reaching insight—yet reposed in their broad power and merits on the basis of living consciousness and experience. Whether as a logical expositor, however, or as a witness, and the mouth-piece of other witnesses, Wesley was never a dry, or a merely scholastic and systematic theologian; there was always in his teaching as a theologian a living freshness of thought and a philosophic basis and mould of exposition. Even as a boy he was singularly remarkable for reflectiveness, and his Oxford discipline in early life, the influence of Plato and Aristotle, of Taylor, and Beveridge, and Law, had contributed their full share to the permanent colour and quality of his intellectual character.

Through all the preparatory stages of his life, Wesley was emphatically a learner. All through life, indeed, he was a man of a peculiarly open and teachable mind, as much so in his ninth as in his third decade. But during the first five-and-thirty years of his life, he was not only a learner, but he was in quest of a teacher; he was looking out for a school in which to study and graduate; he was unsettled in his principles. He went to school to the Rubric, and being a loyal

son of the Church of England, he worked long and assiduously in that school; but this, after all, was only grinding at the elements—"beggarly elements" he found them to be in after days; he went to school to Law, and for some years Law was his oracle, until he found that he durst not any longer follow the hazardous excursions of his teacher; he sat as a scholar at the feet of the Moravians during his voyage to Georgia, and in the colony, although he could not accept all their teachings; he wrote from Georgia to his brother Samuel, entreating him for correction and instruction; in the colony he learnt from Lutheran Salzburghers, and from Scottish Presbyterians, not indeed, as yet, lessons of true ecclesiastical liberality and catholicity, but much which sunk deep into his open and thoughtful mind. All through he felt that his system of theological and ecclesiastical principles remained yet to be formed; he had not found his centre or his basis, he was far from being at rest. Nevertheless, it is notable that, with all this, he felt that he was a teacher likewise, and he acted as such. If he was ever listening that he might learn, he was also ever speaking to instruct. His personal influence was always very great; there was authority in his presence and his words. Especially we must note that he was under the continual conviction that he was destined to be a chief teacher—the teacher not only of a company in his generation, but of multitudes in many generations. This conviction is expressed with startling distinctness in the letter to his elder brother which we have quoted. Begging his brother to give him his thoughts respecting the principles of the Mystics, as summarised in the letter, he says, with singular emphasis, "Give me them as particularly, fully, and strongly, as your time will admit. They may be of consequence not only to all this province, but to nations of Christians yet unborn." So much did he think might depend on the settlement of his own views respecting Christian doctrine. The same sense of a most important destiny for himself as a teacher of men was expressed a year or two earlier in his well-known reason for remaining at Oxford, rather than succeed his father in the Epworth Rectory. "The schools of the prophets," he said, "were at Oxford; and was it not a more extensive benefit to sweeten the fountain than to purify a particular stream?"*

* It is not necessary to the scope of our discussion in the text to consider how far Wesley was justified in the view which he took of his duty respecting the matter referred to above. Not a few have thought that he ought to have yielded to the urgency of what were pleaded as the claims of family affection and duty, and have left Oxford for Epworth. Southey appears to have been

He seems to have had a settled and governing conviction that there was a great work to be done for the Church and the world, for the present and yet more for the future, a work which God had called him to do. He saw around him the need of such a work—a hollow and heartless world, full of corruption, vanity, and unrest, and a supine, undisciplined, insensible Church; and he felt stirring strongly within him the power and the call to awaken and organise the Church, and to impress and convert the world.

Such was John Wesley, the Oxford Methodist and the Georgian Missionary. Such, on the whole, he appears to have remained up to the time of his quitting Georgia. Nevertheless, as we showed in our former article, the intolerant High-Church ritualist was all the time, and especially towards the end of his stay in Georgia, inwardly beginning to melt; the light of spiritual liberty, even before he quitted Georgia, was beginning to break through the darkness which had so long wrapped him round, and to dawn into his soul; and during the spiritual solitude of his voyage home, he must

of this mind. Mr. Tyerman, who gives a clear and full account of the whole question, evidently feels that Wesley ought to have yielded to his father's and his family's appeals. He speaks of this part of Wesley's history as "somewhat painfully mysterious;" and he thinks that he, in fact, clears it up by producing a letter to show that Wesley did, in the end, consent to seek, through his friend Broughton, at the hands of Mr. St. John, then in high office, a presentation to the Crown living of Epworth. Miss Wedgwood, on the contrary, holds that Wesley "fully justifies" his insuperable reluctance to leave Oxford; and the Rev. J. Gordon, in his able and well-informed papers on Wesley in the *Theologian*¹ holds, in like manner, that Wesley was perfectly right in his feelings upon the matter. We think that, on such a point, Wesley alone could be the judge in his own case. It was a question of personal conscience and conviction. "He felt that he had a vocation to teach thinkers and teachers, to teach in the schools of the prophets;" that to him was duty. He knew what a country-parish and parish duty were; he had served more than two years at Wroote; and he felt that a country cure was *not* his vocation. It seems probable from the evidence which Mr. Tyerman has produced that, at the last, Wesley did, against his own proper judgment and will, allow an application to be made on his behalf for presentation to Epworth in succession to his father. Miss Wedgwood, also, has, from other data, arrived at the same conclusion. "It appears, however," she says, "from an obscure sentence in a letter of Charles Wesley's, that John did at last make an unsuccessful and reluctant application for the living." We do not know to what letter she refers, and Mr. Tyerman, who knows almost everything about the Wesleys, makes no reference to any such sentence in any letter of Charles; but the coincidence between Mr. Tyerman's and Miss Wedgwood's conclusion is striking. Still this fact, if it be a fact, does not at all change the general aspect of the affair, and it remains true, notwithstanding, that Wesley, to use his own words, "continued in his purpose to live and die at Oxford, till Dr. Burton pressed him to go to Georgia." We may fairly assume that he neither expected nor desired the application to which he reluctantly consented to be successful.

¹ For April and July, 1871.

have learnt much and learnt quickly. When he landed at Deal, he was a very different man from what he had been two years and a half before, when he sailed for Georgia. This is shown by the reflections which at that time he wrote in his journal. It is evident that his intercourse in the colony with Moravians, Saltzburghers, and Presbyterians, in connection with his experience of his own errors and failures, and with the diligent and prayerful study of the Scriptures, had profited him more, upon recollection and reconsideration, during the voyage, than during the time he was in the colony, and whilst he was actively enforcing his own strongly-held views, and was occupied in the routine of church service and rubrical ceremonial.

The following are the reflections to which we have referred, as written down by Wesley immediately after his return to England. They are so important that, notwithstanding their length, we must give them entire, with the Notes which Wesley appended to them in the later editions of his Journal.

"It is now two years and almost four months since I left my native country, in order to teach the Georgian Indians the nature of Christianity; but what have I learned myself in the mean time? Why (what I the least of all suspected), that I who went to America to convert others was never myself converted to God.* 'I am not mad,' though I thus speak; but 'I speak the words of truth and soberness;' if haply some of those who still dream may awake, and see, that as I am, so are they.

"Are they read in philosophy? So was I. In ancient or modern tongues? So was I also. Are they versed in the science of divinity? I too have studied it many years. Can they talk fluently upon spiritual things? The very same could I do. Are they plenteous in alms? Behold, I gave all my goods to feed the poor. Do they give of their labour as well as of their substance? I have laboured more abundantly than they all. Are they willing to suffer for their brethren? I have thrown up my friends, reputation, ease, country; I have put my life in my hand, wandering into strange lands; I have given my body to be devoured by the deep, parched up with heat, consumed by toil and weariness, or whatsoever God should please to bring upon me. But does all this (be it more or less, it matters not) make me acceptable to God? Does all I ever did or can know, say, give, do, or suffer, justify me in His sight? Yea, or the constant use of all the means of grace? (which, nevertheless, is meet, right, and our bounden duty.) Or that I know nothing of myself; that I am as touching outward moral righteousness blameless? Or, to come closer yet, the having a rational conviction of all the truths of Christianity? Does all this give me a claim to the holy, heavenly, divine character of a Christian? By no

* I am not sure of this.

means. If the oracles of God are true, if we are still to abide by 'the law and the testimony;' all these things, though, when ennobled by faith in Christ,* they are holy, and just, and good, yet without it are 'dung and dross,' meet only to be purged away by 'the fire that never shall be quenched.'

"This, then, have I learned in the ends of the earth, that I 'am fallen short of the glory of God:' that my whole heart is 'altogether corrupt and abominable;' and, consequently, my whole life; seeing it cannot be, that an 'evil tree' should 'bring forth good fruit:' that 'alienated' as I am from the life of God, I am 'a child of wrath,'† an heir of hell: that my own works, my own sufferings, my own righteousness, are so far from reconciling me to an offended God, so far from making any atonement for the least of those sins, which 'are more in number than the hairs of my head,' that the most specious of them need an atonement themselves, or they cannot abide His righteous judgment: that, 'having the sentence of death' in my heart, and having nothing in or of myself to plead, I have no hope, but that of being justified freely, 'through the redemption that is in Jesus;' I have no hope, but that if I seek I shall find Christ, and 'be found in Him, not having my own righteousness, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.' (Phil. iii. 9.)

"If it be said, that I have faith (for many such things have I heard, from many miserable comforters), I answer, So have the devils—a sort of faith; but still they are strangers to the covenant of promise. So the Apostles had even at Cana in Galilee, when Jesus first 'manifested forth His glory; even then they, in a sort, 'believed on Him;' but they had not then 'the faith that overcometh the world.' The faith I want is,‡ 'A sure trust and confidence in God, that, through the merits of Christ, my sins are forgiven, and I reconciled to the favour of God. I want that faith which St. Paul recommends to all the world, especially in his Epistle to the Romans: that faith which enables every one that hath it to cry out, 'I live not; but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me.' I want that faith which none can have without knowing that he hath it (though many imagine they have it, who have it not); for whosoever hath it, is 'freed from sin,' the whole 'body of sin is destroyed' in him: he is 'freed from fear,' 'having peace with God through Christ, and rejoicing in hope of the glory of God.' And he is freed from doubt, 'having the love of God shed abroad in his heart through the Holy Ghost which is given unto him;' which 'Spirit itself beareth witness with his spirit, that he is a child of God.'"

Here was evidently a spirit prepared of the Lord to receive the glad tidings of "salvation by faith," in the simplest and

* I had even then the faith of a servant, though not that of a son.

† I believe not.

‡ The faith of a son.

most evangelical form. Wesley was already on the very verge of the truth in its freedom and fulness. He was "convinced of sin;" was truly awakened and penitent, and was feeling after, was yearning for, the true "righteousness of Christ." It was natural that his humbled and chastened spirit, in the depth of its penitential awakening, should "write bitter things" against itself. In after years, writing in the fulness of his wide and mature Christian experience, Wesley revised the language which he had written in his sore trouble of spirit. To the passage which declares that he had never been "converted to God," he appended as a note the words, "I am not sure of this." Evidently the question here is as to the meaning of the word "converted." In one sense Wesley was truly and deeply "converted;" in another sense he was not yet "converted," not having as yet been made a partaker of the "righteousness of faith," in its full and true evangelical sense. He also, in his later revisions, corrected the record in his journal at some other points, by stating that "he had even then the faith of a servant, though not of a son," and that he was *not* at that time still "a child of wrath," although he had not attained to that "faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," which implies filial confidence, and cannot but bring with it filial love, the witness of the Spirit, and all the fruits which belong to the new birth. A controversy has been raised upon this question, into which we do not feel it needful to go. Mr. Wesley's own *Notes on the New Testament*, especially if the notes are taken in connection with those sermons of his later life in which he discriminates between the faith and experience of a "Servant" of God and of a "Son," are fully sufficient to explain in what sense Mr. Wesley may be truly said to have been, and in what sense not to have been, "converted" at the time of his return from Georgia in the first months of 1738. One thing all must be agreed upon, that Wesley was a man of very different spirit and experience in February 1738 from what he had been three years before. He was then sincere and in earnest, but oscillating between an unevangelical mysticism and an equally unevangelical ritualistic legalism; he was "beating the air," and "going about to establish his own righteousness." Of the true doctrine of grace he seems to have had little perception or feeling, any more than of the true doctrine of faith—the one, indeed, must ever imply the other—salvation is "of grace through faith;" nor does he appear to have been the subject of a true "evangelical repentance." Now, on the contrary, Wesley was evidently a

true and lowly penitent, whom the spirit of God had emptied of his own self-righteousness, that he might be prepared for the reception of Christ's righteousness—"the righteousness which is of God through faith."

In one thing, however, Wesley was not changed on his return. He still believed as firmly as ever in his "vocation." He landed at Deal at half-past four in the morning. That same morning, at a very early hour, before starting for Faversham on his way to London, he read and expounded at the inns, and he did the like after arriving at Faversham in the evening. His humbling experience in Georgia had not in the least disheartened him, or abated his courage in this respect. Since he left England he had seemed to fail in everything; his influence as a clergyman had declined almost to nothing in Georgia; he had become embroiled in law, partly, at least, through his own unwisdom, if partly through his fidelity; his reputation as a man of counsel and of action could not but have suffered; many slanders respecting him were afloat; his heart, for which it seemed as if no haven of conjugal affection was to be found, had been cruelly wounded. Such was the issue of a voyage and mission which he had undertaken in the fond hope, that in a new world he might, in God's hands, be and do something better and something more in his own time and for generations to come, than he had ever been, had ever done, or could have hoped to be and do, even at Oxford, where were "the schools of the prophets," if he had spent his best days there.

It could not but recur to him continually, in his meditations on the history of the two hapless-seeming years he had spent in America, that there must somewhere be a vital, a fatal, flaw either in his character, or in his doctrine, or in his methods. His enterprise as a Missionary pioneer had broken down in a most humiliating way.

It is true, indeed, as Mr. Tyerman happily quotes Whitefield's *Journal*, written but a few months later, to show, that, after all, Wesley had left not a little good behind him in Georgia; that among the best people of the colony "his name" was "very precious," and that he had laid a valuable foundation for Whitefield to build upon. But to Wesley's mind on his voyage home, his failures would be present, while the measure of his success would be as yet unknown. Nor, after all, was that measure of success, which we cannot but place in contrast with the results accomplished in Georgia by Whitefield's own ministry, sufficient to do more than qualify, to a limited extent, the picture of failure, on the whole, which has passed under our view.

His Journal reveals to us, in part, the working of his mind during the voyage. He exerted himself to the utmost for the good of the seamen, but this could only yield him partial and temporary relief. During the first six weeks of the voyage he was "continually weighed down with fearfulness and heaviness." He writes, in the fulness of his heart, among many other words of lamentation, that he had thus far "evidently built without a foundation." During the last fortnight he had some comfort; but yet he writes, five days before the voyage came to an end, "I went to America to convert the Indians; but O! who shall convert me? Who, what is he that will deliver me from this evil heart of unbelief? I have a fair summer religion. I can talk well; nay and believe myself, while no danger is near, but let death look me in the face, and my spirit is troubled. Nor can I say, 'To die is gain!'

"I have a sin of fear, that when I've spun
My last thread, I shall perish on the shore!"

Such was the working of Wesley's mind during his voyage home from Georgia—a period which we look upon as for him a critical season of searching, gracious, humbling experience; a seed-time overcast with heavy clouds, but rich in promise; a seed-time of weeping, which was to be followed by a life-long harvest of spiritual fruitfulness.

Wesley, during the voyage, deliberately reviewed his whole experience, and the phases of thought and feeling through which he had been passing during the twelve years preceding. Of this review we have already availed ourselves, especially in our former article, in delineating the formation of his opinions and the growth of his character. We have seen how near, before he landed at Deal, Wesley had come to the simplicity and truth of Gospel teaching. This "Scribe" certainly was "not far from the kingdom of God." The Providence which had brought him thus far on his way, which had brought "the blind by a way that he knew not, even by paths which he had not known," had in readiness for him at this very point the human guide who was to lead him into the fulness of evangelical faith and experience. "Darkness" was now to be made "light before him," and "crooked things straight." What Philip was to the Ethiopian eunuch, what Peter was to Cornelius, Böhler was to be to Wesley.

At the very moment when Wesley landed at Deal, his teacher was on his way to England from Germany. He was

a Moravian minister, and came to England that he might go forward to the very colonies which Wesley had just left. Within a week after Wesley's landing at Deal, he and Böhler met in London. Böhler, in a letter to Zinzendorf, gives a description of Wesley, as he found him. He describes him as "a good-natured man,"* who "knew he did not properly believe on the Saviour, and was willing to be taught." He adds: "Our mode of believing in the Saviour is so easy to Englishmen, that they cannot reconcile themselves to it; if it were a little more artful [artificial?], they would much sooner find their way into it. They justify themselves; and therefore they always take it for granted that they believe already, and try to prove their faith by their works, and thus so plague and torment themselves that they are at heart very miserable."†

Wesley always regarded his intercourse with Böhler as the cardinal point in his spiritual history. Having landed at Deal on Feb. 1, he fell in six days later (Feb. 7) with Böhler, just landed from Germany, and procured him lodgings. He sets a special note against this day in his Journal, as "a day much to be remembered;" and he mentions that, from this time, he did not willingly lose any opportunity, during his stay in London, of conversing with Böhler and his companions. He accompanied his Moravian teacher to Oxford on the 17th, and took him with him to visit Mr. Gambold (who had been led astray by "mystic delusion"), at Stanton-Harcourt, on the 18th. It was during this visit to Oxford that Böhler insisted so solemnly to Wesley that "his philosophy" needed to "be purged away." On the 4th of March, returning to Oxford to visit his brother Charles, who had been ill of pleurisy there, he found Böhler with his brother, and writes that by him on the next day (Sunday) he was "clearly convinced of unbelief, of the want of that faith whereby alone we are saved."‡ Meantime, Böhler exhorted him to preach the true faith and way of faith, though he might not himself as yet have attained thereto. His intercourse with his Moravian guide at Oxford lasted till the 10th, when Böhler returned to London. On the 23rd, being in Oxford, he met Böhler there again. We give the whole of the entry in his Journal under this date. "I met Peter Böhler again, who

* The English translation here is, no doubt, inadequate. The meaning probably is—a man of excellent disposition and principles.

† Tyerman's *Wesley*, I. 181—2.

‡ "With the full Christian salvation," is Wesley's note at this place in the revised editions of his early Journals.

now amazed me more and more by the account he gave of the fruits of living faith,—the holiness and happiness which he affirmed to attend it. The next morning I began the Greek Testament again, resolving to abide by 'the law and the testimony;' and being confident that God would hereby show me whether this doctrine was of God." Already the "new wine" of the kingdom was working mightily within his breast. He had been the slave of forms; he had been greatly surprised, if not shocked, when he heard the Presbyterian minister in the American colony offer an extemporary prayer.* But now we find him writing, under date April 1: "Being at Mr. Fox's society, my heart was so full that I could not confine myself to the forms of prayer which we were accustomed to use there. Neither do I purpose to be confined to them any more, but to pray indifferently, with a form or without, as I may find suitable to particular occasions." The new wine was threatening to burst the "old bottles;" presently "new bottles" were to be provided, so that the wine should not be lost. Meantime, in the record last quoted, we recognise the main principle of Wesley's ecclesiastical course. His singularity, and independence of decision and action, had nothing factious about them; they resulted from the simple, disinterested, paramount principle, of using whatever means or methods of action clearly promised to do the most good. He enters into no abstract controversy as to praying with or without forms; probably his experiences among the Moravians, yet more than his intercourse with the Presbyterian minister and congregation, had served to emancipate him from the bondage of custom and servile ecclesiasticism as to this particular, while an acute Oxford Churchman like him was not likely to adopt a sweeping condemnation of forms of prayer, which would not only have prohibited the use of the Liturgy of his own Church, ever by him so deeply loved, but even of the Lord's Prayer. But he finds free prayer, under certain conditions of feeling, to be more congenial, more adequate, and more affecting, than any form could be, therefore he determines henceforth to hold himself at liberty, according to the occasion, to pray with or without forms. As to any reproach of singularity or enthusiasm, whilst he by no means courted such reproach, the time had long gone by when it could have any terror for him. Here, then, we have a typical instance, thus early in his course, of the spirit and principles which governed Wesley's proceedings through life.

* *London Quarterly Review* for last January, p. 344.

The ritualist was already greatly changed; a new inspiration was welling up within him. His bonds had been for some time melting away; there was soon to be an end of them. Already the manacles had dissolved from the hands of devotion; soon the fetters would be broken which had bound his feet from running in the evangelical way. Already he had been impelled to use the blessed privilege of free utterance in prayer, and to avail himself of the large liberty to pray with "all prayer and supplication in the spirit;" the day was very near when, by his preaching also, the Word of the Lord was to "have free course and be glorified."

On the 22nd of April, Wesley met Böhler again in London. As to the nature of faith the Moravian had prevailed, and also as to the fruits of faith, but Wesley still doubted whether there was Scripture authority for the penitent, prayerful, waiting soul, to expect to receive the power and gift of faith immediately through the operation of the Holy Ghost; whether it could really be imparted in a moment. Here again he records in his Journal, that he was silenced by an appeal to the Scripture, where, to his "utter astonishment," he "found scarce any instances there of other than instantaneous conversions, scarce any so slow as that of St. Paul, who was three days in the pangs of the new birth." Wesley, however, was not by any means easily beaten out of his English and Church of England habits of thought, in respect to the supernatural faith of a spiritual Christian, who rejoices in the full power and privilege of Christian sonship. He urged, that whatever might have been the case in Apostolic times, there was no proof that God worked in the same manner now. From this last hold of doubt and incredulity he was dislodged the next day (Sunday, the 23rd), by the evidence of "several living witnesses." "Here," he says, "ended my disputing. I could now only cry out, 'Lord, help Thou my unbelief.'"

It is evident that, up to this time, far as he had been brought on his way towards the great Gospel truth, Wesley had yet never been able to free himself from the feeling, that Christian faith was largely an intellectual exercise, and that, where it ceased to be intellectual, it became a humanly moral act; that it was "of the operation," not "of the Holy Ghost," but of a man's own understanding and responsible moral inclination or will. The great truth that the power descends from God, that it must be waited and looked for in the way of prayer and penitent seeking and service; that it is a spiritual, supernatural act and habit of soul, at once the

fruit and seed of a Divine life-stirring, uniting in itself the characters of penitent humility, of self-renunciation, of simple trust, of absolute obedience both of understanding and will, indissolubly joined with loving rapture and self-consecration; that it is, to use Wesley's own words, "the loving, obedient sight of a present and reconciled God." This was a truth which Wesley had not conceived of, and found it very hard to accept. So true is it, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Wesley, indeed, was not, at the time when he first met Böhler, a merely "natural man," any more than the disciples were before Our Lord's resurrection. But he was not yet, in the full and proper sense, "a spiritual man." He was a servant of God; perhaps, in a certain sense, he might be regarded as virtually a child of God, but still he was "carnal." He was not yet fully born into the kingdom of heaven, with its spiritual light and blessedness, although he was "brought to the birth," and was very near the hour of his enlargement into the "glorious liberty of the children of God."

Wesley, in his own epitome of what passed between Böhler and himself, thus sums up the final result, so far as it respected the change which had been wrought in his doctrinal views: "I was now thoroughly convinced, and, by the grace of God, I resolved to seek it (*i.e.* faith) unto the end. 1. By absolutely renouncing all dependence, in whole or in part, upon my own works or righteousness, *on which I had really grounded my hope of salvation, though I knew it not, from my youth up.* 2. By adding to the constant use of all the other means of grace, continual prayer for this very thing; justifying, saving faith; a full reliance on the blood of Christ shed for me; a trust in Him as my Christ, as my sole justification, sanctification, and redemption."*

Wesley continued to consort with Böhler. It was on the 22nd of April (Sunday) that he was finally convinced. He was in continual intercourse with his teacher for several days following, until the 26th, when Böhler accompanied him some miles on his way out of town. His brother's illness brought him back to London on the 1st of May, where he found his friend and guide again. On the 4th Böhler left London to sail to Carolina. Wesley's note in his *Journal* on Böhler's departure corresponds with the emphatic *Memoran-*

* *Journal*, Vol. I. p. 96.

dum inscribed over the date of their first meeting, and reveals also how deep and strong in Wesley's soul was that conviction of his own momentous work and vocation to which we have referred:—"O what a work hath God begun, since his coming into England! such an one as shall never come to an end till heaven and earth pass away!"

Meantime, Wesley had not yet obtained the treasure he had sought for so long and so diligently, though for a long time in wrong directions. He had not himself as yet been able to "believe unto salvation." His brother Charles had not yielded to Böhler's arguments until a fortnight after himself, and indeed had for a short time angrily opposed John on this point; nevertheless, partly, as it would seem, through the ministry of sickness, he was made a partaker of "joy and peace through believing" earlier than John. While John was entering Bethesda, Charles stepped in before him. This was on Sunday, the 19th of May. It was not until Wednesday, the 24th, that John Wesley, according to the beautiful and familiar account which we have in his own words, "felt his heart strangely warmed, felt that he did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation;" and had "an assurance given him, that Christ had taken away his sin, and saved him from the law of sin and death." This day, May the 24th, 1738, is a great landmark in the history of the Wesleyan movement.

Until Wesley learnt the doctrine of "salvation by grace through faith, not of ourselves," but as the "gift of God," he had been a ritualist; and it had been his doctrine that salvation was secured by moral and ritual conformity to what the Church requires. From this time forth he taught that salvation was not by works or rites, but by that faith of the new creation, that faith in "Christ and Him crucified," which unites the soul with Christ, through His Spirit, which introduces the soul into "newness of life," so that the believer is made a child and heir of God and a "joint heir with Christ." Faith he was to teach hereafter as the principle and inlet of the Divine and Christian life in the human soul. But this change entirely revolutionised the character and tenor of his ministry. To constrain, by the authority of Christ and His Church, by virtue very mainly of Church discipline and law, men and women to obey the requirements of the Church, had been his vocation heretofore; he had been an ecclesiastical magistrate, a disciplinary officer, a moral and ritual watchman, in the service of the Church; his work had been to carry out discipline and instruction in detail. But now he was to be something very different. It was to be his business

to preach salvation through Christ Jesus to all men. His first and chief work now was to point the way to Him. The rest would follow for those who repaired to Him. He was not to be a priest, observing, enforcing, carrying out ritual; but a herald who, in the spirit and language of the Baptist, was to direct sinners, away from himself, from the Church, from all else whatsoever, to Christ as "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." Faith henceforth was to be his doctrine; he was to teach that men are saved by faith. But "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God." From this hour, accordingly, the ritualistic priest and ecclesiastical martinet was to be transformed into a flaming preacher. Hence arose Wesleyan Methodism and all the Methodist Churches.

In his famous correspondence with Law, which took place during the period of his intercourse with Böhler, but before he had attained to peace through believing, and which we agree with Mr. Tyerman in thinking petulant and harsh, although we do not think it deserves to be denounced as "an intolerable outrage,"* Wesley has expressed very distinctly what he at the time regarded as being the essential defect of his faith up to the period of his receiving Böhler's instructions. His faith up to this time he describes as a "speculative notional shadow, which lives in the head, not in the heart." He has also described very pointedly the sort of doctrine which, in contrast to his own conceptions heretofore, Böhler had insisted upon. "This faith, indeed," that "holy man" had told him, "is the free gift of God. But seek, and thou shalt find. Strip thyself naked of thine own works, and fly to Him. 'For whosoever cometh to Him, He will in no wise cast out.'" And his complaint against his former

* Miss Wedgwood's observations on this correspondence are acute, and contain a measure of truth, although here as elsewhere she has misconceived Wesley's character, as regards the point of insight and sympathy with particular minds. Wesley wrote as he did to Law because he believed himself to be bound both to God and man, and especially to Mr. Law, to do his utmost to point out to him, in full light, what he regarded as his most mischievous doctrinal defect and error. Wesley's manner of doing this was a remnant of his old hierarchical character and temper, a derivative from the views which he had held so long, and the influences under which his character for so many years had been moulded. It was not to be expected that the conscientious arrogance and dogmatism which such opinions as he had held cannot fail always to produce, should all at once pass away, even when he had begun to look away from his Church to his Saviour. If Wesley had not embraced the doctrines of grace and salvation by faith, he must have retained, as his official temper, such arrogant austerity as he had already shown in Georgia, notwithstanding the brightness and candour of his natural disposition.

instructor, Law, is: "Why did I scarce ever hear you name the name of Christ? Never, so as to ground anything upon faith in His blood."

Miss Wedgwood has firmly grasped the significance of Wesley's experience at this critical period of his history. She reads aright the meaning, at least in general, of his experience during the voyage home, and she sees very distinctly the nature of the revolution in his views and aims which was effected by his conversion. "Wesley's homeward voyage in 1738," she says, "marks the conclusion of his High Church period. He abated nothing of his attachment to the ordinances of the Church either then or to the last days of his life, and he did not so soon reach that degree of independence of her hierarchy and some of her rules which marks his furthest point of divergence; but his Journals during this voyage chronicle for us that deep dissatisfaction which is felt whenever an earnest nature wakes up to the incompleteness of a traditional religion; and his after life, compared with his two years in Georgia, makes it evident that he passed at this time into a new spiritual region. His Journals are marked by a depression which we never meet with again."* Having referred, a few pages farther on, to the religious societies of which Dr. Woodward has left us an account, and which had preceded Methodism, she makes the following discriminating and acute observations. "The religious societies of the seventeenth century were in organisation a feebler and more liberal Methodism.† It was, however, only in organisation that the two things were alike. The spirit of the older societies was not only unlike that of Methodism, but it was the very spirit from which Methodism was a reaction. They were distinctively *Church* bodies, and they belonged characteristically to the Church at that time; they embodied the principles of that party whose watchwords were virtue and vice, and who were not afraid to speak of the support of a good conscience, and of the everlasting rewards which 'were worthy of all the care and toil which were to be spent in the pursuit of them.' (Dr. Woodward.) The reader will at once appreciate the chasm which phrases like these indicate between the speakers and the school of Wesley. . . . Adherence to the Church was no longer the *first* condition of membership in any society with which he was in sympathy. *The birthday of a*

* *John Wesley*, p. 140.

† By "more liberal" Miss Wedgwood means "less strict." But the observations which follow show that being *Church* societies, these less strict societies were ecclesiastically more exclusive, and therefore less "liberal."

*Christian was already shifted from his baptism to his conversion, and in that change the partition line of two great systems is crossed."**

The last sentence we have quoted admirably expresses the master truth which explains the whole sequel of Wesley's life, which furnishes the key to the whole development of Wesleyan Methodism. Mr. Tyerman has given a full and excellent account of Wesley's religious experience during the whole of this critical period in his history; with the minuteness characteristic of a student and preacher of evangelical theology, he has exhibited on the surface of his pages those instructive fluctuations in Wesley's own views and experience during the early months after his conversion, which Wesley himself sets forth fully in his Journals, and which show that Wesley's views respecting the nature of the Spirit's witness and the character and extent of regeneration were, as was to be expected, not fully defined or finally settled until some time after his conversion, and, in particular, as Mr. Tyerman intimates, that they had been not a little disturbed and perplexed by what he had heard among the Moravians during his visit to them in Germany almost immediately after he had "found peace." But Mr. Tyerman fails, as we think, to show the critical nature of the change which Wesley underwent through the teaching and instrumentality of Böhler. It is possible to maintain that, in a certain and a true sense of the word, Wesley had been "converted," *i.e.* thoroughly and graciously awakened into sincere repentance, before he knew Böhler; but, nevertheless, what marked and made the absolute revolution in his mind and character, with all his prospects and motives, was his full acceptance of that doctrine of evangelical faith which the Moravian was the means of making known to his spiritual apprehension, and his embrace by that faith of the Saviour as his own in ever-present virtue and plenitude. By making the most of Wesley's antecedent preparation of heart, and by laying too much stress on those fluctuations of spirit and of view, and of those self-depreciatory statements respecting his own experience soon after his conversion, the like of which are so commonly found in the experience of humble and conscientious young converts, who, as yet, are necessarily wanting in experience of spiritual difficulties, perplexities, and temptations, and whose natural but unwarranted expectations of settled joy and tranquillity have been painfully disappointed, it is possible to diminish the proportions and to obscure the relations of the great cardinal change in Wesley's spiritual character on which

* *John Wesley*, p. 157.

we have been dwelling. Miss Wedgwood, however, clearly sees the importance and the critical nature of that change, and has admirably stated it in the passage we have quoted. Wesley had embraced the cardinal doctrine of "salvation by faith." Now, to quote again the classical text which we quoted a short while ago, "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God." In other words, the preaching of the truth of God, and not the administration of the sacraments as such, becomes, to the evangelical believer, the great means of spreading salvation, of conveying life to those who are in a state of spiritual death. Christians are to be "sanctified" by "the truth," even by the "Word of God," to be "born again not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the Word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." It is not the sacraments, as rites duly administered, but it is the truth in the sacraments spiritually apprehended and embraced, which fills them with blessing to the believer. The "expulsive power," accordingly, of the "new principle" which Wesley had embraced, could not but before long cast out the sacramental ritualism which had held him in bondage. He did not, of course, cast all his "grave-clothes" off at once; but rapidly, though gradually, he did cast them away. Meantime he preached his new doctrine with new and startling power; and so entered upon that grand course of preaching which was to lay the foundation for all his organisation, for his whole fellowship and "connexion." Wesley the Ritualist was transformed into Wesley the Preacher. Wesleyan Methodism is derived, not from Wesley the Ritualist, but from Wesley the Preacher.

Let us here be permitted to quote some sentences which have appeared before in this Journal. "With Wesley's ritualism his High-Churchmanship could not but also wither away. A number of old and long customary prejudices and predilections—habits of thought and feeling which had become a second nature—still clave to him for a while; but these dropped off one by one, until scarcely a vestige of them was left. All the irregularities of the Methodist leader; his renunciation of Church-bigotry and exclusiveness; his partial, but progressive and fundamental, separation from a Church which imposed shackles on his evangelical activities, and frowned upon his converts, and the ultimate separation, in due sequence, of the Church he had founded from the Church in which he was nurtured: all these results were involved in this change. Newman renounced justification by faith, and clung to Apostolical succession, therefore he went to Rome;

Wesley embraced justification by faith, and renounced Apostolical succession, therefore his people are a separate people from the Church of England.*

Let us turn, accordingly, from Wesley the Ritualist to Wesley the Preacher. In this character he is, perhaps, quite as little known, as little really understood, at the present day, as in his character as a thinker, to which we shall soon have to advert. His character as an organiser has usurped public attention to such an extent as quite to obscure his character as a preacher. And yet, as we have intimated, the foundation of all his power and success as an organiser was laid in his power and success as a preacher. He was, in simple truth, the most awakening and spiritually penetrative and powerful preacher of his age. Whitefield was more dramatic, but less intense; more pictorial, but less close and forcible; less incisive and conclusive. In Wesley's calmer discourses, lucid and engaging exposition laid the basis for close and searching application. In his more intense utterances, logic and passion were fused into a white heat of mingled argument, denunciation, and appeal, often of a most personal searchingness, often overwhelming in its vehement home-thrusts. Some idea may be gained as to the character of his most earnest preaching from his *Appeals to Men of Reason and Religion*, especially the latter portions of the first of these, and from his celebrated *Sermon on Free Grace*.

We are, of course, aware that the intimation we have now given of the character of Wesley's preaching will surprise some even of the well-informed readers of this Journal, and that it is not in accordance with the popular conception of his preaching. It is many years since the late beloved James Hamilton, in an article in the *North British Review*, gave pictorial expression, in his own vivid way, to the mistaken idea which has grown up in some quarters respecting Wesley as a preacher. He sketched him as, "after his morning sermon at the Foundry, mounting his pony, and trotting, and chatting, and gathering simples, till he reached some country hamlet, where he would bait his charger, and talk through a little sermon with the villagers, and remount his pony and trot away again." A more unfounded and misleading specimen of fancy-painting than this it would be impossible to imagine; and one can only wonder where good James Hamilton picked up the ideas or the fictitious information which he

* See *London Quarterly Review*, Vol. XXX. (July 1868), pp. 293-4. Also Dr. Rigg's *Wesley and the Church of England*. Second Edition, p. 39.

deliberately put into this written form. He was altogether at fault in his picture. As Wesley was, during the greater part of his life, simply the most assiduous horseman, and one of the most spirited of riders, in the kingdom, riding ordinarily sixty miles (let it be remembered what the roads were in the middle of the last century) day by day, besides preaching twice or thrice, and not seldom riding eighty or ninety miles in the day; so, for many years Wesley was frequently a long preacher, was often one of the longest preachers of whom we have ever read or heard, and never stinted himself of time when the feeling of the congregation seemed to invite him to enlarge, and when opportunity favoured. Of course, however, he preached at all times many more short sermons than long ones, because he preached commonly three times every week day, and four or five times on the Sunday, and because his earlier sermons on the Sunday needed to be over in time for his hearers to attend church-service. But when he preached after church hours, whether in the afternoon or the later evening, and on special occasions even on the week evening, he was, as we have said, for many years often a very long preacher. Let us give some instances of this, only premising that all the special instances of protracted preaching which we are about to cite occurred after Wesley had taken to field-preaching. He had been an earnest, and not unfrequently a long preacher before; but it was not until he began to address crowds of thousands in the open air that his larger and grander powers as a preacher were called forth.

About sixteen or seventeen months after his conversion, Wesley writes in his Journal as follows, under date Oct. 7, 1739 (Sunday):—

“Between five and six I called upon all who were present (about three thousand) at Stanley, near Stroud, on a little green, near the town, to accept of Christ, as their only ‘wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption.’ I was strengthened to speak as I never did before, and continued speaking near two hours: the darkness of the night and a little lightning not lessening the number, but increasing the seriousness, of the hearers.”

Wesley had already, before this service, preached three times on that day; and he preached yet once after it, “concluding the day” by “expounding part of Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount to a small, serious, company, at Ebley.” Five services, therefore, that day, and among them one in which his sermon alone was nearly two hours long!

On Friday, the 19th of the same month, Wesley preached at

Newport, in Monmouthshire, in the morning, and coming to Cardiff about the middle of the day he preached in the Shire Hall twice, in the afternoon at four and again at six in the evening. He had a large congregation, "almost the whole town," and preaching from the six last beatitudes, he says, "My heart was so enlarged, I knew not how to give over, so that we continued three hours." On Sunday, June 13, 1742, he preached in Epworth churchyard—his own and his father's Epworth—standing on his father's tomb, and continued the service "for near three hours." This was his fourth service that day. On Wednesday, May 24th, 1745, at Bristol, being the anniversary of his conversion, he "was constrained to continue his discourse *near an hour longer than usual*, God pouring out such a blessing that he knew not how to leave off." On Whitsunday, the 14th of May, 1749, at Limerick, he began to preach at five, and, there being no liturgy and no lesson, but only the simplest service, three short singings, one short prayer, and a final benediction, besides the sermon, he yet kept the congregation till near seven, "hardly knowing how the time went." At Whitehaven, on a Saturday evening in September 1749, he preached from six to eight—a simple week-night service—which must have implied a sermon of not less than an hour and a quarter long: and at eight he met the society. These instances may suffice to show how Wesley enlarged under special influences. Even when he was more than seventy years of age, he sometimes, on a week-night evening, was so drawn out as to "preach a full hour"—as, for instance, in the market-place of Caermarthen on the 21st of August, 1777.

In the article to which we have referred it has been said, that while Wesley could "talk through a little sermon with villagers," he "seldom coped with the multitude." In the *Wesleyan Methodist Magazine* for December, 1847, will be found a paper from the pen of one still living—the venerable Thomas Jackson, now in his eighty-ninth year—which examines and reproves the errors of that article. Mr. Jackson thus deals with the point now under notice:—

"That he preached to villagers, so as to be understood by them, as his blessed Lord had done, will not be denied; but that he 'seldom coped with the multitude,' is notoriously at variance with fact. No man was accustomed to address larger multitudes, or with greater success. At Moorfields, Kennington Common, Kingswood, Bristol, Newcastle, in Cornwall, Staffordshire, and Yorkshire, immense multitudes of people were accustomed to congregate around him through a long series of years, and that with undiminished interest; and it may

be fairly questioned, whether any minister in modern ages has been instrumental in effecting a greater number of conversions. He possessed all the essential requisites of a great preacher, and in nothing was he inferior to his eminent friend and contemporary, except in voice and manner. In respect of matter, language, and arrangement, his sermons were vastly superior to those of Mr. Whitefield. Those persons who judge of Mr. Wesley's ministry from the sermons which he preached and published in the decline of life, greatly mistake his real character. Till he was enfeebled by age, his discourses were not at all remarkable for their brevity. They were often extended to a considerable length, as we learn from his Journal, and yet, according to his oft-repeated statements, he did not know how to leave off and dismiss the people; for his mind was full of evangelical matter, and his heart was richly charged with heavenly zeal. In a sense higher than ever entered into the thoughts of Archimedes, as he himself states, he was often ready to exclaim, when addressing vast multitudes in his Master's name, 'Give me the where to stand and I will move the world.'

Such is the testimony of Thomas Jackson, the author of the full and admirable *Life of Charles Wesley*, and the very accurate editor of Wesley's voluminous works, who was himself born before the death of Wesley; who has made all that related to him his life-study; who knew well some of the men who had known Wesley best; and who should himself have done for the life of John Wesley what he has so excellently done as the biographer of Charles. The case being as Mr. Jackson has stated it, and as the extracts from his Journal, which we have given, prove it to have been, it is proper to explain how the erroneous ideas which have been current as to the character of his preaching have originated. Three causes may be assigned to account for them. One is hinted at by Mr. Jackson in the extract we have given. Mr. Wesley's was a very long life. Those of his people who had known him in his prime of strength and energy, had died before himself. The traditions as to his preaching, which have been current during the last half century, have been mostly derived from those who had only heard him in his extreme old age, and, in many instances, on his hasty visits from place to place, preach at seven o'clock on the week-night evening, or at five o'clock in the morning. But another and, perhaps, more influential cause has been, that an inference as to the length and style of his spoken sermons has been erroneously drawn from his published sermons. How unwarranted any such inference must be, may be shown by a remark of his elder brother Samuel's, made at the very

beginning of Wesley's preaching career, and before he had begun field preaching. In a letter addressed to Charles Wesley, but which refers to both the brothers, Samuel says, under date December 1st, 1738: "There is a most monstrous appearance of dishonesty amongst you; your sermons are generally three-quarters of an hour or an hour long in the pulpit, but when printed are short snips; rather notes than sermons."* If this was the case so soon after the brothers had broken away from the bondage of sermon-reading in the pulpit, it is certain that, in after years, except in special cases—such as a sermon preached before the University—the written sermon, which was ordinarily a composition having a definite purpose of theological statement and definition, must be regarded as altogether different in character from the preached sermon, delivered extempore, often after little or no written preparation. Wesley the preacher was tethered by no lines of written preparation and verbal recollection; he spoke with extraordinary power of utterance out of the fulness of his heart. Still another cause of the error we have been exposing, must probably be found in the urgency with which Wesley in various places enjoins on his preachers, as a rule, to preach short, and the emphatic way in which he insists to them on the evils of long preaching. But it must be remembered, that the great majority of Wesley's preachers were men whose stock of knowledge was very small, and who had received no intellectual training whatever. They resembled the plainest and most fervid of the Methodist local preachers or exhorters of to-day. The same rule could not be applicable to him as to them. But, indeed, the great Methodist preachers of Wesley's day, his most powerful lay-helpers were, as a matter of fact, none of them short preachers, while most of them were often, if not usually, very long preachers. Such were Walsh, and Bradburn, and Benson, and Clarke.

The fact at any rate is as we have stated it, so far as respects the preaching of Wesley, and although we have carefully abstained hitherto, and must still abstain, from being entangled in this article with the thread of Charles Wesley's life, closely associated as he was with his brother, yet, we may add, in passing, that for not a few years Charles Wesley was as long and often as powerful a preacher, even as he was as hard-riding and hard-working an itinerant evangelist, as his brother John.

In showing that Wesley, instead of being a talker of neat

* Jackson's *Life of Charles Wesley*, Vol. I. p. 173.

little sermons, was, in his prime of life, frequently a long preacher, and sometimes one of the longest preachers of whom we have any knowledge, we have not only shown how mistaken has been the popular tradition respecting his special characteristics as a preacher, but we have also proved that there must have been a remarkable charm about his preaching. None but a very eloquent speaker could have held thousands of people intently listening to him for two or three hours together in the open air. We have to add, as we have already intimated, that he was a singularly powerful preacher. Southey has given conclusive evidence as to this point, in the interesting chapter in the first volume of his biography of Wesley, entitled *Scenes of Itinerancy*. No one, indeed, has done such justice as Southey to Wesley's gifts as a preacher. Not only in the *Life of Wesley*, but in *The Doctor*, and in his *Common Place Book*, he has given evidence of the careful study and the full appreciation with which he has realised the preaching powers of Wesley. The able and eloquent American historian, Stevens, does not appear to have been able to understand the secret of Wesley's special power, but he gives some striking instances to show how great that power was. "In the midst of a mob, 'I called,' Wesley writes, 'for a chair; the winds were hushed, and all was calm and still; my heart was filled with love, my eyes with tears, and my mouth with arguments. They were amazed; they were ashamed; they were melted down; they devoured every word.' That," says Dr. Stevens, "must have been genuine eloquence."* Doubtless it was, and the very words, the vivid, affecting style of the description here quoted from Wesley himself, may serve to intimate what was part of his special power as a speaker. Like many terse and nervous writers, Wesley was not only a nervous but a copious speaker. His words flowed in a direct, steady, powerful, sometimes a rapid stream, and every word told, because every word bore its proper meaning. With all the fulness of utterance, the genuine eloquence, there was no tautology, no diffuseness of style, no dilution. Close logical, high verbal, adequate philosophic culture, had, in the case of Wesley, laid the basis of clear, vivid, direct, and copious extempore powers of speech. Culture and discipline such as had prepared Cicero for his oratorical successes, helped to make Wesley the powerful, persuasive, at times the thrilling and electrifying preacher, which he undoubtedly was.

* Stevens' *History of Methodism*, Book V. Chap. xii.

What a picture is that given of the effects of Wesley's preaching in connection with his famous visit to Epworth! For eight evenings in succession, in that splendid early summer season, he preached to vast crowds from his father's tomb, and his last discourse was his most powerful and prolonged, and was addressed to the largest multitude. The circumstance, however, to which we refer took place not on the last day of his preaching, but the day immediately preceding (Saturday, June 12th, 1742). "While I was speaking, several dropped down as dead, and among the rest such a cry was heard, of sinners groaning for the righteousness of faith, as almost drowned my voice." "I observed a gentleman there, who was remarkable for not pretending to be of any religion at all. I was informed he had not been at public worship of any kind for upwards of thirty years. Seeing him stand as motionless as a statue, I asked him abruptly, 'Sir, are you a sinner?' He replied with a deep and broken voice, 'Sinner enough;' and continued staring upwards, till his wife and a servant or two, who were all in tears, put him into his chaise and carried him home." The stricken, staring, statue-like master—the weeping wife and servants—what a picture, we say, have we here!

That Wesley's preaching was attended by more powerful and penetrating immediate results than that of any of his famous contemporary Methodist preachers, is notorious; but it has been thought difficult to understand this. He was not, as we have said, a pictorial or dramatic preacher, like his great preaching contemporary Whitefield; but whereas Whitefield, powerful preacher as he was, was yet more popular than powerful, Wesley, popular preacher as he was, was yet more powerful in comparison with his fellows than he was popular.

To our thinking, however, there is really no special mystery about the power of Wesley's preaching. All we know of his earlier preaching, under special circumstances, would lead to the conclusion that he could not but be a singularly powerful preacher. His invariable terseness of phrase and style prevented him from ever being tedious. His full and ready flow of thoughts, as well as of fit words, carried his audience with him. He was most pleasant in manner, pellucid in statement, fresh and lively throughout, and so frequent, so continuous, we might almost say, in his personal application of what he was saying, making his doctrine tell at every point throughout his discourse, that he never allowed the attention of his congregation to slumber. The celebrated Kennicott, at

that time an undergraduate at Oxford, heard Wesley preach his last sermon before his University in 1744, a flaming, searching, intrepidly faithful sermon. Apart from its severity, he admired the sermon greatly, and was evidently very much impressed by the personality of the preacher. "His black hair," he says, "quite smooth, and parted very exactly, added to a peculiar composure in his countenance, showed him to be an uncommon man." He speaks of his "agreeable emphasis" in reading. He refers with approval to "many just invectives" in his sermon, but with disapproval to "the zeal and unbounded satire with which he fired his address, when he came to what he called his plain, practical conclusion." If "his censures" had only been "moderated," and certain portions omitted, Kennicott says, "I think his discourse, as to style and delivery, would have been uncommonly pleasing to others as well as myself." He adds, "He is allowed to be a man of great parts."*

Cowper's lines on Wesley will not be forgotten, while we are on the subject of his preaching. They were written when the fire and flame of Wesley's early manhood were very long gone by. He speaks of him as one—

"Who, when occasion justified its use,
Had wit as bright as ready to produce.
Could fetch from records of an earlier age,
Or from Philosophy's enlightened page,
His rich materials, and regale your ear
With strains it was a privilege to hear.
Yet, above all, his luxury supreme,
And his chief glory was the Gospel theme :
There he was copious as old Greece or Rome,
His happy eloquence seemed there at home ;
Ambitious not to shine or to excel,
But to treat justly what he loved so well."

We apprehend that the last four lines give a most true and happy description of Wesley's ordinary ministry, while Kennicott's description enables us in some measure to understand the fire and intensity which characterised Wesley's preaching, on special occasions, and in the prime of his life.

Dr. Stevens has dwelt on the authority with which Wesley spoke, the calm command which belonged to his presence and gave weight and force to his words. No doubt there was this characteristic always about Wesley's person and pre-

* Tyerman's *Wesley*, Vol. I. p. 449.

sence. In our former article we quoted Gambold's testimony to this effect, in regard to Wesley in his early Oxford days. Calm, serene, methodical as Wesley was, there was a deep steadfast fire of earnest purpose about him, and, notwithstanding the smallness of his stature, there was an elevation of character and of bearing visible to all with whom he had intercourse, which gave him a wonderful power of command, however quiet were his words, and however placid his deportment. But the extraordinary power of his preaching, whilst it owed something, no doubt, to this tone and presence of calm, unconscious authority, was due mainly, essentially, to the searching and importunate closeness and fidelity with which he dealt with the consciences of his hearers, and the passionate vehemence with which he urged and entreated them to turn to Christ and be saved. He had not the "gift of tears," as Whitefield had, or as his brother Charles had, whose preaching appears to have been, in several respects, intermediate in character between that of his brother John and of his friend Whitefield; yet Wesley was often moved to tears as he pleaded with his hearers, and oftener still was the means of moving multitudes that heard him to tears. At times, however, his onset in applying his subject to the lives, the cases, the consciences of his hearers, was too intense, too direct, too eclectic, to be answered by tears. His words went with a sudden and startling shock straight home into the very core of the guilty sinner's consciousness and heart, and cries, shrieks, sudden fits, cases of fainting and insensibility, men and women "dropping down as dead," as if they had been physically struck by a blow from some terrible engine, by a stone from a catapult, or a ball from a cannon, were the frequent consequence. And yet it was not that Wesley used stronger words than other preachers; not that he used high word-colouring or exaggerated expressions: the contrary was the case. Rather it was that, using simpler and fewer words than others to express the truth, going straighter to his purpose, and with less word-foliage, less verbiage, to shroud or overshadow his meaning, the real, essential truth was more easily and directly seen and felt by the hearer. There was less of human art or device; the language was simpler and more transparent; and so the truth shone more clearly and fully through. There was less in language of what "man's wisdom teacheth;" less of what was fanciful, or elaborate, or artificial, and therefore there was more of the Spirit's operation; more of "the demonstration of the Spirit and of power." So far as any mere

written composition can give an idea of how Wesley preached, when his aim was specially to convince and awaken, perhaps his last sermon before the University, to which we have lately referred, and the wonderful "applications" contained in his first *Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion*, which we have before mentioned, may help us to such an idea; but it must always be remembered, that no written compositions can really proach the energy and directness with which Wesley preached when vast crowds hung upon his lips, to whom he was declaring, as in Epworth churchyard, "the whole counsel of God."

Of the clear, strong, intense style in which Wesley could, if he felt it to be necessary, combine doctrinal argument with declamatory invective of the most scathing terribleness, we have an instance in his famous sermon on *Free Grace*. But for the publication of that sermon, we should at the present time have had no conception of what his powers were in that kind; and it was owing only to very special circumstances, and much against his liking, that Wesley felt himself constrained to publish that sermon.

It is well known that Dr. Johnson had a great reverence for Wesley, and much enjoyed his society. In a letter to Wesley himself, he compliments him as "Plato." Cowper, also, in the lines we have quoted, refers to Wesley's power in social conversation, of bringing forth the treasures of ancient philosophy. Let any competent judge read the plainly written but elevated and beautiful sermon on *The Original of the Law*, mentioned by us some pages back, and he will at once recognise the impress of a mind which, while it avoided all display of learning, was deeply imbued with the training and results of philosophy—of the highest and best philosophy, whether ancient or modern—so far as philosophy had advanced in Wesley's day.

Wesley had been an excellent preacher in his kind, though not as yet evangelical, before he went to America. His beautiful sermon on the *Circumcision of the Heart*, preached before the University of Oxford in 1733, is one of several sermons included in his works, which afford decisive evidence on this point. His style, also—a style which the best judges, such as Southey, have agreed in greatly admiring, which, indeed, no one who understands and loves clear, pure, pleasant English can fail to admire—seems to have been already formed at that period, although its full power was not as yet developed, was awaiting development under the inspiration of full Christian tenderness and zeal. But it was not until after he had become Böhler's disciple, for reasons we have already stated,

that preaching came to be recognised and felt by himself to be his great work, or that the characteristic power of his preaching was brought out. It was his perception of the doctrine of salvation by faith which not only transformed him thereafter into a preacher, as his first and greatest calling, but also which breathed a new soul into his preaching. When he began to preach this doctrine, his hearers generally felt that a new power accompanied his preaching, and, at the same time, the clergy and the orthodox Pharisaic hearers felt that a dangerous, startling, revolutionary doctrine was being preached. Wherever he preached crowds flowed, in larger and larger volume, to hear him, but, at the same time, church after church was shut against him. As Gambold wrote in a letter to Wesley, it is the doctrine of salvation by faith, which seems to constitute the special offence of the cross. This, at any rate, in Wesley's days, was the one doctrine which clergymen and orthodox Church-goers would not endure. Short of this almost anything might be preached, but on no account this. The University of Oxford would endure the high doctrine as to Christian attainment and consecration taught in the sermon on *The Circumcision of the Heart*, but it would not endure the doctrine of salvation by faith, which, ten years later, the same preacher would have preached before his university. The reason would seem to be two-fold: the evangelical doctrine of salvation by faith strips men altogether of their own righteousness, laying them all low at the same level in presence of God's holiness and of Christ's atonement, as needing Divine pardon and Divine renewal, and it also teaches the "real presence" of the Divine Spirit, insists upon the present supernatural power of God to inspire repentance and faith, and to renew the soul, the present supernatural power of Jesus Christ to save the sinner. Such a doctrine is "spiritual;" it enforces the living power and presence of spiritual realities; it is accordingly "foolishness," and "a stumbling-block" to the "natural man." The "natural man" receiveth not these "things of the Spirit of God." The doctrine of high Christian holiness may be regarded as but another and the highest form of moral philosophy, of select and virtuous Christian culture. The doctrine of salvation by faith through grace is one which humbles utterly the pride of the human understanding, and of merely human virtue. It was when Wesley became the preacher of this doctrine that he became a truly and fully Christian preacher. It was not a new doctrine; it was the doctrine of the Apostles, the Reformers, the

Homilies, and even the formularies of the Church of England itself; but in a sense-bound and heartless age it had been almost utterly forgotten. To revive it by the ordinance of preaching became henceforth Wesley's great life-work. He became, above all things, himself a preacher, and he founded a preaching institute; with preaching, however, always associating close personal and individual fellowship.

The whole of Methodism unfolded from this beginning. To promote preaching and fellowship was the one work; fellowship itself meaning chiefly a perpetual individual testimony of Christian believers as to salvation by grace through faith. Preaching and fellowship—this was all from first to last; true preaching, and true, vital, Christian fellowship, which involved opposition to untrue preaching, and to fellowship not truly and fully Christian. From this unfolded all Wesley's life and history. His union for a season with the Moravians, and then his separation from them, when their teaching became for the time mixed up and entangled with demoralising error; the foundation of his own Society—that of “the people called Methodists;” his separation from his brother Whitefield and from Calvinism; his field-preachings; his separate meeting-houses and separate communions; his class-meetings, and band-meetings, and all the discipline of his Society; his Conference and his brotherhood of itinerant Methodist preachers; his increasing irregularities as a Churchman; his ordinations, and the virtual though not formal or voluntary separation of his societies from the Church of England: all resulted from the same beginning, from his embracing “the doctrine of salvation by faith,” from his receiving the instructions of Peter Böhler, the Moravian minister.

Into these matters we cannot venture in this article. They demand separate treatment. The personal character and inner humanity of the man Wesley is our theme. We shall now turn our attention to his intellectual character; a subject to which, so far as we know, no writer has as yet done justice, and which is still more misconceived, perhaps, than the style and character of his preaching.

Because Wesley was eminently a man of action it seems to have been inferred by some writers that he was not a man of contemplation: he is admitted to have been an acute logician, but he is represented as having been comparatively wanting in the capacity of philosophic reflectiveness. We have no wish to exaggerate Wesley's philosophical capacity or powers; but it is an entire mistake to suppose him to

have been at all wanting either in the taste or the capacity for philosophic study and reflection. His intellectual tastes inclined him very strongly to the study not only of languages, but of philosophy and theology—of philosophy, perhaps, hardly less than theology. We have had occasion already to furnish one instance of his philosophical taste and capacity. His Journals supply abundant evidence that, in the midst of his life of incessant activity and absorbing care and devotional intensity of feeling, he yet kept up his interest in philosophic studies. He read and criticised Locke with acute intelligence. He not only read but explained to his preachers, Bishop Browne's great work on *The Procedure of the Human Understanding*, preferring Browne to Locke. In his letters to Mr. John Smith, he says, that "in the midst of all his labours he had abundantly more temptation to be a saunterer *inter sylvas academicas*, a philosophical sluggard, than an itinerant preacher." His reflectiveness indeed tended even to scepticism. In the same remarkable letters, he says that, "he had a thousand doubted of the Divinity of the Scriptures after the fullest times assurance preceding."

In his sermon, *The Good Steward*, he uses the striking language which we are about to quote:—

"It is so far from being true that there is no knowledge after we have quitted the body, that the doubt lies on the other side, whether there be any such thing as real knowledge till then; whether it be not a plain sober truth, not a mere poetical fiction, that

"All these are shadows, which for things we take
Are but the empty dreams, which in death's sleep we make,"

only excepting those things which God Himself has been pleased to reveal to man. I will speak for one. After having sought the truth with some diligence for half a century, I am, at this day, hardly sure of anything but what I learn from the Bible. Nay, I positively affirm that I know nothing else so certainly that I would dare to stake my salvation upon it."*

It was, in fact, the strength of the contemplative element in Wesley which largely helped, during not a few years of his earlier life, to give mysticism so considerable a power over him. He loved his college, and his cloister, and his "academic groves;" he loved

* Here again we are struck with that resemblance and yet contrast between Wesley and Newman, to which we have referred already, and which has been pointed out in former numbers of this Journal. Substitute merely "the Church" for "the Bible," in the above extract, and it expresses fully the views of the author of the *Apologia pro Vitâ Suâ* and of the *Grammar of Assent*. All hinged upon Wesley's accepting Scripture teaching instead of traditional influence and prescription.

"To join with him calm Peace, and Quiet,
Spare Fast, that oft with gods doth diet;
And add to these retired Leisure,
That in trim gardens takes his pleasure;
But first, and chiefest, with him bring
Him that yon soars on golden wing,
The cherub Contemplation."

He seems to have had little love for any philosophy that had not an element of mysticism in it; he would

"Unsphere
The spirit of Plato, to unfold
What worlds or what vast regions hold
The immortal mind that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshly nook."

He found delight in Tauler's philosophic and mystical theology, and in Madame de Bourignon's poetry. It is true he was of a very social temper, also, when he could find congenial companions; and this balanced his recluseness. It is also true that, while his mere intellect and his tastes craved for solitude or select society, his moral sensibilities and his conscience continually prompted him to go abroad and minister to bodily and spiritual need and distress; but that did not annul the other side of his nature. It was, doubtless, the strong contemplative element in Wesley which formed so close a link between himself and his friend Gambold, who was first a Methodist, then a Mystic, and then a Moravian, and always predisposed to quietism. Wesley was very fond of Gambold's poetry—poetry of superior merit, and of great refinement, marked especially by a subtle and spiritualistic philosophic tendency—and he not seldom quotes it.

We have quoted Wesley's own words in regard to the philosophical scepticism which was a leading feature of his intellectual character. So conscious was he of his tendency to scepticism that he was afraid, as he tells us, to prosecute the study of mathematics because he found it to undermine his faith in all moral conclusions. He was one of the keenest and most sceptical of historical critics, as we shall immediately show; but, like Dr. Johnson, whilst acutely and intrepidly critical in regard to matters which he conceived to lie fully within the scope of his critical understanding and faculty, he durst not carry the same temper of mind, or assume the same right of critical judgment, in regard to the world of spiritual powers and realities. The principle on which he acted in

judging of things pertaining to the world of consciousness and of invisible spirits and forces, he himself explains in his comments on a certain case which he records in his Journal. We give his words:—

“One of the strangest accounts I ever read; yet I can find no pretence to disbelieve it. The well-known character of the person excludes all suspicion of fraud; and the nature of the circumstances themselves excludes the possibility of delusion. It is true there are several of them which I do not comprehend; but this with me is a very slender objection; for what is it which I do comprehend, even of the things I see daily? Truly not ‘the smallest grain of sand or spire of grass.’ I know not how the one grows, or how the particles of the other cohere together. What pretence then have I to deny well-attested facts, because I cannot comprehend them?”

Thus did the philosophical sceptic justify what religious sceptics stigmatised as his credulity. On the other hand, he was not slow to retort against the sceptics of his day the charge of credulity as respected common mundane things.

As respects historical criticism, Wesley was fifty years in advance of his age; many illustrations might be given to show how penetrating, independent, and impartial, were his views as a student of history. He recognised fully and immediately the merits of Hooke's *Roman History*, pronouncing it far the best he had seen. He says, “I admire him for doing justice to many great men, who have been generally misrepresented; Manlius Capitolinus, in particular, as well as the two Gracchi.” At the same time he objects that “he recites at large the senseless tales of Clœlia swimming the Tiber, Mucius Scœvola, and twenty more; and afterwards knocks them all on the head. What need then of reciting them? We want history; not romance, though compiled by Livy himself.”*

“To-day,” he says, “I read upon the road a very agreeable book, Mr. Dobb's *Universal History* . . . But I still doubt of many famous incidents which have passed current for many ages. To instance in one: I cannot believe there was ever such a nation as the Amazons in the world. The whole affair of the Argonauts I judge to be equally fabulous; as Mr. Bryant has shown many parts of ancient history to be: and no wonder, considering how allegories and poetic fables have been mistaken for real histories.”†

“I read to-day,” he writes (April 25, 1748), “what is accounted the most correct history of St. Patrick that is extant; and, on the maturest consideration, I was much inclined to believe, that St. Patrick

* *Works*, Vol. III. p. 425.

† *Ibid.* p. 373.

and St. George were of one family. The whole story smells strong of romance. To touch only on a few particulars, I object to his first setting out: the Bishop of Rome had no such power in the beginning of the fifth century as this account supposes; nor would his uncle, the Bishop of Tours, have sent him in that age to Rome for a commission to convert Ireland, having himself as much commission over that land as any Italian bishop whatever. Again: I never heard before of an apostle sleeping thirty-five years, and beginning to preach at threescore. But his success staggers me the most of all: no blood of the martyrs is here; no reproach, no scandal of the cross; no persecution to those that will live godly. Nothing is to be heard of from the beginning to the end but kings, nobles, warriors bowing down before him. Thousands are converted, without any opposition at all; twelve thousand at one sermon. If these things were so, either there was then no devil in the world, or St. Patrick did not preach the Gospel of Christ.*

In a similar spirit of wholesome critical scepticism he comments on Dr. Leland's *History of Ireland*, repudiating altogether the notion that the Irish "were ever a civilised nation, till they were civilised by the English." He is bold enough to deny that "Ireland was, in the seventh or eighth century, the grand seat of learning;" and especially singles out as incredible the pretence that in Armagh, one of the "many famous colleges" of the island, there were seven thousand students. All this he "ranks with the history of *Bel and the Dragon*."† On the page following these remarks he quotes with approval his friend Dr. Byron's explanation of the origin of the name of England's patron saint. "I think," he says, "that there can be no reasonable doubt of the truth of his conjecture that Georgius is a mistake for Gregorius; that the real patron of England is St. Gregory (who sent Austin, the monk, to convert England), and that St. George (whom no one knows) came in by a mere blunder."‡

We do not by any means intend to adopt or vouch for all Wesley's trenchant criticisms; we wish only to show the critical quality of his intellect. His whole treatment of the *History of England*, of which he wrote himself a succinct epitome, was distinguished by remarkable independence of mind. He held to the side of Horace Walpole in his *Historic Doubts*, so far as respected the character of Richard III. He gave up, after investigation, the strong prejudices of his youth in favour of "the Martyr" (Charles I.); and when his brother Charles, in a letter, remonstrated with him on this account, his reply was that he could not "in conscience say

* *Works*, Vol. II. p. 91-2.

† *Ibid.* Vol. III. p. 474.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 475.

less evil of him." High Tory as he was by nurture and education, he not only revised but altogether changed his views respecting the controversies of Charles the Second's reign. Referring to Baxter's life, he says,—“In spite of all the prejudice of education, I could not but see that the poor Nonconformists had been used without either justice or mercy; and that many of the Protestant Bishops of King Charles had neither more religion nor humanity than the Popish Bishops of Queen Mary.”* And again he says, referring to the persecutions of the Presbyterians in Scotland, “O what a blessed governor was that good-natured man, so-called, King Charles the Second! Bloody Queen Mary was a lamb, a mere dove, in comparison of him!”† Candour pure and impartial, perfect honesty of purpose in research and in judging, incorruptible love of truth, this is the prime and highest qualification in an historian or an historical critic. More than anything else, it helps to the attainment of the truth in history. This quality John Wesley possessed,—pure and fearless honesty and candour.

Wesley himself, as we have said, often laughed at the credulity of his sceptical contemporaries. Our lessening space will only allow us to give one instance of this. He criticises severely, and in some detail, the Abbé Raynal's *History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the Indies*. He stigmatises “several of his assertions as false in fact,” singling out in particular the assertion that Batavia is a healthy place. He declares that his account of China is “pure romance, flowing from the Abbé's fruitful brain.” He “supposes” that the account of the Peruvian nation is taken from “that pretty novel of *Marmontel*.” He inquires if “many of his assertions do not so border upon the marvellous, that none but a disciple of Voltaire could swallow them? as the account of milk-white men, with no hair, red eyes, and the understanding of a monkey.”‡

He was very keen in his criticism of all contemporary books of travel, very suspicious of “travellers' stories.” In the bosom of “the lovely family at Balham,” he writes, “I had leisure on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, to consider thoroughly the account of the Pelew Islands. It is ingenious, but I esteem it a dangerous book. . . . I cannot believe that there is such a heathen on earth as Abba Thulle, much less such a heathen nation as is here painted.”

* *Works*, Vol. II. p. 297.

† *Ibid.* Vol. III. p. 296.

‡ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV. p. 113, 114.

"But what do you think of Prince Lee Boo?" "I think he was a good-natured, sensible young man, who came to England with Captain Wilson, and had learned his lesson well; but just as much a prince as Tomo Chachi was a king."* This entry was made within about fifteen months of Wesley's death, when he was eighty-six years old.

We have said so much as to Wesley's intellectual characteristics, because, so far as we know, justice has never been done to them. No biographer has brought out the side of his character on which we have been dwelling. As to his accomplishments as a linguist, in which few men in England excelled him; as a logician; as a poetical critic of remarkably true and severe taste, and as himself no mean poet; as to his temper, skill, and admirable talents as a controversialist; his powers as a theologian; and his eminent merits as one of the purest and best writers of English in his own or any age; we say nothing in this article. These subjects have been amply dealt with by others.

It is not necessary, however, to deny that in listening to men's own statements about themselves, Wesley's charity was so extreme as fairly to lay him open to the charge of credulity. On his properly intellectual side he was no more credulous than Dr. Johnson or Father Newman. On the side of charitable hopes and judgments he may have been open to the charge. His brother Charles somewhere in his *Journal* writes that John "was born for the benefit of knaves." John hardly denied the impeachment. When it was necessary to investigate or to watch and study a suspicious case, he would send for his brother Charles to come and assist him. The greater suspiciousness of his brother, and his occasionally keener penetration and insight into personal character, were of advantage by the side of John's unsuspecting confidence. Nevertheless we have it on John's own distinct testimony, that, after all, he was more seldom deceived in his estimate of men, and more seldom betrayed by them, than his brother Charles. He had, in fact, and in no ordinary measure, precisely what Miss Wedgwood thinks that he was lacking in, great faculty of sympathy and insight, as respected individuals, always, however, seeing more directly and fully the good or the capacity of good in them than the evil. He was necessarily, indeed, to a very large extent, an absorbed and preoccupied man. He had no leisure to give his mind to trifles, and sometimes, especially in his earlier years,

* *Works*, Vol. IV. p. 456.

omitted to relate to those interested, pleasant and proper intelligence respecting friends or relatives. But this was not owing to any real want of keen and ready sympathy with others. He was, by the testimony of all who knew him, of such witnesses as his friend and follower Henry Moore, and as his friend, the Irish Churchman, Alexander Knox (a man of high culture and gifts), one of the most pleasant, sunny, sociable of companions, although he could not give more than two hours at a time to Dr. Johnson, who highly esteemed him and his society, whereat the great dictator was sorely disappointed and chagrined.

Wesley was a quick-tempered man, and sometimes in his haste said sharp things; but he was yet quicker to apologise, if he had spoken too strongly, than to be angry. He was incapable of malice; he was the most forgiving of men. He was anything but a Stoic, but he never indulged in vain regrets any more than in settled resentment. Scarcely any other man could have carried such vast cares so lightly as he did. "I feel and I grieve," he says, "but, by the grace of God, I fret at nothing."

He was full of wit and pleasant humour, as all who have read his *Journal* or any of the larger biographies of him well know. Southey, Stevens, and Tyerman all give excellent instances of this. The one fact which we have found it difficult to reconcile with any sense of humour, and with his general sunniness and kindliness of disposition, is the seemingly morose asceticism of his rules for the management of Kingswood School. In our former article we suggested what appears to us the only solution of this apparently strange incongruity—this monastic unkindliness. Public schools in Wesley's time, and for many years afterwards, were rude and harsh Spartan republics, where play meant coarse violence, and where free, unfettered intercourse among the boys meant mutual barbarising and demoralisation. Those who do not know the now happily almost incredible truth as to the state of public boarding-schools in the last century and in the earlier part of the present century, will not be able to do justice to Wesley in this respect. Wesley himself had had a bitter experience at the Charterhouse. As for the mere hardness of the Kingswood regulations, it must be remembered that the regulations of all public schools were hard: very early rising, regular hours for prayer and worship, rigid fare, semi-monastic rules and usages, and special dress, prevailed everywhere alike—in Church of England schools, in Quaker schools, and in Moravian schools.

Before we close, we must needs make some special reference to the manner in which Mr. Tyerman has dealt with Wesley in his maturer and later life. We have nothing to alter in our general estimate as given in our former article, and we cannot pretend to criticise in detail the contents of the three volumes, the intrinsic value of which has, we are glad to see, brought them to a second edition. But we must refer to a few points.

There is no disputing about tastes. We fear, therefore, that Mr. Tyerman will not be persuaded, even by the unanimous advice of his critics, to revise the peculiar phraseology in which he indulges, such as "foul foamings," "mystified balderdash," "spicy," "mealy-mouthed," and the like. But we earnestly wish that he would.

We wish to say a word about the history of Mr. M'Nab, and the affair at Bath with respect to this preacher and Mr. Smyth of Dublin. Mr. Tyerman has given a full and faithful history of the whole affair, for which he deserves our thanks. But while he evidently enters fully into the position and convictions of the preacher who thought himself aggrieved, he does not seem truly to have realised Mr. Wesley's own position and necessities. Whilst we strongly sympathise in a certain sense with the case of M'Nab, it is clear to us that Wesley could not have acted otherwise than he did, and that his conduct in the whole affair deserves the highest praise. It was a crisis in which Wesley could not have given way. But although he remained firm, he respected the feelings and convictions of his preacher; treated him with generous consideration, and, notwithstanding the opposition of his brother, received him back into favour. So long as Wesley lived, he could not absolutely part with his power. He used it in this case to provide an opening for an Irish clergyman, for whom it was important to provide; various and important interests, both in England and in Ireland, seeming to require that he should so provide. He could not have submitted himself, and all his prerogatives and powers, to the theoretical claims of one of his junior preachers, a strong Scottish doctrinaire, a Presbyterian theorist, however amiable or estimable, without breaking down all his authority and discipline together; but he showed no vindictiveness, and hastened to reinstate his contumacious follower. In this, as in some other matters, a larger general view of Wesley's position and principles, of the whole situation, would, in our judgment, have led Mr. Tyerman to a different conclusion from that which he has pronounced.

It appears to us that Mr. Tyerman has failed to apprehend fully the position in which Wesley found himself as to the Church of England, or the powerful reasons which made it impossible for him to accept in full the position of the founder of a new and distinct Church ; a Church outside the Church of England, and apart from all other Churches. We do not hesitate to declare our own deepening conviction, that Wesley could not, as a wise man, could hardly as a sane man, have taken any other position than that to which he held so fast. He was not called by Providence to organise a distinctly and fully independent Church. If he had undertaken the task, he must have undertaken responsibilities which, at his time of life, in his circumstances, and with his antecedents, he could not possibly have sustained. He did all he could to meet the feelings and views of those who demanded separation. He was not obstinate or immovable ; he was eminently candid and open-minded. He yielded whenever and wherever it was necessary to yield. He moved as far as he was obliged, though no farther. This, we think, was not weak timidity on his part, but was dictated by considerations of wise Christian expediency. Nothing else in Wesley would have been consistent or tolerable. In the many instances, accordingly, in which Mr. Tyerman censures Wesley for not fully recognising the claims of his preachers to the full status of pastors, and to constitute, of and by themselves, the supreme and independent governing authority for the Societies, we think him to be in error. We do not admit that the Methodist preachers had any necessary Divine right to be ordained as Presbyters, still less to be constituted the supreme and sole governing body and fountain of authority for the Societies of Methodism, constituted into an independent and organised Church.

At the same time we, of course, fully recognise the fact (as Wesley himself, with beautiful candour, always did, notwithstanding the violent antagonism of his brother Charles), that, from their point of view, the demands of the preachers were very natural, and not at all unreasonable ; that, apart from Wesley's personal history and necessities, and from the prejudices and feelings of many within Methodism, and of many without, much was to be said for the claims they urged.

We had occasion, six months ago, to point out the austerity, the sinister fidelity, to repeat the language we then used, with which Mr. Tyerman deals with Wesley in all cases in which the propriety of his conduct seems at all open to

controversy. This characteristic appears very strongly in his manner of treating the history of Wesley's relations with two eminently useful and devoted women, and in his judgments respecting the women themselves. In the instances to which we refer, he seems to us to have done unintentional but serious injustice, not only to Wesley himself, but to these excellent women,—women with whom Wesley was on intimate relations.

It will be anticipated that we refer, as one of these cases, to Wesley's relations with Grace Murray. As to this case, Mr. Tyerman sums up his judgment in these strong words: "John Wesley was a dupe; Grace Murray was a flirt; John Bennet was a cheat; Charles Wesley was a sincere, but irritated, impetuous, and officious friend."* We confess that we cannot accept this summary judgment. The case is unquestionably one of no little difficulty and perplexity. But Mr. Tyerman cuts the knot with a coarse knife, whereas it needs to be untied with a skilful hand. Grace Murray is not justly described as "a flirt." All we know of her, apart from this affair, renders it very improbable that she should have proved herself to be such in this case. She was a woman not only of singular tact, but of attractive modesty, of perfect propriety, and of deep piety.† All we know of her would lead to the conclusion that she would have been not an unworthy helpmeet even for John Wesley. Wesley worked in her company during many months, and closely watched her for years. We know what his testimony is as to her gifts and graces, her whole character and deportment. Her Diary remains to us; and we know the superiority of her character and the savour of her piety in her long after-life as the wife and widow of John Bennet. Mr. Tyerman himself has furnished full evidence on this point. Such a woman it is hard to suspect of being guilty of "flirtation" with John Bennet, still more with one so revered as Wesley, and more still with Bennet and Wesley together. The temper of "a flirt" would certainly have shown itself much rather in her relations with inferior men than Wesley. No doubt she was strongly attached to Bennet, on whom she had attended assiduously as a nurse for six months, and who seems to have thought himself secure of her affections and of her acceptance of himself whenever he should be free and at

* Tyerman's *Wesley*, Vol. II. p. 55.

† There is nothing in the history of her residence at the Orphan House, as read by a fair interpreter, inconsistent with this conclusion.

liberty to ask it. But if others had not interfered, had not represented to her that she would be sinning against Christ and His Church, that she was under temptation herself, and was making herself a tempter or cause of temptation to Wesley, she would, no doubt, have gratefully and humbly made herself Wesley's helper and cherisher for life. Those who for various reasons were opposed to Wesley's marrying Grace Murray, played continually upon her sensibility and tenderness of conscience, and thus kept her in most painful oscillation or vacillation. Sometimes, also, they did what they could to sow jealousy and suspicion in her mind, so as to alienate her, if possible, from Wesley. These parties all supported Bennet's plea and claim, for obvious reasons. Bennet himself exerted all his authority and influence in the same direction. We are convinced that it is possible to understand the perplexed history to which we have referred without imputing heartless trifling to Grace Murray, although we do not pretend to deny that she showed weakness in the affair; but it is impossible to clear either John Bennet, or Wesley's brother Charles, from all obliquity of conduct in the part they took in this matter. Throughout, the character of Wesley himself shines most beautifully in connection with this love affair, to him, without question, the most painful trial of his life. His own touching and beautiful poem on the subject remains in evidence of his feelings in the case.

From Mr. Tyerman's criticisms on the case of Mrs. Ryan we still more strongly dissent than from his judgment in the matter of Grace Murray. We think the principles on which he has dealt with this case are altogether wrong. The unfavourable antecedents of her early life are made much of,—far too much of, in our judgment. But notwithstanding those antecedents, whatever they were, her proved character and merits were such as to recommend her to the esteem and intimate friendship of some of the most excellent Christians of her time,—Christians of high social propriety and breeding, as well as of pre-eminent Christian character, among whom Miss Bosanquet, after John Wesley, was one of the most conspicuous. To assume that such a woman, because of her early life and connections, ought not to have been employed by Wesley as a housekeeper and a class-leader, is, we think, particularly unworthy of a Methodist historian, and opposed to the spirit of Christ's gospel of grace. That Wesley was right in the confidence he gave to Mrs. Ryan was, in our judgment, demonstrated by the result. She was eminently useful and respected in situations of important

trust, in which Wesley placed her. Where others had failed, she succeeded. No other woman could compare with her, except Grace Murray, who had been so useful to Wesley many years before. She was a remarkably gifted and a most devoted woman. And her life to its close justified the confidence which Wesley reposed in her.

Mr. Tyerman's judgment in these cases is singularly severe, as respects all the parties concerned, not excepting Mr. Wesley. He reflects upon Wesley for taking Grace Murray with him on a pillion in his journeys, several times, when there was special work for her to do. Surely he cannot be ignorant of the universal custom of Wesley's day for women to ride on pillion behind men, either father, brother, husband, affianced lover, trusted and reputable friend, of suitable age, or man-servant. Mrs. Charles Wesley travelled many miles in this way behind preachers or man-servants. To impute imprudence to Wesley in the matter in question is exceedingly strange. Mr. Tyerman condemns Grace Murray, again, because in her earlier life, being under terrible temptation at the time, temptation which assailed the very foundations of her faith, she yet persevered in meeting her class, and in all her other public engagements. To those familiar with the memoirs of such men as Richard Baxter, in former times, and Richard Treffry, in later times and in Methodist circles, a censure of Grace Murray on such an account must seem passing strange. But Mr. Tyerman seems to have very little sympathy with spirits exercised by sore doubt and temptation. Wesley's doubts and fears and self-condemnation soon after his conversion appear to him to be a painful mystery, whereas to us they appear to have been not only natural in themselves but an appropriate and valuable part of the discipline through which such a teacher and leader as Wesley could not but be expected to pass.

Mr. Tyerman more than intimates that Wesley was imprudent in keeping up an extensive and confidential correspondence with a large number of female disciples. Of those letters many samples have been printed. We ask any one familiar with these letters, or who has fairly realised what Wesley was to the leading spirits throughout all his societies—their special personal pastor and spiritual father—or in what relation his personal instructions and influence stood to the whole work of Methodism throughout all the Kingdom, and in Ireland, to judge what Methodism would have lost, if such a correspondence had not been kept up. It is scarcely too much to say that Methodism could hardly have been well sustained without it. Because of the wicked and

insane jealousy of Mrs. Wesley, Mr. Tyerman decides that Wesley's correspondence with Mrs. Ryan, "pure and pious" as he justly declares it to have been, ought not to have been continued!

And now we must write our last paragraph. We have offered no adequate criticism of Mr. Tyerman's three volumes; our object, indeed, in this article has been, in good part, independent of any special critical view. We have wished to give our own views of Wesley, as looked at in lights in which we think he has been but seldom regarded. We desire, in closing, to repeat what we said six months ago, that, though we differ from Mr. Tyerman at not a few points, we fully recognise the great value of his volumes. His unequalled knowledge in detail of the whole ground over which he leads his readers is a great recommendation. The knowledge is perfectly mastered, and is digested and presented in perfect order and clearness. We do not, indeed, think that miserable and scandalous tracts, which fell still-born from the press when first published, and never got a hearing, never were remembered or made the slightest impression while he lived, should be resuscitated and rehabilitated in Mr. Tyerman's pages. It lends to such productions an importance which never belonged to them; it is, in fact, misleading, because it leaves the impression that there may have been some foundation for them, or, at least, that they attracted some attention and possessed some importance at the time. But, apart from this feature in Mr. Tyerman's volumes, we can only thank him most heartily for his ample and wonderful research. If he were, in future editions, to spare us needless details of the sort we have indicated, he might, we think, save space for such statements, reflections, and general views, here and there, as would more distinctly represent Wesley's character, position, and motives, than has now been done even in these volumes. We want to be made to understand Wesley by the light and sympathy proper to his own character, objects, and surroundings; to judge him, as if we had lived both then and now, with him and his contemporaries, as well as in this present age. The mere facts Mr. Tyerman gives, and also the correspondence in part; but still Wesley is judged too much by the light and feeling of to-day instead of by the light of his own circumstances and age. Nevertheless, with whatever drawbacks, Mr. Tyerman has done a great work, and a work which greatly needed to be done. He has furnished perfect means of knowledge; the means, indeed, if he is carefully read, of correcting himself where he is wrong; he has given

a most interesting narrative—the interest of which is proved by the large sale of his volumes. His narrative of the most important parts of Wesley's life is particularly full and good. The last two chapters for example, are complete and impressive in a high degree, presenting Wesley's later years and last days as they had never been presented before. In fine, Mr. Tyerman has furnished almost complete materials from which to prepare a remoulded history of Wesley, which shall, with perfect realisation, exhibit him as he grew and changed, and was enlarged from stage to stage, as he felt and judged and acted from point to point of his eventful life.

ART. V.—1. *Die Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. 1872.

2. *Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss*. Vortrag von Dr. G. LISCO. Berlin : Henschel. [The Apostles' Creed ; a Lecture.]

THE Protestant Association, bearing the misleading name of *Protestantenverein*, numbers now a great number of very active supporters, and commands the talents and energies of some of the keenest intellects of Northern Germany. Its lectures are quite an institution ; as such they are the leading programme of modern Rationalism. These lectures are very similar to the effusions of our English Rationalists : but they have this immense advantage, that they are delivered by a strong corporate body, learned, and earnest, and plausible, and popular. It is in Germany not merely a defensive society, organised to protect and encourage freedom of thought against the High-Church Lutheran party, but an aggressive and propagandist company of agitators, who hold their offices, and yet assail the most precious truths of Christianity.

The watchword of this party is the "Reconciliation between the Church and modern culture." In order to accomplish this end, it proposes a thorough reform of the ecclesiastical constitution, and a revision, amounting to revolution, of the relation between the Church and the State. So far as this programme goes, the society would have the sympathy of many outside, and of a large party within, the borders of German Lutheranism. It is most desirable that a reconciliation should be effected between the tendencies and results of modern science and the religion of Christ ; or, rather, that a careful exhibition of the points of difference should show that they are not incompatible with the truth of both. As to the reform of the German State-Church relations, also, there is abundant room for reformation. But this society, wherever it establishes itself, proclaims only too loudly that its reconciliation with culture means the surrender of all that Deistical science may demand, and its reformation of Church and State the subversion of the very foundations of a religion for the community. Its prevailing mania at present is the abolition of all confession and of all dogma ; the only creed which it will tolerate, or allow the State to tolerate.

rate, is one which shall be flexible enough to adapt itself to the myriad opinions of its holders, or rather a creed which shall have only a personal obligation and a personal internal interpreter.

We must not be misunderstood to signify that this League is of any great importance as an external organisation. It derived at the outset a factitious prominence from the adherence of many eminent men, as we showed when referring lately to the life and labours of R. Rothe; but nothing in its recent history has tended to indicate that the heart of reviving German orthodoxy has lost courage. Bismarck is strong in his resistance to Papal and especially Jesuit encroachment; but there is something much stronger than Bismarck at work for the redemption of German Protestantism from the vestiges of its former bondage. The League certainly makes steady advance of a certain kind. Within the last year an organisation has been established in Pesth, with the imposing name of "Hungarian." We observe that in East Friesland a society has been formed, as the result of vigorous action on the part of the District Synod. Some members were expelled in consequence of their known adherence to the League; they established a branch of their own, which sent out its system of doctrine. Objections were urged against it, on the ground that the doctrine of the resurrection was denied; its defence ran, that "they did not indeed preach, like the orthodox, a bodily resurrection with skin and hair, and the very garments that were worn by the deceased before death; but that it did not follow that there was no immortality of the spirit, of which every day preaches to us." This pacified the minds of many, and some thirty members were added. Moreover, the League exulted in the honour of a certain kind of bloodless martyrdom, and fervent were the mutual blended congratulations and condolences. In Silesia, also, some advancement has been made, if we may judge by the issue of an energetic weekly paper. However, on the whole, the society droops. Its partisans used to say, that "the whole evangelical people of Germany were behind them;" but now they are busily finding reasons, if that may console them, under the fact that adherents are so few. One of their orators hit upon a fine word: "Behind us stand the *mental aristocracy* of the German nation." A certain amount of satisfaction was produced by this discovery, and a wide induction of proofs soon followed, that every really good cause must first gather around itself the elect, and be content for a long time to reckon only the most privileged classes of

intellect among its upholders. But the records of their meetings show that this flattering unction soon ceased to afford its fragrance. In a meeting lately held at Strasburg, one speaker pathetically remarked, that "the orthodox take hold of the people everywhere, while we have succeeded hitherto only in training a certain aristocracy;" and urged on his hearers the importance of moving upon the people. And it is very significant, that the Bremen organ of the party remarks, concerning the Elberfeld Association: "It has removed its locality to that of the Workmen's Mutual Improvement Institute, which has had the good effect of gathering around it many artisans—an untold advantage to the Protestant League, inasmuch as this never can unfold the riches of its energy until it succeeds in winning the masses of the common people to its views."

Indeed, it would scarcely be going too far to say, that some of the leaders of the movement are becoming absolutely disheartened. Professor Holtzendorff published lately a discourse, in which he reviews the public ecclesiastical conferences of the four parties—the Romanist, the Old Catholic, the Evangelical, and the League. After some violent and exasperating remarks on the Papal supremacies of Romanism and Lutheranism, he goes on: "If the Protestantenverein perish, they will fall like those Greeks at Thermopylæ, guarding the approaches to the sanctuary of the German nation." He is oppressed with fear of the Jesuits, and assures us that the free state and the modern intelligence of which we hear so much, and in which we so much glory, are of no force against these enemies. Perhaps, certain discussions in the German Parliament, and the tendency of the German Chancellor's action, may have since encouraged him. He has, however, very much to say in deprecation of undue confidence among his colleagues. The utmost he can allege of the recent gathering in Darmstadt is, that it was a representative assembly, and not swept together promiscuously from all kinds of people.

To turn to another side of the subject. It has been much discussed among the leaders of the movement whether or not the time has come, and whether or not facilities are at hand, for the formation of new congregations and churches; but, however little wanting in boldness when the name of Jesus and ancient orthodoxy is the only fear, they are by no means daring in their opposition to ecclesiastical authority. One or two more than ordinarily shameless acts of defiance have brought them into collision with the consistorial authorities.

These cases are, in a certain sense, still pending, but the result is obviously such, either as already felt or sure to be prognosticated, that there is not much reason to fear the establishment of an ecclesiastical organisation conducted on the principles of the Protestant League. It would be a new thing in the world if such an organisation were established. Since infidelity began, it has never consolidated itself into a community; it has in it nothing worth binding together to maintain; its negative protest against certain doctrines of the faith instinctively betrays its weakness by declining to erect Church against Church. Communities which wrap around the truth of the redemption that is in Christ innumerable errors that do not absolutely suppress the doctrine of that redemption, may live in virtue of the unsuppressed vitality of their central truths. But no organisation has ever yet succeeded in commanding the homage of any nation that has been based upon a rejection of the doctrines of the person of Christ, and the redemption wrought by His death.

Much thought has been spent upon the question of a basis for any possible future ecclesiastical fabric; hence the general assault upon the symbols of the Church. The Apostles' Creed has been singled out for almost unanimous attack by a great number of these agitators. Tired of the skirmish warfare which they had conducted against this and that particular doctrine of Christianity, they have determined to take from the Church its confidence in the original historical basis of Christianity. In Bremen, Greifswald, Berlin, Magdeburg, the preachers and lecturers of this society have discharged their arrows as with one consent against article after article of the earliest symbol. Dr. Sydow has felt himself urged, by "a sacred enthusiasm against the disfigurements of hierarchical liberalism," to argue away the supernatural birth of Jesus. Several eminent names have joined him in this new Herodian onslaught upon the "child Jesus." Dr. Lisco has spoken, however, with the most unfaltering voice against the entire Apostolical Creed, and this has aroused a very strong counterprotest of those who think that, if the adoption of this creed is left optional, or its use suppressed, there remains no guarantee for the objective stability of Christian teaching; all is left to arbitrary caprice, and there remains no question but that of Pilate, "What is truth?"

Dr. Lisco has a right to say, that scientific investigation denies to the Creed its strictly Apostolical character; but it may be demonstrated that every article has an Apostolical foundation, and he must be a determined enemy of the

Christian faith itself, who should reject it as contrary to the Apostles' doctrine. In fact, those who reject this old and simple formula, have already rejected the New Testament documents. Dr. Lisco, ministering in the congregation, avows that he, in common with multitudes of Churches and ministers, is entirely estranged from the view of the Creed, having been taught by modern science and philosophy to feel dissatisfied with its views of God and nature. He numbers himself among those who cannot but hold as legendary the narratives of the miraculous birth, the resurrection, the ascension, the session at the right hand of the Father, and the return to judgment. It seems strange that any man can use the formularies with such a sentiment concerning them as this. In Germany, as in England, ministers take refuge from what they call the tyranny of prescription in the subterfuge of a secret protest. But that cannot last long, in the case of honest men, or men who have any sense of truth left in their mental constitution; and we cannot but think that this Protestant Association will sooner or later issue in the formal exodus of a large number of divines from the National Church. If it were merely matter of the Creed, there would be less significance in this movement; means might be found of relieving the consciences of those who scruple to utter some of its sentences. Many a Christian Church utters publicly no Creed. But here the very foundations of the Christian faith are in danger, and they who decline the Creed in their secret hearts decline the greater part of the New Testament, and the entire fabric of Christian mediation and worship.

To return, however, to Dr. Lisco. The Royal Consistory of the Province of Brandenburg has dealt with him firmly though kindly. His avowal that he was sorry at having given offence by what was not intended to provoke discussion led to the modification of a censure. He was exhorted to remember his ordination vow, not to preach or spread any other doctrine than that which is grounded on the plain Word of God and defined in the Apostolical and other creeds of the Evangelical Church. He was further admonished to be mindful of this, lest the Consistory should be placed in the painful position of requiring him to lay down his ministerial office. The submission of Dr. Lisco, however, did not follow: he effaced a few offensive expressions, but changed nothing in the substance of his lectures. So the matter now rests; and it remains to be seen whether there is authority enough in the Lutheran Church, in its singular relations with the State, to

deal with offenders like these. If not, England will be found to have set Germany an example.

Probably Dr. Lisso and others with him are waiting for the opportune time of establishing free congregations. But the more this step is considered, the less attractive it is found: there is nothing to kindle enthusiasm in the negative conviction of these men. Many, however, are turning their attention to the question as to what there is in common between them and the old confessions. One of the latest essays on this subject, by a Dr. Kradolfer, gives some idea of the strange Christianity which these new Illuminists would have the Churches rally round. He says: "We believe in Christ, though he is man like ourselves, not without error, and not sinless in the strictest sense of the word." And as to the faith in the Holy Ghost demanded by the Creed, he has this luminous utterance: "It is the faith in ourselves, in the Divine life concealed and slumbering in the depths of our own souls." This complacent preacher thinks he has brought to light the great principle of Christianity here, and triumphantly exclaims, "In the main points we are one." He admits, however, that on some ethical points the divergence from common Christianity is great. And no wonder; for he avows with remarkable *naïveté*, "that it would have been a most unhappy thing for the development of humanity if the first pair of the human race had not sinned." As to regeneration, his mind is that the free unfolding of the energies of man is the strongest means for the overcoming of evil.

Dr. Schwalb is another of the leaders of this movement. He has published some lectures on the question, "What think ye of Christ?" which were delivered at intervals during the last two years. Even his own partisans were offended in him. But he persevered, and reached the end of his course, the result being a specimen of common Rationalism which we in England know familiarly enough. Jesus was a religious genius, who taught as the sum of truth that God was his Father and the Father of all men, and that love is the highest duty. He requires us to distinguish what is permanent in the teaching of Jesus from what requires perpetual adaptation and modification. The abiding elements are faith, love, and hope: the Rationalist trinity of God, virtue, and immortality. About immortality, however, he is not sure. The power of Jesus to us is in his example and his teaching. We know him only from the Three Evangelists; and our lecturer is never weary of making these contemptible. Dr. Schwalb goes straight to his point. Jesus is a Jew; and one who did not

Dr. Schwalb.

accommodate himself to the notions of his time, but really shared them. He had the errors that all had, but overcame them perhaps better than others.

It has been observed that many of the confederates of this lecturer repudiate his sentiments on some points. On the other hand, the friends of the truth deal far too gently with him. They praise his sincerity, his transparent simplicity of purpose, and a certain human love which he sometimes seems to feel for the person of Jesus. The tone of the orthodox reviews and papers has too much of the conciliatory in it. It is a shame even to speak of such lucubrations in any other language than that of profound indignation and sorrow. But there is a certain tone of sympathy which ought, it seems to us, to be carefully suppressed; at least so long as they continue to avow faith in creeds and doctrines which they profoundly explain away and hold up, in the sense in which they are generally held, to ridicule. It must not, however, be supposed that we include all German reviews and religious papers under the category of this undue tolerance. That portion of the religious press of which Hengstenberg and his *Kirchenzeitung* was the representative, are faithful in denouncing the treachery of the League. But, in Germany it is as in England, familiarity with the offence lessens its offensiveness, and sympathy with the motives of the delinquents and their hard struggles to make sacrifices which are almost too severe for human nature, tend to disarm the severity of a loyal protest. We are, of course, removed beyond the reach of the private fascinations of these men; and are concerned only with their daring avowals of unbelief. They make their case worse, indeed as bad as it can be, when they insist upon regarding their theological ground as the same on which the Church to which they seem to belong stands. It is with mingled sorrow and satisfaction that we mark how parallel is the course of Rationalism in the Evangelical Church of Germany with that which it is running in the Church, or rather the Churches, of England: there is not much difference. Precisely the same tendencies are seen, though much more restrained with us than in Germany. The same strong determination not to leave the Church, if possible, but to leaven it from within, meets us to our sorrow in both. And in both there is the same general helplessness on the part of the authorities; relieved, however, by some occasional and hopeful signs of vigour.

To return to Dr. Schwalb. As his is the latest manifesto of the Free Protestant Organisation, it may be well to give a few further references to its sentiments. One of the lectures

on "The Historical Character of the First Three Evangelists." In a certain sense, the lecturer thinks, the contents of the Synoptists are altogether historical, inasmuch as these Gospels give us precisely the image of Christ, His doctrine His death, and His resurrection, which Christians at the end of the first and the beginning of the second century, and for many centuries afterwards, held as historically true. But he thinks that, if we take the word historical in its ordinary meaning, that of "what actually took place," then, with the exception of the discourses and sayings of Jesus, by far the greatest part of the Evangelical narrative is decidedly unhistorical. It might seem impossible to reconcile these contradictions; the lecturer indeed is embarrassed by them, and admits that the idea held by the first Christians concerning their departed Master could throw its inference back, in a certain sense, upon the kind of person He really was and the kind of life He really led. This, however, is what almost every votary of mythical hypothesis would allow: that there was some nucleus of reality in the centre of the wonderful nebula of later Christology. Our author gives this as his summary of what may be regarded as historically certain; and we give it as showing how despotic is truth in its influence upon one who would fain be a disbeliever in all but a symbolical Christ. "In the reign of Tiberius there lived in Galilee a man of the name of Jesus. This man was reputed to be a son of Joseph, the Carpenter, and of his virtuous wife Mary. While Pilate was the Roman Procurator, and therefore about the thirtieth year of our reckoning, this Jesus appeared as a Rabbi, among the villages and towns of Galilee. He preached on the Sabbaths in the synagogues; and, when opportunity allowed, under the open sky. He acted after the manner of the ancient prophets, and his word was very mighty. He said of himself, and it was believed concerning him in his neighbourhood, that he was the Messiah, the King and Saviour of Israel, so long announced by the prophets and expected by all the devout. As such he chose out from among his dependents twelve men, men of the people, to be his coadjutors, and in due time his co-rulers in the kingdom of heaven. As the Messiah, and on account of his reforming zeal and deadly animosity against the hypocritical spirit of the times, he was delivered up to the Roman power by the priests, who belonged to the Sadducees rather than to the Pharisees, and condemned by Pilate not later than A.D. 35, and crucified at Jerusalem. He died on the cross on a Friday. On the Sunday following many of his disciples saw him alive. They saw

him because they thought they saw him, being in a state of unconscious ecstasy." This is the old story, which for seventeen hundred years has been repeated by unbelief, at its wits' end for arguments. There are many very many, difficulties in the narrative, which are the trial of our faith, and humility and patience; which cause us much to marvel at the Keeper of the mysteries of Christ, that He should have suffered them to be committed to records which were liable to some of the contingencies of all human literature. But the difficulties of the unbelieving theories are far greater. What can be more grotesque in its absurdity than the theory which makes the histories of the resurrection of Christ the records of an epidemic hallucination that swayed the minds of hundreds of men and women, and transformed their lives, and taught them to encounter death; a hallucination, moreover, that has shaken the world!

It seems hard to find all the miracles swept away into one common receptacle of the legendary. Yet our author is evidently not content with his own exposition, and is reluctant to accept his own teaching. For, while he declares the miracles to be unhistorical, he at the same time lets fall hints that these wonders were the effect of the confidence which Jesus had awakened in his disciples, and that, while he was among men, many things occurred to him that were even to himself inexplicable; and that many of his prayers were in a remarkable way answered. But he does not pause to clear up the difficulties which he creates. There is no classification of the miracles; nor does he distinguish between the answers to Christ's prayer, the effects of enthusiastic faith, and the legendary accretions of the succeeding wonder-loving ages.

A few words as to the author's view on St. John, because this is a pressing subject in our own time and in our own country. Schwalb regards the First Three Evangelists as "very poorly endowed writers," and thinks that they wrote with an artless faith in the truth of their own narratives, but in such a style as to weary their readers. The Fourth Evangelist, however, has written self-consciously a poem of wonderful composition and most attractive beauty; the lectures on this Gospel, however, are full of strange suggestions and contradictory statements. The beloved disciple so often mentioned appears not to have been the Evangelist John, or any one of the Twelve Apostles, but manifestly the author himself, who was conscious of his own love to Jesus, and of the love of Jesus to him, of the common fellowship between him and his Lord surpassing that of any other, though a full century sepa-

rated him from his Master. The lecturer has certainly one redeeming feature—he has a high estimate of the virtue and power of personal affection to the Lord Jesus. It is not the worst of his heresies, that he should attribute so strong a feeling of attachment to the saint who, with mistaken loyalty, sat down to write a poem touching Christ and call it history. Let us hear the lecturer, when he is excited and apostrophises his readers: “The scene between Jesus and Pilate I will not set before you in abridgment; read it for yourselves, and rejoice over it. If you do not recognise in this scene a masterpiece of dramatic painting, pardon me if I say that you cannot know what poetry and what history are!” There is something terrific in the assurance with which a Christian minister can pronounce such a sentence, touching the sacred scene that precedes the Cross. Surely the common sense of the world must be against him here; believers and unbelievers alike must, one would suppose, be constrained to admit, that no servant of Christ could, even if his genius sufficed, have invented this awful scene. But this is the reckless style of patronising effrontery that seems to please a certain order of German hearers; it is also a fair instance of that essential superficiality which characterises the criticisms and critical reflections of this school. Nothing is easier than to pronounce such a sentence upon the scene as described by the Evangelist; but let any candid person read it carefully, connecting it with the entirely independent narratives of the three other Evangelists, let him note the innumerable petty indications of a purpose at least to describe facts as they occurred hour for hour, and he will come to the conclusion, rather the conclusion will be irresistibly forced upon him, that all this is history, whether minutely accurate or not.

It is curious to notice how Dr. Schwalb treats the miracle of the feeding. He makes it refer to the sacramental doctrine of the Evangelist, according to whom “the believer partakes of the true flesh and the true blood of Christ. But he did not conceive the doctrine in a gross form: he had not subscribed the Lutheran article that we eat Christ with the mouth and with the teeth. He does, however, regard this eating and drinking as a mystical reality. But then for him and for his contemporaries the question arose: How is that possible? How can Christ communicate his body to all, and give his blood to all to drink? The petty questions of the doubters are answered at once by the Evangelist by the double wonder. If they objected that Jesus could not give his flesh

to be eaten and his blood to be drunk, he replies by showing that he fed five thousand men with five loaves, and yet there remained more over than there was at the first. If they objected that Jesus was too far off, that he who was seated in heaven could not be also on earth to distribute himself, then he shows him walking firmly on the yielding sea, and at his command the ship was instantly where it should be. What for him are quantity and space and distance? Nothing." This is exceedingly ingenious, and, of course, like everything else in these treatises, based upon a foundation of truth. But this author, and all the class of which he is a member, have all the severer responsibility resting upon them in consequence of the glimmering of light they enjoy. They know enough to aggravate their ignorance and deepen their guilt. There is a marked difference between them and the professional sceptics who have simply been trained on the dry theory of unbelief. These men, like many among ourselves, have known the simple truth, and have been familiar with the use of evangelical formularies, and they can never altogether lose the influence, go they ever so far from their early faith.

But to draw these notes on Dr. Schwalb to a conclusion. We naturally turn to the account of the resurrection for the testing points. Dr. Schwalb teaches his flock to believe that the Evangelist himself did not hold his own narrative to be historically true; and thinks it must be most decidedly maintained that there is doubt whether Jesus was regarded as a personal being who continued to live. The record of the flowing of water and blood out of the pierced side of the Crucified is an allegory. How an allegory it may be instructive to learn in these pages. "Water signifies everywhere in the Fourth Evangelist spirit, and spirit is identical with the Logos. Blood is an essential element of human corporeity." Hence the water and blood flowing from the pierced breast of Christ is "so to speak, a physiological evidence that the Crucified was the incarnate Logos. The confidential witness who saw this was the Fourth Evangelist, who saw it with the eyes of the spirit." This style of comment might deduce anything the writer might wish from any part of the Gospels. But it gives evidence of a secret consciousness of the true doctrine of the Evangelist concerning the Person of Christ, and yields evidence far from unimportant as to the impression produced on the mind of a Rationalist expositor as to the fact of the Incarnation as taught by the Fourth Evangelist.

But we reserve for the last the crowning piece of Illuminist criticism on St. John's text. The term Logos itself, which

has exercised the minds of the philosophical interpreters of Germany so much, finds in Dr. Schwalb a new sort of treatment. "The Logos is no other than the reasonable religion, the religious reason; and, inasmuch as the Fourth Evangelist applied this idea to Jesus, he in a certain sense understood Jesus better than Jesus understood himself. Yea, the most hidden and essential being of Jesus, his incomprehensible fellowship with God, the mystical in him, the Fourth Evangelist has most historically exhibited in his unhistorical picture of Christ; and in this consists pre-eminently the historical importance of his book."

It may not be uninteresting to the reader to have a few more excerpts from the theological literature of the new German Protestantism, and they will show how far from one and united their new creed is. Dr. Sydow is an eminent authority, and delivered lately in Berlin a discourse on the miraculous birth of Jesus. After considering carefully the records, he comes to the conclusion they are simply a symbolical poetic invention of Jewish-Christian minds: a symbolism which, if it be turned into dogma, tends to make Jesus to us an alien and ghostly kind of being. He further thinks that it "rests upon an Oriental disparagement of the female nature, as in its kind inferior to that of man, and not like his a personal factor in humanity,"—as if the evil on the woman's side might be easily suppressed, but not so on the man's. The one redeeming feature of the essay is the maintenance of the sinlessness of Jesus. This was taught him by Schleiermacher, and separates him from most of his associates. But he fails to see how intimately, and how gloriously, the miraculous incarnation and the miraculous death of Christ are united: how essential one is to the other in any consistent theory of Christianity. It is hard to understand precisely what is meant in this theory by the Divine operation in the birth of our Lord. Certainly, with all his faults, Schleiermacher went much beyond this essayist.

Passing to a kindred lecture, that of Pastor Remy, on "Jesus as the Redeemer from sin," we gather from current notices of it that all the work of Christ is rightly reduced to this. But the orthodox doctrine of redemption is entirely rejected inasmuch as it demands the Deity of Christ. Also the Rationalist view is denounced as based upon a superficial idea of sin and morality. Then the preacher gives with rhetorical emphasis, but without much penetration into the subject, his own opinion. He leaves it entirely unexplained how the merely human personality of Jesus, though a sinless personality, should have

exerted its influence upon the disciples and upon men generally only after His departure, if the fact of the resurrection and of His Divine power are not acknowledged. The preacher is altogether unfaithful to the leading principles of the redeeming atonement. Personal obligation and guilt, personal relation to the Redeeming Saviour, and personal conscious forgiveness, have no place in this theory of redemption.

It is remarkable that so many of the recent speculatists in Christian theology have combined two views which we should have thought incompatible : maintaining the personal sinlessness of Jesus and yet denying the atoning virtue of His death. This is a combination that we do not remember to have seen in England. It seems that the idea of one entering into the race without its stain of sin commends itself to the thought of many who deny the real reason of that sinlessness. They thus pay their homage to the majesty of the truth ; and, strange to say, some of them are more faithful to the sublime conception of the essential sinlessness of the world's Redeemer than some of those who are true to His Divinity. On the other hand, we find here, and in great numbers of other German theologians of the broader type, the strange delusion of a redemption wrought by a personal influence of Christ. In some most feeble sense expiation is supposed to be effected by the extraordinary goodness of Christ, accepted of God in lieu of the world's righteousness, through some mysterious and unaccountable connection between the complacency of God in one man and His complacency towards all men. But if the transcendent excellence of Christ avails for those who plead it, and if He Himself pleads it for those who know it not, and therefore plead it not for themselves, what a strange view does this give of the Atoning Death ! Some, however, renounce even this faint note of adhesion to a vicarious redemption, and, like this author, limit the deliverance of man from sin to the effect of His holy character and words upon those who become His disciples. Therefore, while they give up the thought of a displeasure in God which needs propitiation, they also must needs despair of the salvation, in the Christian sense at least, of all who never heard the Gospel before Jesus came, and who have never heard it since. Marvellous are the variations of faith or opinion on this great subject. In England we have a few types of doctrine ; and so in America. Given a certain view of the Incarnation on the cross, we can construct the whole creed to which it belongs. In Germany it is otherwise. And the Protestantenverein has proved this more forcibly than any other school of theology.

We have referred to North Germany as the home of the movement; but have incidentally shown that it has its sporadic manifestations elsewhere. In fact, it takes root and produces a strange kind of fruit in the soil of Calvin and the Reformed Theology. Dr. Lang of Zurich has shown that South Germany and Switzerland are not behindhand in vigour at any rate. He takes up the common topic of the times, "the life of Jesus," adding to it "the Church of the Future." The Northern Reformers have, as we have seen, held fast a certain basis of documents for the life of our Lord, and a certain outline of His figure as authentic; but the Southern Reformer cries: "It is of no use; we must confess that we know nothing at all of the life of Jesus." He thinks, indeed, that the early Christians cared very much less about that than we are apt to suppose. Therefore, some few discrepancies, inconsistencies, and subjects of embarrassment, more or less, cannot vitally affect the question: indeed, are of no importance at all, and ought not to vex criticism and theology. Dr. Lang does not scruple therefore to differ, and to proclaim that he differs, from many of the League. One expatiates on the freedom of Jesus from the bondage of the law: Lang contradicts that flatly. Another ascribes to Christ a deep consciousness of the redeeming significance of His death: Lang, like many others, holds that up to scorn. But, however little he may know, or permit us to know, about the life and development of Jesus, there is a great deal of knowledge that he bases upon that ignorance. "Here is a Christendom without miracle! the original Christendom of Jesus Christ himself, the Christendom of the nineteenth century, the future of the Christian Church!" We echo the language of the *Ev. Kirchenzeitung*:—"A Christianity without miracle indeed, but also without truth, without grace, and without peace! Woe to those who thirst for the source of light and righteousness, and find nothing but the troubled puddles of this modern Christendom." How does it sound but as mockery, when we hear it said to one who is seeking in the Bible for the truth of his soul's salvation that the Scripture is a book which is interesting even when it seems alien to our ideas! The modern culture makes this bargain with the Gospel, that it shall become one of the Apocrypha.

The Southern leaguers against orthodoxy have not failed to take up the anti-confessional cry with vigour. It was in Switzerland that this spirit first had its effectual manifestation, and there it has always had its most efficient defenders. Some time ago, appeal was made with some force to a well-

known expression of Neander; to wit, that he knew of no symbol absolutely the expression of his religious conviction "save the Apostles' Creed, which witnesses to the fundamental facts of the Christian faith, apart from which there can be no Christian Church." Dr. Binkau is represented as asserting in his lecture, that upon the Churches with confessions a judgment has gone forth; a sweeping generalisation, in which Churches without confessions might just as well have been included. He thinks that the time has now come for the supplanting of confessions by love to the Lord and brotherly love among His people. It is wearisome to comment upon such abject frivolities, and needless to point out the essential fallacy of all such assertions. Love to Christ and love to the brethren are doubtless imperatively demanded, but they are much more likely to be secured by the definition of something that there is in Christ to love, and by the establishment of some common objects of belief and hope among the people of Christ.

Another minister of Christ's Gospel, Pastor Schroeder, lectures on "Religion and Theology," and on the "Idea and Essence of Faith." He knows no theology that is not confession, and, rejecting all theology, calls Christianity religion alone. The pious feeling of man is, when touched by Divine influences through the Word, faithful to God and receptive of salvation. Jesus must be received in the Father, and His truth be taken into the heart. His Christianity was altogether free from theology; in some points, indeed, it clung to old prepossessions, and many things, such as the predictions of His return, have been falsely put into His lips. It belongs simply to constructive theology that Jesus was called the Messiah; and much of Paul's doctrine, and John's Logos entirely, must be relegated to dogmatics as distinct from religion. Hence it follows, that true Christianity was from the very beginning overwhelmed and buried under theology. Luther partially restored its freedom, but he adhered to the dogma as to Christ and the authority of the Bible. It is, according to this exponent of the *Protestantenverein*, lecturing to a sympathetic audience, the province and the prerogative of this Association to abolish all confessional standards, tear to pieces all disguising veils, and penetrate to the kernel of the truth. But the dispute now rages, of course, as to what are the veils, and how much really belongs to the interior truth. These liberators of religion are contending as fiercely about what is the kernel, as their opponents are supposed to have contended about the shell. Meanwhile, when they have

decided upon something that is really essential to religion, we will assert that there must be a confession about that, whatever it is, and if this point is yielded, the question of creeds is yielded too. The same author ought to admit this; for we find him writing: "It is true that the religious idea clings, in its first manifestation, to a historical personality. But it penetrates humanity only, when, in a certain sense, it frees itself from that individual personality, and shows itself strong and independent, and living from within. The possession of religion cannot be made dependent on the going back to the original source." If we rightly understand this sentence, it means that Christ's personality and personal character belong to the elements and first principles of the nonage of Christianity. What the Friends say of the sacrament holds true of the Redeemer's person; it was necessary only to establish Christianity in the world, and is necessary only to begin religion in the human heart. If we rightly understand this principle—and we believe it is rightly understood and very prevalent among the party—it expresses the very last shred that links Christianity with the Word of God and its Divine origin. Abandonment of the foundation cannot go much further. It is in diametrical opposition to the teaching of the Scripture and of man's instinct concerning Christ. He is a Teacher, a Guide, and a Saviour, whose claims become more imposing in proportion as religion increases, and whose idea by a sacred necessity tends to the extermination of every other. It is not very wonderful that the same fundamental thought should find another expression thus: "Nothing that cannot be historically demonstrated or scientifically explored, or derived from the circumstances and experiences of our own interior being, or, finally, be proved by the rigorous logic of hard thinking, should ever be laid down as the foundation of man's religious thought and conviction."

It may be inferred, that these founders of a new theology recoil from the doctrine of Justification by Faith. They make faith more and more the strength that produces salvation, less and less the organ that receives it. Doubtless they are right, to a certain extent, in insisting upon a deeper and more influential recognition of their principle, but not to the disparagement of the other, much less to its exclusion. Paul and Luther are often summoned to the bar, and sharply rebuked for having been such fools, so slow of heart, and so entirely brought into bondage under the law of a Vicarious Atonement. With endless iteration it is declared, that past

offences can never be the object of Divine displeasure; that the process of salvation has reference to the deliverance of the soul for the time to come, and not to its redemption from any consequences of the past; that the very return of man from sin to God is the extinction of sin, and the only extinction that is necessary; that the entire system of sacrificial atonement is a huge anachronism, which the dawning intelligence of mankind, aided by these new primary instructors, may be supposed to be on the point of correcting. In this particular, rather than in the others, we perceive a striking resemblance between the English and the German Rationalism. We may boldly say, before closing this subject, that there cannot be a more effectual defence of the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement than the series of objections to it which these keen intellects, generally well instructed both in the letter of Scripture and in the fundamentals of philosophy, are accustomed to urge. Not to refer to any special arguments, let such a sentence as this be considered:—"The striving and willing of our own heart is the seedcorn implanted by God, out of which the Divine life of man, the child of God in him, the Son of God, is brought through manifold efforts to perfection." This is a sentence which condenses the pith of many a heresy, and its expression reveals the thoughts of many hearts. The whole of the Christian religion becomes an allegory, the meaning of which must be found in the depths of every man's consciousness. Not only is the kingdom of God within us, but the Cross, and the Atonement, and the Regeneration, and the Incarnation are all, and in this order, produced within us. Now, to be consistent, this internal theology should remember, that in the same heart which is the seat of desires and labours after renewal, there are irrepressible convictions of wrath in God, of a displeasure to be dreaded, and of a personal impotence that needs a deliverer as much as personal guilt. But this department of the forms of consciousness is left out of the induction altogether. We have no objection to the theory that would bring the doctrine of Atonement in the Christian confession to the test of human consciousness, provided the test be fairly, comprehensively, and impartially applied. We believe that no valid objection to our doctrine can be derived from the secrets of the soul of man. The unsearchable depths of the Divine Nature may be approached, and it may seem to a blinded philosophy that there can be in it nothing that demands the punishment of sin. Against this our appeal is simply what that God says concerning Himself. As to man,

it is impossible to do justice to his complex nature, without taking into account that response to the Divine wrath which most effectually pleads for its existence in God.

Before closing our observations, it must be mentioned that the Protestantverein is at the present time a subject of inquisition in the ecclesiastical courts of Germany. We shall state the progress of the question hereafter. On the other hand, it should also be mentioned, there have been recently some efforts put forth, in free Bremen particularly, towards an amalgamation of the ecclesiastical system at present organised with the Protestant League, on some common principles that should bear the character of a compromise. That such a notion was possible implies a miserable state of things in Bremen, ecclesiastically considered. The Senate, which has the disposal of religious matters, is decidedly latitudinarian in its views and principles. Hence the League has never striven there to sever the Church from the State; on the contrary, it has always spoken with much respect of the mild government of the Senate, and paid it manifest and open court. The attempts to bring about a fusion of the Reformed, the Lutheran, and the League, on the basis of a lax and unobligatory confession, of rites and ordinances flexible and free, has, we believe, entirely failed. So far as we understand it, the experiment would have been one of the most singular ever made. It would have tested, on the most fitting ground, the possibility of a Christian organisation based on the exclusion of almost everything that Christendom has always prized. Whether the experiment has finally failed, we cannot say at present.

The subject is not exhausted. Our readers will perceive that there is a strong similarity between our own position in England and that of our German brethren. There are also some differences, which, on the whole, though we speak under reserve, are in favour of England. The Church of England has certain bounds beyond which her tolerance must not be urged. So, perhaps, has Lutheranism, but they are not rigidly marked out as yet, and offenders are very leniently dealt with. In Germany, too, infidelity to the documents and confessions of Christendom is more organised than with us, and seems to meet with more popular favour. The pulpit and the lecture-room are abundantly employed. But it would be premature to institute a detailed comparison. The great and all-absorbing question of the Christian faith, as based upon Christian documents, is, alas, both in Germany and in England—the two foremost Christian lands—in too many respects *sub judice*. May both countries be found faithful!

- ART. VI.—1. *The Life of Thomas Cooper.* Written by Himself. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.
2. *The Purgatory of Suicides.* A Prison Rhyme. In Ten Books. By THOMAS COOPER, the Chartist. London: Jeremiah How. 1845.
3. *The Bridge of History over the Gulf of Time.* A Popular View of the Historical Evidence for the Truth of Christianity. Fourth Edition. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 1872.

THE reasons why we read biography with interest are very various. Its subject may have been famous, or only notorious; a "saint, sage, or sophist," on the one hand; or, on the other, a villain or a fool; a man of whom we know so little that the barest outline of his history and character concerns and quickens us; or of whom we know so much that we would fain learn more, and specially of his inner life; a man in whom we trace a certain resemblance to ourselves, and so read, as in a mirror, what we essentially and verily are, or might have been, or may yet become; or one so unlike us in training, pursuit, habit, and achievement, that we study him much as, perhaps, the "spiritual beings" who, with good or evil purpose, "haunt the air" scrutinise us,—watching and wondering at our strange thoughts and ways. Autobiography has its peculiar charm. Criticism is not so much a profession, as a pleasant necessity of human nature. We like to know what one man can say of another, and to form our own judgment of both. Still more do we like to adjudicate upon what a man says of himself. We feel we have a right to be prejudiced. He asks us to listen to details about which, perhaps, we feel no care; he puts his own gloss on the narrative; it is impossible for us to pry into the motives which, as he professes, have generally guided him, and he may be deceiving us, perhaps, because himself self-deceived. If, as he tells the story, or at its close, he has overcome this prejudice, there is a reaction, and he perhaps wins more favour than he merits. There are at this very time men of much worldly wisdom, and more clever women, who, if they could, would make the claimant to the Tichborne baronetcy a peer of the realm.

There lies now on our table one of these tales of a man's life related by himself; and one of its chief merits is that, when we have read it, we come to much the same conclusion as to the author and his ideas and doings as that at which he himself has arrived. In spite of the prejudice to which we have referred, and the pleasure we confess we should have felt in indulging it,—for we have always considered the typical Chartist as almost *ferè natura*,—a smile has mantled upon our stern, judicial face, as we have read the book, from the first page to the last. And it is because that but to few of the various worlds which constitute the huge universe of English society is even the name of Thomas Cooper familiar, that we the rather call attention to this very suggestive narrative of another self-made man of great mark and merit, and, in his own sphere, of unquestionable success. We give a brief outline of his story, commenting on portions of it as we proceed.

Let us first say, however, that we like the tone of the whole narrative, and that its style and general handling are admirable. He writes this record of his life because "hundreds of people," no doubt, of those whom he now very widely influences, have told him that he ought to write it. Thousands, he admits, will wonder at his assurance in acting on this advice; but, having determined to do so, he will take his own course. "If the account of a man's life be worth writing at all, it must be worth writing with fair completeness." "I shall do so, more especially when it will gratify myself. For, if there be any gratification to be derived from the reading of my book, I think I ought to share it." "I have written the book chiefly to please myself, and that I suspect is the chief reason why anybody writes an autobiography." All this is truly, newly, and pleasantly said. So is what follows:—

"One could desire to have such a power" (he has been quoting a far less intelligible passage from Coleridge) "of tracing every thought to the earliest part of one's conscious existence, not for the purpose of inflicting all one's thoughts upon others, but for the purpose of being able to tell the truth. What were the exact motives for the performance of certain actions in our lives, we often cannot state unerringly in our later years. It is not simply because memory fails, that we cannot give the veritable statement, but because the moral and intellectual man has changed. We no longer think and feel as we thought and felt so many years ago; and, perhaps, we wonder that we did some things and spoke some words we did and spoke at certain times. We are inclined to set it down, that our motives then were what they would be now. We see the past, as it were, through a false glass, and cannot represent it to ourselves otherwise than as something like the present."

The blood of "Yorkshire Quakers" flows in Thomas Cooper's veins, and has tintured all his character; but, as is not uncommon, the hereditary bias and impulse played but feebly on some of their progeny; passing by capriciously, as it would at first sight seem, but probably because of intermarriages, their immediate descendants, that it might work more strongly on a remoter line. The father, early an orphan, and apprenticed to a dyer in Long Acre, abandoned the creed and customs of his ancestors, went to India, and, after his return, travelled about England, practising his trade. In the course of these wanderings he married, at Gainsborough, a woman bearing "the old Saxon name of Jobson," one of a race of small farmers and carriers, but some of them fishermen.

The son was born at Leicester, in 1805; but the itinerating father removed him to Exeter, when about a year old. He taught himself to read, and, at three years old, "used to be set on a stool in Dame Brown's school, to teach one Master Bodley, who was seven years old, his letters." Father and son were wont to read and rehearse to each other fables and tales, and the lad led the "pleasant, sunny life of early childhood." But his mother—he her only child, and but four years old—became a widow, and returned to her native town. There he lived for a quarter of a century. She had learned her husband's trade, and pursued it as she could, for, though strong, it taxed all her strength. During her first year there, the son was grievously disfigured by small-pox. "At five years old, when I began to go out of doors a few paces, I felt, child though I was, the humbling change that had come over me. I was no longer saluted cheerfully and with a smile, as at Exeter,—no longer flattered and called a pretty boy. Some frowned, with sour-natured dislike, at my marred visage; while others looked pitiful, and said 'Poor thing!'" All around, too, was desolate. No father "with his little lays and stories." "One chamber and one lower room, the latter parlour, kitchen, and dye-house; the mother all day at work, "amidst steam and sweat." Yet for him she had ever "words of tenderness." "My altered face had not unendeared me to her. In the midst of her heavy toil, she could listen to my feeble repetitions of the fables, or spare a look, at my entreaty, for the figures I was drawing with chalk on the hearthstone." What exquisite pictures these of the homes of the English poor! In our day we are bridging over the gulf which has long separated them from our cosy or sumptuous dwelling-places. We may be sure that we shall learn as much from them as we shall ever teach them in return.

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Gertrude Aram—she was usually called “Old Gatty”—became the director of his studies; and he could soon read the tenth chapter of Nehemiah, with its hard names, “like the parson in the church,” and spell wondrously. He played little out of doors. So his mother bought him penny story-books, which he read, got off by heart, and was wont to repeat. He followed his bent for drawing. On fine Sundays, his mother, a religious woman, as we shall see, took him to gather flowers in the fields, a practice which, in the case of those cooped up at hard labour all the week through, though not by any means in the case of others, we are glad to see that so strict a keeper of the Christian Sabbath as Lord Shaftesbury, in a recent speech at Glasgow, emphatically approved. On rainy Sundays, mother and son turned over, with mutual delight, the pages of Baskerville’s big Bible with its engravings, and talked over what the dead father had used to say about the stories and the pictures.

The mother’s business involved her in debt, which she strove painfully to pay. To aid this, she took to making and hawking pasteboard boxes, travelling with them on her head sometimes twenty or thirty miles a day. When her journeys were shorter, the boy went with her. One day, whilst pursuing their way, a sudden and terrible danger threatened him. The rent was due; the landlord was a hard man; a toilsome fortnight had been spent in making an extra lot of boxes, and the pair set out to sell them, she dragging him on by her apron “as she walked sadly, but stoutly on. We were not half-way towards Lea, when we were met by Cammidge, a master chimney-sweeper, and his two apprentices, bending under huge soot bags.” He offered “two golden guineas” for the boy.

“She looked anxiously at them, but shook her head, and looked at me with the tears in her eyes; and I clung tremblingly to her apron, and cried, ‘Oh mammy, mammy! do not let the grimy man take me away!’ ‘No, my dear bairn, he shall not,’ she answered, and away we went, leaving the chimney-sweep in a rage, swearing, and shouting after my mother that she was a fool, and he was sure to have me sooner or later, for that she could not escape bringing herself and me to the workhouse. My mother never went thither, however, nor did she ever ask parish help to bring me up.”

When the mother left him at home, it was under the care of old Will Rogers, who kept a lodging-house, where small pedlars and beggars slept, or of Thomas Chatterton, an old soldier, who had lost his sight in Egypt. Here he listened to stories of fairies, ghosts, and witches, and heard the blind

man tell how "he stepped out of the boat up to the waist in water in the Bay of Aboukir, and how they charged the French with the bayonet, and, under cover of the cannon from the ships, drove the enemy back from the shore, and effected a triumphant landing."

He was sent to the Methodist Sunday-school. His mother had frequently taken him to the Methodist chapel, from the time he was able to walk about, "after that year of diseases," but now he attended regularly every Sunday morning.

"I can recall," he writes, "the face, and figure, and manner of the preachers I heard in those very early years. Quaint-looking Joseph Pretty, and gentlemanly John Doncaster, and *young*, dry, solemn-looking and solemn-preaching Isaac Keeling. He was equally *dry* when he was old, but 'he had a rare canister of brains,' as an old, intelligent Methodist used to say of him; and *young*, fervid, and seemingly-inspired John Hannah; and hearty, plain, original, and often eccentric John Farrar." [Not the ex-president, but his father.]

But a new free school was opened, and in those times, when a Methodist day-school, or a school conducted by Churchmen where liberty of conscience was allowed, were, in a small country town, alike impossible—let unthankful crotchets-mongers ponder well the wonderful progress of our age—in those times, we say, this boy could not be admitted into the free school unless he attended the parish church twice on Sundays. Of course, he went to the new institution and to church, also was allowed, yearly, "a coat and cap, blue, with yellow trimmings." In spite of modern notions, we still cleave to the idea of academical and professional costumes. All that was taught was reading the Scriptures, writing, and the first four rules of arithmetic, simple and compound. But constant drilling in these "formed, at least, a good preparation for larger acquirements," and this boy was only eleven years of age when he commenced the course. If this limitation of the course of study was too narrow,—and new ideas and schemes *may* err quite as disadvantageously in the opposite direction,—he liked the school, and, above all, "I liked the grand organ at the church, the stately church itself, and the stately service." Twice in the year, the boys were examined in the Catechism,—with all its faults much better than none,—by the vicar, preparatory to repeating it in the church, in the presence of the congregation, and were rewarded with a shilling each, and with smiles and kind words. Of him wicked people said "that he was the best

judge of the quality of a bottle of port, the best hand at loo or whist, and the best patron of the play and the ball-room in the whole town." Better this than an absurd ritualist, or a conceited rationalist; perhaps than even that section of the clergy, one of whom a lively young priest described to us the other day as "a Sammyite." But the old gentleman kept a curate, sternly evangelical, who "preached boldly against the vicar's tastes, without naming him, without remonstrance, but also without any change of habits." After long study of the natural history of the good old Church of England, nothing strikes us more than the divers modes and repeated instances in which Satan casts out Satan. Nonconformists may explain it as they can; but there is a compensating and regulating power in the relations which Established Churches bear to the State, and still more to society at large, which, from time to time, and in the strangest ways, preserves them from abandonment to either of those alternative extremes of opinion, which, as with the regularity of a law, and almost of the tide, ebb and flow around and into them, threatening their existence as establishments, but thus conserving and promoting their influence on the religion of the people.

Cooper was elected into the choir, and a new taste was developed and educated. "I could thus see the large church-organ played as well as hear it; and how I wondered at the changing face of the organist, as he touched the keys! The other boys laughed at him, but I could not." His preference to the loft had a still more pleasant result.

"It brought to our house the father of the organist, a gentlemanly person, though he had a wooden leg. He was a great player on the dulcimer. The instrument was soon brought to our house, and I became so enamoured of it, that my mother eventually purchased it for thirty shillings. A few lessons, by the ear, I had from the old gentleman, and soon was able, by the ear, to play any tune I knew, or heard sung or played in the street. How often I have wished that the dulcimer had been a violin or a pianoforte, and that I had been taught music by the notes—had been taught to read music at that age. Such wishes are vain; but I have them, and of various forms. Oh, that I had been trained to music—or painting—or law—or medicine—or any profession in which mind is needed; or that I had been regularly educated, so that I might have reached a university. I say I often catch myself at these wishes still, even at sixty-six; but they are not so fervent as they were some years ago, for I remember that life here will soon end with me."

How few self-made men write in a tone like this! We

hardly remember another instance of the kind. Risen from the ranks by his own sheer force of wit and will, how seldom do we meet with the founder of his own success so modest; so ready to admit a higher, or even another, standard of excellence than that he himself has achieved; so conscious, after all, of comparative failure; so content even when he admits failure!

All kinds of educational influences had come into play. It was the period of what, notwithstanding all that has happened in more recent times, must be still called the Great War. Matthew Goy, the postman, "with his hat covered with ribbons, and blowing his horn mightily," rode, from time to time, through the little town of Gainsborough, bringing news of such victories as those at Badajoz and Salamanca, while Cooper and his companion, Thomas Miller, who also has attained deserved literary distinction, drew pictures of Wellington and "Boney,"—never then called Napoleon. From Abraham Haxley, who had served against the Dutch, in India, they heard delectable tales about elephants and tigers, of "guavas, bananas, figs, jacks, and cat-head apples,—your hatful for a farthing;" and they tried to draw the strange animals. Job Holland taught him bird-nesting; "delightful, not so much for itself, as for the adventures" connected with it. George Wimble—we cannot make up our mind to omit one of these so purely English names—enriched him with lore about herbs. Of the names of wild flowers he knew less; but he gathered every one of them in its season, and is now familiar with them all. His holidays, allowed during glean-ing time, were spent with Luke Jobson, his mother's brother, a small farmer and carrier, residing twenty-one miles away, in "a large thatched cottage," at Market Rasen. The outer room had a wide, open chimney.

"My uncle's arm-chair was under it, and you could see the swallows' nests in the chimney, as you sat in the chair. On the chimney-front hung a curious old picture painted on oak, displaying a cat playing bagpipes to dancing mice in one corner, and a gamester, shaped like an ape, playing at cards with clowns in another. Above was the legend—

'Gamesters and puss alike doe watch,
And plaie with those they aime toe catch.'

In the inner room, or parlour, was a heavy antique clock; and on the walls hung 'The Twelve Golden Rules of Good King Charles,' and 'Death and the Lady,' a long, serious dialogue in verse. In my uncle's fields and on the adjoining moors, I saw wild birds, and wild

four-footed creatures in abundance ; weasels, ferrets, fomarls, moles, hedgehogs, were often taken, and owls and hawks shot. The kestrel often hovered overhead ; now and then the glade or kite would soar aloft."

The volume abounds with passages as charming as this ; and Defoe himself never wrote better. We must omit or abridge many more. Every Friday, the day that the uncle came to Gainsborough, as weekly carrier from Market Rasen, Cooper, so soon as school was over, read to him the directions on his letters and parcels, "for he was never put to school, and to his dying day 'knew never a letter in the book, save round O,' as he used to say." Though he was a tenant of Squire Tennyson, of Tealby, and it is very possible the boy that was to be Laureate knew and studied him, yet he is not the original of Tennyson's picture of a Lincolnshire farmer ; for "he made much of me," writes Cooper ; "always gave me a few coppers for my writing paper, lead pencils, and water colours ; and, indeed, showed every disposition to indulge me." Yet there is a certain likeness, for "he had contrived to hoard up three hundred spade-ace guineas in a stocking-foot."

We are wandering, and we cannot help it, from our purpose of tracing the educational influences which combined to construct this thorough Englishman. What thorough Englishman has, for now many generations, developed into what he is, without "hours of wonder and rapture passed with Bunyan," the adequate substitute for Shakspeare himself, in cases where he does not become his precursor ? For this treasure he was indebted to a "number-man," or travelling bookseller, who, now and then, lent him not only Bunyan, but Baines's *History of the War* then waging ; and *Pamela* ; and *The Earl of Moreland*, as corrupting a novel as was ever written, though, strange to say, abridged by Wesley himself from Henry Brooke's *Fool of Quality* ; and the stories of Turpin and Nevison, famous highwaymen, and of Bamfylde Moore-Carew, the King of the Gipsies ! "Chevy Chase" supplied him with the first rhymes he ever read with pleasure. As he read them, he felt warlike as Matthew Goy himself riding into town with tidings of another victory, "or the array of the Gainsborough Loyal Volunteers," when they marched to the sound of fife and drum. Then came "the general peace," with its "grand emblematical procession," in which was "a car holding figures of the conquering heroes of the time," and of "the fallen emperor, labelled 'Going to

Elba," and its "thanksgiving sermon and anthems at church, and feastings at the inns," and general illumination. The boys re-enacted the scene next day, and Cooper himself was the Wellington; and they went round to the squires and farmers, and sang "Awake my soul, and with the sun," and its companion evening hymn, and shouted "Peace and Plenty," "God save the King;" and held their caps for coppers; and Sir Charles Anderson, the "good old English gentleman" that he was, called them very good boys, and gave them a real silver half-crown,—none of your shabby "French shillings," as they were called, debased one-franc pieces, with which, soon after the war ended—we remember it with indignation to this day—smiling friends used to tip us, when we were returning to school, and which formed a proportion somewhat too large of the coins put into the collection-boxes, when the then Dean of Wells, or Dr. Collyer, or Robert Newton had exhausted their eloquence on their hearers.

Let our readers get this book and read the story, worth all the price, of "Bob Mason's Speculation in Cockles." But we must be grave, as becomes the chair in which we sit, and tell of the troubles which darkened this otherwise pleasant boyhood. Rent and taxes, and bad harvests, and dear bread, the converse of the expected plenty, made it very hard for Cooper's mother to find him food and shelter, and also to keep him at school, yielding her no present help. "At one time wheaten flour rose to six shillings per stone, and we tried to live on barley cakes, which brought on a burning gnawing pain at the stomach. For two seasons the corn was spoiled in the fields with wet, and, when the winter came, we could scoop out the middle of the soft distasteful loaf, and to eat it brought on sickness." Meat was out of the question, and mother and son would have starved, but that, in the dreadful winter of 1813—14, some generous Quakers started a subscription, in which other people joined, and families usually independent, were fed gratuitously with "soup, biscuit, potatoes, and red herrings." The tax-gatherer, too, was a jobbing and oppressive man, favouring some and hard on others; and, as the old prophet well knew, times are bad indeed when "exactors" are *not* righteous, but the very impersonations of unrighteousness. Cooper's mother, snatching "now and then at the back-door a few whiffs at the pipe," would talk matters over bitterly with her neighbours as the boys were drawing or cutting out papers. (There is another picture!) Once this honest woman disappointed her enemy by removing and hiding her few effects. At other

times she petitioned the magistrates,—some of them known protectors of the poor, and then, as now, if unpaid, and sometimes—at the instance of well-paid lawyers, be it remembered—harsh and blundering, the cement and stay of our rural populations. Still the patient creature took her boxes all the country round, weekly going to Epworth market, where she also took in goods for dying. Her son often went with her, a distance of twelve miles, and actually crossed the Trent in the ferry-boat, and saw sea-gulls and a heron! Cooper waxes eloquent at the mention of the river which, to this day, is the boundary of many a Lincolnshire peasant's universe, and, like most ideal horizons, has all the glow and glory of our exit out of this miserable life into the boundless light and air of the best beyond it. He bathed sometimes in a little arm of the stream at Ash Croft, a part of the marsh called Humble Carr, in which lies Cand'ish Bog, the spot where Cromwell pistolled young Colonel Cavendish and beat his troop; and, as we gather, the boy knew the story and fed on it. Gainsborough, too, had then a great shipping trade. Brigs, sloops, and keels, and ketches, or flat-bottomed boats from Staffordshire, crowded the river, and lively sailors loitered in the streets. It was a stirring sight when the tide was at its full. Sometimes porpoises were caught.

In 1814, the breaking up of the ice, after nineteen weeks' frost—it was during that famine-time—came in a moment, shook the town, stopped the waggon-passage, and put out the fires, on the water. Then came a great flood, during which the boys kept constrained holiday, and drew on paper the men and boats as they looked out of their chamber-windows. During the same year soldiers and sailors crowded home from service in the war; and "a half-lunatic,"—Cooper calls him so,—a provincial Cobden, we should say, "inglorious," but by no means "mute," with a helmet on his head and a piebald dress, went up and down the lanes and alleys shouting "No Corn Bill."

Cooper grew out of the monotonous teaching of the free school, and betook himself to that kept by "Daddy Briggs," where he acted as a kind of usher until he was about fifteen. Here he made much progress in mathematics, but, above all, gained access to plenty of books. He found favour also at the circulating library, and had soon devoured the *Arabian Nights*, and *Shakspeare*, and *Cook's Voyages*, and a host of novels and romances, old and new. Moses Holden, a Methodist lay-preacher, who used to itinerate with lectures on astronomy, very well elaborated and delivered, opened the

universe to him; and, in his twelfth year, he went round the neighbourhood, reproducing, for pennies, what he had thus learned. A notable old man, known as "the wise man of Retford," seduced him for a time into the study of astrology; and he had a severe fit of this insanity some years after. He read the *Paradise Lost*, but it was above him, and did not make him feel; while *Childe Harold* and *Manfred* thrilled through his whole nature. He took his first lessons, too, in the Radicalism of the day, more honest, if slightly more ignorant, than that of ours.

"There was a shop of brush-makers very near to us, and they were most determined politicians. They read *The News*, the most radical paper of that day; and they were partisans of Cobbett, Wooler, and Hunt; and they used to lend me Howe's *Caricatures* and *The News* weekly, and talk to me of the 'villainous rascals,' Lord Castlereagh, Lord Sidmouth, Lord Eldon, and the Prince Regent, until I hated the Liverpool Ministry, and believed that the sufferings of the poor"—his own privations included—"were chiefly attributable to them."

But now a signal change came over him; and his genius and passion for knowledge, his radicalism, and his religion, all combined, have so strangely moulded this remarkable man, that we must trace each influence as it began to work. Again we quote his own words; commenting, however, before we give the text, on the very noticeable statement as to the impression produced on his mind by the simple daily reading in hum-drum school course, if anyone please to call it so, of the wonderful records in the Gospels. It is in flat contradiction of much that is perpetually dinned into our ears by orators about National Education. True, many boys, when they read the Scriptures in class, do so mechanically; but many do not. Those who do, would read any book mechanically, even *Robinson Crusoe*. But what an effect upon those whose intelligence and tastes are quickened, yes, and satisfied, by the profound but obvious truth, and the delicate natural sentiment, of The Book! to say nothing of the value of such special impressions as those of which Cooper says he was conscious. Flippant members of Parliament assure us that the reading of the Bible at school did *them* no good. We believe them.

"It cannot be supposed that, with a nature so emotional as mine, I had listened to the earnest prayer of my teacher in the Methodist Sunday-school, and joined in the singing so delightedly, both in

church and chapel, and heard sermons, without having religious impressions. From a child I felt these. *Often, during our reading of the Gospels, verse by verse, as we stood in class at the Free School, the Saviour seemed almost visible to me, as I read of His deeds of mercy and love.* The singing of our morning and evening hymns, and repetition, on our knees, of the Lord's Prayer, had always a solemnising effect upon me. And, doubtless, seeds of spiritual good were sown thus early in my mind, never to be really destroyed."

We do not pursue the details of this part of the story. "The Ranters," alias "The Primitive Methodists"—we often wish that both they and the Society of Friends had possessed Wesley's common sense, and had adopted the names which popular prejudice, not without some cause, invented—came to the town. They addressed themselves to the very lowest class; and we would fain hope that, if they ever get access to the higher, they will never forget the objects of their first and their continuous commission. We can only refer, in passing, to the remarkable letter recently addressed by S. G. O. to *The Times*, demonstrating, notwithstanding some inaccuracies, that this commission is continuous, and may, faithfully discharged, prove of lasting service to English Christianity, good order, and happiness. Cooper heard the apostles of this new sect, and to good purpose. The sacred fire was lit. How came it so soon, and almost altogether, to go out?

We cannot dwell on a subject like this. But this book is pregnant with suggestions; and here is one which, in our judgment, needs continual and emphatic repetition. It concerns many—we fear very many—of the multitudes of earnest men who are seeking to bring religion to bear on the masses, and specially those known in all Churches—the highest section of the Church of England now not excepted—some of them, however, self-sufficient, independent workers, disdaining the control and sympathy of any Church—who are known (do none of them like the parade and exclusiveness of the term?) as "Revivalists." Think, all such as, at their pleasure, some very much at their leisure too, enact travesties of the "works of God" in "His wonderful dealings towards the children of men," of the grave, eternal import of such a transaction as His most gracious forgiveness of the sin, and restoration to a Divine life and power, of any one individual man! *Must the truth come out?* "Neither yet," perhaps, are the "Churches able to bear it." The great reason of that decay of energy and success which ought to startle

those editors of religious newspapers, or ecclesiastical leaders of religious sects, who deny it with most vehemence, or most soothingly explain it away,—the great reason of this decay is not scepticism, nor reviving superstitiousness, nor abounding worldliness, nor any of the evils which float on the surface and penetrate the very depths of modern society. “Christianity, in earnest,” can spend a future eternity in telling how, again and again, and with the calm, continuous flow of some New-world river, it has encountered and overwhelmed obstacles like these. No! The great reason of decay is just the abandonment, more or less, and with more or less of carelessness, on the one hand, or, on the other, of direct intention and aim, of the old prescribed modes of thoughtful, painstaking, time-occupying, conscience-dealing labour in the pulpit, and of Church communion, order, and discipline out of it; and the fashion and fever for a spurious, spasmodic, mechanical, and unscriptural “Revivalism.” “Haste, again, ye days of grace!” Yes; of promised, certain, triumphant, *grace*; of rain from the bountiful heaven on patient culture; on the constant, seasonable, sowing of good seed; on the watching, weeding, inclosing, improving; on the universal implicit obedience of the “great ordinances” of New-Testament religion. Now let us hear Thomas Cooper upon but one branch of this comprehensive question:—

“Some of the boys, at length, professed to find the pardon of sin. For a day or two I believed I had received it, but as I felt conscious that I sinned, I supposed that I must ‘act faith,’ as they said, to find it again; and this ‘acting of faith’ became, in the course of some weeks, so irksome to my mind, that my mere common sense revolted at the practice. We were told to ‘believe,’ but I understood the teaching to mean, that we were to *believe ourselves into the persuasion that we were forgiven*; and I could not avoid the conviction, that this was *not* receiving pardon by the witness of the Holy Spirit,”—his own and better notions were muddy—“but *pardoning ourselves*. So I began to grow weary of creeping into corners twenty times in a day to repent for sin, for I thought I was always sinning, and believing myself again forgiven. I shrunk from the practice at last in sheer disgust, but neither did that bring ease of mind. I began gradually to get back to my music and my reading, but some of the members of the Society, poor men who knew little of books, but who found happiness in prayer, and in hearing others read and preach about the goodness of God, demurred to my reading any book but the Bible, unless it was a ‘truly religious book.’ My mind rebelled completely now, and I ceased to frequent the little chapel, and began to go to

the Methodist (Wesleyan) chapel instead, where I listened to the argumentative preaching of Thomas Ingham, and the warm, genial discourses of William Stokes."

We must again in passing just call attention to the estimate given, here and elsewhere, by this thoughtful and cultured man, of the Methodist preachers who, fifty years ago, were wont to be appointed even to little country towns. But we proceed with the religious history while we are upon it.

Soon afterwards, Cooper formed the friendship of Christopher Macdonald, a sensible Methodist, who directed his mind to more solid reading, and specially urged the study of theology. Guided by this acquaintance, he continued to frequent the Methodist ministry, and "enjoyed the intelligent and deeply spiritual preaching of Laurence Kershaw." But Macdonald left the town, and Henry Whillock took his place. The two walked, and read, and, for some time, studied astrology, together. In time, they got hold of Elihu Palmer, Volney and Voltaire. These books did not make them unbelievers in the usual sense of the word; but they "began to conclude that there must be some fable at least in the Old Testament." Soon they gave up all public worship. John Hough succeeded as favourite, with "decided views on nonconformity and dissent," and a strong partisan of Jonathan Edwards in doctrine. His advices, and Whillock's early death, again gave a decidedly religious bent. He read more books on the Evidences than, now-a-days, are to be found in the libraries of most Christians. At last, he fell ill. He had begun again to pray "for light." He could repeat to himself the substance of Paley's *Evidences*, and that book "served to enable me to rest on Christ's existence and mission as facts." Then he read *Henry Martyn's Life*, and said within himself,—"I ought to be ashamed to have a doubt while Henry Martyn believed." With his illness came "sickness of the heart." "Sin of the heart and mind, that is not outward, was my sin, but it was not the less sin for that." The Methodists came and prayed with him. They told him to give his soul no rest until he had found the pardon of sin; but the young curate of the parish, and Hough, his Independent friend, were not of just the same mind, and he knew not what to do. His health improved, and he frequented the chapel Hough attended; "but the problem was not solved with me as to what constituted religion, or, rather, religious experience." He thought the

preaching dull; "nor was there warmth enough in the worship of the Independents for a nature like mine, while it was so full of the fire which it has taken time and experience to cool." He went to the parish church in the afternoon, and the curate's "preaching, gentle as it was, touched chords within me that the Independent minister could not reach." The Church-service, too, was "associated with the happy feelings of boyhood;" and he began to go to church thrice a day. His dissenting friends rallied him on his becoming, as they said, an Episcopalian. "Nay, nay, said I, you know I don't believe in Lord Bishops, or Right Reverend Fathers in God; but I want to find peace of mind, and I have not found it yet." He partook of the Sacrament of the Supper. Still he found himself unhappy, proud, and peevish. Prayer was often neglected, and the spirit of devotion languished. At last he betook himself to a "Wesleyan Methodist Class-meeting." He readily listened to advice. He sought it in Wesley's writings. The latter corrected much that was wrong in the former. We commend this part of the story (pp. 79—82)—we must abridge it—to the perusal of all teachers of the way to heaven. Soon he found rest. Then he read *William Bramwell's Life*, "on my knees, by three in the morning." He began to preach, and to meet in the class "of a female class-leader who, for many years, had been noted for fervid devotion." Soon he believed and professed that he had drank the "empyrean air" of entire consecration.

For some half-a-year, "I was in a religious state that I have never reached since." "For some months I never struck a boy in my school"—we are anticipating his secular history—"and the children looked at me so wistfully when I spoke to them tenderly and lovingly, if any had done wrong." "If, throughout eternity in heaven, I be as happy as I often was for whole days during that short period of my religious life, it will be heaven indeed." We are glad that this plain testimony will reach so many quarters where it will be a novelty. But body and soul became exhausted. "One day, when I was faint and weak in frame, I lost my temper under great provocation from a disobedient boy in the school, and suddenly seized the cane and struck him. The whole school seemed horror-stricken. The poor children gazed, as if on a fallen angel, with such looks of commiseration on my poor self, as I cannot describe. I wished I was in a corner to weep, for I was choking with tears, and felt heart-broken." After this he felt that his talk in the village pulpits became vapid. He began to ask himself what right he had to deal

out extemporaneous shallowness," prepared written sermons, delivered them as best he could, and became both popular and useful.

"Nor could I continue to take a part in such work," he writes, "without endeavouring to make it serve my own intellectual culture. The writing out of sermons was a noble introduction to the art of expressing one's thoughts. I strove to make my sermons worth listening to. I had become master of a vocabulary of no mean order by committing Shakspeare and Milton to memory, and repeating them so often; and my reading of the old English divines enabled me to acquit myself in the pulpit with more than the ordinary ability of a Methodist local preacher. I possess no copy of any of the sermons I preached in those years; but I know they contained passages of euphony, of pathetic appeal, of picturesque description, and power of argument and declamation, that I should not be ashamed if I saw them now in print. Nor did I neglect attendance on any popular living example of eloquence and of the power of preaching that came within my hearing."

Of all the preachers he ever heard, Rowland Hill, strangely enough, made the most impression on him. Of the Methodists, he particularises "the wondrous voice and noble form and eloquence" of Newton, "the stately form and high intellectuality" of Watson, "the poetic power" of McNicol, "the spiritual power" of Peter McOwan, "the manly preaching" of Galland, "the stern and relentless scourging of sin by brave Daniel Isaac," and "the never-ending missionary tales of Joshua Marsden." But "for originality of conception, richness and variety of imagery, clearness of Scriptural illustration, pathos, humour, power of grappling with the conscience, and *mastery in the art of winning a man*"—the *italics* are ours—"William Dawson was," in his judgment, "the preacher of preachers." We must hurry on with the sketch of his religious life. He went to Lincoln to hear "the revivalist John Smith," and saw there a Methodist girl, who, whenever the veil is lifted up from her in the pages of this book, seems to have been all that a Methodist girl ought to be, and married her; and formed a friendship, as lasting, and almost as valuable to him, with Frederick James Jobson one of John Smith's converts—then but eighteen years old—"on trial" as a local preacher; an architect and antiquarian, "full of passion for art and of admiration for poetry," and who "had already displayed considerable eloquence in the pulpit."

"My after life has often separated me from my dear friend's companionship; but never, in any change of my opinions, or adverse

turn of fortune, did he forsake me, or fail to help me in a difficulty; and many a time have I had to rely on him as my only human help. Our friendship has now lasted unbroken for two-and-forty years; and I thank God that I ever had such a true, faithful, and unfailing friend as Frederick James Jobson."

A very large proportion of our readers will identify this friend with the Dr. Jobson, a distinguished Ex-President of the Wesleyan Conference, to whom this volume is most appropriately dedicated.

Now begins the tale of another religious declension. An unworthy minister, who was subsequently proved to be so, and who became an outcast of his brethren, was the Superintendent of the Circuit. Quarrels arose, in which, for all we see, Cooper was in the right, and the minister disgracefully in the wrong. Cooper removed to Lincoln. But there, too, he found or fancied his chief pastor prejudiced against him by the gossip of the Gainsborough minister. So he left the Society, and gave up attendance on public worship. "I feel now," he says, "I was very guilty in this; guilty in forsaking God because man had been unkind to me." So he drifted away, but gradually.

"If any one had asked me what I considered myself to be in point of religious belief six years after I left the Wesleys, I should have answered that I was a Wesleyan still. But I had not spent many months in talking to the Leicester Chartists, before my 'religious conscience' began to receive a new 'form and pressure' from its new surroundings. I could not preach eternal punishment to poor, starving, stockingers. But when the belief in eternal punishment is given up, the eternal demerit of sin has faded from the preacher's conscience, and then what consistency can he see in the doctrine of Christ's Atonement?"

He sank into some of the dreariest depths of unbelief. "Atheistic reasonings" became habitual. One night—it was in prison—as he knelt beside his iron slab and bag of straw, he sprang up, and determined to pray no more; nor did he ever kneel to pray so long as he was in confinement. But on the beautiful May morning of his release, he "burst into tears, and sobbed with a feeling" he "could not easily subdue, as" he "once more saw the fields and flowers, and God's glorious sun. The world was so beautiful, I dared not say there was no God in it; and the old, long-practised feeling of worship welled up in my heart in spite of myself." After this he struggled against the demon which had well-nigh mastered him. He fastened on Strauss, and became his

entire convert ; nor did he get out of " the pernicious meshes " of this net for twelve years. But the bright day came at last. He had lectured, for several years, up and down the country, on all kinds of subjects, and in 1855 had, in several towns, discoursed on the Crimean War. It was at this time that he began, once more, to feel that he was in the wrong. He was quick enough to see, and he states, in two or three sentences, the point at issue at this moment between the disputants about systems of National Education, for he himself had striven to be a public educator.

" I had taught morals, and taught them strictly, but the questioning within that would arise, day by day and hour by hour, made my heart ache. *Why* should man be moral? Why cannot we quench the sense of accountability? And why have you not taught your fellow men, that they are answerable to the Divine Moral Governor, and must appear before Him in a future state, and receive His reward or punishment? It was not a conviction of the truth of Christianity, of the reality of the Miracles and Resurrection, or of the Divinity of Christ, that had worked the change in me. *I was overwhelmed with a sense of guilt, in having omitted to teach the right foundation of morals. I had taught morals as a means of securing and increasing men's happiness here, but had left them 'without God and without hope in the world.' I had ignored religion in my teaching.*"

Memorable teaching this ; and new just because it is so true. *The guilt* of setting up to teach a fellow-man that he can be happy and virtuous in this confused and mysterious world, without the apprehension of God, without the hope of a day in which all will be clear and plain ! *The guilt* of those who, on the pretext of separating the religious from the secular, of devolving the one on the State and the other on the parents or the Churches, are really striving to get rid altogether of the religious, well knowing how little either parents or Churches ever have done, or ever will do, of their allotted duty ! The " folly worse than the crime," with which even good men, confounding " religious " with irreligious " liberty," are allying themselves with persons and bodies out of whose company they would rush in blushing, frightened haste, were the Great Teacher Himself to appear for one day amongst us, and to cast the light of His calm, grave eye on our pitiful compromises and apostasies ! We resume. The moment Cooper had obeyed conscience, and altered his whole strain of teaching, all went well. Charles Kingsley, always " on the Lord's side," though sometimes a straggler from the camp, counselled and

strengthened him. At first, he "simply taught Theism." It was not until two years had been spent in reading and thinking, that his sense of guilt as a public teacher "gradually merged into the deeper and more distressing conviction of" his "own personal life of sin, in living without the God" he had "loved in his early manhood." Dr. Jobson and Charles Kingsley, we doubt not with a substantial unity of teaching, but in very different ways, set themselves to help him. One morning, as he awoke, "the bondage of dumbness of spirit," for he had not dared to pray, was "suddenly broken" "by the words running through" his "mind that had been familiar to" him "when he was a Bluecoat boy, and stood in the aisle of Gainsborough Church: 'Almighty and most merciful Father, I have erred and strayed'"—and so on, all through the pregnant phrases of the "General Confession" in the Service of the Church of England. Saying those same words within himself, morning by morning, they germinated, and plentiful prayer sprang forth. He became a new man, even a lively Christian, and set himself to lecture up and down, especially in places where he had before lectured, and to the classes over whom he had acquired influence, teaching them about God, and of possible, present, well-founded, and everlasting virtue. He did not again unite himself with the Methodists. One day a General Baptist asked him some questions which he could not answer. Baptists have a way of doing so; and perhaps other Christians are somewhat too careless in returning the compliment. At all events, Cooper was immersed, and we do not suppose he was any the worse for it.

We have been tempted too far into our references to this interesting religious history, and must now resume, and very briefly, our notices of the self-education of this remarkable man, and of his eventful career. We left him when he was fourteen years of age, taking his first lessons in astronomy and politics. A year afterwards he left school. The neighbours had told his mother, who had all this time been starving herself to keep him at his books, that she would make him "a good-for-nothing, idle creature." At last she yielded. He tried the sea for nine days, but could not endure the weariness and brutality he witnessed day by day. Very shortly he "sat down in Clark's garret to begin the art, craft, and mystery of shoemaking." It was hard to persuade the mother to submit so far as this. "The Lord's will be done," she said; "I don't think He intends thee to spend thy life at shoemaking. I have kept thee at school, and worked hard to

get thee bread, and to let thee have thy own wish in learning, and never imagined that thou wast to be a shoemaker. But the Lord's will be done. He'll bring it all right in time." He toiled hard at this trade until he was nearly three-and-twenty, never earning more than about ten shillings a week. During all these years he read all the books that came in his way. History, poetry, and the Waverley Novels, philosophy and theology were alike welcome to him. He also began to practise composition. The periodical literature of the day came within his reach. "How rich I was! How all this intellectual food was glutting me on every side! And how resolute I was on becoming solitary, and also on becoming a scholar!"

He read in Drew's *Imperial Magazine* the story of Dr. Samuel Lee, the great linguist of that time, at Cambridge, though ignorant of English grammar and of arithmetic, and felt as if he must accomplish a broader triumph of self-education. He determined further that he would use the best and most refined English he could command, and speak it without the pronunciation of his native county. He began Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and French. All this time he was working hard at that study of the *Evidences* to which we have before alluded.

"Historical readings, or the grammar of some language, or translation, was my first employment on week-day mornings, whether I rose at three or four, until seven o'clock, when I sat down to the stall. A book or a periodical in my hand whilst I breakfasted, gave me another half-hour's reading. I had another half-hour, and sometimes an hour's, reading or study of language, at from one to two o'clock, the time of dinner, usually eating my food with a spoon, after I had cut it in pieces, and having my eyes on a book all the time. I sat at work till eight and sometimes nine at night, and then either read or walked about our little room, and committed *Hamlet* to memory, or the rhymes of some modern poet, until compelled to go to bed from sheer exhaustion; for it must be remembered that I was repeating something audibly, as I sat at work, the greater part of the day, either declensions and conjugations, or rules of syntax, or propositions of *Euclid*, or *Paradise Lost*, or *Hamlet*, or poetry of some modern author. When, in the coldness of winter, we could not afford to have a fire till my mother rose, I used to put a lamp on a stool which I placed on a little round table, and standing before it, wrapped in my mother's old red cloak, I read on till seven, or studied a grammar, or my *Euclid*, and frequently kept my feet moving to secure warmth, or prevent myself from falling asleep."

This must be almost our last quotation, and we omit many

more which we would like to make. He followed his bent for natural objects; and, though he gave up his drawing, he still occasionally played on the old dulcimer to his mother when she wished to hear it. At last his strength failed; and he had reason to fear that his power of mind also was giving way. One favourite study after another was given up. There was but scanty strength left to earn daily bread for himself and for his mother, now becoming dependent on his labour. Then came the first religious crisis of which we have spoken. Gradually he recovered, and set up a school, taking as minute and persevering pains with his pupils as he had spent on himself. Now he published his first work, a volume of verses, entitled *The Wesleyan Chiefs*. It was a dead failure; though James Montgomery, the only man of literary mark to whom he could gain access, corrected the proofs for him, and of one piece, that *To Lincoln Cathedral*, pronounced: "These are very noble lines, and the versification is truly worthy of them." He removed to Lincoln, was active in forming a Mechanics' Institute, and himself opened a class for Latin. He perfected himself in Hebrew, Greek, and French, and learned Italian, and German, and chemistry; founded a successful Choral Society; began writing for the press; and again attempted to write poetry. One day, as in a moment, he conceived the idea of by far his most remarkable book, *The Purgatory of Suicides*, "a drama, or an epic, wherein the spirits of suicidal kings, and other remarkable personages, should be interlocutors on some high theme or themes." He got immersed in politics, which, indeed, had now become his trade. He wrote a romance. He visited London, and formed some literary acquaintanceships there. He underwent the usual vicissitudes of a man striving to live by his pen. At last he secured an engagement on the *Lincoln and Stamford Mercury*, and, when thirty-five years old, went to reside at Lincoln, the place of his birth.

Now came "the winter of his discontent." Leicester was a principal centre of the wretchedness and famine which were then affecting the operative classes, and so of the then prevalent fever of Chartism. Cooper took the disease, and, of course, became at once a leader of the movement. By means both of the press and the platform, he carried on the agitation until it culminated in sedition. The story of this period of his life is, to the highest degree, picturesque and interesting. We specify, in particular, that part of it relating to his journey by night to Macclesfield, a fugitive from the law, after making two exasperating speeches at Hanley. The peeps

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into the interior of the Chartist Cabinet, not one other of whose members seems to have been as honest and consistent as himself, but wielding a power which frightened the empire, are instructive lessons to modern politicians; for worse men than the worst of these, probably, have, more recently, been at once the advisers and the dupes of statesmen. He was apprehended on a charge of aiding in a riot; committed to Stafford gaol; tried at the Special Assize of October 1842, not only on the original charge, but also on that of arson; conducted his own defence with great skill and eloquence, against the then Solicitor General, Sir William Follett; was acquitted; was again tried at Stafford in 1843, on charges of conspiracy and sedition; defended himself in a speech ten hours long; was found guilty; and, ultimately, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in his old quarters. Here he was subjected to the strictest rigours of the place; struggled by every means within his reach, passive and active, to secure their abatement; succeeded, at length, in getting possession of his books and papers; wrote the remarkable poem to which we have before adverted; resumed his readings in four languages; and, at the close of his confinement, was offered, would he give up politics, the benefit he had so long desired, of an education free of expense to himself, at the University of Cambridge,—an offer promptly and indignantly refused, but the credit of which he attributes to the venerable Earl of Harrowby.

His difficulties, and, finally, his success, in securing the publication of his poem form another lively chapter of the volume. It was, in every sense, a success. It is enough for our present purpose to say that Douglas Jerrold and Charles Dickens helped him to bring it to light; and that Thomas Carlyle, to whom it was dedicated, while deprecating, in intensest phrase, the idea of any man, in these vexed times, writing a poem about anything, praised heartily its "dark, Titanic energy," and traced in it a music, which "might serve to irradiate into harmony far profitabler things than what are commonly called 'poems.'" It reached its fourth, but, we fancy, not its last edition. The power which produced it still survives, and, as we have been informed, seeks to expend itself in another poem, the exponent of very different views, of a soberer judgment, and of a chastened temper, and which is to treat of *The Paradise of Martyrs*.

He again betook himself to his pen, to gain his livelihood, at times also occupying the pulpit of William James Fox, the Unitarian preacher, in Finsbury. Then he commenced Sunday

evening lectures on his own account, enlivening them by music and chorus-singing, and attracting large crowds to hear him. His sagacity and experience saved him from any complication with dangerous political plots,—respecting which he tells a startling tale. But his lectures took more and more a sceptical tone. He travelled widely through England, Scotland, and Ireland, dealing, however, principally with general topics. He wrote novels. He accepted an engagement to lecture on the Crimean War, explaining a “model of the Crimea and Sebastopol.” Then came the beginning of the great religious change of which we have spoken. He commenced the year 1856 at the Hall of Science, intending to discourse on various countries, their productions, people, habits, and customs. But when he came to deliver the second lecture,—

“I could not utter one word. The people told me afterwards that I looked as pale as a ghost, and they wondered what was the matter with me. I could hardly tell myself, but at length the heart got vent by words, and I told them I could not lecture on Sweden, but must relieve my conscience, for I could suppress conviction no longer. I told them my great feeling of error was, that while I had been perpetually insisting on the observance of a moral life, in all my public teachings for some years, I had neglected to teach the right foundation of morals—the existence of the Divine Moral Governor, and the fact that we shall have to give up an account to Him, and receive His sentence, in a future state.”

A very few sentences must epitomise the rest. At first in connection with other occupations, and for now more than a dozen years, exclusively and continually, he has devoted himself to the public explanation and defence of the *Evidences of Christianity*. Every Sunday, and nearly every week-day in the year—his plans already arranged and advertised for each whole year, about the time of its commencement—he lectures on this one subject, attracts large audiences, and does great service. Such men as Mr. William Edward Forster, not quite so bad as some people would have us believe, Mr. Samuel Morley, who spends more time and pains in giving than in getting, and Dr. Jobson, purchased for him and his wife, some years ago, a small annuity, which secures him a modest independence. In 1870 he visited Lancashire; and his record of this visit, as coming from a man so long and intimately acquainted with the working classes, is so very discouraging, that, in the face of other facts and testimonies, we cannot implicitly receive it. Still it is one of the most remarkable passages in the volume.

Its concluding sentences, and we are sorry to dismiss it, are full of Christian wisdom, placidity, and hope. The last word is one of earnest exhortation. He is spending his remaining days in battling for the Truth against increasing and abounding infidelity. He asks help. He wants "one hundred intelligent, studious, pious, and courageous young Christian men," to engage in the service; not entering upon it as a genteel profession, nor stipulating for reward, nor selling tickets, nor taking moneys for admission, but making voluntary collections, on the ground that they cannot live on air. They cannot starve, he thinks, if they have industry and brains, and honesty of purpose,—we add, if they have Cooper's culture, and more or less of his experience and wisdom. We heartily endorse his appeal. Day by day our conviction becomes deeper that one great want of our times is an agency which, sanctioned and authenticated by the Churches, and acting in entire subordination to them, shall work irregularly, in the sense of being subjected to no strict and carefully-defined and arbitrary rules:—the pioneer of systematic instrumentality and efforts; the teacher of "first principles" to the masses of those who so largely, and, we fear, so increasingly ignore them.

LITERARY NOTICES.

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Frederick Denison Maurice.

The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry. Delivered in the University of Cambridge. By F. D. Maurice. Second Edition. Macmillan and Co. 1872.

THE appearance of a second edition of one of Mr. Maurice's smaller and more recent books, a book that on the whole may be described as a sound and healthy protest against the fatalistic resolution of man's identity into an illusive play of baseless feelings, which seems to be the favourite *scientific* basis of our modern physiological metaphysics and ethics, reminds us that its writer has passed away from the sight and judgment of men. Many years ago a comprehensive and thorough exposition of Mr. Maurice's system of theosophy, his special theological and philosophical mysticism, was given to the public through the pages of this Journal. That exposition has since been published as part of a separate volume, and has passed through more than one edition in that form. But no one has ever attempted to dispute its substantial accuracy as an exhibition of Mr. Maurice's fundamental principles, from the point of view of an avowed opponent, writing as an evangelical theologian. It is one thing, however, to criticise a man's special errors, and quite another to sit in judgment on his life and character and total influence. In connection with his strongest and most searching protests against Mr. Maurice's erroneous views, the author of *Modern Anglican Theology* gave him large credit as a teacher for much that was true and noble. Whilst denying that Mr. Maurice was an "evangelical" or even an "orthodox" teacher, he pays, notwithstanding, the tribute which we now quote:—"Much," he says, "there is in [his works] that is benevolent, wise, beautiful, and eloquent; there is much earnest, practical teaching, specially appropriate to the civil and economical needs of the present time. Seldom has anyone been found who could, by the light of the Divine records of the Old Testament, read more searching, faithful, and impressive lessons upon the subject of relative duties to men of every grade and class. Indeed, as the earnest and eloquent interpreter and spokesman of the lessons of Sacred History, he has rarely been equalled. Seldom,

if ever, has there been a teacher more deeply impressed with the fact that Jehovah is the living and ruling God of men and of the universe, nor one better able and more resolved to impress this fact as a living truth upon the hearts of all that listened to him."* Now that Mr. Maurice has departed from us, it is proper that the whole of his character should be before our view. Brought up a Unitarian, he was virtually a Unitarian to the end, as respects the doctrine of Atonement, while his views as to the Trinity, and much besides, were exceedingly vague and doubtful; but he was a man of rare benevolence and of singular devotion to the good of his fellow-men, especially of the humbler classes; and there seems reason to believe that his unresting toil of mind and will in trying to serve his generation shortened his space of life. He was sixty-seven when he died, and he seems to have been worn out.

He was the son of a Unitarian minister. He entered, notwithstanding, at Cambridge; and intending, as it would seem, to go to the Bar, took a first class in Civil Law in 1827; but he could not sign the Thirty-nine Articles, and so left Cambridge without a degree. He went to London, and began to write for the press, especially the *Athenæum*, to which, in concert with Sterling, he was a large contributor. He came under the influence of Coleridge at this time,—an influence which pervaded his soul, and gave colour and character to his whole after-life. He accepted Coleridge's manner of reconciling philosophy and theology, and became thereafter incomparably the truest, ablest, and most thorough representative of Coleridge's special school of theological mysticism. Nowhere in Coleridge's own writings can be found so complete a development of his views as is contained in Maurice's *Kingdom of Christ*, beyond question the ablest of his works.

Maurice now began life again, with a view, apparently, to take orders in the Church of England. His difficulties as to signing the Articles were now removed, and he repaired to Oxford as an undergraduate of Exeter College, where, in 1831, he took a second class in Classics. In 1834 he was ordained; in 1838 he was appointed chaplain to Guy's Hospital, in which capacity he preached some of his finest sermons,—sermons with which little in his later authorship will compare. They were published in a volume entitled, *Christmas Day, and Other Sermons*.

There is no need for us to pursue his course in detail. He was appointed Professor of History and Literature at King's College in 1840, and Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and also of Divinity, in 1846, from which latter posts he was displaced by the Council of the College in 1853, in consequence of the publication of his *Theological Essays*. The first of these three appointments was suitable; the second was simply absurd, no man being more unlikely than Mr. Maurice to make a good Professor of Ecclesiastical History; the third

* *Modern Anglican Theology*, Second Edition, p. 121.

was mischievous, and was afterwards proved to have been made in entire ignorance of Mr. Maurice's special and strongly-pronounced theological views.

Mr. Maurice, closely associated with Mr. Kingsley in sympathy and friendship, was united with him and the late Mr. Robertson in the adoption and advocacy of the ideas which were included in the scheme or theory of "Christian Socialism." There was truth and right, as well as inexperience and error, in this movement. Out of it originated the "Working Men's College," with which Mr. Maurice was identified to the end of his life.

From 1846 to 1860, Mr. Maurice held the chaplaincy of Lincoln's Inn. On his resigning this post in the latter year, he was appointed to St. Peter's Church, Vere Street. In 1867 he accepted the professorship of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge; and in 1869, finding himself unable to bear the strain of his duties both at Cambridge and in Vere Street, he resigned the Vere Street incumbency.

As Professor he was unscientific and uncritical, but his lectures were suggestive and quickening, although his vagueness and obscurity as a teacher must have greatly limited his power. If he was obscure as a lecturer, he was still more obscure as a preacher. To obscurity, also, in his later years was added monotony of tone and thought, and frequent repetition of phrase. In truth, the *Essays* were almost his last fresh and telling work; and whoever has read the *Kingdom of Christ*, the *Essays*, and the *Unity of the New Testament*, has read all the philosophical and theological thought which Mr. Maurice ever published; whilst his volumes on the *Patriarchs* and the *Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament* (which are among his best books) contain all that he had to say as to the history and practical lessons of the Old Testament. We may add to the list of books published by him which will repay reading, the earnest protest of which we have placed the title at the head of this article.

Nothing is more noticeable in Mr. Maurice's writing than the monotony and perpetual self-repetition of which we have spoken. For many years past he has been evermore thinking and teaching in the same circle. He has written much, and apparently read little. In its friendly though discriminating notice of him,—a notice evidently written by a personal friend, and probably by one who, having been formerly his pupil, became afterwards his successor,—the *Guardian* truly says that "he could hardly be called a learned man;" that "he wrote and published far too much, and his works suffered from want of concentration of thought and completeness of execution." He was, in truth, a most voluminous writer. No man of our age has published so much, and at the same time repeated himself so much. His later works all read like echoes of the older and of each other. What is still more remarkable, in his exposition of other persons' thoughts, he makes them all to mean and say much the same things, all agreeing with each other and himself. His object seems ever to be to trace the fundamental identity in all human thoughts and experiences. It is well to do this

so far as it can be truly done; but at the same time it is all the more necessary in order to distinctness of conception, truth and vividness of idea, and power of recollection, that the distinctive differences of thought, feeling, purpose, character, expression should also be clearly noted. Otherwise all philosophical history becomes but a perpetual reduplication of echoes from the private consciousness of the particular historian. Very much such does the history of "moral and metaphysical philosophy" become under the treatment of Mr. Maurice. He reverses the art of the ventriloquist. Each successive philosopher appears before us as expressing the sentiments and using the voice of Mr. Maurice.

Nevertheless in some respects Mr. Maurice's influence was both good and powerful. He was an intense realist; he opposed with the whole fervour of religious conviction the "philosophy of nescience." His influence was wholly antagonistic to that of Scottish Materialism, of the utilitarianism of Bentham or of Bain, and of merely negative philosophy in general. He believed in man's living individuality and immortal personality with his whole soul, although not always in consistency with himself as a philosophical and theological teacher at other points. And he believed, with his whole soul, in the kingdom and government of the Living God. So believing, he lived a pure, earnest, intense consecrated life. His disciples regard him as scarcely less than an apostolic man.

Winer's Symbolik.

Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschiedenen Christlichen Kirchenparteien nebst vollständigen Belegen, aus den symbolischen Schriften Derselben. Von Dr. G. B. Winer. Dritte Ausgabe, besorgt von Lic. Dr. E. Preuss. Berlin: Schlawitz.

THIS is a work of established reputation, and of great value. It presents in one-and-twenty chapters the leading doctrines of Christianity, with the points of divergence between the several communions, and illustrations of those divergences drawn from the recognised confessions of the several Church parties, as they are called. The quotations are given in full, and this gives the book a singular value; no clearness of statement on the part of a polemical writer will compensate for the absence of authentic and authoritative citations. This work, which has been for nearly a generation a standard one in Germany, is advertised for translation by Messrs. Clark, and we are sure that it will be received with thankfulness by all students of theology. The fact of its preparation for English use suggests, what it otherwise would not have occurred to us to mention, the importance of remembering that it will be found to give a comparatively scanty account of the theological doctrines of a great number of Christian communities to which the nineteenth century has given birth. The world of Me-

thodist Churches is almost unknown. The churches of English Dissent and of the Westminster Confession are also lightly despatched. On the other hand, it must be confessed that the doctrines of Quakerism are very honourably mentioned and abundantly illustrated, though Barclay is placed in a position of pre-eminence and isolation, as the representative of that brotherhood, which the Friends would hesitate to confirm. As a text-book in the controversy with Rome, Winer's symbolism is exceedingly valuable. In this respect, it seemed to be fortunate in the editor of its last edition—the well-known Dr. Preuss, formerly of Berlin, a young theologian of eminence, whose writings on Justification and other kindred subjects made his name prominent, and gave promise that he would attain a high position, even among German divines. A few years ago this Dr. Preuss went to America, where he was received by the old Lutherans with open arms. While noting the few terse notes which Dr. Preuss has added to the new edition of Winer, we were startled by reading in the German religious newspapers, that he had gone over to Rome, having burnt his Lutheran books and his own on Justification. This fact does not invalidate the correctness of the historical notes which the editor has occasionally introduced, and we suppose the translation will not be deprived of them on account of the writer's defection. It is a pity that so noble a book should be injured by the conduct of its vacillating editor. He should have abstained from this kind of work, at least, while his principles were in a state of flux. He can burn his own books, but it is hard to burn the notes he has incorporated here. They happen to be exceedingly few, however, though very good. In conclusion, we wish well to the English edition.

The original is a very beautiful work, printed on good paper, in Roman type, and with all the improvements which are observable in the German books recently printed.

Döllinger on Mediæval Fables.

Fables respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages. A Contribution to Ecclesiastical History. By John J. Ign. Von Döllinger. Translated, with Introduction and Appendices, by Alfred Plummer, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. London: Rivingtons. 1871.

WE welcome the appearance, in a good English translation, of another volume of the writings of this learned and accomplished author. Though our views on many ecclesiastical questions widely differ from those of Dr. Döllinger, we cannot, on that account, withhold our testimony to his impartial, fearless, and scholarly treatment of the various subjects of his investigation. Dr. Döllinger's special qualifications for historical writing are here effectively illustrated. His long-continued studies in ecclesiastical history, his eminent attainments, his patient research, his fair and fearless spirit, together with the

keenly-felt pressure of many historical passages upon the position and assumptions of his Church, combine to qualify him for his difficult and very delicate task. To clear up doubtful records, to sever legend from fact, and discriminate the true from the false, is a work which, to the historian, is first in importance and in difficulty. Careful investigation, severe criticism, keen discrimination and honest judgment are conspicuous in this volume. No work of Dr. Döllinger's with which we are acquainted equals this in patient critical inquiry; while we have all the advantages of a severely chastened, clear, and luminous style of writing, remarkable for its precision, conciseness, and condensation. Confining himself to the legends respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages, Dr. Döllinger deals with nine subjects, beginning with the old story of the Papeſs Joan. Passing to the insertion of the name of Cyriacus into the list of the Popes, where "interested imposture, visionary fancy, and groundless credulity have conspired together to create a Pope who is as unreal and as purely imaginary as Pope Joan," he exposes the ancient fable respecting Marcellinus and the Council of Sinuessa: a Synod whose acts "are evidently fabricated in order to manufacture an historical support for the principle that a Pope can be judged by no man." The legend of the Baptism of Constantine by Silvester at Rome, and the false details of the story, are next exposed. The celebrated Donation by Constantine of houses and lands to the Church of Rome is thoroughly sifted. The statements in the *Liber Pontificalis* affirming it are proved to be interpolations; and the history of opinion respecting it is traced from the earliest to recent times. This is both an interesting and valuable chapter. The stories of Liberius and Felix; of Anastasius II. and Honorius I.; of Gregory II. and the Emperor Leo III., and of Silvester II. complete the series. It is not surprising that the learned author in his researches, undertaken with a view of writing a history of the Papacy, should find it needful to clear these fables out of the way. It was a brave thought to contradict the traditions of ages, to probe their foundations, and to lift off the covering of error which enveloped them; but to trace the thin line of evidence back through every winding was a prodigious exercise of patience, and needed the support of a deep religious interest in the issue.

Dr. Döllinger's first and most careful attention is given to the story of Pope Joan: a filthy story which we should rejoice to see consigned to the lumber of fable. Protestantism needs no support, as indeed it has none, from the follies of Romanism. It is to its interest that the truth of the Papal history should be known. It serves no high and worthy purpose to circulate a single untruth. A party's aims may seem to be served; but it is a self-deception which recoils injuriously upon the heads of them who encourage it. With these sentiments we could not but desire that, if the history of the Papacy has been blackened by falsity, that falsity should be cleared away. Though it has long been felt by many careful readers of history that Pope Joan was a mythical conceit, there still remained a hiatus which could be filled up only by the solution of the problem of its origin. Dr. Döllinger, while at-

tempting to show the utter improbability of the story, traces it to its fountain-head. A more patient piece of inquiry has seldom crowded its results into so few words. Slowly the story is shifted further and further from the realms of probability, now by independent denial, and now by critical examination of works written in its defence. A very considerable if not a final step will be taken in the solution of the difficulty by this work.

At the outset he encounters Luden, who, in his *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, "does all he can to make the reality of the well-known myth at any rate probable." He is also met by the more sober views of Kurtz, in whose unprejudiced judgment the myth is an insoluble riddle. In the following words Dr. Döllinger opens the way to his work and claims the attention of his readers:—"That the riddle has not yet been solved, that all attempts at explanation which have been made, up to the present time, must be held to have miscarried, is true enough; that a solution which may satisfy the historian is, nevertheless, possible, it will be the object of the following pages to show."

The ground is first cleared of untenable current explanations. The supposition of Baronius, that the story was a satire on John VIII.; of Aventine, Heumann, and Schröck, who see the satire to be directed against the period of female rule in Rome, the infamous Theodora and Marozia; the opinion of Secchi of Rome that it is a Greek calumny, originating with Photius; Pagi's view, which is supported by Eckhart, that the Waldenses invented it; that it was a perverted account of Thiota, a false prophetess of the ninth century, as Leo Allatius thought; the invention of Leibnitz, who thinks the person may have been a foreign bishop, a woman in disguise, who gave occasion to the story; and the notion of Blasco and Henke, that it was an allegorical satire on the false decretals of Isidore—an opinion which is supported and expanded by Gfrörer—are all seen to be inapplicable, when it is remembered that in them the story is assumed to have been in circulation at a much earlier age than is proved to be the case. Having the advantage of the very laborious researches which, during the last half century, have been made among mediæval manuscripts, he is able to assert, "We can now say quite positively, that in the collected literature, whether Western or Byzantine, of the four centuries between 850 and 1250, there is not the faintest reference to the circumstance of a female Pope."

So far the ground is made sure, and the position assumed is quite unassailable. The mention of the Papess by Marianus Scotus, in his *Chronicon Universale*, written in the eleventh century; by Sigebert of Gemblours, who died early in the twelfth century; and by Otto of Freysingen, who died in the middle of the same century, are proved, by an appeal to the oldest and best manuscripts, to be in each case an interpolation. This brings us to Stephen de Bourbon, "the first who has really taken up the myth." In a work on the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, written about the middle of the thirteenth century, he makes mention of the Pope Joan, citing a chronicle which, however, he does not name. This is a critical passage in the course of the argu-

ment, and the following extract must be carefully considered: "Now seeing that he quotes with exactness all the sources from which he has gathered together the collection of passages which contribute to his practical homily, we can, at least with great probability, show from what chronicle he has obtained this mention of Pope Joan. Among chroniclers he names Eusebius, Jerome, Bede, Odo, Hugo of S. Victor, the 'Roman Cardinal,' and Jean de Mailly, a Dominican. We may set aside all but the two last. The 'Roman Cardinal' (or Cardinal Romanus (?))—there were several of this name, but none of them wrote a chronicle—is probably none other than the author of the *Historia Miscella*, or continuation of Eutropius, whom the Dominican, Tolomeo of Lucca, also quotes later on among his authorities as Paulus Diaconus Cardinalis; but he cannot be distinguished with certainty. It remains, then, that the lost, or as yet undiscovered, chronicle of the Dominican Jean de Mailly, who, moreover, must have been a contemporary of Stephen's, is the only source to which the latter can have been indebted for his account of Pope Joan. And Jean de Mailly, we may be tolerably certain, got it from popular report. We can therefore consider it as established, that not until the year 1240 or 1250, was the myth about the woman-pope put into writing and transferred to works of history." The conjecture of this passage leaves a weak place yet to be strengthened.

The story lies in abeyance until circulated by the popular chronicle of Martinus Polonus; but even in this work, which had so long and so widely-extended an authority, it is plainly an interpolation. In Germany the *Flores Temporum* circulated the myth, deriving it probably from an interpolated copy of Martinus, of which it is confessed to be mainly a compilation. In the collection of Biographies of the Popes, *Liber Pontificalis*, made by Anastasius, the interpolation again is obvious, and possibly from the same source, unless, indeed, Martinus borrowed it from the work of Anastasius, for which Dr. Döllinger offers some ingenious reasons.

The myth now gains circulation, though received with suspicion by many; one reason for its free publication being found in the rupture between the Roman see and the Dominican and other orders. In the reign of Boniface VIII. the story rapidly gains ground. "We notice that from the time of this crisis, which was especially a crisis for the waning power of the Popes, historians among the monastic orders mention and describe with a sort of relish scandals in the history of the Popes."

In the fifteenth century almost all doubt had vanished. A bust of Joan was placed in the cathedral at Sienna, and remained for a couple of centuries. Huss met with no contradiction when he cited the case before the Council of Constance. And so the story became embedded in history to await more critical times.

So far the inception, growth, and acknowledgment of the myth has been traced, and the history criticised. Now follows the analysis of the story itself. Here discrepancies in the name of the Papess, in the

date of her pontificate, in her previous abode, and in the accounts of the famous catastrophe, tend farther to shake the foundations of the tradition. But the full investigation of the subject demanded a probable explanation of the origin of the story. Four circumstances combine to furnish this. They are, the use of a pierced seat at the institution of a newly-elected Pope; an enigmatical inscription on a monumental stone; a statue having long robes, and supposed to be that of a woman; together with the custom of avoiding a certain street in processions between the Lateran and the Vatican. These are examined, and more or less satisfactorily explained. A number of similar stories are adduced, to illustrate the liability of one such as this being invented. To Mayence is assigned the honour of being the native place of the supposed Papess; a reason for which may be found in its being a leading city in a country so often in feud with Rome.

Thus this foul legend is exposed, and, if the mythical character of the story has not been demonstrated, it has been declared so far probable, that he would be a bold if not a foolish man who, in the face of this effective treatment, would attempt again to affirm its truth. In this we greatly rejoice. Dr. Döllinger labours in the interest and for the honour of Catholicism, to clear the history of the Papal descent from mythical surroundings; for this we honour him. But he labours also in the general interests of truth; for this we thank him. We commend the book to the careful attention of our readers. In addition to history traced with a precision and conciseness, at once the charm and value of this author's writings, they will find a useful illustration of that dark period, when such conceits gratified popular taste, and when the existing state of the Church was so bad as not to affirm such stories to be obviously untrue.

Philippi and Gerrevink on the Romans.

Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Römer, von F. A. Philippi, D.D.

De Brief aan de Romeinen in zijn Ideengang. Door G. van Gerrevink. Utrecht.

THE latter of these works is the production of a Dutch minister. It is not a commentary exactly, but a series of essays bringing out the train of thought in the Epistle with remarkable force and clearness. In fact, in this respect it is a happy medium between the expository sermons and the exposition proper. Its substance is a vigorous exhibition of the line of thought elaborately expanded in Philippi's *Commentary*.

The work of Dr. Philippi has been recently published in a third edition. It stands, in our judgment, at the head of the German expositions of the great Epistle, even as its author is second to none of the modern representatives of old Lutheran theology. He is a High Lutheran, but desperately faithful to the Word of God and the dogmatic

divinity of that wonderful generation of theologians whom the Reformation produced in Germany. It would be vain to seek elsewhere for such a perfect systematisation of theological material as they present. It is the honour of a large body of modern divines, of whom Philippi is, perhaps, the foremost, to aim steadily at reviving the old and strict Lutheran divinity. This book is the noblest fruit of the exegetical department.

There is one chapter in which we cannot follow Dr. Philippi's guidance. Strange to say, it is the seventh. Though not a Calvinist, he takes the view current among Calvinists.

"Before we proceed to the explanation of verses 14—25, it is necessary to ask what condition the Apostle describes in them, whether that of the regenerate or that of the unregenerate. Generally it may be said that Pietistic and Rationalistic exegesis refers the passage to the unregenerate state; the Augustinian and that of the Reformed, to the regenerate. On a first glance it seems that only the unregenerate state can be here meant, for it tends to lower the power of the Spirit of regeneration, and perilously to encourage carnal security, if we maintain that the regenerate have in them no more than a powerless will towards good, which is overpowered and neutralised by the opposite doing of evil, so that the whole benefit of regeneration is reduced to a mere longing which follows as well as accompanies the action contrary to law. It is also contradicted by what chapters vi. and viii. teach concerning the regenerate, as also by what St. Paul predicates of his own conscious experience in Phil. iv. 13. Hence, it is not to be wondered at that our passage is by commentators almost unanimously referred to the legal struggle of the unrenewed. It will be, therefore, as useful as it is necessary to examine carefully this theory of interpretation, as well as the various modifications which it has assumed or may assume. If it is necessary to ascribe to the unregenerate a sentiment of pleasure in the law, it can hardly be understood why it should be said that to this there corresponds always the contrary act, and never an acting in accordance with that pleasure. At certain times this may be the case, when the strong attraction of the sense overpowers the will of the reason. It may also be a perpetual condition in irresolute or deeply sensual characters. But there are men of strong will, heroes of self-denial, peaceful and tranquil characters, who declare, in fact, that they are able to order their lives according to the law of reason, and to regulate the sensual desire by the superior authority of reason keeping it in subordination. Heathenism has furnished eminent examples of asceticism. If in such men, or generally in the *bonis viris*, the 'willing' is good, the 'acting' is good also. Here arises a second objection. Can we suppose the Apostle to ascribe to the natural will of man the 'hating' of evil, the 'taking pleasure in' and 'serving' the law of God, and a consenting to the law which he has expressly called 'spiritual'? Can we suppose him to represent the 'I' of the man, the innermost centre of his personality, as in entire accordance with the law of God? How

does this comport with his descriptions, and those of Scripture, of the profound corruption of the human heart? He had said that the law wrought 'all concupiscence;' but, on the theory now considered, he might rather have said all manner of desire or concupiscence *towards good* and not *towards evil*. In chapter viii. 7, he characterises the 'carnal mind' as 'enmity towards God;' but if in the dominion of this carnal mind there is yet a hatred to evil, its inmost principle would be that of love rather than that of hatred towards God. In Phil. ii. 13, he ascribes not only the doing, but the willing, also, of good to God's gracious power; but if this willing of good is of the substance of the ethical condition of man by nature, it must be regarded as a natural gift of God's creating power rather than as a spiritual gift of grace springing from redemption. Accordingly, to the unregenerate, bent upon obeying the law, there can be ascribed neither a doing of evil alone, nor a willing of good alone. If the inmost 'I' of the man, the inner man, the 'mind' is directed to good before regeneration, so that only the 'flesh' hinders the performance in outward act, then must the Apostle be credited with a Rationalist anthropology, according to which the will of man, good in itself, is only bound by sense, and is overpowered to the commission of the evil. In opposition to the best interpreters, who attach to 'flesh' a deeper and more comprehensive meaning than sensuousness; it embraces the entire sphere of the corruption of human nature, its alienation from God, and its selfishness no less than its sensual lust, as is seen in Gal. v. 19, and in Phil. iii. 4, where the Apostle describes trusting in works as the fleshly mind, and Cor. ii. 18, where theosophical ascetics even are 'puffed up in their fleshly mind.' "

Before we proceed, a remark may here be made. It is scarcely right to say that the advocates of the opposite view to that held by Dr. Philippi are the Pietists and the Rationalists. The prevalent sentiment of antiquity ran that way. The majority of the Christian world, as expressing their opinions by these most eminent expositors, are opposed to him, as he admits. Moreover, he is himself an example that the Augustinian and the Reformed are not the only theologians who hold his view; for he belongs to neither of these classes. He is not a Calvinist, and yet he holds the doctrine of Calvinism in this chapter. The reader will find a striking history of the current of opinion on this subject in Tholuck's *Commentary on the Romans*, as also in the volume on the Romans in Lange's series. The truth will be found to be, that all who hold lofty views of the power of Christ's redemption as enjoyed in this world, steadfastly oppose the application of the chapter to the regenerate. But the matter is now one of pure exposition, and we will give Dr. Philippi's method of meeting the reply to his own objections in our abridgment.

It may be said, that the true meaning of the "flesh" may be preserved—and his is undoubtedly the true meaning—by those who assign the paragraph to the unregenerate. In this case he cannot understand whence comes the better I, that resists, while it is van-

quished by the lower I. He declines to admit that Conscience explains it; making a subtle and, in this case, indefensible distinction between the conscience as a *law* and conscience as an *impulse*, and establishing too great a distinction between the "spiritual law of God" and the law to which conscience is faithful. He seems to forget that the conscience is, in this argument, neither a law nor an impulse, but a moral consciousness, that is, the feeling of harmony or discord with the law of God. There can be no distinction between the law that the better I longs after, and the law that conscience responds to: the "longing," on which so much stress is laid, is not a natural longing, but inspired by the spirit of conviction. The "consent" is heightened into "longing," though this latter is not the Apostle's word. Against this, an expositor urges that everything "spiritual" is in Scripture described as supernatural and of grace; and we have only to reply, that the man in St. Paul's case, in Rom. vii. 1, is not wholly without grace. He says also, that what is born of the flesh can be only flesh, John iii. 6; that the carnal mind discerns not spiritual things, 1 Cor. ii. 14; that he is one who is "without the Spirit," Jude 19. These three texts are not strong enough to support his argument. As to the first and second, a man may have his mind so enlightened by the Holy Spirit as to discern the beauty and the importance of spiritual things, without being regenerate and put in possession of them. As to the last, there are two answers at our disposal: "not having the Spirit" does not exclude the having some measure of the promptings of the Spirit; and it may, probably does, refer in St. Jude to those from whom the Spirit of regeneration had in displeasure departed, either finally or for a season.

It seems strange that a theologian who has such a firm hold on the doctrine of universal redemption should refuse to accept a preliminary redemption of the race from the worst effects of the fall. The error of synergism, that is, of the co-operation of man's natural faculties with the grace of God, is by no means bound up with such a view of the universal redemption. It is the office of the grace of Christ's Spirit that accomplishes the good: grace that leads to regeneration, but falls very far short of it. This, however, Dr. Philippi, a keen and faithful exegete, hesitates to accept for many reasons. Vers. 17—20. The proper I of the man is fully sundered from sin and opposed to it, in harmony with the spiritual law of God and one with it. Now the proper I cannot be the serving portion of a man, only the dominant.

This is a difficulty, without doubt; but we have only to remember that the man who speaks has found out the verity of his I, and carries it back, so to speak, to his transition state, giving that transition state the benefit of his later experience. To the Apostle's enlightened eyes he was always his better self, and sin, at the worst, only "dwelling in him." It is also a difficulty that the Apostle runs on in the present tense; but a difficulty that must yield to other considerations, and is relieved by the fact that, in some sense, the whole of the chapter

exhibits but one continuous state, though broken by the spirit of a stronger conviction at verse 14.

Vindicating his own adherence to the other side, Dr. Philippi insists that this description of a regenerate state must be taken in strict and inseparable connection with its counterpart in chapter viii.—its counterpart, not its opposite, as we hold. "The combination, indeed, of such opposed elements is conceivable only when we regard sin not as ruling the will and the act, but only as the provocative of evil lust, dwelling continually in the inner man, always restraining and defiling the new and holy tendency, and therefore always experienced to be a yoke of bondage." All, he thinks, from verse 7 onwards, is referred to the *desire* and not to the outward act. The continuous movements of the evil impulse may be regarded as a doing of the evil not willed. Such a sentence as the following is required to make the exposition run. "The uninterrupted, sinful inclinations of the inner man, even in the sanctified life of the regenerate, led of the Spirit, may be described fully as a doing of the evil not willed, to which must be added that these never remain absolutely internal, but, even apart from those sins of ignorance, infirmity, and surprise, in which, in manifold ways accompanying them, they betray themselves, they exercise a retarding and staining influence upon the best deeds of the regenerate, and throw a veil of earthliness over their most beautiful brightness." The whole passage is supposed by our expositor to be condensed *in nuce* in Gal. v. 17; but this is a rather superficial observation, since the "Spirit" in this latter passage must needs be the Holy Spirit, whose counteraction of remaining corruption is said to be effectual. The Spirit is never mentioned in Rom. vii., only the human "mind" enlightened by Him, but not yet brought under His absolute control. His advent in all His spiritual power is reserved for chapter viii.

The practical effect of the opposite interpretations is thus stated:—"It may be said that the application of the whole to the regenerate in the sense, that is, of an exposition, must needs be considered not the laxer but the more strict interpretation. It would be the more lax if the meaning were that the regenerate had nothing but impotent and resultless willing of the good in connection with continual accomplishment of the evil. But, inasmuch as the other interpretation makes the state of the unregenerate encroach upon that of the regenerate, though in an abnormal way, it must conversely be said that carnal security is dangerously encouraged by it, since the regenerate may repose in such an abnormal condition as consistent with the state of regeneration. And again, a Pietistic self-tormenting may be promoted, since it is thought that the roots of sin must be so destroyed, that the cry of verse 24 shall no longer be heard. Thus carelessness and despair are the Scylla and Charybdis."

All this is very feeble, and not in keeping with the vigour and truth of the rest of the commentary. It is not true to say that our interpretation anticipates for the unregenerate an abnormal regenera-

tion. The convictions of the Holy Spirit may be exceedingly keen, and the desire for redemption infused by Him may be exceedingly strong, without reaching the regenerate condition. In Rom. viii. and Gal. v. 17, 18, it is the glory of the regenerate that they are not "under law," as law is the condemnation, the provocative, and the registrar of sin. Its empire is abolished as simply recording and condemning. But its righteousness is fulfilled by the consenting mind and the renewed will and the strengthened act.

But Dr. Philippi is no Calvinist. Turning to the end of the eighth chapter, his exposition of the golden chain of election is very fine and very satisfactory. For instance, "Whom He *foreknew*, not whom He *foreappointed* : expressive of the Divine prescience, not of the Divine predestination." After an elaborate philological note, we read, "Thus the believers are 'called according to His purpose,' and yet predestinated according to His foreknowledge, which can be united only if the faith is of God and not their own work. For, only if God in the prevision of their faith beholds them as nothing other than His own creation in Christ Jesus, does the free election to life on the part of God consist with the Divine foresight of the believing appropriation on the part of man. Our passage certainly contains, as the exegetical tradition of the Lutheran Church, in unison with the non-predestinarian Fathers, has always acknowledged, a *dictum probans* for the doctrine of a predestination not absolute, but resting on a prevision." As to the words, it is well known that "to know anyone" is never used in Latin or Greek in the sense of forming a purpose concerning him.

It is not probable that this work, which would occupy two portly octavo volumes in English, will be translated. But to the student who reads German there are few works better worth a hearty recommendation.

St. John's Gospel.

The Gospel according to John. By John Peter Lange, D.D. Translated from the German, Revised, Enlarged and Edited by Philip Schaff, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

The Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel, Considered in Reference to the Contents of the Gospel itself. A Critical Essay, by William Sanday, M.A. Macmillan & Co.

Het Evangelie van Johannes. Door G. W. Stemler. Amsterdam : C. Van Helden.

Of the many works on St. John's Gospel which have lately appeared, these three have struck us as the most able. Taking it altogether, and in all its bearings, the discussion of the Fourth Gospel is one of the most important theological subjects of the age.

As everything depends on the Person of Christ, so the Person of Christ depends on the Fourth Gospel. There are very few who are competent to deal worthily with St. John, or who have a right to demand a respectful hearing when they make him their study and publish the results.

Readers of his *Life of Jesus* will be prepared to find in Dr. Lange an enthusiastic commentator on the beloved disciple. His is a nature of the Johannæan type; and his name is a guarantee for reverence, profundity, subtilty, and, above all, sympathy with the sublime characteristics that distinguish the last of the Evangelists. The final delineation of Christ is reproduced in its general outline by Dr. Lange in a most masterly manner: in such a manner as to bespeak tolerance for many rhapsodical and doubtful interpretations of minor points. As a whole, this volume is the most complete and comprehensive, and, indeed, exhaustive commentary on St. John that our language contains. It might be thought a drawback that it represents, like all the volumes of this series, such a variety of authors and views; but, in the present case, we are disposed to think it an advantage to have before us the opinions and theories of almost every notable expositor, ancient and modern, with a large quantity of homiletic matter that is often based upon sound exegetical results. But, valuable as this volume of Lange is, its value is greatly increased by Dr. Schaff's contribution. His is a name that we gladly see on any title-page: his learning, conscientiousness, impartiality, and superiority to every sort of bigotry, render him an admirable editor of such a work. The following extract will give an idea of the importance of Dr. Schaff's contribution. It is on the tendency of modern thought concerning the genuineness of this Gospel:—

“The Gospel of John was never seriously assailed in the Christian Church till the nineteenth century. The rejection by the Alogi of the second century was a consequence of their rejection of the doctrine of the Divine Logos, and unsupported by any argument. The doubts of Evanson, 1792, Eckermann, 1796, Ballenstädt, 1812, and others, were superficial, and made no impression. But more recently it has become the chief battle-ground between the old faith and modern criticism, as applied to the documents of primitive Christianity. . . . The composition was assigned by these writers to some anonymous author of the second century, though without any agreement as to the exact time. The author assumed the name of John, to give Apostolic sanction to his theological system, which, according to Baur, is the last and most ingenious attempt to reconcile the supposed antagonism of the Jewish-Christian or Petrine, and the Gentile-Christian or Pauline types of Christianity, and presents an artificial history as the symbolical vestment of ideas. Renan, like Weizsäcker, denies only the genuineness of the discourses of Jesus, and admits the Johannæan composition of the historical portions. . . . But these inconsistencies are untenable, and must give way to the alternative of a whole truth or a whole fabrication. Strauss, in his new *Life of Jesus*,

exchanges his former mythical hypothesis of unconscious poetic composition for Baur's hypothesis of conscious invention, as the *only* alternative to the orthodox view, and thereby he shows his sound and clear sense. Keim, in his *History of Jesus*, with all his attempts to mediate between the traditional view and the Tübingen school, arrives at the same result, but traces the composition of John about fifty years higher than Baur. He represents it as the production of an anonymous genius, a liberal Jewish Christian of Asia Minor, in the age of Trajan (100—117), i.e. almost within the lifetime of John. To call such a pseudo-Johannæan work by its right name—a literary forgery—is, according to Keim, a sign of ignorance, or results from a rough nervous constitution. He even doubts that John was ever at Ephesus. English and American divines have had, so far, too much reverence and common sense, or too little interest in such problems, to be affected to any considerable degree by the bold hypercriticism of the Continent. But, quite recently, it has been re-echoed by some writers in the *Westminster Review*, more elaborately by J. J. Tayler, *Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel*, London, 1867, and by Dr. Samuel Davidson, in the new edition of his *Introduction to the Study of the New Testament, Critical, Exegetical, and Theological*, London, 1868, 2 Vols., Vol. II. pp. 323 ff. and 357 ff. Dr. Davidson, a man of learning but little judgment, who, in his first edition (1848, Vol. I. p. 224 ff.), had vindicated the Johannæan authorship of the Fourth Gospel against the crude vagaries of Lützelberger, now openly advocates the subtle speculations of the Tübingen school, and assigns the composition of *John* to an anonymous writer, about A.D. 150. 'This great unknown,' as he calls the author, p. 449, 'in departing from Apostolic tradition, teaches us to rise above it. He has seized the spirit of Christ better than any Apostle, and if, like him, we ascend through their material setting to ideas that bring us into close contact with the Divine ideal of purity to mankind, we shall have a faith superior to that which lives in the visible and miraculous.' This is all idle illusion. An anonymous tract, entitled, *Was St. John the Author of the Fourth Gospel?* by a Layman, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, London (Longmans, Green & Co.), 1868, takes a similar view, and, after a superficial discussion of the alleged discrepancies between the Synoptists and the Fourth Gospel, arrives at the conclusion that the latter is the invention to be found in some one of the other Gospels. But the discrepancies between the antagonists of John are far more serious and fatal than the discrepancies between John and the Synoptists. In one thing only they agree: in rejecting the Johannæan origin of the Fourth Gospel, and ascribing this sublimest of all literary compositions to an unknown impostor, they make it the greatest mystery in the history of literature. All these attacks will pass away without being able 'to pluck a single feather from the mighty wing of this eagle,' who sails serenely and majestically above the clouds, in full vision of the light of eternal truth."

With these remarks of Dr. Schaff lingering in our ears, it is painful to turn to Mr. Sanday's work, the fundamental error of which is that it is written, only too soon, by one whose judgment is not yet formed as to the true character and relation of the Fourth Evangelist. Mr. Sanday has read, studied, digested, and unhappily in some instances assimilated, most of the modern German writers who have set up their various theories. Not that he is a slave to these theories, or to their style in setting them forth. He is an independent thinker, and writes terse, beautiful English. His essay is well conceived; it runs through most of the usual topics, but singularly fails to include the relations of the Gospel to the Apocalypse, and the Hebraistic colouring that gives it a character, and the harmony of diction that pervades the Johannine writings. A few sentences from the close of the volume will show why we cannot heartily recommend it to the student of theology. Mr. Sanday will have no inspiration, no election of this man by our Lord to be the final interpreter of His person and expositor of His work, no plenary suggestion of the Holy Ghost, according to the Saviour's promise, among the elements of his theory. "The Apostle is a man of like passions with ourselves, more chastened, more tender, more clothed with the Spirit of his Lord, more intimate with the world of the Unseen, and yet not supernaturally withheld or withdrawn from the ordinary laws to which flesh is heir; maturing slowly and gradually, drawing upon the stores of his experience, not wholly forgetful, liable to mistakes, unconsciously giving out the fruits of his own reflections as if they had been objective facts—an Apostle and yet a man. If either side is lost, the picture is destroyed; its humanity disappears; and a mechanical structure, wanting in nature and vitality, is set up in its place. I can as little think of the author of the Fourth Gospel as a forger, or even disciple laboriously building upon other men's foundations, as see in him a passive organ of infallibility. Both views equally fail to explain the facts, and by the facts in this, as in all cases, we must judge, certain that in the end the interests of truth must accord with them. In this case they seem to give a clear verdict. The Gospel is the work of the Apostle, the son of Zebedee; it is the record of an eye-witness of the life of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and its historical character is such as, under the circumstances, might be expected; it needs no adventitious commendation to make it higher."

From this we entirely dissent. The Divine Spirit might rest on the Evangelist, and fit him to be the exact recorder of our Saviour's discourses, without making him a "passive organ." The fact is that our critic has no hold whatever of the Spirit's inspiration as a doctrine. In his vigorous analysis of "the last Discourses," which are really our Saviour's programme of the work of the Holy Ghost, he thus speaks: "Meanwhile, to the Apostles in their labours a two-fold assistance would be accorded; on the one hand, through prayer to our Father in the name (i.e. in complete devotion to the cause and person) of the Son; and, on the other hand, through the gift of

the Paraclete, who should take their Master's place after He was gone, and should abide with the Church perpetually—with the Church and not with the world." This is a strange interpretation of "in the name;" but, passing that by, we find that the great announcement of the Holy Ghost, on which all depends, is thus stifled.

No wonder that Mr. Sanday, omitting this inestimable truth, is able to say that "this discourse is involved, that many of the sayings are in the wrong place, that the functions of the Paraclete are needlessly broken up into five fragments, which the composer would have done well to throw together; and finally, that the personality of the Paraclete, and His functions, are not, in relation to the Son, well defined." The following words might have been written by Professor Jowett. They are worthy of the master. "Then came the gift of the Spirit (to which there was certainly some objective fact to correspond, whether exactly that described in Acts ii. or not). He, like the rest, felt himself carried away by a strange exaltation and enthusiasm, which is still reflected in the pages of the Acts. He found his sorrow actually turned into joy. He found himself actually sustained before mobs, and councils, and kings. He found, both at first and as time went on, that the full significance of his Master's mission, the nature of His Messiahship, the value of His sufferings, became much clearer to him. One by one the sayings of his Lord came back into his memory, seeming to explain both past and present, and also to give a key to the future. All this he would connect with the gift and promise of the Holy Spirit, and all this would help him to fill in or retrace the outline of the promise itself. The Apostle ascribed to the Paraclete those changes which he was conscious had been supernaturally wrought in himself. The functions thus indicated may have been, and probably were, foreshadowed in the discourse of which these chapters are the reproduction, but the autobiography of the Apostle lent them additional distinctness and individuality."

Every page of this volume betrays the uncertain hand. The critic has no theory, and wavers painfully—to use the word of his school—between faith and unbelief. There is no middle course. If his researches should lead Mr. Sanday to accept the truth that the Third Person of the Trinity has a function in the Church as distinct and as important as the Second Person, his learning and talent will be of great service to the Church. If not, we should be glad if he would stay his hand.

Biblical Criticism.

Outlines of Textual Criticism applied to the New Testament.
By C. E. Hammond, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

THE books that help the theological student in the study of criticism proper—that is, the scientific determination of the text of the Scrip-

tures—are generally expensive and ponderous. Mr. Scrivener's works may scarcely be said with fairness to be either the one or the other: it is simply a perfect octavo, as fascinating as it is useful. But we want a small manual which younger students may master; and on which they may rely for good elementary matter, as well as for a sound guidance of their judgment with regard to the various representatives of the text, especially of the Greek Testament. Mr. Hammond's little book approaches very nearly the ideal which we have of such a work: it would, perhaps, have more absolutely succeeded if it had been itself less critical, and more entirely confined to a statement of opposite principles with their opposite applications. On the very first page of the Introduction we find that we shall have to take a side; and the thought that our little book is to establish the truth as between opposite schools, both represented by exceedingly able men, makes us feel as we go on that it is hardly on a sufficiently large scale to accomplish that object. Moreover, the pledge is given at the very outset that one side shall be defended in this work, and expectations are excited which are not altogether satisfied.

"We may fairly take Dr. Tregelles and Mr. Scrivener, the two chief English writers on this subject, as the exponents of the opposite schools. Dr. Tregelles says, 'The mass of recent documents possess no determining voice in a question as to what we should receive as genuine readings. We are able to take the *few* documents whose evidence is *proved* to be trustworthy, and safely discard from present consideration the eighty-nine ninetieths, or whatever else their numerical proportion may be . . . I should feel that I did indeed put the text of the New Testament in peril, if I adopted the authority of the mass of manuscripts which is *proved* to be at variance with what was read by the Christians of the third century at least.' On the other hand, Mr. Scrivener says, 'Irenæus and the African Fathers, and the whole Western, with a portion of the Syrian Church used far inferior manuscripts to those employed by Stunica, or Erasmus, or Stephens, thirteen centuries later, when moulding the *Textus Receptus*.' And again, 'In the far more numerous cases where the most ancient documents are at variance with each other, the later or cursive copies are of much importance, as the surviving representatives of other codices very probably as early, perhaps even earlier than any now extant.' This hypothesis, then, assumes the existence of certain correct codices different from any of the codices now extant, all of which have perished, and only survive in their representatives; which, moreover, remained in such obscurity as to be unknown to the African Fathers, the whole of the Western, and a portion of the Syrian Church. This is, however, undoubtedly the view popularly held in England. The following pages are an attempt to explain the principles of the other school, with the grounds on which they rest."

This school had its foundations laid in England by Bentley. But, in this as in many other things, Germany reared the superstructure; and Lachmann has permanently connected his name with it. It need

not be said that the new codex occupies its right place in this latter volume, which might easily be made, in another edition, as perfect a compendium as could be desired. This is one of the few books that really fills, and well fills, a place hitherto unoccupied. Young theological students cannot do better than to make themselves thoroughly familiar with its contents.

The Real Presence in the Eucharist.

An Answer to Dr. Pusey's Challenge Respecting the Doctrine of the Real Presence. By John Harrison, D.D. Two Vols. London: Longmans.

THESE ponderous volumes have the same characteristics which we indicated in the author's *Whose are the Fathers?* They exhaust the subject; exhibiting every opinion, and shade of opinion, that has ever had a place in the history of Christian doctrine concerning the Eucharist. They are a rough, plain, sometimes rather involved and inelegant, but always fair and earnest, refutation of modern error, especially that particular kind of error that takes the form of the Anglican doctrine of the "Real Presence," which is neither Transubstantiation, nor Consubstantiation, nor what used to be called Sacramentarianism; but something *sui generis*. What it is this book will teach. One great advantage it has is its marvellous catena of testimonies from all ages. Were these better arranged, and the systems of reference by notation made more available, the two volumes would have, on their account alone, a very great value. As it is, we should recommend the theological student to get this work and its predecessor already alluded to, if only for the sake of the enormous quantity of extracts from the theologians of former times that he would thus have within reach.

Dr. Harrison has incontrovertibly proved that the Pascasian doctrine out of which Transubstantiation grew was not held by the ancients; but he has scarcely done full justice to the mystical half-belief in a physical Consustantiation that clung to their words. They were not wrong in the sense of modern error, but they were far from right in the sense of Scriptural teaching. One of the most striking things in the work is the light thrown by Dr. Harrison's plain statements and convincing quotations upon the doctrine really held by Zwingli.

"If Bishop Browne has stumbled much at Calvin, he has stumbled much more at Hooker. Respecting this supposed profound mystery in regard to the consecrated elements, he connects Hooker with Calvin, and remarks, 'So Calvin; and so our own Hooker: "What these elements are in themselves it skilleth not; it is enough that *unto me that take them* they are the body and blood of Christ.'" Hooker is here speaking as an avowed Sacramentarian. In the very section of the book from which the Bishop has made the citation, what he has

represented as four opinions on the presence in the Lord's Supper, viz.—1. Transubstantiation; 2. Consubstantiation; 3. The Real Spiritual Presence; 4. The denial of any special presence altogether—Hooker has included in three, for he properly includes Zwingli in the third class, and consequently with him there is no place for the fourth as a definition of the opinion of Zwingli. As to the real identity sentiment between Hooker and the English Church and Zwingli, he goes on: 'Hooker not only teaches the doctrine of Zwingli, but also speaks of him with approbation, and classes him among the orthodox teachers of Eucharistic doctrine. He says, "This was it that some Lutherans did exceedingly fear, lest Zwingli and Œcolampadius would bring to pass that men should account of this sacrament but only as of a shadow, destitute, empty, and void of Christ. But, seeing that by opening the several opinions which have been held, they are grown, for aught I can see, on all sides at length to a general agreement on that which is alone material, namely, the real participation of Christ, and of life in His body and blood by means of this sacrament." Again, he states, "It seemeth, therefore, much amiss, that against them whom they term Sacramentaries so many invective discourses are made, all running upon two points, that the Eucharist is not a bare sign or figure only, and the efficacy of His body and blood are not all we receive in the sacrament. For no man, having read their books and writings that are thus traduced, can be ignorant that both these assertions they plainly confess to be most true." . . . That strong conceit which two of the three have embraced as touching a literal, corporal, and oral manducation of the very substance of His flesh and blood, is surely an opinion nowhere delivered in Holy Scripture! Those whom the Bishop has classed under two heads, viz., holders of the doctrine of the Real Presence, and deniers of any special presence altogether, Hooker has classed under one head, viz., Sacramentaries, and included himself and his Church among them."

Other extracts are given, which show that among the Reformers there were but two opinions: the Consubstantial Presence and the Sacramental. The belief that the sacrament is only a remembrancer, was held by none nearer the truth than Anabaptists and Socinians. The Spiritual Real Presence is what all believe who believe in the Eucharist as a sacrament; not the substance of Christ's body and blood, but, as Hooker says, "that grace which, with them or by them, it pleaseth God to bestow"—His spiritual body and blood; Himself by the Holy Ghost. It is very strange that eminent divines, who in other respects know the uses and felicities of language, should fall into such confusion about the spiritual body of Christ. Whatever His spiritual body may be, it is still His body, and it is nowhere but in heaven, save in that virtue which belongs to Himself, in the unity of His saving person, by the Holy Ghost. The Lutheran consubstantialist contents himself by declaring, that Christ communicates Himself in His glorified corporeity, which has its share in the Divine perfection of ubiquity. Their *Communicatis Idiomatum*

gives them some basis for their doctrine, and saves them from the necessity of explaining it. But English divines do not hold the theory of the communication of Divine properties to the human nature, and therefore their language is incomprehensible and inconsistent, whenever they approach this subject. The Bishop of Ely says that we expect a spiritual presence of that body, and that we receive it really, substantially, corporally, since corporal is not of necessity opposed to spiritual, and thus in a wonderful way, never intended by St. Paul, "The Lord is that Spirit;" or rather, "The Lord's body is that Spirit." The Holy Ghost is the only ubiquitous manifestation of Christ that we admit.

Our examination of this work has not gone beyond this point, and the abundant references which this has involved; a large portion of the whole. But we have studied it carefully enough to be able to say that Dr. Harrison has produced a work which brings the whole question of the Eucharist before the reader in a way that has no parallel in English theological literature.

Christ and His Seed.

Christ and His Seed: Central to all Things. Being a Series of Expository Discourses on Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. By John Pulsford, Author of "Quiet Hours." Hamilton and Adams.

As a series of meditations on this Epistle, Mr. Pulsford's volume is exceedingly beautiful, suggestive, and edifying. As a theological commentary it is indeterminate, and sometimes misleading. The very first reflections on the first verse will show what we mean: "*To the saints and faithful in Christ Jesus.* Saints, according to New-Testament usage, are those who of 'God's abundant mercy have been begotten again to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.' So far as their old nature prevails in them they are not saints. The only holy thing in them is their new nature. As a son of Adam, Paul declares that his heritage is 'a body of death,' and he a 'wretched man.' 'The faithful in Christ Jesus,' are those who, with Paul, repudiate and disown their fallen nature, who regard their new humanity in Christ Jesus as their only personality." This seems to us an unfortunate key-note, suggesting Romans vii. as the description of the regenerate state; particularly unfortunate at the opening of an exposition of the Ephesian Epistle, which gives a very different idea of the Christian privilege. Mr. Pulsford's exquisite exposition of the end of the third chapter, containing the Apostle's prayer, is a protest against this strange explanation of saintship. Such a view is strangely discordant with the tone of the book generally, which proclaims a salvation for the whole man in his unity and integrity in Christ.

Mr. Pulsford's interpretation of the Predestinarian element in the Epistle is noble, and altogether to our taste. We have no objection to the ideal of mankind that he sets up, or rather regards as having been set up by the Father in His Son. "Long before the geological eras began, long before the great chaotic age, and long before that first of all the sad changes, namely, the angel-fall, God beheld His final human race perfect in His Son. Whatever we have become through the two great falls, in heaven and on earth, in Christ Jesus we are the holy children of eternity. Our right home is in our Father's house, amid the first-born eternal glories. It is not strange, therefore, that there should be a spirit in us, which refuses to rest in anything under the sun, as our final condition." This, again, is profoundly true: "Strictly speaking, God has but one Elect, in whom His soul delighteth. 'He saith not, and to seeds, as of many; but as of One, and to thy seed, *which is Christ!*' . . . If you are not in the Son of God, you are in reprobation. Whoever abides in the nature and spirit of his own personality is reprobate. To reject Christ is to reject God's predestination. If we are made partakers of Christ, we are comprehended in eternal election. There is nothing arbitrary in it. The election of God is without variableness, or the shadow of a turning; the same to-day, yesterday, and for ever. . . . If God from eternity had elected to eternal life *certain persons* rather than other persons, it would be the coldest and most cruel mockery after that to 'preach the Gospel to every creature.' It would be horrible to suppose that Christ, who tasted death for every man, would have charged His Apostles, after He was risen from the dead, to carry His Gospel into all nations, and bring it home to every creature's door and heart, if He had not known that the election of God was open to every man."

Mr. Pulsford's view of the Atonement is peculiarly his own, and defies anything like a brief exhibition in other words than his own. This, however, is its condemnation. Light is come into theology on this subject; and we think the tender and profound truth of this exposition might be brought out more simply, and in a manner more in harmony with the language of Scripture. It is not enough to say that man is "made nigh," taken up into unity with God, by receiving the life-blood of Jesus into his spirit. Nor is expiation satisfied by saying that man's sinful humanity is put away in the death of Christ. "The blood of Christ is clearly susceptible of two very distinct apprehensions, corresponding with the distinction between the humanity that lived and died on earth, and the humanity which now lives in heaven, and can die no more. As the children were partakers of a strange blood (a blood which most effectually cuts us off from the kingdom of true life), 'He likewise took part of the same,' that He might once for all sacrifice it, and take the bar away." The mystical union between Christ and His people has found of late years no more beautiful expositor than Mr. Pulsford. Were a little more emphasis laid upon the work of Christ that was

wrought for the race, independently of man, that into which the mystical union does not enter, it would be perfect. As it is, we are conscious that one element of great importance is wanting.

We are tempted to select and comment upon many passages of original thought expressed in most felicitous language. But we forbear. The book is too spiritual, too obviously an exposition from the heart of one whose mind the Holy Ghost moulds through St. Paul, to tolerate the ordinary style of criticism. Passages that deserve, even as they require, thrice to be read and to be deeply pondered, abound almost on every page. Here is one, however, that will show that our author is not a mystical divine only, dwelling in the heavenly places of theology, but that he knows how to preach to his flock :—

“Children should be made to obey long before they can understand *why* they should obey. Their hearts should beat, their muscles grow, and their nerves vibrate and play, under the necessity of obedience. From the beginning their freedom should be freedom in obedience. As soon as they can understand it, they should be taught that reverence for their parents, manifested by unhesitating obedience, is God’s command. And children who obey their parents because God commands it are in the straight way wherein they shall not stumble. It shall be ‘well with them,’ both for time and eternity. They are in ‘the way that they should go,’—‘the way that leadeth unto life eternal,’—and when they are old they will not depart from it.’ They have begun to do ‘right.’”

It is some time since Mr. Pulsford greeted the thoughtful Christian world with the little book of his *Quiet Hours*. We are glad to receive this proof that he is living and studying to reflect more and more clearly the true light. In this volume the reflection is as pure and tranquil as before. It is also, if we may use such an expression, more direct and less refracted than it was. We recommend all who love mystical theology of the right kind to meditate much on this book.

The Last Twelve Verses of the Gospel according to St. Mark, Vindicated against recent Critical Objectors, and Established. By John W. Burgon, B.D. Vicar of St. Mary the Virgin’s, Fellow of Oriel College, and Gresham Lecturer in Divinity.

Those who know Mr. Burgon as a writer will understand the difficulty we feel in characterising this book. It displays a remarkable union of strength and weakness, of solid merits and most serious faults. We find in its pages learning without judgment, wide research without clearness of system; laborious investigation alternates with hasty inference, minute criticism with fervid declamation. Surprise has been expressed by many that a book of three or four hundred pages should be written on such a theme; but there is no real ground for wonder. The subject is far wider than the text. Mr. Burgon

assails the whole theory of textual criticism, as at present understood; and has such confidence in his cause that he claims the victory a dozen times, and sings the psalm in the very midst of the battle.

The author reviews at length the evidence afforded by the early Fathers (ch. iii. v.), the early Versions (ch. iv.), the ancient MSS. especially B. and X. (ch. vi. vii.), the Lectionaries (ch. x.), the Scholia and Notes in MSS. (ch. viii.): he claims to have shown in ch. ix. that internal evidence is favourable to the genuineness of the verses, and in ch. xi. to have accounted for their absence from ancient copies of the Gospels. The volume is enriched by eight Appendices, a Postscript, and Facsimiles of pages of the Codices X. and L.; and closes with a poem of very singular character.

In the examination of patristic authorities, and of the arguments from the phraseology and style of the lection, there is much valuable matter. Mr. Burgon traces the influence of Eusebius in several early statements which have been regarded as independent, and exposes some serious mistakes, which have been handed down by one critic to another. Many of the peculiarities of diction which have been said to characterise the lection are shown to have little or no significance. On the other hand Mr. Burgon evidently does not feel the real difficulty presented by the opening words of the ninth verse. We are grateful, however, for the good service he has rendered in the two departments specified; not least grateful for his detection of current inaccuracies resulting from the too common practice of copying statements without verification.

Mr. Burgon has chosen for the motto of his work some words of the late President Routh. "'Advice to you,' sir, 'in studying Divinity?' Did you say that you 'wished I would give you a few words of advice,' sir? . . . Then let me recommend to you the practice of always *verifying your references, sir!*" Mr. Burgon has evidently studied accuracy, but he has not always followed Dr. Routh's counsel. Let the reader turn to a note on page 82, where, out of eleven statements in regard to readings of the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., as many as four are contrary to fact. But we are not disposed to rest content with the President's dictum. Wise as it is, it hardly contains the suggestion most needed in the case before us. If we might offer counsel, it would take the shape of a warning against imaginative hypotheses and arbitrary judgments. In all this Mr. Burgon would go with us. He justly complains of Dr. Davidson's critical principles and "oracular remarks," and frequently visits them with powerful and deserved rebuke. And yet, as so often, the extremes meet. There is no one of whom our author so frequently reminds us as of Dr. Davidson himself. Agreeing in nothing else, the two men are equally remarkable for positive statements and arbitrary decisions. Now Mr. Burgon's subject is not one that will bear such treatment. This subject, as has been already said, is the whole field of textual criticism, so far as the New Testament is concerned. Mr. Burgon believes that the fundamental error of modern critics is an undue reverence for the

two oldest MSS. We do not deny that there is danger in this direction; and every true critic will be grateful for the caution, if it is well founded. Mr. Burgon can do no greater service than by making good his assertion. How does he proceed? Of course, he collects a large number of readings in which the authority of the two MSS. has exercised preponderating influence; inquires judicially into the internal evidence for or against each reading; compares and classifies the combinations of manuscripts and other authorities which support the readings in question; and, by means of an accurate induction from a multitude of particulars, comes at last to a sure conclusion as to the falsehood of the charges which he impugns? Nothing of the kind. The method pursued is easy and short. A few readings are quoted from each MSS., and pronounced to be false. Sometimes a reason is briefly stated; at other times the process is summary. When the collection of examples is sufficiently large, it remains only to draw a simple inference. The readings of X. and B. are bad: therefore the MSS. deserve no credit: *Voilà tout!** In the name of all enlightened criticism, we protest against this mode of dealing with the sacred text. Under the leadership of such principles, it would be possible to prove anything. Dr. Scrivener's name comes before us frequently in these pages, and Mr. Burgon justly professes the highest respect for this eminent critic. We are persuaded that many a reading which the disciple casts aside with contempt would be accepted by the master, and that Dr. Scrivener would join us in reprobating principles so conservative in appearance, so revolutionary in reality. No one can suspect Mr. Burgon of any conscious unfairness; but we rise from a perusal of some of his chapters with a sad conviction that, in dealing with such subjects as these, he does not know what fairness means. He might have done good service if he had pointed out the inconsistency and arbitrariness which disfigure many pages of modern criticism: he has instead done what one man can do to bring back 'the reign of chaos and old night.'

The question of the genuineness of Mark xvi. 9—20, is too delicate and complex for discussion in these pages. We trust that the very imperfect, though learned and able, investigation presented in this volume may stimulate some scholar to a calmer and more accurate examination of so deeply-interesting a problem.

The Want of Methodism at the Present Time. By Frederick J. Jobson, D.D. Conference Office.

DR. JOBSON'S tractates are always sent out at the right time. He does not ponder and elaborate his project until the hour for the "word uttered in season" is past. Just now, no question is of more importance to Methodism, and therefore to the evangelical interests of Great Britain, than that which occupies this handy little

* We have not room for examples: we can only refer to the treatment of John i. 18 (p. 81), Mark xxvii. 34 (p. 84), Luke iv. 44 (p. 85), and to the extraordinary inferences drawn from Victor's words (pp. 64, 65).

book. Dr. Jobson takes up one topic, and deals with it earnestly, powerfully, and pointedly. It is hard to deny, especially after reading his intense and consistent pleading, that there is one want: indeed, in this, as in everything spiritual, there is always one thing that is central, the presence of which makes all else vigorous and the absence of which throws languor over all. We believe that if every Methodist would read this tract, in the spirit suggested by the writer, a very different state of things would soon result. At the same time, there are some other things necessary—Dr. Jobson does not deny it, rather he suggests it himself—which are distinct from a deeper work of religion, though necessarily bound up with that; and, moreover, there is much in the present work of Methodism that has had no parallel in the past, and gives hopeful augury for the future while it shows that in the present there is no need for despondency. But, while admitting this, and considering earnestly all the questions to which it gives rise, nothing but good can come of a serious and devout meditation on this tract. We trust the earnest hope of the writer will be fulfilled, and that thousands will read it and reflect: Should this honour be put upon the little book, it will exert no slight influence upon the deliberations of the coming Conference.

Revelation in Progress from Adam to Malachi. A Series of Bible Studies. By the Rev. J. H. Titecomb, M.A., Vicar of St. Stephen's, South Lambeth. London: The Religious Tract Society.

THE object and character of this book is well stated in the following extract from the Preface:—

“For the most part the Bible has been treated as one revelation of equal breadth and brightness; simple events occurring early in the world's history being made typical of Gospel doctrine, and legal ordinances being regarded in the clear light of evangelical truth. The consequence has been that Bible students have often lost sight of the beautiful connection subsisting between those different methods by which God has, from time to time, taught and governed His Church, and the particular conditions of the Church at such corresponding periods. Instead, therefore, of grasping those exact truths which the progress of Divine Revelation was intended to give at the time of their delivery, too many persons have looked away altogether from their historical interpretation, only to gaze upon their irradiation under the light of the New Testament. Both lines of study have, of course, their respective uses; but to pursue the latter method at the expense of the former, is, by a kind of spiritual refraction, to raise up the history of God's Church above the proper line of vision, and often to put the deeper meanings of type and prophecy on the horizon before they have any right to appear. By this means we fall under a double disadvantage; for, while on the one hand we attribute to the Old Testament Church a greater amount of evangelical knowledge

than it really possessed, we fail, on the other hand, to realise the interesting growth of its true knowledge."

Students of the Old Testament will find this a very useful aid in their inquiries. The progressive character of the revelations is carefully and steadily kept in view, and much instructive comment on the growing history of the early Church is made.

The analysis of the books of the Old Testament, and of the successive periods of the history, are all well done, and properly take their places in the body of the volume. It is another valuable addition to the useful library which the Religious Tract Society is accumulating for the benefit of Bible readers.

John of the Golden Mouth: a Preacher of Antioch, and Primate of Constantinople. By Walter Macgilvray, D.D., Minister of Gilcomston Free Church, Aberdeen. London: James Nisbet and Co. 1871.

A MORE profitable occupation of enforced leisure could scarcely have been chosen by the learned author of this volume than the pursuit of studies of which this is the fruit. In these days of strong patristic tendencies, accurate representations of these spiritual sires are greatly needed. The author is not wanting in the special gifts of a biographer and historian. He has the penetrating spirit, the spirit of discernment, which can trace the outward action back to its hidden spring and forward to its ultimate issues, and which alone can prevent a memoir from being a mere dry record of incidents. The materials for this biography have lain near to hand for any one to use; there are no facts given with which previous writers have not been familiar; memoirs of Chrysostom, too, have not been wanting, to wit the beautiful work of the spiritual and discriminating Neander, who is so often followed in these pages. But no one has more compactly and gracefully presented a view of the life and times of the man of the "Golden Mouth," and the relation of this life to present Church controversies. Though, of course, this latter subject remains to be expanded in a treatise on the works of Chrysostom. The views given of the condition of national morals and the pictures of Church life are highly instructive. Chrysostom does not coldly stand alone. His companions are appropriately grouped around him; yet not in any wise to detract attention from the central figure. Interesting as a story, it is useful as an illustration of a critical period of the Church's history. Caustic remarks on Church questions are not withheld; yet the whole is written with moderation, though with fidelity to views opposed to the patristic leanings of the present day. It is a volume in which a young minister may profitably study the life of one of the most renowned men in his profession, whose great genius and labour have never ceased to influence the destinies of the Church, and it is a fitting preliminary to the study of Chrysostom's works. Classic elegance, poetry and beauty, enrich a volume which we hope will be followed by a similar monograph on Augustine.

We are glad to learn that the study of the works of Chrysostom is likely to be fostered by the issue of a new translation from the eminent publishing house in Edinburgh to which theological students in this country are so much indebted—the Messrs. Clark.

Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek. By Hermann Cremer. Translated by Dr. W. Simon, Ph.D., and William Urwick, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

THIS work, in its original form, we have already examined, analysed, and most heartily recommended. The translation is a thoroughly good one, and it has the advantage of the additions and emendations of a new edition in the original. There are more press errors in the Greek than Messrs. Clark generally allow to go out. But the reason is obvious. It is printed in Germany. The paper is stronger than most English publishers send out. The Greek type is perfection; and, altogether, it is, barring the occasional typographical errors, a superb volume.

There is no work, the habitual use of which will more abundantly repay the student of the Greek Testament. With a good text, *Winer's Grammar*, as Mr. Moulton has translated it, and this theological dictionary of the Greek terms: a diligent student may dispense with almost all other help. It will accustom him to perceive the lexicological meaning of the words—for it is a good lexicon—and, more than that, it will help him to pursue his studies in that most important of all the theologies—Biblical Theology. There is no one book for the translation or publication of which we are more thankful.

Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford, between A.D. 1826 and 1843. By John Henry Newman, sometime Fellow of Oriel College. Third Edition. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1872.

In the republication of Dr. Newman's *Sermons* it was needful this separate volume should appear. Not one of a series, it has its own special and well-known value; partly arising from the subject chiefly discussed in it, and partly from the historic circumstances connected with its publication. The enhanced value of this edition lies in the preface written expressly for it by Dr. Newman, and in his Explanatory Notes, defining more accurately the terms faith and reason, of which subjects the volume mainly treats.

The Sinlessness of Jesus: an Evidence for Christianity. By Carl Ullmann, D.D. Translated by Sophia Taylor. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

AN earlier edition of this important work was reviewed at length some years ago in our pages. The present edition is an improvement

on that, but by no means so revolutionary in its revision as to destroy the value of the old edition. The subject, however, is of very great importance; and it is bound up so closely with the central subjects of modern theology, that every student should be abreast of the times in relation to it. Dr. Ullmann's is the classical work on this question; and the library of every theologian should possess it.

Helps to the Young in their Efforts at Self-Guidance. Edited by the Rev. W. Jowitt, M.A., Head Master of the Schools of the Corporation for Middle-Class Education, Cowper Street, Finsbury, E.C. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

THOUGH these estimable papers are formally addressed to the young, yet they are specially adapted to thoughtful educators of youth, who cannot fail to see in them the indications of new paths of usefulness, or fail to find principles enunciated which, if worked out with care and applied with diligence, must be of immense benefit in the more advanced stages of teaching. It is a valuable little work.

The Life of Jesus Christ. By a Member of the Church of England. Vol. I. From the Birth of the Saviour to the Death of the Baptist. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

IN a simple and effective way the incidents in the life of the Redeemer, together with His words, are woven into a continuous narrative, and in the language of the present hour. It is neither bald by defect, nor overdone by excess of explanatory statement; and the subject of the sweet story is not hidden by innumerable reflections. Reserving an opinion as to the utility of such works, we pronounce this to be the best of its kind we have met with.

Ecce Episcopus: The Bishop of Souls (1 Pet. ii. 25) and His Church. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

A SERIES of brief papers on the spiritual aspects of Church-life and relationships. We have read some of them with pleasure. They are simple, pious reflections, not exhibiting any profound thought, not marred by any conspicuous fault.

The Book of Job. Translated from the Hebrew Text. With an Introduction; and Notes, Critical and Explanatory. By A. Elzas, Translator of the "Proverbs of Solomon."

OF similar character and equal value to the author's work on the *Proverbs of Solomon*, noticed by us in a former number.

II.—MISCELLANEOUS.

The Kepler Tercentenary.

Kepler und die Astronomie [Kepler and Astronomy: for the Tercentenary Jubilee of Kepler's Birth on 27th December, 1571]. By Dr. Reuschle. Frankfort: A. M. Heyder. 1872.

THREE hundred years ago was born Kepler, one of the founders of Modern Astronomy; and our German neighbours, far more loyal to the memory of their ancient worthies than we are, have celebrated the Tercentenary in their own way, by an abundant effusion of memoirs and pamphlets. Before referring to the national estimate of this great man, let us briefly sketch his history.

John Kepler, or Keppler, was born on the 27th Dec. 1571, in the neighbourhood of Weil in Wurtemberg, and died at Ratisbon, 15th Nov. 1630. His constitution was delicate. His mother could neither read nor write; his father, returning poor from the service of the Duke of Alba, opened a little inn, and took his precocious son away from school to help him. Hard fates were the lot of Kepler until, in his nineteenth year, the cold charity of a brother-in-law, a Lutheran minister, helped him to obtain a State allowance at the University of Tübingen. While there the young student felt the theological influence of the place, and contracted a habit of devout meditation on Divine things which he never lost. But his orthodoxy was suspected, and his attention was diverted to science, and especially to mathematics and astronomy. These are his words: "It is in truth a Divine voice which calls men to the study of astronomy, a science which is not expressed by words and syllables but by the world itself, by the efforts of human intellect to measure itself with the series of the celestial bodies. But a fatality draws men towards this or that occupation, to teach them secretly that they are part of the creation, as they occupy a place in the designs of Providence. . . I was taught at the charges of the Duke of Wurtemberg; and, when my comrades hesitated, on the invitation of that prince, to go abroad, I resolved to accept all that was destined for me. The first employment offered was that of astronomy." . . . No doubt, it was a secret intimation of the will of God that decided this great genius to turn to the higher mathematics and astronomy; and we can join some of the freethinking panegyrists of Kepler in thankfulness that he forsook theology. But not for the reason that makes them grateful. We think that he had a vocation to create an epoch in science; and that the earnest

piety which he carried into the pursuits of science has left fruits more valuable than any that as a Lutheran minister he would probably have produced. Much of his work had a semi-theological character; and in this, as in many other respects, he may be compared with our own Newton. But his theology was not quite so clear as Newton's, as will be proved by the following extract from a letter written at Graetz, in Styria, where he was professor of mathematics from 1594 to 1599. "Before the creation of the world there was no number but that of the Trinity, that of God Himself. The world was created according to number and measure. Leaving out the irregular bodies, there remain six bodies regular; the sphere and five rectilinear bodies: the sphere pertains to the last heaven. The world is double, mobile and immobile. The immoveable world is occupied by the fixed stars, the sun, the intermediate ether; three elements which correspond to the Son, the Father, and the Holy Spirit in the Trinity. The moveable world is occupied by the six planets turning round the sun, which presents the image of the creating Father: the sun diffuses movement as the Father diffuses the Holy Ghost." Driven from Styria by a persecution that ejected from the college all Protestant professors, Kepler accepted the invitation of Tycho to aid him in Prague. Tycho was a hard man, and his subordinate fared ill. On Tycho's death in 1601, Kepler became astronomer to the Emperor, with a residence at Linz. In 1613 he was sent to the Diet at Ratisbon for the purpose of conducting the correction of the Gregorian calendar. He imitated Tycho-Brahe in renouncing by slow degrees the old hypotheses by the aid of which his predecessors still explained or tried to explain the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies. The result of one flash of inspiration was the germ of the "Laws of Kepler." And this he communicated to Tycho, who had advised him to abandon the astronomers and observe phenomena for himself. The letter he received from the older astronomer gave him great joy or "would have done so had it not been followed by an *eclipse of the sun which portended great calamities.*"

Persuaded by slow degrees that there must exist certain fixed relations between the length of the revolutions of the planets and their distances from the sun, Kepler determined to concentrate his attention on the discovery of these relations. This seems to have been his problem in the order of Providence. After a multitude of unsatisfactory experiments, he arrived at the formularisation of the following three laws: 1. The squares of the times of revolution of the planets round the sun are as the cubes of their distances from it; 2. The planetary orbits are ellipses of which the sun occupies one focus; 3. The areas described by the radius vector which joins this focus to the centre of any planet are proportioned to the times employed in describing them. These laws bear the name of the immortal astronomer; and as they are applied to the movements of the satellites around the planets, they form the basis of planetary astronomy. It may be supposed that they also govern, in stellar astronomy, the

gravitation of secondary stars around their principals in those systems of celestial bodies to which the name of multiple stars is given. In his strange book on the *Harmony of the World*, which is full of Pythagorean notions concerning numbers and musical intervals, he cries: "It is eight months since I saw the first rays of light; three months have I seen the day; only for a few days I have seen the sun of my admirable contemplation. I give myself up to my enthusiasm; I dare to say that I have robbed the gold of the Egyptians to form a tabernacle for my God far from the confines of Egypt. If you pardon me I will rejoice; if you reproach me, I will bear it; the die is cast, I have written my book; it will be read by this age or by posterity, no matter which. It may wait for a reader. *Did not God wait six thousand years without one to contemplate his work?*" It was not, however, so long before Newton showed, by profound analysis, the exactitude and the importance of Kepler's laws. Kepler seems to have had the idea of the astronomical telescope: in a work on Dioptrics, published 1611, he speaks of the combination of two lenses which invert the images. He was in other respects eminent in optics. He likewise worked with great patience at mathematical tables. But his works were without much influence on the progress of astronomy. His fame rests pre-eminently on one great discovery.

Like Newton, it has been remarked, Kepler intermeddled considerably with theology. He wrote something, and suffered much in consequence, about the ubiquity doctrine of the *Formulae Concoordiæ*, and in the Calvinistic controversy he took a part. His entire works are pervaded with a spirit of evangelical piety, in strange contrast with the tone of many of the present day. The extract just given is remarkable for its combination of self-assertion and humility. Let it be paralleled by the following, from the same book: "Father of lights, who hast by the light of nature awakened in us the longing for the light of grace, in order to raise us to the higher light of Thy glory! I thank Thee, O Lord and Creator, that Thou hast rejoiced my heart by Thy creation, and that I have been entranced by the work of Thy hands. I have laid open to men the glory of Thy works, so far as my limited spirit can apprehend Thy infinity. If I, sinful man, have said anything that is unworthy of Thee, or if I have sought only idle honour, pardon me in Thy grace!" He declares it to be the deepest desire of his heart, "that he might find that God dwelling in his inmost heart whom he had been contemplating in His universe, and, as it were, serving with his hands."

Kepler's domestic life was not a very happy one. He was poor, and found it hard to get his salary paid him by the authorities. It seems strange to find that the founder of planetary astronomy had sometimes to make and sell almanacks to earn his bread. His first wife was a sore trial to him; her three children died one after another, and she ended in insanity. His mother was accused "of having been instructed in the art of magic by an aunt who was burnt as a sorceress; of holding frequent colloquies with the devil; of

having no power of weeping; of killing the young pigs in the neighbourhood by riding them in the night; of being able to look no one in the face," and so forth. The astronomer had to come from Linz to Stuttgart, and intercede with the Duke for his mother. He succeeded, however, only in modifying the sentence: "it was decided that the hangman should terrify the old woman, by presenting to her, piece after piece, the instruments of torture, explaining as he went their mode of action." She declared her innocence, of course, and died soon afterwards. A second marriage brought him seven children. He was on a journey to get the arrears of his salary when he died, aged fifty-nine years. He was buried in the cemetery of St. Peter, November 16, 1680, with this inscription over him, written by himself:—

"Mensus eram cœlos, nunc terræ metior umbras;
Mens cœlestis erat, corporis umbra jacet."

In 1808, a monument was raised to his memory in Ratisbon. A bust in marble was placed on a pedestal, the bas-relief of which represents his genius lifting the veil which covered Urania. With one hand the goddess presents him the telescope; with the other she holds a roll, on which is traced the orbit of the planet Mars. That was a long delayed but graceful tribute. Grateful Germany has been lately summoning her men of letters to celebrate the Tercentenary of her great astronomer, and the result is a number of books at least. We were going to say "of her greatest astronomer," but Copernicus, and, perhaps, Tycho Brahe, and Leibnitz, as a mathematician and physical philosopher, rise to contest that point. When the Tercentenary orators point to those three names with pride, as showing that early in the sixteenth century the astronomical primacy was with Germany, it is impossible to rebut their assertion, especially as they candidly admit that it passed with Newton to England, and was, in the last century, divided between England and France. That it has now "most decidedly returned back again to Germany," is not only doubtful but certainly untrue. Bessel, Enecke, and a few others, have maintained the reputation of German science in the departments of calculation and observation. A German telescope detected Uranus, but it was not a German who discovered Uranus, and the greatest names are still, at the present time, French or English.

Kepler was a very voluminous writer. In this respect he resembled Leibnitz, who was born just after Kepler died. Frisch's edition, in eight immense volumes, of his works, will be, if completed as it has been begun, the best monument of that devout and noble astronomer, whose name, beyond every other, demands and is not unworthy to be associated with that of Newton.

Renan on the Reformation of France.

La Réforme intellectuelle et morale : par Ernest Renan.
Levy : Paris.

SUCH is the title of a new essay, added to a collection of old ones, which Ernest Renan, the writer of the imaginary *Life of Christ*, has given to his countrymen. It is characteristic of the writer and readers, that in its pages the regeneration of a deeply corrupted people is so confidently predicted. The author, in order to conciliate all Frenchmen, vents his opprobrium on the Germans, and, professing an inward sorrow for the degeneracy of ideal Germany, heaps on their soldiers the hardest names : such is the beginning of this penitential preaching. He declares, also, that France has become the most peaceable land in the world, and has put away all Germanism, that is, all lust of war. And he calmly announces, that it is the "most glorious trait in the character of France that, better than any other nation, it can see its faults and condemn itself." The bitterness against Germany is a fault, however, which it will be long before they either see or condemn. It takes here the ridiculous form of asserting that Germany is very far from being able to pretend to such a society as France showed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when polished infidels wrote and the court was swayed by beautiful courtesans ! Renan is as unhappy in his advice to his own countrymen as he is unjust to their foes. Deducing the misery of France from its superficial democracy, and pointing to the re-establishment of a strong monarchical government as the first essential to safety, he comes to the question of the Church, and says : "We find ourselves with reference to Catholicism in the strange position that we can live neither with it nor without it." What, then, is to be done ? Something as follows : "What we must desire is a liberal reform of Catholicism, without any blending of State relations. The Church ought to admit two categories of believers, one holding to the letter, the other holding to the spirit. At a certain point of culture, faith in the supernatural becomes to many an impossibility ; let not these be forced to wear the mantle. Intermeddle not with what *we* teach and write, and we shall not contend with you about the people ; contest not our place in the university and academy, and we will leave you, without reservation, the national education throughout the country. We maintain for the people its religious education ; but, in return, leave us free !" What can be more miserable than this style of reform ? and what can be a worse omen than the popularity of writings that indicate a course of reformation based on deliberate hypocrisy, and trifling with the most sacred things ? The very conception of such a compromise between superstition and Atheism would be impossible in most countries. Doubtless the selfcomplacent philosopher supposes that the training of the higher schools, and the influences of the Academy, would soon

efface all inconvenient traces of the doctrines instilled into infant and youthful minds by the priesthood. The matter would not be worth much notice if Renan stood alone. But a fearful unreality and want of truth seems to pervade other classes of writers. The writers in the *Revue des deux Mondes* are very busy with the regeneration of France: that note is sounded from every trumpet. One summons to watchfulness, not again to be caught unawares, as France was by millions of apparently peaceful neighbours; and mourns over the feverish and restless state of Europe, now that France, the true umpire and arbiter, no longer keeps order and constrains the strong to respect the weak. Another speaks of the frightful surprises of Prussia. George Sand condescends to say: "The German is of a very practical nature. He loses his brother. He loses his son. But he gets instead a watch. That is sufficient consolation." Alfred Maury writes: "Germany makes invasions; France only conducts wars, that is, achieves heroic deeds, for an idea." As to the declaration of war, 18th July, "the Assembly which came to the decision to take up arms was certainly one of the most peaceable in the whole of Europe: it decided for war only in consequence of a promise given that this war would introduce a general disarmament throughout Europe. It had no desire for the left bank of the Rhine. It desired the lessening of armies and the suppression of wars for the time to come. Its decision was really a decision of peace." We have seen an extract from Quatrefages, who has discovered a new race of men, the Prussians, who became afterwards tinctured with civilising influences, through the infusion of French elements in consequence of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes: "This race developed itself under an unfavourable sky; their heart hardened; their ambition grew; their religion itself partook of a wild character: it was not the God of Christ, the common Father, who was invoked; it was Jehovah the Avenger. This race was located in Prussia, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, and might be termed a Finnish-Slavic irruption, quite distinct from the other Germanic races in its heathenish origin."

So much for the literary reform of France. We have seen in another article what is doing in protest against Romanism. But it ought not to be disguised, that the state of Protestantism is not as encouraging as it might have been hoped that it would be. The Ultramontanists, with Veillot at their head, are doing their utmost to keep France bound at the feet of the Papacy, and prepare it for Charles V. and a more absolute submission than it has ever known to Rome. But the Protestants are not at one in bringing their influence to bear upon the regeneration of France. This is not the place to dwell upon the attitude of French Protestants. Suffice that they have a great responsibility, and ought to lay aside their animosity to Protestant Germany, cease to be tolerant to the International, and pray and preach and labour for the Protestantism of France. In many parts of the country the feeling prevails that Catholicism has proved its worthlessness. "The good God has become Protestant," said a simple man, after the

war. M. Berard, one of the ministers whom the Neuchâtel Society for the Evangelisation of France sent out, mentions in his report that he had often heard it said, that "if France was not Protestant within ten years it would be lost." But we shall have other works to introduce on this subject.

Resoconto Autentico della Disputa Avvenuta in Roma, le Sere di 9 e 10 Febbraio, 1872, fra Sacerdoti Cattolici e Ministri Evangelici, intorno alla Venuta di San Pietro in Roma. Rome: Tipografia Lombarda. 1872.

Authentic Report of the Discussion held in Rome on the Evenings of February 9th and 10th, 1872, between Catholic Priests and Evangelical Ministers, concerning the Coming of St. Peter to Rome. Translated by William Arthur, Author of "Italy in Transition," &c. &c. London: Wesleyan Conference Office. 1872.

It was a striking indication of the changed state of the times, when, through the columns of a public newspaper, a Protestant minister in Rome fearlessly challenged reply to a lecture, in which he would show, "by arguments drawn from the Bible and the Holy Fathers, that St. Peter never was in Rome." Only second to it in courage and novelty was the acceptance of the challenge by six priests of the Roman Catholic Church.

Of this extraordinary discussion the report is now before us. Its almost faultless translation does credit to the aim of the translator: "to enable the English reader, as far as the case admitted, to see through my sentences those of the speakers;" all the more as "speed forbade any aim at literary finish." Two sets of reporters were engaged—on behalf of the Catholics, the reporters of the Œcumenical Council; for the Protestants, those of the Italian Parliament. The report is printed in Italian as it came from the reporters, without any revision in style, and its accuracy attested by the signatures of the four Presidents attached to the manuscript.

That such a discussion should have taken place within the walls of Rome, and amidst the circumstances which surrounded it, warrants the following just remarks of the translator:—"Had Mr. Disraeli, when writing *Lothair*, laid a scene in Rome, not four years after the battle of Mentana, in which the hall of a pontifical academy, brilliantly lighted by Catholic hands, was crowded with an audience divided into two parts: Roman Catholics on the right, admitted by yellow tickets; non-Romanists on the left, admitted by red; to hear a debate between Priests and Protestants on the question whether St. Peter ever was in Rome;—had he set over the discussion four Presidents; on the one side, a Roman Prince, with an Advocate of fame and title, on the other, two Pastors, the one of Hebrew extraction, the other an English Methodist residing in Italy;—had he intro-

duced as Disputants a distinguished Canon, with two erudite Roman ecclesiastics, and opposed to these the famous ex-Monk Gavazzi, with a Pastor of the old Waldensian Church, and a converted Franciscan,—a Methodist;—further, had he represented the debate as able and fervent, yet proceeding with temper and ending with shaking of hands—would not the critics have said that, of all the improbable things in the book, that was the most extravagant? Yet, at seven o'clock on the evening of February 9th, 1872, that scene opened, not to dissolve until after eleven, and then only to re-open on the evening following. And the public already knows, through the correspondence of *The Times*, *The Daily News*, and other papers, that the conditions just named were fulfilled. Besides its intrinsic interest, the Discussion here translated will always claim a place in the history of thought and of political institutions; for here inquiry advances to joust with authority in fair and honourable lists, opened on ground where for ages he durst not show his head; and here a public meeting, for earnest but orderly debate, is held where, of all institutions, the public discussion has been the most alien, and popular assemblies have been only for rites or amusements, unless we except the lottery. But the deepest interest of the discussion will lie in its bearing on religious belief; always the strongest force in moulding both thought and institutions."

The thesis having been read, from a number of *La Capitale*, by one of the Presidents, Il Comm. Giov. Battista De Dominicis-Tosti, in the following words: "Signor Francesco Sciarelli, Evangelical Minister, will give a public lecture, in which he will show, by arguments drawn from the Bible and the Holy Fathers, that St. Peter never was at Rome," a brief time was allotted to private prayer.

Sciarelli commenced by stating the Roman Catholic belief in regard to the pontificate of St. Peter to be as follows:—"St. Peter came to Rome in the second year of the reign of Claudius; that is, in the forty-second year of the vulgar era. Here he held the pontificate for twenty-five years, and here was martyred in the year 66, in the time of the Emperor Nero." Against this belief he undertook to prove, "that St. Peter did not come to establish his see in Rome from 42 to 66 of the vulgar era, and that, not having come during this time, he could not have held the pontificate here for the space of twenty-five years, nor here have suffered martyrdom in the same year of 66, in the time of the Emperor Nero." This was a slight change in the terms, if not a shifting the grounds of his thesis, which did not escape the keen eye of his opponents. He began by fixing the date of St. Paul's visit to Jerusalem, "to see Peter," as the forty-second year of the Christian era, basing his assertion on the opinion of the Roman Catholic professor, Ellendorf, that St. Paul's conversion took place in the year 39. From this moment St. Peter's course is traced to the year 66, the date of his First Epistle. "And the year 66 of the vulgar era is, for Catholic theologians, the year in which St. Peter had to suffer martyrdom. Then, according to that which the Holy

Scriptures teach us, it is not true that St. Peter came to Rome to establish his see there."

The special mission of Peter to the circumcision, and the dating of his first Epistle from Babylon, which play an important part in the subsequent discussion, are then dealt with. From these he turns to patristic tradition, the real stronghold (!) of his opponents, citing the Epistles of St. Clement to the Corinthians and St. Ignatius to the Romans, and the words of Papias, as quoted by Eusebius, of whom we hear so much afterwards.

The strength of Sciarelli's argument lay in the utter absence of even a scintilla of positive proof from Holy Scripture to the supposed residence of St. Peter in Rome; in the comparatively satisfactory way in which St. Peter's course could be traced, quite incontrovertible by positive statement, and in the feebleness of the traditional link between the times of the Apostles and Irenæus. Of subsequent authorities he well says: "Hence of the unanimous consent of tradition, which, from the times of Irenæus to modern times, has always confirmed the journey and pontificate of St. Peter in Rome, we shall make no account, until Catholic theologians shall have refuted with undeniable and irrecusable arguments, those which we have drawn from Holy Scripture against such a belief."

Sig. Sciarelli's argument shed no fresh light on the old controversy; but it threw the onus of proof on his opponents, and exposed the utter futility of the pretended twenty-five years' residence, and, indeed, of the whole assumption, in such a way as a Roman audience had never heard before. Though his thesis left him open to the weak assertion of his hard-pressed opponents, that the presence of St. Peter in Rome for a single day or hour would suffice to contradict it; yet, firm in the persuasion that no such single hour could be maintained, it was fairly adopted, and ingeniously argued.

Sciarelli was followed by Canon Fabiani, an eminent archæologist, a scholar, and a subtle dialectician, who had made this question one of special inquiry. He stated the Catholic argument with the utmost clearness and breadth. His address, though replete with patristic erudition, was far from an adequate reply to his opponent's arguments. To the silence of Scripture, and the lack of early historical testimony, he opposed the inevitable notoriety of the fact, in a few sentences, which sufficed to parry the argument, but not to answer it. He laid much stress on the traditional testimony, naming a long list of authorities from Papias and Irenæus down to Gregory the Great; exulting in "the multitude and the grandeur of these critical witnesses who can be brought forward for this historical fact, visible to the eyes of all, without need that it should be authenticated by a particular revelation of the arrival of St. Peter in Rome." A series of testimonies, which "commences with brief and covert allusions, such as in a letter of affection, a man is accustomed to make, who speaks of a thing perfectly known by himself, and by him to whom he writes. Little by little it becomes the foundation of all discussions, of which

what follows must take account." The possibility of a journey to Rome, in the intervals of time, is gravely discussed; but the chronological difficulties are evaded, or only met by a reference to the diversities of opinion on chronology. To him succeeded Sig. Ribetti, a Waldensian pastor. His position was a difficult one; but he maintained it with courage, and not a little skill; making some happy replies to his antagonist, especially regarding the patristic authorities behind which Canon Fabiani had entrenched himself. He took occasion to deal somewhat severely with the Roman Catholic system.

He was followed by a Roman priest, Cipolla by name, who did little more than repeat the arguments of his chief. This closed the first meeting. The discussion was opened on the following evening by Sig. Gavazzi, whose skill in debate seems not to have been behind his famed oratorical power. He cleverly turned the negative argument from the silence of the Bible into proof positive; reviewed the course of the discussion; supported and illustrated the arguments of his comrades, dealing heavy blows against the defences of his opponents. He showed himself not wanting in patristic lore; and flinched not from the thorough examination of the Catholic arguments, which he met by counter arguments as fresh and forcible as they were eloquent. That he was well prepared for the part he took in this debate, the readers of his little work on the *Favola del Viaggio di San Pietro a Roma* will well understand. The strength of the final reply by the Rev. Professor Guidi may be judged by a single sentence:—"But the most elementary philosophy of history teaches us that for facts proportionate causes must be asked; and for the fact of the existence of the Roman Church, and of the continual tradition of that Church, no other proportionate cause can be assigned than the coming of St. Peter to Rome."

The excitement which this discussion created is not easy to describe. From early morn to a late hour of the night on the 1st of March, the strange cry was heard in the streets of Rome from men and boys: "*Resoconto autentico della discussione sulla venuta di S. Pietro in Roma.*" An edition of three thousand copies was sold in the city in the course of twenty-four hours.

Thus liberty of speech bears its fruit. Thus is exposed to the popular gaze the narrowness of that base on which rests the pigment and presumption of the Petrine establishment and supremacy of the Church of Rome.

Introduction to the Study of Palæontological Botany. By John Hutton Balfour, A.M., M.D. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 1872.

It is with regret that we have to record our disappointment with this book. We had hoped that Dr. Balfour's promised volume would supply a long felt want in giving us a manual comprehend-

ing the substance of all that is known on the subject of Fossil Botany, and accurately reflecting the present condition of this rapidly advancing study. We are sorry to say that such is not the case. The book is very unequal; much of the work is well done, but other parts are seriously defective. The explanation of this is probably not difficult to find. Dr. Balfour is not, and we believe does not pretend to be, a profound authority on the obscure and unsettled subject of Palæontological Botany; hence he has contented himself with epitomising the writings of more practical men. Had this task been fairly performed, we should not have complained, but it has not. Dr. Balfour has resigned himself to the influence of one school of phytologists, as represented by one of his own most distinguished pupils, and practically ignored every opposing one. We appreciate as highly as most, both the personal character and the indefatigable labours of Mr. Carruthers; they are alike worthy of the highest praise; but the subjects of his studies are unusually obscure and difficult to interpret; we do not wonder, therefore, that some of his most important conclusions are rejected by observers whose opportunities for acquiring information are at least fully equal to his own. The fact that these differences of opinion exist is well known in scientific circles, and it ought to have been fairly put before the young student. It is true that it is desirable to avoid bewildering him with conflicting hypotheses where such a course is possible, but it is still less desirable to set before him one side of the question, ignoring the other as if it had no existence, or to present to him, as proven, conclusions which other authorities, of equal trustworthiness, altogether reject. In illustration of our meaning we would quote the statement which Dr. Balfour, following Mr. Carruthers, makes respecting the structure of *stigmara*: "what Brongniart calls medullary rays are mere cracks or separations in the wedges traversed by vessels." (P. 47.) This may appear to be a trivial observation scarcely worth noticing, but it symbolises much that is of the highest significance, hence the truth or error contained in it becomes very important. When, therefore, we find that the contrary of what is here stated had been affirmed by such distinguished botanists as Adolphe Brongniart and Dr. Hooker, and that, more recently, the proceedings of the Royal Society contain Professor Williamson's absolute demonstration of the correctness of their views on this point, we feel that we have a right to complain of Dr. Balfour's one-sided treatment of the question. Similar remarks are applicable to the figures on page 60, and also to those on page 62, both of which are copied from the writings of Mr. Carruthers, but both of which are emphatically rejected by some of those who are practically acquainted with the subjects of them. It is in the same spirit of favouritism that the minutely detailed observations of some writers are reproduced—whilst those of others are either altogether ignored or passed by with but the slightest possible allusion to them.

Other statements, embodying a truth, are nevertheless made so vaguely and devoid of proper explanations, that no student could

derive from them a correct conception of what they are designed to teach. We allude to such observations as that "Knorria is said to be the internal cast of a *Lepidodendron*." "*Sternbergia* is considered by Williamson as a *Dadoxylon* with a discoid pith," &c. The first statement must be utterly unmeaning to the student, who is aware that normally *Lepidodendron* had no internal cavity in which a cast could be formed. Still less could he learn the fact that, in some instances, the bark of these plants frequently remains after the more central portions have disappeared through decay, whilst in others the inner parts of this bark also underwent destruction. In both cases equally—when inorganic sand or clay filled the interior of what remained of the bark-cylinder, it produced the fossil known as a *Knorria*. The second quotation still more obviously fails to convey a definite meaning to any one seeking to know what a *Sternbergia* really is. So far from its being a *Dadoxylon*, or, in other words, a noble forest tree, it is merely inorganic sand or clay which has found its way into certain cavities that existed in the pith of the tree in question; a piece of detailed information which ought to have been given when speaking of objects so likely to perplex the student as are the so-called *Sternbergia*. Indefinite statements like these, and the quotations of such could be abundantly multiplied, are not wanted by the experienced palæo-phytologist, whilst they convey no conceivable meaning to the student. Why, then, were they written? When they merely appeared in a brief concluding chapter of an otherwise useful manual of recent botany, the form which they assumed was of little importance, since no student would go to so restricted a source for information on the subject; but when that chapter is expanded, and comes before us in the more important form of a Manual of Fossil Botany, we have a right to ask that they too should be expanded; at least, sufficiently so to express some definite meaning.

In spite of these defects, we trust that Dr. Balfour's book will reach a second edition, because, as already observed, much of it is well written, conveying useful information, and because a good manual on the subject of "Fossil Botany" is much needed; but we trust that, before republication, the author will extend his work sufficiently to enable him to make his explanations definite and intelligible, and, at the same time, do more justice to those investigators who have neither studied in his class-room nor been born north of the Tweed.

Notices of the Jews and their Country by the Classic Writers of Antiquity; being a Collection of Statements and Opinions from the works of Greek and Latin Authors previous to A.D. 500. By John Gill. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Longmans. 1872.

WE are glad to welcome a second edition of Mr. Gill's very valuable book. He has gathered together, and arranged in a manner most serviceable to the student, the whole body of classical allusion

to the Jews. There is no attempt to point the moral of it all. This the reader can hardly fail to do for himself. The object of the Essay is literary, not theological, the only comments made upon the text being such as historical accuracy and fairness demand; and we think the author's reserve in this respect a wise one. The evidence here accumulated makes it more plain to us than ever that the Jews were the most unpopular people of antiquity. A hatred and contempt altogether exceptional were poured upon them by the imperial races of Greece and Rome. From their first acquaintance with the Jew, these lords of the earth appear to have despised him. It is not too much to say that 'when they saw him, there was no beauty that they should desire him.' His customs were either odious or contemptible, his traditions were the subject of mockery, and his religion declared to be the most execrable of superstitions by a people so tolerant of the religions of their subject races that half the idolatries of the East were naturalised in Rome: "Jam pridem Syrus in Tiberim, de-fluxit Orontes."

The fallen fortunes of other nations met with some respect from their conquerors, and their loftier traits of character gained at least some recognition: the Jew's misfortunes alone excited no sympathy; for him and his affairs was reserved a peculiar contempt which made him the general butt and victim in a manner that had no parallel. The nobler sort of Roman seems almost as little able to be generous, or even just, towards him as the baser sort. If Martial and Petronius make him the theme of filthy jests, a moralist like Seneca can speak of the "*gens sceleratissima*," and a historian of such order as Tacitus can make a disparaging comparison between the rites of Bacchus and the religious institutions of the Jews, branding the latter as absurd and contemptible. Admitting the actual faults of the Jew, it is to us a remarkable thing that none of the keen observers we can quote appears to have discerned where the true strength of the Jewish character lay. Is it not possible to distinguish between the unworthy individual character, and the type under which it may be classed? Are we not, indeed, as familiar with the ideal Englishman or Frenchman as with the individual, and do we not endow that ideal with attributes of character which, possibly, we seldom find conspicuous in any one member of the race idealised? It seems marvellous to us then that Cicero, and Seneca, and Pliny, had no glimpse of the ideal Jew in all the Jews they met. Even when they cease to sneer at his superstition, or make fun of him for his horror of swine's flesh, and refer to something on the nobler side of his belief or conduct, they are strangely unable to see its significance as an element in the national character. Tacitus, for example, says (*Historia* v. 5): "The Egyptians worship various animals and images; the Jews acknowledge one God only, and conceive of Him by the mind alone. They condemn as impious all who with perishable materials form images in the human shape to represent God; that Being, they say, is above all, and everlasting, neither susceptible of

change nor subject to decay." It is hard to believe that this glimpse into the lofty nature of the Jewish religion should not have awakened even a philosopher's curiosity in Tacitus, and that such a sentence should be followed by the comparison with Bacchus-worship to which we have already referred. No, with all the worst faults of the Jewish race in its worst periods, it presented to men's view something besides the ignoble, had there been eyes to see it. We are persuaded, further, that the exceptional bitterness of the Jew's lot in the heathen Empire was not wholly due to the vices and meannesses which Roman Satirists have lashed. Not only that which was worst in the Jew, but that which was best in him, must be taken into the account. His rigid monotheism, and its accompanying horror of idols, his observance of the Sabbath, the remoteness of his religious thought from that of the people on the one hand, and the philosophers on the other,—these were reasons for his unpopularity in the heathen world, and, so far, it was a noble opprobrium, a sort of "scandalum crucis," which it was his honour to bear until the still more glorious "offence" for which so many of his race were willing to endure the loss of all things. We heartily commend Mr. Gill's most interesting and suggestive work, and close this notice with a short extract from its conclusion. "In surveying the fragments of Jewish history thus collated, an impartial reader can hardly fail to notice the unanimity with which heathen writers of ancient times describe the religious isolation of that people, their invincible attachment to the simple ceremonies of their heaven-appointed ritual, and the unity and spirituality of the Being whom they adored. The worst crimes charged against them with any truth are poverty, which is no disgrace, and bitter anger for which they had bitter cause. Doubtless many of them were no better than the rest of mankind, but their general standard of morality put to shame both the cultured Greeks and the mighty Romans; while their history, written even by hostile pens, forms a powerful argument for the truth of those monotheistic principles which they so fearlessly upheld. Even Minucius Felix, while condemning the Jews of his day and suggesting that God may have given them up to punishment, says it would be a great mistake to suppose that the Jews of that age were a type of their fathers, "who for long ages worshipped the one God honestly, harmlessly, and religiously; observed healthful laws; increased from a small number to an innumerable multitude; rose from poverty to wealth; from slavery became kings; a little band without arms chased armed hosts before them by the command of God, and even vanquished the opposing elements."

Sainte-Beuve.

Souvenirs et Indiscrétions. Le Diner du Vendredi Saint. Par C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Publiés par son dernier Secrétaire. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1872.

UNTIL such time as the complete memoirs of Sainte-Beuve, poet,

critic, and man of letters shall appear, this volume must be accepted as his biography. It is, by the confession of the editor, inadequate and incomplete, though containing fragments of great value, more particularly an outline sketch of his own history found among Sainte-Beuve papers. For the rest, the volume is composed of fragments, some from the hand of the deceased author; the others, written in the spirit of devoted hero-worship, are by M. Troubat, his secretary and friend during the last eight years of his life.

M. Sainte-Beuve was born at Boulogne, on the 23rd of December, 1804, two months after the death of his father, and owed everything in early life to the care of his mother and an aunt, who together kept house, and brought up the fatherless boy. At fourteen years of age, he was by great effort sent to Paris to complete his studies. Thither, after a while, he was followed by his mother; and henceforth Paris was his home, his sphere of action, and his world. He began to write in 1824, in connection with *Le Globe*, a newspaper just then established. We translate a few passages from the paper entitled "Ma Biographie."

"My first articles of any importance were on the first volumes of Thiers' *History of the Revolution* and the *Tableau* of the same period by M. Mignet. About this time also, M. Dubois having asked me to review the *Odes and Ballads* of Victor Hugo, I wrote two articles, which were noticed by Goethe. I did not know Victor Hugo in the least. Without being aware of it, we were living near each other in the Rue de Vangirard, he at No. 90 and I at No. 94. He came to thank me for the articles, but did not find me in. Next day, or the day after, I went to his house, and found him at breakfast. This little scene has been painted in a lively manner in *Victor Hugo described by a Witness of His Life*. But it is not accurate to say that I went to offer to place the *Globe* at his service. From my youth I always understood criticism; otherwise I never offered myself,—I waited to be sought." The account of the first meeting between Sainte-Beuve and Alfred de Musset is interesting. "De Musset was eighteen years of age. I met him one evening at Victor Hugo's, for the families were intimate; but no one at Hugo's house knew that De Musset wrote verses. Next morning De Musset knocked at my door, and said to me, on entering, 'You recited some verses yesterday; well, I have written some too, and I am come to read them to you.' He repeated to me some charming verses, rather after the manner of André Chénier. I made haste to share with Hugo this poetical recruiting." He describes his relations with Saint Simonism, which have been misunderstood. "The offices of the *Globe* were in the Rue Monsigny, in the same house that the Saint-Simon group occupied. Hence arose frequent intercourse. When Pierre Leroux, for financial reasons, sold the paper to the Saint-Simonists, I did not retire from it on that account. I still wrote articles for it. My relations, which I have never disavowed, with the Saint-Simonists always continued free and without any engagement. When it is said that I assisted at the preachings in the Rue Taitbout, what is meant by that? If they mean to say that

I was present at them, like Lerminier, upon the platform, in a sky-blue dress, it is nonsense. I went there as we go, when we are young, to any sight that interests."

Indeed, Sainte-Beuve was not the man to become a religious enthusiast. He belonged to the polished paganism whose sacred city is Paris, and whose chief prophets are Frenchmen, though, alas, its disciples are to be found in all the capitals of Europe. With many such it has become a point of honour to decline in life and death all Christian ordinances. In his will, written a fortnight before his death, the following direction is given:—"Je veux que mon enterrement soit purement civil, un enterrement sans pompe, sans solennité, aucun insignes, aucune trace d'honneur." We close this short notice with an extract or two from a letter written by M. Eugène Tilloy, a young surgeon, since deceased, to his father, the editor of the *Journal d'Amiens*, giving an account of Sainte-Beuve's funeral:—"I write to you from Sainte-Beuve's chamber. Nothing has changed its place; only, instead of the active old man whom you remember, there is a corpse, whose form is dimly outlined beneath a sheet reaching to the chin. The head alone is uncovered. The eyes are closed. The general expression is that of repose, of sleep, and of the majesty of death. . . . No lighted taper; no sprig of box-wood dipped in holy water; no religious symbol; nothing but the profane, or rather, human things of every-day life. . . . I have just returned from the funeral. An enormous crowd of six thousand, some say ten thousand people. All classes met there: artists, writers, students, workmen. All kinds of opinions were crowded together: Raspail and the younger Baroche, the irreconcilables of politics, and the dilettanti of art. . . . The papers give you the list of well-known men who were present. I saw close by me Dumas père, his hair quite white, and Madame Sand upon the arm of Dumas fils. Flaubert, whom we rarely see since he has begun to hide himself, so to speak, in the country, in order to work, had come to Paris on purpose. He walked holding Taine's arm. I saw at one moment all heads uncovered before old Raspail, who was accompanied by his four sons; no cheers, the place and the occasion did not allow it, but a movement of respect. The procession moved towards the cemetery of Montparnasse, between a double line of spectators. The journey was very soon accomplished. The coffin had scarcely glided upon the ropes of the gravediggers into the vault, where Sainte-Beuve's mother already lay, than Lacausade, standing on a mound, addressed to those who were present the words which the papers have reported. Here they are again, and verbatim; Sainte-Beuve had provided them beforehand for his executors. 'Adieu, Sainte-Beuve! adieu, our friend! Adieu!' Then, turning towards the company, 'Gentlemen, who have accompanied him thus far, we thank you in his name. Gentlemen, the ceremony is over.' They remained there, however. It seemed as though they were waiting for something. This simplicity, or rather absence of ceremonial, plainly disconcerted the greater number. The

spectacle, however, had grandeur of its own. In leaving the cemetery, Madame Sand had a real ovation; it was with great difficulty that she could reach her carriage. The friends returned to the grave, to clasp hands with the people that Sainte-Beuve had loved, and then all dispersed." Sainte-Beuve died on the 13th of October, 1869.

On Mankind—their Origin and Destiny. By an M.A. of Balliol College, Oxford. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

If this work had been printed at Hanwell, its contents would have been intelligible. As it is, it does not appear whether the author is a person suffering as Festus thought St. Paul was, or whether he is one of those perverse day-dreamers who delight to mingle things true and false, wise and unwise, holy and profane in a sublime hotchpotch of philosophical theorising and reverie. The answer which the volume gives to the question raised by its title is an ingenious one. Whence came man? He came from "Nature." Whither goeth he? He goeth to "Nature." If our M.A. of Balliol is mad, verily there is a method in his madness. If he is sane, he must have a large faith in the stupidity or moral insanity of his generation. It must not be supposed, however, that this precious doctrine—whatever it may mean—is argued through the eight hundred octavo pages of the writer's book. Argument is an exercise in which he rarely indulges himself. Assertion, dogma, conjecture, hypothesis, sentiment, vagary—these are the staple of his production; and they are worked up with a whimsical recklessness, on the one hand, and with a subtle dogged persistency of purpose, on the other, which leave the reader continually in doubt whether the author knows what he is saying, or whether it is matter of indifference to him how he comes at his object, provided only he can come at it. One great section of the volume is devoted to the task of demolishing the Historical Books of the New Testament. Of course, the "Nature" theory is in jeopardy in such a region of miracle; and rather than allow a fibre of the supernatural to interweave itself with the course of human development, the Gospels and the Acts must be torn to tatters, as a fabric in which truth is an accident, its main elements being legend, fancy, and imposture. If we were satisfied of the sanity of our author, we should remonstrate with him over the infinite unfairness and unscrupulosity which he shows in dealing with the sacred documents, in this part of his work—an unfairness and unscrupulosity which, in the case of classical texts, would relegate his criticism to company such as scholars and gentlemen are not apt to affect. But with the rest of his volume before us—considering that Judaism and Christianity, as he explains them, where they are not stark frauds and mummeries, are mere modifications of primeval astrology and nature-worship, a matter simply of idols, hieroglyphs, and zodiacs, and that what we know as the Old Testament

Scriptures are a blunder and a delusion from end to end, the real meaning of the Hebrew language and of its earlier literature being wholly esoteric and mystical—our first doubt recurs, and we give the writer the benefit of it. Whether we are justified in doing so, the reader may be better able to judge, when he has studied our Balliol Master's translation of the first two verses of Genesis into the nature-philosophy dialect of the Egyptians, Babylonians, and other august owners of the wisdom of the Old World. "The Forces, the gods (the Amonean gods, the Demiurgi, the artists or makers of the world) carved, formed, sculptured, as a commencement of existence, as a sketch, the substance of the celestial signs of the starry firmament of the heavens, and the substance of the white and arid earth. And this white and arid earth was made a pyramid sign, or one resembling an obelisk, a boundary representing the being without form and without positive existence, and an egg representing the compressive envelopment of the being without form or positive existence, and there was compressive darkness causing hindrance on the surface of the tomb-like pyramidal emblems representing the being without form or positive existence." Mankind need not despair of unravelling the mystery of their origin and destiny, with such a light in the darkness as is here kindled.

The Problem of the World and the Church Reconsidered, in Three Letters to a Friend. By a Septuagenarian.
London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1871.

THIS is a determined and vigorous onslaught on the Church and on all that the Church holds dear. Originating in a view of "the large amount of privation and suffering which are the lot of the great mass of the human race," it assumes that "the theory on which the Church proceeds is calculated rather to impede than to promote man's happiness and well-being in this world," that the Church has rather hindered than aided in "the great business of humanity," and is responsible to a great degree for the small progress made in the improvement of man's condition. It proceeds to discuss what is called "the natural system," and it ends by a denial of the Inspiration of the Scriptures, the Divinity of Jesus Christ, the efficiency of prayer, save its reflex influence upon the deceived petitioner, and the intervention of any supernatural agency in the affairs of human life. It would be beyond our limits to reply to these opinions in this brief notice. They have received our frequent consideration; and, notwithstanding the taunt given, we must re-affirm that they do belong to "the class of objections which have already been answered again and again."

As to the accusation that the Church has not more largely alleviated the sufferings of the bulk of mankind, without any diminution of our high estimate of the mission of the Church of Jesus Christ, we would inquire, if the Church has charged itself with the removal of all

the evils of society? and we would ask, with perhaps more confidence, whether the Church is alone responsible for the existing state of things? Why have not the great moral, intellectual, and material agencies outside of the Church diminished the suffering, the ignorance, and the wrong that is in the world? Why have not the legislative intelligence, with all the various philanthropic, educational, and scientific institutions of this country, succeeded in readjusting the disturbed relations of the different classes of society, in diminishing crime, pauperism, disease, and the many social evils under which we mourn? Surely the Church has not prevented their free action. Why has no efficient effort been organised outside the Church to amend the condition of men? Certainly, at present, the Church bears the palm for the greatness and benevolence of its aims, for the extent and self-sacrificing character of the efforts by which these aims have been pursued; and, with all allowance for the errors of its agents, we venture to say, for the beneficent fruits of its toils. Some of the strictures on particular Churches, we confess, may be justly merited; but historical bodies are not to be merged with the system which they but imperfectly represent.

The development of the so-called "natural system" would be not a little interesting, even amusing, if it did not rouse our indignation to see it gravely presented as a substitute for Christianity. Reading over the propositions in which the "system" is embodied, we are equally struck by the meagreness of them, and the presumption of any one attempting to build up a system upon such a foundation. They embrace a few simple statements of matters of fact, some obviously erroneous assumptions, and a few principles which, from our youth up, we have been accustomed to hear inculcated within the circle of the Church. As an adequate "view of the Divine government," it is nothing less than preposterous. The beautiful naturalness of Christianity is sometimes overlooked by its friends, often denied by its foes. Of opposition to "natural law," it knows nothing. Its principles are not impositions upon the life of man, but the very laws of that life. Its one object of attack is lawlessness. Nothing would be more effectual in relieving existing distress and meeting existing difficulties in society than to revert to the simple principles of life laid down by Jesus.

The criticism on "the theory of the Church" is of the kind rightly called negative. There is no positive element in it. We have searched this book for one single positive principle which we did not already possess. We have searched in vain. Are men to be taught by negations? What can we build upon a negation? The supernatural is denied. Is it scientific so to do? Is there not a presumption of perfect knowledge in that denial? It were hard indeed to prove a universal negative here; its assumption is the greatest imposition upon science. Do we know all law? To deny the theory of the Church is easy, especially if it take the form of denying its harmony with present phases of thought. That harmony may not be

immediately obvious, even when the phase of thought is acknowledged to be a true one. But the statement of the disagreement is a step towards the demonstration of the harmony, for it is a definition of our labour. Slowly the Church has answered the words of objectors. The grandest field now open, is to answer the objection that the Church's theory does not accord with the most recent discoveries of science and the most advanced stages of scientific thought. Either or both may be wrong. In such case their supposed harmony is illusory. Both may be right, and yet the line of their agreement is yet to be traced. We are not awed; we still have faith in Christ and in the supernatural, this book notwithstanding. We must say, after no hasty examination of it, *The Problem of the World and the Church* has still to be "reconsidered."

Hand-Book of Bible Geography; containing the Name, Pronunciation, and Meaning of every Place, Nation, and Tribe mentioned in both the Canonical and Apocryphal Scriptures. With Descriptive and Historical Notes. By Rev. George H. Whitney, A.M. Illustrated by nearly One Hundred Engravings, and Forty Maps and Plans. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

THIS book well answers to its descriptive title. It is a very convenient hand-book, bringing within the reach of a large number of Bible-readers many valuable results of the labours of the most recent travellers and the best writers on the several subjects it embraces. It is clearly printed; the maps and numerous illustrations are well done, and the subjects are treated judiciously, and with sufficient amplitude. It is altogether a beautiful and useful book.

Autobiography of John Milton; or, Milton's Life in His own Words. Edited by the Rev. James J. G. Graham, M.A. Oxon., Vicar of Much Cowarne, Herefordshire, Author of "Selections from the Prose Works of John Milton." London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

It was a very happy thought to combine, in the form of a biography, the many passages in Milton's writings in which he speaks of himself. It is executed with much skilfulness and care. The words of the text are all Milton's, save a few explanatory sentences. The editor's own remarks in the notes are brief and judicious.

Character Sketches. By Norman Macleod, D.D. London: Strahan and Co.

THESE Sketches have, unless we are mistaken, all appeared elsewhere, and are now gathered into a very pleasant volume. They are

good tales, well told, and give intimations enough of good purpose on the writer's part. Written in good English (or Scotch, as the case may be), showing great knowledge of human life and character, thorough good temper, and a cheerful optimism, and carrying always their freight of sensible, Christian teaching, perhaps they serve the commonwealth as effectually as do the productions of some less accomplished and versatile doctors of divinity. The only criticism that we care to make is, that humour is occasionally strained after in a manner for which there is positively no need. Dr. Macleod was, without doubt, one of the most genial of men, and the humour proper to him does not need to be eked out as it sometimes is. For instance, the very good sketch of T. T. Fitzroy, Esq., would be improved by omitting an introduction which begins thus:—"What first induced me to study the life of young Fitzroy was a starling, a convict, and a locomotive engine." Of course, these three incongruous suggesting causes are not at all necessary to the story, and have to be dropped by-and-bye. Besides, this peculiar kind of joke is, so far as the unwritten patent laws which govern these matters go, the special and inalienable right of the school of humourists reared by Dickens in *Household Words* and *All the Year Round*, which may be consulted, *passim*, in proof of what we say.

Notes on England. By H. Taine, D.C.L. Oxon., &c. Translated, with an Introductory Chapter, by W. F. Rae. London: Strahan and Co. 1872.

MANY of our readers will have some knowledge of these clever letters through their appearance in *The Daily News*, from which, with large additions, they are reprinted. The letters are preceded by a brief sketch of the life of M. Taine, and by an exposition and criticism of his method. These materially add to the value of a volume which is of deep interest to us all. On a smooth and polished mirror many aspects of our national life are minutely and accurately reflected. M. Taine is a careful and correct observer, and very skilful in delineation. All that his eye sees, and it must be a very observant eye, he accurately records. His frequent comparisons between English and French life and manners are apt and instructive. His occasional reflections are just, some of them valuable alike to us and our Continental neighbours. They all display a philosophic mind. Wisely M. Taine confines himself mainly to his observations. His eye cannot deceive him, though his generalisations are occasionally at fault. Intelligent discernment, accuracy and fairness characterise these letters. They will please the English reader, for they exalt our national advantages: they will abase, sadden, and instruct him, for they reveal our deplorable national vices.

A Heathen Nation Evangelised. History of the Sandwich Islands Mission. By Rufus Anderson, D.D., LL.D., Late Foreign Secretary of the American Board of Missions. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

The Pioneer Missionary: Life of the Rev. Nathaniel Turner, Missionary in New Zealand, Tonga, and Australia. By his Son, the Rev. J. G. Turner, of the Australasian Conference. With a Portrait. London: The Wesleyan Conference Office. 1872.

DR. ANDERSON'S book is an interesting and instructive history of the American Mission to the Sandwich Islands, from the year of its commencement in 1820, to its jubilee and close in 1870, when the Mission stood forth, "acknowledged on all hands, as a successful Christian enterprise, and as the grand conservator of the nation." It is a comprehensive digest, written with clearness and much discrimination, and a most cheering illustration of the renovating power of Christian teaching and institutions over a wild, untamed, and degraded people. The second work is the record of an individual life of earnest, patient toil, of brave endurance, and of great usefulness. With our high estimate of Christian Missions, we should find it hard to exaggerate our sense of the interest attaching to these works. Subscribers to missionary societies would do well to read such testimonies of the toils of missionaries and of the success of their labours.

Musical Development; or, Remarks on the Spirit of the Principal Musical Forms. By Joseph Goddard, Author of "The Philosophy of Music." London: Thomas Murby; Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

THE theory embraced by this work is that, as in speech, personal and instinctive emotions are indicated by tonal changes, and abstract sentiments by variety of accentuation, so, in music, the former are expressed by the melodic style, the latter by the rhythmical. Though the writing lacks simplicity and perspicuity, it is, nevertheless, a very skilful treatise. It is written by a man imbued with the spirit of music, gifted with accurate observation, and not wanting in the power of philosophical generalisation. His comparative analysis of the instrumental music of some of the great masters declares this. The chapter on the Spirit of Sacred Music, and the few remarks on the influence of mental progress upon music, show discrimination and refined taste. It is a work which, for its profound philosophic discernment, its pure and useful treatment of a grand subject, deserves careful study.

A Day with Cromwell. A Drama of History, in Five Acts.
By Auctor. London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington-street.

"Auctor" tells us that this drama was written to relieve its author from the too engrossing pursuits of an active career in science, rather than to gain for him a position in dramatic literature; but that the accomplished actor, Mr. J. C. Cowper, conceives that it may be accepted by the public as an addition to the historic and legitimate drama. We are not aware that it has as yet been submitted to the ordeal of public representation; and a play written, as most of the finest plays are, so as best to meet the requirements of the stage, can hardly be said to reach the fulness of publication until it be acted; because, although some small intellectual minority can construct in imagination the whole of the complex arrangements, variations of voice, gesture, and action, that go to complete the publication of a play,—this is not¹ within the powers or wishes of the general public, who care but little for the written drama, or at all events for the *contemporary* written drama. In the meantime we are free to say that, regarded as a specimen of the written drama, we find this *Day with Cromwell* full of good things, while we can conceive that, as a spectacle,—as a display of men's and women's natures in palpable action,—it would be found to be equally full of spirit and "go." The conception of Cromwell is fresh and striking; instead of the gloomy giant of statesmanship and war that alone answers in the popular mind to the name of Oliver Cromwell, we have shown us, in this one "day" the several phases of a mind as various as the minds of all great men; we get him in all conditions of gloom and gaiety, from being on the verge of suicide, and playing at "crambo," simulating a duel with his Chamberlain, Joshua Buckthorn, and addressing the gentlemen of his Court in the words—

"We will relax awhile, indeed we will,
If any noble Lord will set a back,
We'll play at leap-frog up to Charing Cross."

But while this prismatic vision of the Protector is a desirable innovation on the popular conception in monochrome of the same personage, and while this Oliver rests on a better foundation of authenticity than the stereotype Oliver, it is not in the brighter rays of the spectrum that we find the best things, but rather in the more sombre and deep rays. Oliver playing at "crambo," and proposing to play at leap-frog, though *fresher* than Oliver the patriot and man of giant ascendancy, is not so thoroughly admirable; and we prefer him when he writes such words as those that close the play, after he has been told that the crowds, anxious about his safety, "do pour in like a tide;" he exclaims:—

"Let them surge in! Cromwell would only live
 To be the crest upon the people's wave.
 Let them surge in! Cromwell can only die
 When they shall cease to strive for liberty,
 Strong as the winds and boundless as the seas."

These words are a great truth: Cromwell *can* only die when the struggle for liberty, whereof he is part and parcel in all lands, ceases and sinks down.

In the interesting dialogue that takes place in Act II. between Cromwell and the tragedian Thomas Betterton, the Protector tells how he had once played Tactus in Tony Brewer's comedy of *Lingua*; and he adds, "beshrew me, I did play it well, and did bring down the house; so that, methinks, had I not been a great politician, I had been a great actor." We incline to apply the words to the author, who is doubtless one of our well-known men of science, if we only knew which: had it not been his mission to become one of these, he would probably have shone in literary or dramatic art.

Youth and Years at Oxford, on Questions of the Day. Part I.
 The Destiny of Men—What? Oxford: Shrimpton.
 London: Whitaker and Co.

This tract has just reached our hands. A rather hasty glance shows that the writer—evidently some minister under the disguise of "Manthano"—has a very excellent idea in his mind. In all ages this dialogue style has been found a good one for the discussion of doubts, the resolution of hard questions, and the relief of perplexed minds. "Manthano" here deals with the most tremendous question, or doubt, that can perplex any mind. He has dealt with it fairly, in a reverent manner, and in a style vigorous and sometimes very graceful. Had this been a treatise we should have pointed out some exegetical weaknesses, or rather deficiencies. But the subjects that would naturally come out in a conversation are well handled; what would require close study at home is omitted. With this qualification—an important one, for the matter, after all, to a believer in Inspiration, becomes one of close grammatical and lexical exegesis—the little book is one that may be earnestly recommended. It is very able on the "Annihilation" Theory.

Draft Outlines of an International Code. By David Dudley Field. New York: Diossy & Company. 1872.

At the meeting of the British Association for the Promotion of Social Science, held in Manchester, in September, 1866, a committee of jurists of different nations was appointed to prepare the outlines of an international code, to be submitted to the Association for revi-

sion, and then to be presented to the attention of governments, in the hope of its meeting their sanction and adoption. Mr. Field had the honour of originating this proposal. The present volume is an instalment of the work. Although only a portion of the work of codification was assigned to Mr. Field, he has embraced the entire subject, with the view of facilitating the work of the committee. The *Draft Code* is very simply divided into two books. The first, which is the one before us, embraces "the relations of nations and of their members to each other, except as they are modified by a state of war." The second will treat of "the modifications of those relations produced by a state of war."

We must content ourselves, for the present, by saying that this first volume is a work of considerable merit, displaying great industry and extensive legal knowledge. The classifications are simple and comprehensive, and are expressed in clear, precise, and terse language.

Linked at Last. By F. E. Bunnett, Translator of B. Auerbach's "On the Heights," Grimm's "Life of Michael Angelo," &c. &c. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1871.

A PRETTY story of tried and suffering, but patient love. It is sensibly and carefully written, and, though it lacks strength, is not wanting in tenderness, and is free from glaring faults. The scenes are less skilfully drawn than the incidents. Some of the transitions are too abrupt, giving us the idea of fatigue or haste on the part of the writer. Pertinent and not too frequent reflections point the good moral of the story. The prologue is an artistic feature.

The Biblical Museum; a Collection of Notes, Explanatory, Homiletic, and Illustrative, on the Holy Scriptures, especially Designed for the Use of Ministers, Bible-Students, and Sunday-School Teachers. By James Comper Gray, Author of "Topics for Teachers," "The Class and the Desk," &c. &c. Two Volumes. London: Elliot Stock. 1871.

MUCH useful matter in illustration of the Four Gospels is crowded into these two volumes. Many writers have been laid under contribution, to afford explanatory and homiletical aids to Bible-students and teachers. The work is of too elementary a character to meet the wants of even young ministers, but Sunday-school teachers and others, who may be prevented from making independent researches, will find these compilations useful. The anecdotes are too plentiful, and not always worthy.

Glitter and Gold. By Horace Field, B.A., Author of "A Home for the Homeless," "Heroism," "Jesus Christ the Saviour of the World," &c. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

ARTISTICALLY, this book is faulty. Though not a short story, it is almost all earnest conversation. It is too intense. The reader needs relief. There is too much of mind and too little of nature. There is a lack of scenic description. A background is wanting to throw the objects of importance more prominently into view. Many pages might be spared without weakening the narrative or losing anything of intrinsic value. Yet it is an earnest, closely compacted tale, written with a high purpose, and carrying the burden of a weighty moral. It is a book for the times, for it vividly reflects some of the conditions of the present which demand the careful consideration of the thoughtful.

Echoes of a Famous Year. By Harriet Parr, Author of "Essays in the Silver Age," "Maurice and Eugénie de Guérin," "The Life and Death of Jeanne d'Arc," etc. London: Henry S. King. 1872.

THE story of the terrible tragedy enacted in France from the seventeenth day of July, 1870, to the fifteenth day of July, 1871, is told clearly, spiritedly, and, considering the hasty rush of events, fully. Reading its pages revives but too vividly the rapidity with which we were hurled, in those eventful days, through scenes of bloodshed, disaster, and change. It is a convenient record of that all too famous year.

Flowers and Gardens. Notes on Plant Beauty. By a Medical Man. London: Strahan and Co. 1872.

A book beautifully got up and written with much chasteness and care. It is the production of a mind cultivated, acute, and exquisitely sensitive to the charms of flower beauty—especially to the charms of simple spring flowers. On these the author writes with a microscopical discrimination of their intrinsic qualities, and with much appreciation of their respective beauties. And this, too, with a touch of philosophy, e.g., "The Scented Violet seems like genius in its modest youth, never thinking of display, and almost unconscious, indeed, of its own sweetness and richness. The Dog Violet is this genius drawn into notice, courted, flattered, and perverted by the world, striving ambitiously for show, and quite unaware that its deepest qualities are lost." The author (who wrote during a last illness) thinks the chief fault of modern gardening is, labouring for collective effect at the expense of separate individual excellence; and

here, again, there is in his remarks more than meets the eye: "We find flower-beds habitually considered too much as mere masses of colour, instead of as an assemblage of living beings. The only thought is to delight the eye by the utmost possible splendour." This book will be a great favourite with those who love natural simplicity more than artificial display, whether in flowers or in men.

Songs of Two Worlds. By a New Writer. London: Henry S. King. 1871.

VERSATILE in sentiment and metre, this first book of poems gives good promise for the future. A New Writer will not be surprised if we counsel a more rigorously chastened versification; further discipline in the use of a vocabulary already fairly ample, chaste, and simple; and a yet closer study of those deep problems of human life, upon some of which these first efforts have been expended. We are pleased to note in the book some lines of almost exquisite beauty.

Discussions on Colonial Questions. Being a Report of the Proceedings of a Conference held at Westminster Palace Hotel, on July 19th, 20th, and 21st, 1871. London: Strahan and Co. 1872.

A NUMBER of papers, practical and speculative, on Colonial matters, read by Mr. Edward Jenkins, Professor Sheldon Amos, M.A., Mr. R. R. Torrens, M.P., Mr. Francis P. Labiliere, and others; with reports of discussions interspersed. They are valuable as being the thought of earnest thinkers on grave, momentous questions.

David's Vision: With a Preliminary Dissertation, showing David's Prophecy of Christ. By a Pilgrim to the Holy Land. London: Nisbet and Co. 1872.

THE Messianic predictions in the Psalms, and the references to them in the New Testament, are concisely arranged in the "Dissertation." The "Vision" is more ingenious than poetical.

Peasant Life: Sketches of the Villagers and Field Labourers in Glenaldie. Second Series. London: Strahan and Co. 1872.

TENDER, wæfuf tales; well-written, and which, but for their sorrowfulness, are very pleasant reading.

On the Uses of Biography. A Paper read at the Meeting of the Bromley Friends in Council, Bromley, Kent, December 1st, 1870. With Illustrative Notes from Recent Public Occurrences and Opinions in England and on the Continent, on Social, Commercial, and Political Questions of the Day. By J. B. Brown, Author of "Views of Canada and the Colonists," and of the article "Canada" in the "Encyclopædia Britannica." London: Longmans and Co. 1871.

THE subject receives but feeble illustration in these somewhat presumptuous pages.

Nature: A Weekly Illustrated Journal of Science. No. 137. June 13, 1872.

JUST as we are going to press our attention is called to an attack in the above-named journal upon our article on "The Heresies of Science." Mr. Charles Brooke, M.A., F.R.S., the able author of "The Elements of Natural Philosophy, based on the treatise by the late Dr. Golding Bird," is our assailant. Looking at the character of the charges advanced by Mr. Brooke, and remembering that our article has been in his possession for nearly twelve months, we are at a loss to understand why he should have remained silent so long. We regret that our present reply must be very brief, and necessarily inadequate, but we hope shortly to be able to furnish *Nature* with a more elaborate defence of the positions assailed. We observe that Mr. Brooke is not content to charge us with misrepresenting his opinions; he even ventures to insinuate that we have shown a lack of common literary honesty. But did it never occur to Mr. Brooke that another and more charitable explanation was possible? We, too, have reason to complain of misrepresentation. His opening sentence is altogether misleading. He says that, in the article in question, "two widely different principles are oddly linked together as heretical dogmas, the doctrine of evolution and the conservation of energy." Now, so far from the doctrine of *evolution* and the conservation of energy being *oddly* linked together in our article, as heresies, they are not linked at all. It is the doctrine of *natural selection*, not that of evolution, which we assert to be one of the great heresies of modern science. Mr. Darwin's assumptions are of two kinds, they relate either (1) to causes and laws, or (2) to effects or facts. The former only are hypotheses, that is, speaking with philosophical strictness.

In our pursuit of scientific truth it is not allowable to resort to hypotheses to account for facts not proved to exist. "False facts," says Mr. Darwin, "are highly injurious to the progress of science.


Never has it been so necessary as now to be on our guard against merely ideal facts, and especially as men of high position in the department of science seriously advise that when the usual methods of observation fail us, we may resort to the imagination for the facts needed to support our hypotheses. This is what is meant by "*the scientific use of the imagination!*" In our article we have dealt with the doctrine of evolution only just so far as was necessary to demonstrate that the hypothesis of natural selection possesses no validity. The hypothesis was devised to account for facts not yet proved to exist. Even supposing the fact of evolution established, we should still refuse to accept the doctrine of natural selection because of its inadequacy. We must confess that in the history of human speculation we have found nothing to rival, in absurdity and illogical reasoning, the expositions that have been given of the doctrine of natural selection by its most prominent advocates. Many of its supporters pretend to be unable to discover in the varied phenomena of the mental and material universe any evidence of the existence of a Designing Mind. A sound philosophy recognises the fact that there is a sphere in which honest doubt can have no place. In this sphere all our judgments are self-evident and necessary—they constitute the very starting-points of human thought. To doubt their validity is as impossible as it is to doubt that we doubt. Thus the necessary affirmation of every rational mind, that whatever begins to be has been produced immediately or mediately by the power of some mind, person, or intelligent agent, possesses all the marks of a primary truth. It can neither be supported nor assailed but by propositions which are themselves not more evident or more certain. Hence, in the presence of the events of the universe and in the abiding consciousness of moral accountability, no sane mind can honestly doubt the existence of the Creator and Ruler.

We are now able to explain to Mr. Brooke our reason for linking together as heretical dogmas the doctrine of natural selection and the conservation of energy. In the closing paragraph of his paper Mr. Brooke says:—"It may be remarked with much regret that the principle of the conservation of energy has been misapplied in a fruitless endeavour to supersede the necessity of a creative intelligence."

It was this fact that led us to test the validity of the theory referred to. We found able men of science employing this theory to undermine our faith in a supernatural revelation. If, say they, you accept the doctrine of the conservation of energy, you must be prepared to admit that miracles are impossible, that prayer is folly, and the Bible doctrine of an over-ruling Providence an absurd myth! Mr. Brooke will permit us to say that there are physicists who will not read his admirable treatise, because in it he recognises the constant working of "an all-beneficent Creator." Thus, Dr. L. Büchner tells us that every science that seeks truth instead of pretence *must of necessity be atheistic*. He then adds, "as soon as in a *philosophic* book the word

'God' occurs, except in criticism or reference, one may confidently lay it aside; in it will be found nothing capable of promoting the real progress of knowledge!"

On a careful examination of the theory of the conservation of energy we found that it is based on assumptions that are inconsistent with a correct philosophy of causation. The doctrine of causation which underlies much of our reasoning in the article on the Heresies of Science, and also in previous papers, is not with us a hastily adopted opinion. We shall certainly not abandon it without a long and hard-fought battle.



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